ARTICLES BY CONSTANTINE MENGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100060009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 23, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NOTE FOR: The Director
NFAC 4603-81
23 July 1981
SUBJECT: Articles by Constantine Menges
This is a good piece by Menges.
He concentrates on the extraordinary
degree to which social democrats have
supported Marxist-Leninist groups in Latin
America, especially in Nicaragua, and the
apparent reasons for this support.
I'll be seeing him for lunch on Friday,
24 July and can pass along any comments from
you (rather than writing him).
Henry S. Rowen/
1-DCI
1-DDCI
1-ER
1-NFAC Registry
1-H.Rowen
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SUSPENSE 24 July
Date
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DCI's signature.
STA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
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encl.)
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20 July 1981
Dom
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QOM' ~~ ~',y
S
TITUTE
HUDSON IN
1500 WILSON BOULEVARD., SUITE 810, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209 ? 703-243-7550
NFAMsaP f(
July 14, 1981
Mr. William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington,
D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
During our last conversation I promised to send you a copy of
my most recent article on Central America. A copy is enclosed:
"Central America and its Enemies"
Commentary, August, 1981
In addition I thought you might want to see a written outline
of my perspective on Central America and Mexico. This summarizes
the conversation we had and briefings I have also given at State,
Defense, and the NSC.
With all good wishes.
Cordially,
Constantine C. Menges
Enc: as stated and "Central Americ/Mexico: the Present Opportunity
and Danger", 6/8/81
CCM/sg
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CENTRAL AMERICA AND ITS ENEMIES
35-COMMENTARY-AUG.'81-FL 8545
-Take 12 8545 Kirk 10-11 Bask. w-Ital x 18.6 6-23-
81
1-Menges-Article-
CONSTANTINE MENGES, here making his first appearance in
COMMENTARY, is on the staff of the Hudson Institute where
he specializes in American foreign policy.
THAT there has been a dramatic in-
crease in Central American revolu-
tionary violence in the past four years is obvious
to everyone. What is not so obvious, however, is
.that this increase has been accompanied by the
presence of four international forces supporting
the groups engaged in such revolutionary vio-
lence: first, Cuba and other Communist countries
.along with the regional Communist parties; sec-
ond, Palestinian terrorists and some radical Arab
states; third, Mexico; fourth, virtually all social-
democratic governments as well as the parties that
make up the Socialist International.
B Y NOW the role of the Cuban and
Communist groups in Nicaragua
and El Salvador is quite well known. As late as
1977, the State Department described the Sandi-
nista movement (FSLN) in Nicaragua as a "small,
pro-Castro, Marxist terrorist group" with little
popular backing. In 1978, revolutionary violence
-began to gather momentum after the leader of the
genuinely democratic opposition forces, Pedro
Chamorro, was murdered by still-unknown terror-
ists. By early 1979, with active Cuban encourage-
ment, all the Marxist-Leninist groups were unified
and then entered into a coalition with democratic
,and other non-Communist elements which were
,also opposed to the Somoza regime. In July 1979,
this coalition of democratic political groups and
Communist-led guerrilalas overthrew Somoza and
took power.
Since July 1979, the Communist and radical
Left groups have made a hidden but nevertheless
intense effort to consolidate their power within
the nine-person FSLN directorate. In contrast, the
-much more loosely organized democratic groups
represented by various independent political par-
-ties, non-Communist business and labor associa-
tions, most of the Catholic Church, and most of
the population have been steadily weakened by a
strategy of ambiguous but unremitting harassment
and persecution.
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As a result, Nicaragua today is nearly under the
control of the Communist groups. A new secret
police has been built with Cuban and East Ger-
-man help, and a new army has been established
with the help of thousands of Cuban advisers, and
a neighborhood-informant network, called the
Sandinista Defense Committees, has been estab-
lished in imitation of the Cuban block commit-
tees. These three instruments of social control are
in the hands of the FSLN directorate and are
being strengthened with Cuban and other Com-
munist help in order to provide a base for irrever-
sible power. In spite of written promises to the Or-
agnization of American States before the July 1979
victory, political and civil rights are being re-
pressed and free elections have been "postponed"
until 1985.
