WARNING ASSESSMENT: CHINA-EAST ASIA PACIFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070025-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: February 26, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Rel~ 2005/03TOP' S II RRDP83B00100R0~00070025-0
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
26 February 1980 //
ME~10RANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
FROM
SUBJECT
Deputy Director for National Foreign .Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
''SI
~
(~"
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP
Warning Assessment: China-East Asia Pacific
The following items were discussed by the Community Repre-
sentatives at the 20 February Warning Meeting.
1. Analysts had not observed any change in the situation along
the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, except for the fact that
the general trend in Soviet aerial reconnaissance activity had been
generally upti~~ard this year as compared to a year ago. I'Io draw-down
of Soviet troop strength in the relevant MRs to provide fillers for
Afghanistan had been noted.
2. It was assumed that the Chinese were providing assistance to
the Afghan rebels, but they were not telling us what they were doing
in this regard. The Soviets were closely watching presumed Sino-US
collaboration in aiding the rebels and were alleging the US was playing
the "China card," but *r~ere not stressing this issue. Chinese arms aid
to Pakistan was continuing, with 15 MIG 19s recently delivered (not 16
as reported in last month's taarning Memorandum); it was anticipated
that further Chinese assistance would be discussed when Zia visited
China later this year. T1_ze Chinese were capable of making modest
increases but could not supply high-technology items; they were, in
fact, looking to the US in this regard and were exhorting us to make
our oum aid to Pakistan worthwhile.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Copy
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGPTER
REVIEW ON FEB2000
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE
For Release 2005/03/2 :CIA-R P83B00100R000300070025-0 25X1
TOP SECRET
 Approved For R~se 2005/03~ P~4-S~~a1~DP83B00100~300070025-0
3. As a consequence of the Afghanistan situation and Chinese
involvement in helping Pakistan, the Chinese were attempting to improve
their relations with India and to assure the Indians that the Sino-
Pakistan relationship did not constitute a threat to them. ^
China Internal
4. In discussing the implications of Deng Xiaoping's 16 3anuary
speech, analysts were in general agreement that Deng has succeeded in
reestablishing political momentum since the beginning of the year and
was now tackling in more direct fashion the question of the leftists
within the Party. It was noted, however, that leftist influence
persisted, as evidenced from the contrast between Peoples Daily
editorials in early February stressing the need for stability and unity
within the Party and a 5 February Peoples Daily "Commentator" article
saying in effect that stability and unity could not be achieved unless
those who undermined the Party line were removed. ~~
5. It was pointed out in addition that although recent personnel
shifts in the provinces and in Beijing had appeared to bring into greater
prominence a number of supporters of Deng Xiaoping, leftists were still
in place in senior positions in ~'ujien and in t?ze Northeast; Han Xianchu,
a presumed leftist in command of the Lanzhou Military Region, had also
just been named to the Military Control Commission. (A possible
compromise was indicated by the simultaneous appointment of three
supporters of Deng to the MAC.) ~~
6. Some analysts suggested that Deng had also reached a critical
point in his relations with those who, while not disagreeing with his
policy objectives, wanted to take a more conservative route. Given
the fact, though, that Deng's line on modernization as established at
the 3d Plenum of December 1978, appeared to have become firmly established,
the possibility was raised that Deng may have made some trade-offs with
the more conservative elements (e. b backing away from "big character
posters") to assure their support.
7. Altogether, the chances of a donnybrook appeared to analysts to
be remote. Nevertheless, personnel and leadership problems persisted.
More light should be shed on this issue at the Party Plenum which began
several days after our meeting.
D
pprA ovedFor Release 2005/03/x: F,,~Q~QP83B00100R000300070025-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 . Approved For R~se 2005/0 s P83B00100~300070025-0
25X1
Indochina
8. Analysts noted that while a major. DP.V military offensive in
Western Kampuchea had still not developed, the level of Vietnamese
military operations in'this region had been stepped up. Some
PAVid units, in fact, had made shallow penetrations of the Thai border
to attacl: DK elements inside Thailand, and small-scale reconnaissance
activities inside Thailand were continuing. PAVN reenforcements were
still arriving, including several additional regiments of North
Vietnamese. The scale of the military actions initiated by the
Vietnamese was not yet alarming, but they had made contingency plans
in the event that they found it necessary to cross the Thai border,
either to close down DK resistance or to chastise the Thai, or both.
