FOOD FOR THOUGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 15, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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~ 1 ~ pp
15 February 1980
SUBJJCT : Food for Thought
FROM : Assistant NIO for Warning
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officers
Attached are some thought provoking questions which may be of
use to you, perhaps in your monthly warning meetings next week.
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FOOD FOR THOU IT
I. USSR-Afghanistan: Have the Soviets underestimated the magnitude of the
task of pacifying the country?
Current reporting raises increasing doubts about the feasibility of
Moscow's long-term plans for reconstituting the A 'ghar, ar-rned forces.
a. Growing number of clashes between Soviet and Afghan forces.
b. Evidence that some Afghan units have refused to engage the insurgents.
c. Defections of whole army units to the insurgents.
d. 0SR's assessment (HID 13 Feb.) raising questions about Soviet capabilities
to conduct counter-insurgency operations: "A bhange in strategy will
be required if the Soviets are to stand a reasonable chance of
succeeding without a massive military commitment."
Was the decision to intervene based on the assumption that a decisive
turning point in the pacification campaign would be achieved in about three
months? Soviet envoys have privately claimed that Soviet troops may begin
to withdraw within two or three months. According to Babrak Karmal, Soviet
commanders estimate that it will take at least until some time this summer to
pacify the rural areas (implying that the Soviets were expected to face little
challenge in securing the main urban areas).
If reconstitution of the Afghan armed forces is no longer a viable option
and if the pacification strategy is, in trouble by mid-summer, will the Soviets
have any alternative other than massive occupation of the country? This
alternative obviously would have far-reaching implications for Soviet
policy toward Pakistan and Iran, as well as for Soviet relations with the West.
II. Soviet Intentions toward Pakistan: If the Soviets encounter substantially
greater problems in Afghanistan than they originally anticipated, will. they
adopt a more threatening stance toward Pakistan? Is the Soviet stance already
hardening? Will the Soviets try to deal with their dilemma by making force
withdrawals from Afghanistan contingent upon a Pakistani. pledge to refrain
from increasing assistance--its own as well as external aid-to the insurgents?
A Reuters report of 1.1 February quoted the Afghan government as stating that
"limited contingents" of Soviet forces would withdraw as soon as an unspecified
"credible guarantee" was received.
If the Soviets fail. to secure a satisfactory commitment from Pakistan,
will they shift to a policy of intimidation in dealing with the Zia regime?
a. Continuing reports of Soviet contingency planning for military
action against Pakistan.
b. Incitement of Baluchi and Pushtun separatist demands. (Gromyko's
warning that Pakistani cooperation with the West in assisting Afghan
resistance will "undermine its position as an independent state.")
c. Soviet warning to Pakistani officials in Geneva that the USC;R will
not stand by and see Pakistan used as a training center and safe
haven for Afghan "bandits" and that the Soviets will strike at
hostile refugee concentrations.
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President Zia's Intentions: Is Zia's equivocal posture the result of Soviet
pressures or his calculation of Pakistani interests? Is he simply stalling
in an effort to extract greater US military and econcamic aid and firmer
security commitments, or is he genuinely anxious to avoid actions which might
give the Soviets a pretext for escalating their pressures, including limited
cross-border military action? The Pakistanis reportedly are resisting Chinese
efforts to supply arms to the Afghan resistance because they apparently fear
that significant outside support to the insurgents could precipitate Soviet
action on the border. HuangHua is said to have found Zia to be more worried
about how US and Chinese assistance would affect Pakistan's relations with
India and the USSR than about a Soviet military threat.
III. USSR-Iran:
a. How will the Soviets evaluate Bani-Sadr's apparent progress in
strengthening his authority and the improved prospects for an early solution
to the hostage impasse? Does the invitation to Ghotbzadeh to visit Moscow
imply a negative signal to Bani-Sadr, particularly following Iran's protest
over Soviet military activity in the Transcaucasus MD and Bani-Sadr's warning
to Brezhnev against interfering in Iran's internal affairs?
b. If Bani-Sadr has in fact won Khomeini's approval of a formula to
resolve the hostage issue, will the Soviets adopt a cooler attitude toward
the Tehran regime? Or will they see no alternative for the time being to
maintaining their relatively benign attitude, as reflected in Brezhnev's
10 February message to Khomeini reaffirming Soviet support for Iran's
independence and territorial integrity:
c. If it is accepted that Soviet military training exercises in the
Transcaucasus MD exceed "normal" levels, do these activities represent:
-preliminary measures to increase the readiness of Soviet forces.