In El Salvador, three groups are competing: a
centist civil-military coalition, the extreme Right,
and an extreme Left coalition led by the unified
command of five different Marxist-Leninist
groups. Here too Cuban involvement has been
clear at least since March 1980 when the Carter
administration publicly told Congress that Cuban
support for the terrorist groups in El Salvador and
Guatemala included "advice, propaganda, safe
haven, training, arms ... along with men and ma-
terial...... In his last few days in office, Carter was
finally provoked by a Communist-led "general of-
fensive" into sending military aid to "support the
Salvadoran government in its struggle against left-
ving terrorism supported covertly with arms, am-
munition, training, and political and military ad-
vice by Cuban and other Communist nations."
Shortly thereafter the new Reagan administra.
tion issued a white paper on the extensive Cuban-
managed international Communist networks sup-
porting the revolutionary process in El Salvador.
It discussed the "covert delivery to El Salvador of
nearly two hundred tons of arms brought mostly
through Cuba and Nicaragua" and the "major ef-
fort . . . to provide cover" for this operation by
supplying arms of Western manufacture and by
supporting an "organization known as the Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front to seek non-Communist
political support."
U xLIICE Cuban involvement, the role of
the PLO and other Palestinian and
radical Arab terrorist groups in Central America
has remained virtually unexplored. Thus when
the Reagan administration recently told Congress
that "radical Arab states, the PLO, and the terror-
ist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
have furnished guns, arms, and training" to Marx-
ist revolutionaries in Central America, it was
opening a subject that had for too long been
treated with silence. Yet it provides an excellent
example of cooperation among anti-Western ter-
rorist groups.
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Shortly *after the victory in Nicaragua, a Sandi-
nista leader said: "There is a long-standing blood
unity between us and the Palestinian revolution.
We have long had close relations with the Pales-
tinians. Many of the units belonging to the Sandi-
nista movement were at Palestinian revolution
bases in Jordan.... As an example of our cooper-
ation with the Palestinian revolution, a number of
our comrades took part in the operation to divert
four planes which the Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine seized and landed at an air-
field in Jordan." Yasir Arafat too, during a visit to
Nicaragua in July 1980 boasted about the signifi-
cant help the PLO had given the revolutionaries.
In El Salvador the extreme Left has provided
evidence of its close relations with the Palestinian
extremists by often condemning the "ultra-right-
ist alliance of Washington, Tel Aviv, Guatemala
City, and Caracas." Tel Aviv is consistently first
after Washington, and before Guatemala, in most
of the condemnations issued by the various revolu-
tionary groups in Central America.
As to the involvement of radical Arab states,
former CIA director Stansfield Turner informed
the American people on the television program
Sixty Minutes that "Libya is providing extensive
help for the revolutionaries in Central America"
as part of the "internationalization of the revolu-
tion down there." This covert support became
more visible in April 1981 when Libya provided
$100 million to help Nicargua cope with the loss
,of $15 million in U.S. aid.
It is obvious that the tie that binds the terrorists
of Central American and the Middle East is their
common enemy, the United States. For the PLO
and other Palestinian and radical Arab groups,
giving help to the revolutionaries of Central
America is a strategic investment. Whether suc-
cessful or not, this violence distracts the United
States and saps its energies. But neither the Cu-
bans nor the Palestinian extremists could have im-
agined that the Central American revolutions
would have brought about such a deep division
between the United States on the one side and
Mexico and the social democrats on the other.
