INTERAGENCY GROUP ON THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090018-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 16, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDE NTTAt.
NSC Review Completed.
MI.MORP-NDUM FOR- Mr. McFarlane, State
Mr. Burt, State
Mr. Wolfowttz, State
Mr. Pipes, NSC
brigadier General Gran;to ?, jCT
Mr. ehma 'CIA
Mr. , DOD
FROM : Ambassador Lawrence S. J'(leirge r,
Chairman I
SUBJECT: Interagency Group on the Soviet union
An Interagency oup, (JG) on the Soviet Union will be
convened on Marc h at Qom" in the European hff.airs
Conference Room (Room 6226) at the Department of State.
Please confirm your attendance or provide the name of in alvernate to Laura Kennedy at 632-1952. -. 3?
Representatives will discuss the 'Perms of Reference
for the East-West Relations Study and make drafting
ass.ig nments _
Copies to : /S -. - As. Lopez
FUR - ?1r. Barry
Mr. Palmer
Mr. Schlamm
EUR/f.OV - Mr. German
Mr. Combs
P - Mr. Matthews
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS (3/13/81)
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EAST-WEST RELATIONSt SUMMARY ?BRIMS OF REFBBThCE
I. The Soviet'Challenge
A. Soviet Goals. What are Moscow's key foreign policy aims.
strategy and tactics for the next decade? Will Soviet goals
remain constant as political succession occurs?
B. Soviet Assets and Liabilities'. What are the essential
strengths and weaknesses of Moscow's international power?
What are the likely trends for the next 10-15 years? How
will domestic problems (succession, economy, nationalities)
affect foreign behavior? How will Eastern European develop-
ments affect Soviet policy?
II. U.S. Response
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B. Policy toward Allies and,-Neutrals. How do we.elicit
y
maximum support and cooperation on defense, economic, and
our national security?
Where
are we ,'weak vis a
vis the USSR, and
what should we do about it? Hcw can arms control enhance_
and liabilities?
A. National Security Policy. What are our present assets
political strategies concerning, the Soviet Union? How
propaganda, economic cooperation) toward the Allies and
the neutrals?
should we counter Soviet policies (traditional diplomacy,
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C. Policy toward the Developing World. What-are our
priorities in the developing World? What are our strengths
and weaknesses relative to the USSR (economic and security
assistance, effective cooperation with allies and with
China, traditional and public diplomacy)? How can we
neutralize Soviet friends among developing countries, while
strengthening our own?
D. Policy toward China. How should be manage the triangular
relationship?
E. The Bilateral Relationship,,' Under what conditions should
we undertake economic and exchange activities? Where do our
interests and those of the Soviet Union genuinely overlap?
How do the style and modalities of bilateral relations
affect their substance? How s)iould we apply linkage and
reciprocity?
III. Immediate Problems
A. Poland. What are the internal dynamics of the Polish
situation? 'What are the probable determinants of Soviet
policy? What are the implications for Soviet-EE relations
over the longer term?
B. Afghanistan/Southwest Asia. Which of the Carter Admin-
istration sanctions should be continued?- What policy
should we adopt toward Pakistan, the Afghan rebels?
C. Persian Guif. What more should be done to deter Soviet
expansion into this vital area?
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D. CSCE, TNF, SALT, Other Arms Control. What are our aims
during the balance of the Madrid Conference? When should
we resume TNF talks with Moscow? Should we commence a strategic
dialogue with the USSR prior to establishing our negotiating
tactics on SALT issues? What should our position be toward
our obligations under SALT II pending resumption of negotia-
tions? How should we proceed With other arms control under-
takings (Sverdlovsk incident and BW, CN, CTB, MBFR, ASAT)?
E. U.S. and Allied Consensus,1 Can we minimize Soviet wedge.
driving, and diminish inconsistency in our policy toward the
USSR, by articulating a basic policy and explaining it to
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the Congress and the public asrwell as to our allies?
IV. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations.
