THE ROLE OF AN NIO FOR MATTERS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B00140R000100040028-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 8, 2007
Sequence Number:
28
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 7, 1981
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP83B00140R000100040028-1.pdf | 189.88 KB |
Body:
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NFIDENTIAL 0
NFAC#5627
7 September 1981
FROM
SUBJECT
Chairman/National Intelligence Council
nalytic Group
The role of an NIO for matters of Science and Technology
1. The category "science and technology" in the intelligence community
currently embraces a wide variety of such unrelated subjects as recombinant
DNA research, nuclear-pumped laser development, and climate modification.
Analysis is often needed by consumers 10 to 20 years before the foreign S&T
developments in question could have an impact on the United States.
Estimating the future implications of current S&T developments requires
familiarity with the latest advances in science and technology. The
diversification, long lead-time, and the need to remain up-to-date have the
following impact on S&T intelligence:
a. Analysis is often esoteric, with aspects often understable only
to a few intelligence analysts.
b. The special knowledge required in analyzing a narrow S&T subject
reduces the possibility of finding analysts also skilled in
political, military, or economic analysis. Similarly, analysts
in the other fields shy away from S&T issues.
c. Collection components geared to political, military, and economic
intelligence requirements often have difficulty coping with
requirements for information on S&T matters.
d. Policymakers are often ill equipped to discern S&T questions in
the issues they face, and are less well equipped to choose among
conflicting analyses in the S&T intelligence community.
2. The above observations suggest several potential advantages in
creating an NIO/ST slot:
a. The spectrum of possible consumer requests in the S&T field --
and the lean nature of expertise and resources in the
intelligence community for responding to them -- suggest that an
NIO could usefully serve as a filter and broker of consumer
requests.
b. The human. barriers to coordinating S&T analysis with political,
military, and economic analysis suggest that a central authority
such as an NIO would be able to ensure a better multidisciplinary
response to consumer needs.
c. An NIO/ST would be in a position to champion specific collection
requirements that, because of their esoteric nature, have not
received adequate support by collectors.
d. A key benefit would be the NIO/ST capability to move among the
major S&T oriented consumers (a group that consists of the NSC
and the President's chief science advisor, DoD/DDR&E, Commerce,
DOE, and State/OES). The principal S&T figures in this group
typically are unaware of the intelligence community's ability to
help them on specific issues and lack a contact in the
intelligence community who could speak authoritatively about the
intelligence resources that would be able to respond to their
varying needs. Equally useful, an NIO/ST would be able to
identify the S&T issues within the more general issues facing
non-S&T-oriented policymakers (e.g. economic competition with
Japan) and would be able to interact with these consumers to
determine whether S&T intelligence is succeeding in helping the
intended users.
3. The existing mechanisms for collecting and producing intelligence
have been able to cope with the special nature of S&T intelligence, more or
less adequately, and in some ways serve quite well. The interagency
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, for example, focuses
community attention on the specific collection efforts needed to respond to
key S&T issues, and it also contributes finished intelligence based on
interagency study and consensus. Also, in the case of specific S&T issues
that are already of recognized importance, "old boy" and low-level ties
between consumers and producers often have sufficed to get the job done. The
primary improvement that could be expected in creating a central broker for
S&T intelligence issues would be in the area of the intelligence community's
greatest current weaknesses--monitoring new S&T issues facing the consumers,
and in marketing S&T intelligence conclusions in multidisciplinary packages.
4. Despite the apparent advantages in creating an NIO for S&T, such an
NIO could experience serious problems in trying to realize the desired
improvements in S&T intelligence. The multifarious nature of S&T
intelligence, first of all, suggests that an NIO/ST would differ from
economic, military, and regional NIOs. Whereas the other NIOs function as
substantive experts capable of fielding new questions and exploring new issues
with consumers in an extemporaneous manner, the NIO/ST could never approach
comparable expertise on a broad range of subjects. More than the other NIOs,
he would be dependent upon diverse analytical components in the intelligence
community. This would make quick response difficult and in some cases could
merely complicate the existing production process. The esoteric nature of the
NIO/ST portfolio might also limit his ability to represent the DCI in
discussions with policymakers on S&T intelligence issues.
5. An NIO/ST routinely would have to work quite closely with all other
NIOs in the NIC, if he is to be effective in indentifying the S&T components
of general non-S&T-oriented issues. In improving the blending of political,
military, economic, and S&T analysis, the NIO/ST probably would most
frequently find himself making inputs to papers being prepared by the other
NIOs. His"own" production might amount to NIE-11/12 and one or two other
estimates per year. Thus an effective NIO/ST probably would have to
successfully overcome the factors that inhibit the NIOs from acting as a
collegial body.
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C*NFIDENTIAL
6. In sum, an NI0/ST could be helpful to the S&T intelligence business
in his capacity as a focal point for consumer/producer interaction, but he
would need to be propped up extensively by the analytical components of the
community, (and hence by the associated line managers). Paradoxically, the
need for extensive interaction with internal components would tend to limit
the opportunities for an NI0/ST to operate in the consumer environment. An
NI0/ST might be most successful as an integrator of S&T analysis into
multidisciplinary studies.
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16CoNriutN i iAL qP
Attachment
Customers for S&T Intelligence
Principal Customers
1. President's Science Advisor (George Keyworth) and his associated
OSTP staff
2. NSC Staff (various people, depending on subject matter, plus the
OSTP representative on the staff)
3. Defense, Undersecretary for Research and Engineering (Richard
Delauer) and his deputies -- particularly Robert Cooper, heading
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Also the JCS,
Plans and Policy Directoirate (J-5) and the Joint Technical
Support Activity Staff
4. State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, (Assistant Secretary James Malone) and Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs (Assistant Secretary Robert
Hormats)
5. Commerce, Undersecretary for International Trade (Lionel Olmer)
and also a focal point being reestablished at the level of an
assistant secretary for S&T matters, which groups NBS, NOAA,
NTIS, and the Patent Office.
6. Energy, Assistant Secretary for Research and the Office of
International Security Affairs (Julio Torres)
Less Frequent Customers
7. NASA
8. Congress, Office of Technical Assessment
9. NSF
10. NIH (primarily genetic engineering)
11. National Academy of Sciences (Frank Press)
12. US Trade Representative (William Brock)
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