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ONE observer has described the Nicara-
guan revoltuion as the fruit of a new
"Havana-Mexico-Social-Democratic Axis." I have
already sketched Havana's work in Nicaragua on
behalf of Marxist-Leninist groups. As for Mexico
and the social democrats, in April 1979, the Marx-
ist FSLN and the "group of twelve," which repre-
sented the genuiely democratic opposition to So-
moza, met in Mexico City with leaders of Mexico
and the Socialist International. The Sandinistas
were blunt in telling their hosts that "moral aid is
not enough ... we need material help to guaran-
tee the victory." On May 4, 1979, there was a
worldwide gathering of Socialist International
leaders in Jan Jose, Costa Rica, specifically to re-
view the situation in Nicaragua. There it was de-
cided to undertake a "total offensive against So-
-moza." The representative of the social democrats
of the Dominican Republic declared: "If the Nic-
araguans want words, we'll give that to them, if
they want money, we'll give them money, if they
need arms, we will give them arms, if they need
men and voluntteers, we'll search for them until
there are enough to overthrow Somoza."
After the revolutionary victory in July 1979, the
obvious next question was whether the Cuban-sup-
ported Marxist-Leninist groups or the genuinely
democratic forces would prevail in Nicaragua.
Every student of Communist revolution and, in-
deed, of this century's history, knows that the
united front is a standard technique for achieving
revolutionary success. In 1920, Lenin drew on his
successful experience with the social democrats
against the Russian Czar to write: "The Commu-
nist movement should always make use of the
united front and support its social-democratic al-
lies as the rope supports the hanged man."
This pattern of building a coalition with the so-
cial democrats was also used by Fidel Castro. In
1957 and 1958, Castro described himself fre-
quently as a "Jeffersonian democrat" and a person
who intended to bring democracy to Cuba. After
his victory, Castro admitted candidly that he had
shaped his initial program "with care," to prevent
his movement from being "very small and lim-
ited." After he had crushed the social democrats
and moved beyond the transitional state of appar-
ent power-sharing, Castro said: "If it had been a
more radical program ... the revolutionary move-
ment against Batista would not, of course, have
gained the breadth it obtained and made possible
the victory."
Many Latin American social democrats also
shared in the "Cuban mistake": endorsing Castro
without establishing a separate power base. The
failure of their hopes for democratic change there
should have demonstrated the dangers of acting in
coalition with the violent Left. And many Euro-
pean social democrats, like Willy Brandt, would
have cause to remember the Communist success in
dominating much of the Republican coalition in
the Spanish Civil War against Franco and more
recently the Portuguese experience. There, follow-
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ing the 1974 revolution which ended the five-dec-
ade long Salazar/Caetano regime, the Communist
party with strong covert Soviet support moved
quickly to dominate most government organiza-
tions, trade unions, and communications, and
seemed to be heading inexorably toward dicta-
torial power. Only the failure of a Communist
coup attempt in 1975 and a concerted effort by
democratic parties and governments in Europe to
help both the Christian Democrats and the social
democrats and oppose the Communists resulted in
the free elections of 1976 and the functioning de-
mocracy that Portugal has today.
These revolutionary experiences-perhaps ex-
otic to the average American political leader-are
an important and living element of the tradition
of the European and Latin American social-demo-
cratic parties. Paying heed to it would have
meant, in Nicaragua, an effort on the part of Mex-
ico and the social-democratic parties to strengthen
the genuinely democratic groups and to prevent
the covert Cuban strengthening of the Marxist-
Leninist groups.
This did not happen. Instead, a number of Eu-
ropean countries with social-democratic parties in
power (together with the United States under
Carter) contributed more than $600 million in fin-
ancial aid to Nicaragua in the first year after the
revolution but made no serious effort to encourage
democratic institutions. In addition, a consortium
of international banks renegotiated the debt of
Nicaragua on generous terms so that an additional
$500 million of resources were made available.
Much of this aid came as a result of the support of
the SocialIInternational through its member par-
ties Europe and Latin America.
In August 1979, the Socialist International said
it would do everything it could to provide help
for the "people of Nicaragua" and it sent a delega-
tion of leaders headed by Mario Soares of Portu-
gal to visit Managua. Soares, at that time, said
that "aid should be unconditionally given. The
Chilean revolution failed because no one gave it a
hand." In September 1979, the social-democratic
president of Costa Rica said specifically that the
for established its
Socialist International "has
junta of na-
tional and support tional reconstruction and the directorate of the
FSLN."