Attachment: Detailed Terms of Reference
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Suggested Agency Taskings
1. The Soviet Challenge
A. Soviet Goals
B. Soviet Assets and Liabilities
Intelligence Community
II. U.S. Response
A. National Security Policy DOD
B. Policy toward Allies and Neutrals STATE (EUR/EA)
C. Policy toward the Developigg World STATE (Working Group)
D. Policy toward China I STATE (EA)
E. The Bilateral Relationship STATE (SOV)
III. Immediate Problems STATE
A. Poland EE
B. Afghanistan NEA
C. Persian Gulf PM/NEA
D. TNF, SALT, Other Arms Control PM
E.U.S. and Allied Consensus ' SOV/ICA
IV. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations STATE (S/P)
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 Terms of Reference,
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1 - Soviet Strategic Goals. As ess Soviet geopolitical
objectives and long-term game plan, pith an emphasis on Moscow's
strategy toward the US, Western HemiIsphere, Western Europe,
China, Northeast Asia, and the Mideast/Persian Gulf regions.
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What are the dimensions of the problems we must deal with in
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the near-midterm period? Discuss Moscow's priorities over
the-next 5-10 years (e.g. - economic/military; Europe/North-
east Asia). What are Soviet goals in the developing world and
can we identify any longer term objective beyond the exploita-
tion of "targets of opportunity"? To what degree do power/
ideology influence these Soviet objectives, and how might this
question change with a new Soviet leadership generation?
2 - Soviet Strategic Assets/Liabilities. What are Soviet
resources for pursuing their strategic goals in the 1980's?
a - Short-Term. How could the Soviets seek to exploit
their combination of.strategic parity and clear conventional/
theatre nuclear superiority, together with present US ICBM
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vulnerability, to score political gains over the next five
years -- in Europe? vis-a-vis China and Japan? in the Persian
Gulf? in the developing world? What are the Soviet targets
which will be the most vulnerable to, the use of military power
for political pressure purposes? To what degree does the economic
weakness of USSR and its allies, and the political vulnerability of
its surrogates, undermine its capacity to sustain such pres-
sures and make the Soviets vulnerable to counter-pressures? To
what extent would a US/Western drive to weaken the Soviet Union and
challenge its control over Eastern Europe moderate Soviet inter-
national behavior?
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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b - Mi dam. Discuss prospects and implications-of
a Soviet Union in the mid-80s which combines great military
strength and serious economic/energy weaknesses. What are
the likely consequences in terms of Soviet policy toward
US,-Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Northeast Asia, Persian
Gulf and developing countries? Is this situation likely to
enhance Soviet proclivity to use military power for political/
economic purposes, to promote greater cooperation with West
or to
pursue alternative diplomatic strategies (e.g. - acco2mno-
dation with China)? What will be the likely Soviet vulnerabil-
ities (e.g. Eastern Europe) in this time period2
c - Longer Term. What are the prospects for more
moderate Soviet foreign/security policy in the 1990's? How
can our policies in the 80's enhance that
Possibility and ensure
sufficient strength of US and core alliances should current
Soviet policies persist? What kind of a relationship do we
want to pursue with the USSR in the next decade?
3 -- Soviet Internal Scene. Examine current Soviet
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political dynamics, prospects for Brezhnev succession and
impact on US/Soviet relations. Assess state of Soviet economy,,
including dependencies that could bet exploited or could lead
Moscow toward foreign adventures. Discuss Soviet nationalities
problem and dissident movement and both opportunties/dangers
they represent for the West.
3ECRET/SENSITI-r
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4 -- Eastern E Is Eastern Europe a long-term
strategic asset or liability for Moscow? In what ways short
of military power can Soviets maintain control, in face of a
changing Eastern Europe? Review the degrees of internal
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liberalization, external independence and "Westernization"
of. the East European, states and discuss options for promoting
the gradual development of these trends in cooperation with
our key allies. Analyze how we cari exploit endemic East
European economic problems to enha ee our influence and their
freedom of action vis-a-vis Moscow especially as the USSR
is increasingly unable to bail them out. Discuss how these
goals can be furthered in the short-term and longer-term without
provoking internal political convulsions and Soviet interventions,
5 - US/Soviet Bilateral Relations. What are the major bilateral
issues in US/Soviet relations? What is the current status
of these issues? What are the US objectives, how should we
pursue them and with what priorities? How can we exploit the
Soviet belief that they will be able "to do business" with e
tougher but more consistent US Administration? How- do questions
of style and rhetoric play into subgtance of our relations?
Discuss the status of established bilateral cooperative ar-
rangements and describe those that are advantageous to us and
of real interest to Moscow. Discuss aspects of bilateral rela-
tionship which are outside the control of both parties.