-an attempt to influende political developments in Iran, particularly
Revolutionary Council policies toward the US and the USSR.
-an exaggerated Soviet perception (particularly in the first half of
January) of an increased chance of some US military initiative to
force a resolution of the hostage impasse? Soviet Foreign Ministry
officials reportedly stated in January that Moscow's "principal
fear" was that the US might use the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
as an excuse to "invade" Iran.
d. Will Soviet policy toward Iran in the next three months be more
heavily and directly influenced by developments in ifghanistan % The NID of
2 February noted that Soviet concern about Iranian support to the Afghan
insurgents is "contributing to mounting dissatisfaction with the trend of
events within Iran." In view of statements by Khomeini and Bani--Sadr
condemning the invasion and. promising support for A,fghr_..n resistance, will
Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan impel Moscow to adopt "linkage" tactics
in dealing with Tehran, i.e., by pressing for an Iranian commitment to
refrain from interfering in. Afghanistan? If the Iranians reject such pressure,
will the Soviets shift to a policy aimed at destabilizing the Khomeini-Bani-Sadr
leadership and giving greater support to minority Troups in Iran?
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IV. Syria-Lebanon: Does the private Syrian explnation in early February
of Assad's dedision to withdraw Syrian troops from Beirut now seem more
credible, i.e., an effort to force Sarkis to exert stronger leadership over
quarreling Lebanese factions? Has the "postponement" of withdrawal diluted
Assad's leverage? If the Lebanese government and the PLO refuse to accede
to Syrian demands, what are the chances that Assad will then order at least
a partial withdrawal? Is Assad overestimating his leverage and prospects
for achieving a favorable political solution that would include a bilateral
defense agreement and. greater control over anti-Syrian Christian militias?
What were the motivations that impelled Assad to press for a "solution"
in Lebanon at this time? Is he under greater pressure to return substantial
numbers of troops to Syria? If Assad fails to ac,ieve at least some of his
current objectives in Lebanon, what effect might this have on his future
policy and on Palestinian freedom of action vis-a-vis Israel?
V. Libya: Will Libya's provocative moves against Tunisia and France, and
the airlift of armored vehicles to Djibouti, be followed by further ri_,ky
adventures? Will Qadhafi now esca? ate his campaign a g,A 11st tr.e French pre: ence
in Africa and renew attempts to overthrow the Bourguuiba government? Did
Qadhafi simply miscalculate prospects for stimulating an internal movement
to bring Bourguiba down, or did he have some plausible reason to believe
the Tunisian regime's authority is eroding?
What is Egypt's perception of Qadhafi's motives and intentions? Might
Sadat calculate that Libya's provocations provide a convenient justification
for an Egyptian attempt to eliminate Qadhafi? The "target date" for Egypt's
invasion of Libya was deferred last August to April 1980. Might Sadat now
have better prospects for winning the support of his senior commanders for a
strike against Libya this spring? Are there any indications that Cairo is
giving more active consideration to a move against Libya?
VI. Vietnam-Kampuchea: Are the Vietnamese preparing to launch the
major phase of their offensive in western Kampuchea which was delayed in
late December? Vietnamese military communications on 1 February referred
to a "dry season mission" inFebruary, including attacks on Pol Pot forces
inside Thailand, and a Vietnamese defector has described a plan for operations
up to 10 kilometers inside Thailand, including multi-divisional attacks on
Thai positions if Thai forces react.
OSR has suggested that "February would seem about the latest period for
launching a major operation to curtail Thai support for anti-Vietnamese
resistance forces" in view of the advent of the rainy season in May. Is it
time to consider a second Alert Memorandum?
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