This was a disturbing statement because the
FSLN, as a Marxist-Leninist party, was not the so-
cial-democratic party of Nicaragua. In fact, by
then, the genuinely democratic parties, including
the Nicaraguan Social Democrats, were already be-
ginning to become very apprehensive about the
close links with Cuba the Sandinista directorate
was establishing in the building of a new army
and a new secret police, and about the mounting
evidence.that the promises of free elections and re-
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spect for political and civil rights were not going
to be kept. The Nicaraguan democratic parties ap-
pealed to Mexico, Venezuela, and the Socialist In-
ternational to take these matters up with the San-
dinista directorate. Instead, President Lopez Por-
tillo of Mexico visited Nicaragua in November
1979 and expressed his fraternal solidarity with
the new goverment while making clear that Mex-
ican aid would be totally "unconditioned." Lopez
Portillo justified his passive posture concerning
democratic elections in the name of Mexico's his-
toric principle of "nonintervention." Nor did the
Socialist International provide any help to the
genuinely democratic groups.
by the spring and summer of 1980, the Sandinis-
tas had announced their plans to build an army
three times the size of the army under Somoza. An
estimated 4-5,000 Cubans were in Nicaragua, anc'.
the Cubans and East Germans continued strength-
ening the new secret police as well as the neigh-
borhood-informant committees. In the summer of
1980, the four democratic parties of Nicaragua
made a plaintive and urgent public appeal for
free elections and civil liberties. In the fall and
winter of 1980, first the Carter and then the Re-
agan administration provided Mexican and social-
democratic leaders with evidence of Nicaraguan
support for revolutionary violence in El Salvador
and Guatemala. None of these facts or appeals led
to any change in the policies of Mexico and the so-
cial democrats, policies which drew no distinction
between the totalitarian and democratic Left.
D URING 1980, while Cuba worked to
help its friends in Nicaragua consoli-
date power, and while Mexico and the social demo-
crats continued to ignore these harsh realities, the
focus of revolutionary violence in Central America
shifted to El Salvador.
Following a December 1979 meeting in Havana,
the five Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups and the
Communist party of El Salvador agreed to form -a
united command, publicly announced in January
1980. This extreme Left coalition has followed a
consistent political-military strategy which has in-
cluded relentless terrorist, military, and propa-
ganda attacks on the current government to frag-
ment and isolate it internally and internationally,
along with a steady build-up in the organizational
and military strength of the unified command.
Growing from an estimated 400 terrorists in 1979
-to about 1.000 in 1979, the Communist-led coali-
Liv11, now called the FMLN, fielded a well-armed
'force of 5-6,000 in the January 1981 "general of-
'fensive."
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Nhile Cuba and the regional CommunnneO
works played their well-established role of training
establish-
and indoctrinating a guerrilla fighters
routeseSMexi o
ing arms-supply
and the social democrats made their own impor-
tant contributions to the revolutionary cause. In
January 1980 a West German social-democratic
political-action foundation held a conference in
Costa Rica for the purpose of declaring its solidar-
ity with and legitimizing the new revolutionary
coalition of El Salvador. Mexico joined in, provid-
ing financial support and facilities which permit-
ted its territory to become, in the words of the
New York Times, the "guerrillas' propaganda
base.
Although the government of El Salvador had
implemented a major land-reform program and
had nationalized all banks and agricultural export
companies, this had little effect on the March 1980
meeting of the Socialist International. The mem-
ber parties, including the democratic-socialist par-
ties of Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and other major U.S. allies, denounced the new
land reforms as a "false program of reform and re-
pression" and warned against a "North American
military intervention." A senior State Department
official had given Willy Brandt, president of the
SI, a complete briefing on the extensive evidence
which showed that the Salvadoran revolutionary
front was Communist and tightly linked to Cuba,
but Brandt made no effort to achieve any balance
in the discussion. In fact, the Socialist Interna-
tional invited Fidel Castro to speak as an honored
guest, passed a resolution calling for Puerto Rican
independence as the "only solution," and urged al-
liance with the guerrilla forces in Latin America.