SECRET SENSITIVE
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Identify existing interests (e.g. -'nuclear proliferation) and
possible future ., common interests ~on which we might build..
Discuss the political role of arms control negotiations in
overall US/USSR bilateral relations.!
?6 - US Military Counter-Strategy
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a - Strategy. What are the objectives of US security
policy in the context of East-West rglations?. How do we cope
with strategic parity and Soviet 7NF/conventic nal superiority in East/West
competition? How can we restore our grip on escalation control
and thus deter Soviet risk-taking in Europe and other parts
of the world? How credible is a horizontal escalation approach
and how might it work? What is the relationship between our
strategic goals and US/allied military assets? Hoer could China
and friendly third countries be associated with these efforts?
How should security assistance contrj.bute to attaining our
goals?
b - Force Improvement Priorities. Give broad brush
review of our strategic force assetsjliabilities as backdrop
to US military requirements/options In key theaters c-f cvMret ti n
with USSR. Identify US conventionaland theatre nuclear force
posture weaknesses which undercut our capacity to compete
effectively with the USSR in Western 11 Europe, Northeast Asia,
Persian Gulf and developing countries? Suggest what in broad
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terms needs to be dons to correct conventional. and TNP de-
ficiencies, and, taking account of general Administration
budgetary projections, assess regional priorities. Identify
potential new developments (e.g. - ERW, CW) which require allied
assent and discuss priorities and approach to securing it.
c - Arms Control. Diacusshow the arms control process
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or actual agreements could, in tandem with force posture
adjustments, serve the goals described above. In particular,
identify current broad US/allied negotiating goals for LRTNF,
CDE and MBFR talks, assess prospects, for their achievement,
discuss possible alternative objectives and indicate how MBFR
might interact with initiation of CDE process. How should we
deal with other arms control issues (e.g. - Sverdlovsk/BW/
CW/ASAT)? What is the proper relationship between SALT and
the overall East/West relationship?
7 - Political Counter-Strategy. Discuss a possible strategy
for combating Soviet subversive activities, in Europe and
Japan, as well as in developing world. How do we avoid a
reactive posture vis-a-vis Moscow? Describe options for public
affairs diplomacy (including ICA/VOA), ways to counter Soviet
peace offensive" in allied countries and methods for highlighting
Soviet interventions in LDCs. This analysis should take account
of indigenous LDC forces of nationalism, the weak Soviet foreign
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assistance record and cooperation in this area with allied and
friendly countries.
8 - Political Competition in Deye 1 o ping World.
a - General. What are'US objectives relating to political
competition in the developinq world? What regions are of major
importance to the US now and for the next 10. years? Are all
areas a target of competition or is there potential for co-
operation in some? What other elem'nts, i.e., nationalism,
regionalism, etc., must be considergd? What should the US
do to attain its objectives?
b - Countering Soviets. Discuss how we-can counter
the political-military influence of Moscow and Soviet client
regimes (including Cuba, Libya, PDRY, Ethiopia, Angola and
Syria)'and how we can exploit their vulnerabilities. Attention
should be given to Latin America/Caribbean basin. identify potent,ta2
Soviet "targets of opportunity" in next two years and how to cope
with such dangers. Consider what can be done to undercut Lrietnameae
control of Kampuchea and support Thailand and ASEAN states. Iaentj'tfy
possible LDCs with which we can cooperate in Third Countries.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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c) Core Alliance Partners. Discuss how we can
generate the cooperation of Europeans, Japanese and other
friendly countries in containing. Soviet expansion in develop-
ing world. Identify particular problems/vulnerabilities of
key allies (e.g.-FRG) and how to gain their support. In this
connection, analyze the "division of labor" concept and how
it might be applied to political, economic and security areas,
as well as to greater allied nationol security commitments to
Southwest Asia, taking account of distinctive roles of
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Europeans and Japan. How can we ensure that allies blame
USSR rather than US if East-West relations turn colder? In
what areas (if any) should we proceed unilaterally?
d) China. Analyze US interests in the Sino-Soviet-
American triangular relationship anti how to manage these
relationships to our advantage. Discuss how Sino-American
cooperation can limit Soviet expansion, including diplomatic
and military consultations, intelligence sharing and parallel
approaches toward Kampuchea and other international issues.
How does arms supply issue fit into this picture? Indicate
how Chinese relationships with Japan and Europeans might serve
these goals.