The details of these contingency plans were fairly well known, and if
the Vietnamese did decide to attack, the Thai would be unable to stop
them. Seven PAVP1 divisions were now located in the vicinity of the
Thai border. ~~
9. On the DK side, DK units were now moving out of their holding
centers near Takeo and shifting toward central Kampuchea; there had
been other unusual DK movements involving elements of 1000 men or more.
With the help of the Thai, Chinese logistical support was reaching the
DK forces, which appeared to have emerged from the DRV's dry season
attacks in far better shape than anyone had earlier anticipated. The
next rainy season was now not too far off.
10. With respect to the refugee situation, it was reported that
after some interruption by the DP.V food supplies were once again
filtering across the Thai border to Karmpuchean refugees on the other
side. Reference was made to a visit to this area by a State officer
responsible for refugee affairs, who had seen far fewer refugees in
camps inside Thailand than we had been accepting -- a total of less than
150,000 in~.~ll the major camps, as opposed to our own estimates of
600,000. He believed that groupings on the other side, although still
present, were down to perhaps less than 15,000. No one was able to
account for this apparent drop in numbers of refugees.
0
11. The question of Soviet logistical support for the DRV was
addressed. Two of the SU-7 aircraft provided by the Soviets had now
been assembled, and the Soviets evidently were also providing the
Vietnamese with the 300 km_.._. SCTJD missile -- an addition which would
certainly be of concern to the Chinese. On the other hand, Soviet
logistical support flights by Soviet aircraft (which had stopped
entirely in mid-January) had resumed at a level of less than half of
what had been the previous norm. The reason for this reduced level
of flights remained obscure, and any relationship to the Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan. was considered problematical. In physical
terms the Soviet military presence in and around Vietnam was reported
D
~nnrn~ or Release 2005/03 P83B00100R000300070025-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
 TOP SECRET
Approved For Fuse 2005/03-C-I~ -RDP83B00100~0300070025-0
as being at a high level: 13 ships operating in the South China Sea,
some of which had touched at Danang; two TU-95s conducting surveillance
missions, and for the first time, too TU-142' antisubmarine aircraft,
all out of Danang. The first visit by a Soviet combat vessel (an AGOR)
to Ho Chi Minh City had occurred in this period. ^
12. No change had been observed in the force structures of the
respective protagonists on each side of the Sino-Vietnamese border;
approximately 250,000 Vietnamese troops vs 200,000 Chinese.
13. The Koreas -- Analysts noted that the threat to an imminent
counteraction against military strongman Chon Tu-Hwan appears to be
reduced based on recent reporting from Seoul. There was general
agreement, however, that suspicions and dissatisfaction with Chon
continue, both within the military and in other quarters as well. Chon
enters an especially critical period as he attempts to broker a
"proper" role in the ROK hierachy; students return to campus in March
and economic problems are growing more apparent. At least one source
has claimed Chon intends to use anticipated unrest (real or contrived)
on the campus and in the labor markets to take control of the government.
While Chon's motives continue to be an enigma, analyst~nerally do
not take his claims of political innocence seriously.
14. Analysts see the North still commited to following up on its
initiative to reopen talks with the South to exploit a difficult
period of political adjustment in Seoul after Pak's death. North
Korean I&W indicators were judged normal although analysts noted that
in February, for the first time in over two years, two DPRK Air Force
exercises included offensive as well as defensive operations. ~~
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070025-0
25X
25X
25X
25X
25X
25X
25X
 Approveld For Release,~,29A~5tA3/2~IA-RDP83B00100R00030~~70~
~ SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
I
A/?IIO/W (5 G 00)
,;1 ~
2
3
DD/NFA
~-~~6~'~~
4
5
~,.tia
6
ncI
,. ~~9~~,.
ACTION DIRECT REPIY
PREPAR
DATE INITIALS
pproved For ~~4~~sle~~~U3/24 : CIA-RDP83B001
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2005/03/24 :CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070025-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/03/24 :CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070025-0