Then at its June 1980 conference the Socialist In-
ternational passed a resolution declaring that it
"fully supports the struggle of the Revolutionary
Democratic Front [FDR] ... in El. Salvador," as
the new united-front organization was called.
The Mexican foreign minister now began to
speak publicly about the need for a "Nicaraguan-
style solution" in El Salvador, and the supportive
activities of the Mexican governing party, the
PRI, grew steadily. The next month, during a
visit to Germany, Lopez Portillo met with Willy
Brandt and the two agreed to ignore U.S. concerns
and continue their activities on behalf of the revo-
lutionary Left in Central America. In the mean-
time, the campaign of political terror was proudly
being described by the "liberation front" in fre-
quent bulletins such as this report of May 25,
1980:
The political-military offensive of the liberation
forces . . . has been effectively implemented
through constant sabotage actions and bold dev-
astating attacks. . . This offensive was necessary
to announce the threat of war to the repressive
corps of this small nation . . which has
been invaded by the regular Honduran& and
Guatemalan armies lands thousands of soldiers
and all kinds of planes, helicopters, tanks, and
armored vehicles from the United States and
Israel.
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The report goes on to list the killing of 914 sol-
diers, national guard, police, and "informers,"
which accounted for about half of the estimated
2,000 deaths up to that time. The anti-Israel ele-
ment reflects the persistent theme of linkage
among the "imperialist" enemies.
In June 1980 the leader of the Salvadoran Com-
munist party went on a journey to the Eastern
bloc where he obtained specific commitments from
Moscow that it would encourage its partners like
Vietnam and Ethiopia to donate hundreds of tons
of (mainly American) weapons for use in the
-'general offensive." Shortly thereafter while on a
trip to Havana, the Mexican president expressed
his "continued solidarity with the Cuban revolu-
tion," and Gustavo Carvajal Moreno, the leader of
spe-
Mexico's ruling party, thePRIe, gaureedlupon
n both
cific measures in support of
El Salvador and Guatemala. This included com-
mitments of financial and propaganda support as
well as rumored help in the shipment of weapons
through Mexican territory. In addition, the PRI
promised to host a conference of "world solidar.
ity" with the Salvadoran revolution in late No-
vember.
Y JANUARY 1981 a new situation ex-
B isted in El Salvador. The extreme
Left had failed three times to obtain popular sup-
port for its attempted general strikes in 1980
(May, August, and December); the Salvadorgn
population had not rallied during the military of-
fensive in January 1981, and the government
forces had repulsed the attacks after a week of
-bloody fighting. Moreover, there was a new Re-
agan administration in Washington which seemed
clear about its determination to prevent a Com-
?munist victory in El Salvador. Did this new situa-
tion lead to any change in the actions of Mexican
or the social-democratic leaders?
The evidence to date is that both of these
"friendly" participants in the contemporary poli-
tics of Central America have continued their sup-
port of the revolutionary Left. After the military
offensive failed, the Socialist International issued a
call for a worldwide economic embargo against El
Salvador. Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky
warned that "revolutionary movements in Latin
America have gained sympathy in Europe" and
that American backing for "dictatorships" like
that in El Salvador "could provoke anti-American
feelings in Europe worse than during the Vietnam
war." In recent months the socialist International
has reaffirmed its endorsement of the Revolution-
ary Democratic Front.
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Mexico, if anything, became even more em-
phatic in its support of the Salvadoran revolution-
aries. The president of the ruling party was sent
-to Nicaragua, where he said that country was "not
alone" against the United States and pledged con-
tinued support for the revolutionary Left in El
Salvador that "fights for its freedom." In February
1981, the "Permanent People's Tribunal" met in
Mexico and concluded that the Salvadoran gov-
ernment was guilty of "carrying out genocidal pol-
icies . . . reminiscent of testimony offered at the
International Tribunal in Nuremburg after
World War II and ... the U.S. was guilty of com-
plicity in the perpetration of the crimes."
