SOVIET POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 80S: THE MILITARY TEMPTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100040009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 19, 1981
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP83B00140R000100040009-2
DATE
"rE2AKI4=KAI'rM SLIP
1
9 Oct 81
TO:
Bob Gates
ROOM NO. BUILDING
REMARKS:
You might be interested in this
collection of papers on the Soviet
Union that I either picked up
at conferences or that have been
sent to me recently.
FR
M
:
O
ST
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM N5 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
roved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP83BOO14OR000100040009-2
%T
 Approved For Ruse 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP83BOO14OR00000100040009-2
Soviet political institutions in the 80,
The i.:ilitary temptation
September 1981
Paper for the "Internal and External Factors in Soviet behavior :
Implications for the West " workshop, National Defense College,
Latimer, Zzagland , September 25-27, 1961
 Approved For Ruse 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP83BOO14OR000100040009-2
?
Interfering with the 'Movement of History': What
Constitutes a Threat to the Soviet Union?
September 1981
Prepared for the European American Institute workshop, "Internal
and External Factors in Soviet Behavior: Implications for the West,"
National Defence College, Latimer, England, September 25-27, 1981
 Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP83BO0140R000100040009-2
MOSCOW'S TROUBLES OF EMPIRE: SO WHAT?
Fritz W. Ermarth
Washington D.C.
September 1981
Prepared for Workshop on "Internal and External Factors in Soviet Behavior:
Implications for the West"; European American Institute for Security Research
at the National Defense University, Latimer, England; 25-27 September 1981
Not for reference or citation without permission of the author.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP83BOO14OR000100040009-2
Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP83BOO14OR000100040009-2
STAT
 DtTENTE, it seems,
was all a mis-
understanding. In
fact, it was several
misunderstandings.
Let us begin with the
word itself.
The French noun detente means relaxation, of
course, but relaxation of a peculiar kind. It is from
the verb detendre, which means to relax through
the release of a mechanism drawn taut with pres-
sure. It means: to discharge; to unleash; to let go,
as one would a spring or a rubber band. It is not
surprising, then, that the noun detente also means
the trigger of a gun, and therefore, logically, the
condition of detente is one which follows a barrage
or assault. Now this is not what we mean by it, of
course; and we have simply made a silly mistake in
the choice of terms. But, on the other hand, we
have, since we began to use the term, unleashed an
impressive barrage of human rights propaganda
that has yet to find a relaxed Russian reception.
Incidentally, the Russian terminology for detente,
razriadka napriazhennosti, relaxation of pressure,
is entirely analogous to the French (the Russian
verb razriadit' meaning just what detente does).
Whether the Russian terminology is appropriate to
their objectives is not easy to know because of the
controversy over their foreign policy and the closed
nature of their society. As for our objectives, my
impression is that our understanding of the process
of detente reflects the anomalies of the term itself.
An older misunderstanding, and a far more
serious one, is the problem of cultural incompre-
hension. We are accustomed to the strictures
on Russia of Westerners like Giles Fletcher,
Adam Olearius, the Baron Custine, and Karl Marx,
John Milton's commentary, less well known, is
much like the others':
"They have no learning, nor will suffer [it] to be
among them; their greatest friendship is in drink-
'John Milton, Works, Vol. X (1937), pp. 339-352.
2 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Voyages, Vol. II
(London, 1907), pp. 99-108.
ing; they are great Talkers, Lyars, Flatterers and
Dissemblers."'
A century earlier, George Turberville, an
emissary of Elizabeth I to Ivan IV, described them
similarly in verse:
Drinke is their whole desire, the pot is all their
pride,
The sobrest head doth once a day stand needful!
of a guide.
The cold is rare, the people rude, the prince so
full of pride,
The Realme so stored with Monks and nunnes,
and priests on every side:
The marten are so Turkie like, ... the customes
are so quaint,
As if I would describe the whole, Ifeare my pen
would faint.
If thou be wise, as wise thou art, and wilt be ruld
by me,
Live still at home, and covet not these barbarous
coasts to see.
Loe thus I make an ende: none other newes to
thee,
But that the countrey is too colde, the people
beastly bee.'
In the same tradition is our conventional view of
Russian politics. Government, either Russian or
Soviet, has been for a long time a malign con-
spiracy of men who just manage generation after
generation to suppress the forces of decency,
humanism, and liberalism which are the noble and
inherent virtues of the Russian people. In this
scheme of things, Russian statesmen are not merely
nasty and utterly self-seeking, but they are
unnatural as well, in all the vicious connotations of
that term. And the forces of natural law and
destiny work on the side of decency, humanism,
and liberalism, though they have been un-
accountably slow to do their work. A plausible
account of the motives of these evil men is rarely
attempted, because it is understood somehow that
the government is as mysterious as it is malign, and
hence the question of motivation is not considered
a heuristically necessary part of the picture. I