Next, just as the Reagan administration was
threatening to act against Cuba unless it ceased
providing weapons, funds, and training for Cen-
tral American guerrillas, Mexico announced its
first energy agreement with Castro.
W Hy have Mexico and the social-
democratic parties decided to join
with Cuba in supporting Central American revo-
lutions? The explanation can be found in the in-
fluence of a strong, radical-leftist faction within
the PRI and most social-democratic parties; in a
theory of poliitics in developing countries which
emphasizes anti-imperialism and nationalism
while ignoring democracy and rejecting any no-
tion of possible danger from forming coalitions
with Communist groups; in a hidden Realpolitik
which assumes that timely help for leftist revolu-
tionaries will be repaid in domestic social peace
and future international influence; and in a parti-
san interest in weakening such domestic rivals as
Christian Democrats.
During the last decade these factors in different
combinations and strengths in Mexico and among
many social-democratic parties and governments
in Europe have produced what Carl Gershman has
accurately described as an alignment with "anti-
Western revolutionary movements in the Third
World" which include, besides the totalitarian
Left in Central America, the PLO and other Pales-
tinian terrorist groups and Marxist regimes and
movements like SWAPO in southern Africa.
Due to its historic leadership, its wealth, and
the role of Willy Brandt, the German social-demo-
cratic party currently is the most influential mem-
ber of the Socialist International, and can best
serve to illustrate how the current situation came
about.*
? For a detailed analysis of the case of Mexico, see Carlos
Rangel's article, "Mexico and Other Dominoes," in the June
issue of COMMENTARY.
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While the majority of German social democrats
are moderates, they have permitted their interna-
tional presence to be managed to a large degree by
far Left groups. Yet the success of this growing mi-
nority faction also owes much to the fact that the
socialist parties have for now abandoned both
their commitment to democracy in the developing
countries and their previous realism about Com-
munism. Today's Socialist International, founded
in 1951, issued a clear statement of principles
which included the view that there can be no so-
cialism without liberty and that Communism had
deformed socialism and created a new imperial-
ism. The 1962 Oslo Declaration repeated these
views in eloquent terms, stating that "liberty and
democratic self-government must not be surren-
dered."
Yet in 1974, the Socialist International, thanks
largely to German initiatives, modified its statutes
to permit non-democratic parties from developing
areas to participate as "observers," and further
changes toward cooperation with "socialist-ori-
ented" but not necessarily democratic parties were
welcomed by the Geneva revisions in 1976. This
permitted groups such as the FSLN of Nicaragua
and the New Jewel Movement of Grenada to par-
ticipate. A next step was in 1978 at the Vancouver
Congress where the Socialist International invited
representatives from "socialist-oriented" dictator-
ships (such as Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau)
and approved joint political action with forces of
the Left including Marxist-Leninist parties.
Brandt himself explained this new viewpoint:
in the Third World one should not expect politi-
cal rights which have "too much of a European'or
North American stamp" because "he whose life is
exposed to sheer misery can take only a minor in-
terest in civil rights" other than "social human
rights." This in effect implied a triple standard,
one for the democratic nations, another for dicta-
torial governments or movements using leftist
rhetoric, and a third for rightist dictatorships ir-
respective of their economic success. In May 1979
the social-democratic leaders of Latin America,
Spain, Portugal, and Germany met in Costa Rica
to plan their material support for the Nicaraguan
revolution and declared that "they had to estab-
lish strategies to break with the anti-Communist
ideologies . . . approved by the Latin American
military and the government of the United
'fates."
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? ?hould be noted that constant anc*reg
criticism of the U.S. along these lines by the so-
cial-democratic parties occurred while the Carter
human-rights policy in Central America was in
full flower. Although the United States joined in
contributing to the $625 million in economic aid
provided to Nicaragua by the democracies, and
though President Carter publicly stated until his
last three days in office that there were no serious
signs of a Marxist dictatorship being established
in revolutionary Nicaragua, the social-democrats
seemed to take little notice. Indeed, a Portuguese
socialist declared: "For Europe, Carter sells a pol-
icy of human rights and for Central America a
policy of repression."
Beyond muddled and radical ideology, beyond
the fashionable and condescending view that de-
mocracy cannot be expected in the Third World,
is the deep anxiety of many European leaders
about their countries' dependence on raw materi-
als from the Third World. They believe that a
policy of fraternal cooperation with ruling or
soon-to-be-dominant parties in countries which
supply those needed resources might produce posi-
tive economic effects. (Mexico, for its part, hopes
to buy itself immunity from external revolution-
ary pressures.) Combine these perceptions of na-
tional interest with the twin myths that democracy
is impossible and revolution is inevitable in re-
gions like Central America and the justification
for the recent policies becomes strong even for
many moderate social democrats.
Last, there is the partisan dimension. No group
likes to admit grave errors in judgment. When the
"united front" with Communism fails once again
and the slide toward totalitarianism becomes
clear, who do social democrats do? As Jean-Fran-
cois Revel points out: "If they remain silent
things just get worse, but if they were to rebel
they would have to confess publicly that they were
wrong about the Communists. . . ." This is not
only difficult emotionally and institutionally, it is
not good politics, and for that reason social demo-
crats will usually find other explanations for why
things went badly. But for the German and most
other socialist parties, there is an even more direct
partisan reason for refusing to become realistic
about Central America. Their domestic political
rivals, the Christian Democrats, are on the other
side.
In marked contrast to the social-democratic par-
ties, the Christian Democrats of Europe and Latin
America have shown a consistent commitment to
democratic social reform in Central America and a
sober realism about the threats posed by both the
extreme Left and the extreme Right.
Venezuela in particular, under President Luis
Herrera Campias, a Christian Democrat, has been
a positive democratic example and influence.
Upon becoming president, he continued the sup-
port for the Nicaraguan revolutionary coalition
begun by his social-democratic predecessor by
providing $100 million in economic aid to the
new government. At the same time, however, in
early 1980, the Venezuelan government began to
speak publicly about the need to safeguard the
democratic opportunities in Nicaragua by permit-
-nnlaSe
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Ifa?El Salvador is concerned, the Veno- S
lan government and Christian Democratic party
have contended that "the current civil-military
junta represents the political center, and is there-
fore the only hope for a moderate solution to the
ongoing civil war." Since Jose Napoleon Duarte,
the Salvadoran Christian Democratic president,
had been deprived of his election victory by the
extreme Right in 1972 and then lived in Venezue-
lan exile until 1979, he has many close friends
among the Venezuelan Christian Democrats. They
understand the enormous difficulty of reformers
who must struggle against both extremes simulta-
neously. Though it is now forgotten, in 1960 the
new democratic government of Venezuela found
itself under simultaneous assault by the extreme
Right, including Trujillo, the Domican dictator,
and the extreme Left supported by Fidel Castro
Venezuelan Christian Democrats recall that they
joined with their social-democratic colleagues in
welcoming the victory of Castro but soon the
thousands of innocent firing-squad victims and po-
litical prisoners helped them see their mistake.
Other Latin American Christian Democratic
parties, many of which are in opposition to au-
thoritarian regimes, have frequently expressed
support for the Duarte party and endorsed the Sal-
vadoran social reforms. In Germany, too, the
Christian Democrats have tried to broaden the dig-
cussion in the European media by presenting the
facts about El Salvador; they have also tried to
persuade the Schmidt government to restore aid to
the Duarte regime, especially in view of the fact
that Nicaragua has received large German contri-
butions. Dr. Hennig Wegener, a CDU member of
the German parliament, has known Duarte and El
Salvador for some years, and after a visit in Janu-
ary 1981, wrote:
El Salvador cannot be conquered militarily
any longer. There will probably be a second
"final offensive." ... The people are not with
the guerrillas. They have enough of force and
terror. They want peace and social reform. Will
this occur? The agrarian reform is a hopeful be-
ginning....
[However] the political isolation of El Salva-
dor that has been achieved might be decisive. It
is not just a product of Communist deception.
The Socialist International has played a major
role. Whoever believes hat the [social-demo-
cratic] titular head of the FDR ... will play a
real role after a guerrilla victory will be brutally
surprised. . It is incomprehensible that the
German Federal Republic has supported a
United Nations resolution on El Salvador that
was drafted by Cuba, Angola, and Nicaragua,
that is practically by the Soviet Union ... and
that holds the officials of the Salvadoran govern-
ment alone responsible for all the suffering
there.
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There is no question that the international soli-
darity among the Christian Democrats has been of
immense political, material, and moral help to
their associates in Central America. The tragedy
of the social-democratic policy is not only that it
strengthens the Communists but also that it re-
moves social democrats from active cooperation
with Christian Democrats in building democratic
institutions, as occurred in Portugal and Spain.
W HAT must the U.S. do to improve
the prospects for democratic re-
form and prevent Communist success in Central
America?
A first step-which the Reagan administration
has already taken in El Salvador-is to recognize
the danger and provide a balanced program of bi-
lateral help to the threatened countries. Second,
there is a need to work with transnational groups
such as parties, trade unions, civic, business, and
religious organizations to strengthen those genu-
inely democratic and moderate forces which exist
within each country. Third, together with friendly
governments, there must be competent action to
neutralize the terrorist networks established by the
violent Left in the region with help from Cuba,
other Communist countries, and the radical Pales-
tinians.
As it happens, there may now be a .greater dis-
position in the region to support such an ap-
proach, not only because of the actions of the Re-
agan administration but also because Castro
launched a terrorist offensive last February and
March that backfired. Within a few weeks, Cu-
ban-armed Colombian guerrillas were shipped via
Panama into Colombia (and caught); attacks and
death threats were directed against U.S. personnel
in Panama and Costa Rica; Honduras suffered an
embassy attack, the bombing of its parliament,
and an airplane hijacking; and there was an unau-
thorized Cuban raid on the embassy of Ecuador in
Havana. (Last year, moreover, Castro ordered the
assassination of the president of Costa Rica be,
cause he had given sanctuary to many of the Cu-
bans who fled in the spring of 1980.)
Rather than intimidating the target govern-
ments, these "responses" by Castro to Reagan have
brought about the suspension of diplomatic rela-
tions with Cuba by Colombia and Ecuador; an ap-
parent end to the cozy working relationship Pan-
ama believed it had established with Cuba; and a
crackdown by Costa Rica on various exile groups
that had been part of the Cuban-managed propa-
ganda and arms-smuggling networks.
13
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?? ?9
But can Mexico and the social democrats be
persuaded to withdraw their support for the revo-
lutionary Left in El Salvador? Can they be per-
suaded to oppose both extremes and work with
the existing democratic reform groups, including
the Christian Democrats? Can they be made to see
that success for the extreme Left in El Salvador
would soon be followed in Guatemala by in-
creased repression and guerrilla terrorism leading
to Communist victory there too, and the high
probability of revolutionary violence and counter-
terror in Mexico, with devastating damage to the
prospects of democratic development in the entire
region?
Yet El Salvador can also be a positive turning
point. The centrist coalition is implementing re-
forms and holding firm against both extremes. It
is becoming known that the totalitarian Left has
systematically deceived the social democrats of Eu-
rope and a variety of groups in the United States.
If the guerrillas had won last January, their lies
might never have been exposed, but there is still a
chance to confront the social democrats with their
misconceptions about El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Success in El Salvador is possible. This tragic con-
flict represents a major opportunity for Mexico to
reclaim its realism, and at leasyome of the mem-
ber parties of the Socialist International to re-
claim their lost commitment to genuine democ-
racy.