9. Economic Issues. Identify the major issues relating
to the economic relations between US-USSR. Indentify US
objectives relating to these issues. Discuss how economic
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policy fits into overall political and security policy
framework. Assess in broad terms how we can use economic
and security assistance to support US competition with
USSR. Summarize the state of US/Soviet trade, joint
ventures and technology transfers and the effects of
Afghanistan related sanctions. Assess merits of tightening
up/easing off on sanctions and what could be achieved in
short and medium terms. Assess the possibility of insti-
tuting a policy of economic denial designed to lesson Soviet
military-industrial potential and how the allies could be
brought to support such a policy. On the East-West economic
front, review Soviet/European gas pipeline, CSCE energy
conference, COCOM rules and allied cooperation on common
export credit policies toward USSR.
10. Priority Problems. In light of above analysis,
how should we deal with current urgent problems.
a) Poland. Summarize present internal political
situation in Poland, likely developments through July 1,
potential effects on Polish political structure and fall-out
effect in other East European states. Consider possible
Soviet reactions, identify potential "trigger points" and
indicate interaction of Soviet Polish policy with broader
US/Soviet relationship. Review possible US reprisals for
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Soviet invasion, likely allied reactions and Soviet
responses. Analyze Polish. economic prospects and broad
US/Western options, including possible multilateral for
multiple-bilateral) debt rescheduling.
b) Afghanistan/Southwest Asia. Discuss state
of Soviet control in Afghanistan, internal political
equation and prospects for negotiated solution. Assess
effectiveness of current sanctions, their viability and
how they could be made more effect~ve. Review options for
supporting Afghan freedom fighters, in cooperation with
other countries, and steps needed to strengthen Pakistan
and deter further Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia.
c) CSCE. How should we manage the balance of
the Madrid Conference? What are the realistic possibilities
to pursue US strategic goals toward the USSR in the post-
Madrid CSCE framework? How can we work with the allies to
achieve this end?
d) Persi4n Gulf. What should be done to strengthen
Western security interests and to deter Soviet expansion into
this vital area?
e) Southeast Asia. What strategy should we pursue
to bring about the eventual withdr1wal of Vietnamese forces
from Kampuchea?
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f) SALT. How best can our national security
and foreign policy goals be supported by SALT? What should
our position be toward our obligations under SALT U. pending
resumption of negotiations.
11. Basic Issues on US-USSR Relations
a. What kind of relationship do we want with the USSR by
the end of this decade? What actions can we take to
preempt and counter Soviet challenges in third areas?
How could we weaken Soviet capabilities from within in
order to discourage such behavior in the first place?
How can we deal with the threat from Soviet surrogates
such as Cuba and Libya? What political, economic and
military actions do we need to take now to compete
more effectively in the 1980's pnd to'lay the basis
for more constructive US/Soviet relations in the late
80s and 90s?
b. How do we restrain Soviet and proxy adventurism in the
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'Third World -- including dealing with perceptions of
trends in U.S. will and capabilities? What is the
relationship between our efforts to negotiate Soviet
restraint through linkage in the bilateral US/Soviet
context and to put Moscow up against costly choices as
a result of unilateral (and allied) actions? How do we
ensure consistency and sound priorities among such
policies?
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What power balances are we aiming at with the Soviets in
Europe and in third areas? In this regard what specific
additional military force characteristics are needed to
deter Soviet military moves against US and Allied
interests over the next decade? What should be the
balance of resource allocation between conventional and
strategic forces? Which of those forces can be fielded
over the next 2-3 years?
d.* In what ways can we work with allies to fashion multi-
lateral strategies for countering Soviet challenge
third areas?. To what extent should we act unilaterally
to oppose the Soviets where allied cooperation is not
possible? How can we stimulate; allied support on Important
matters where allies are reluctant to cooperate and :pow do we
weigh our broad interests in strong alliance relations
with our concern over specific crisis areas? How can
we counter Soviet pressures. on our allies and other
friendly governments?
e. What is the role of our strategic relationship. with
China in our effort to.correct the defense balance and
restrain Soviet international behavior? To what extent
can Beijing be helpful on these issues and how can we
channel their energies most usefully?
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f. What are the objectives of our East-West trade and
technology transfer policies? What relative weight
should be given in this respect to linkage to Soviet
external policies and to the fostering of internal
changes in the USSR? To what degree can such US
economic policies be effective? What will be allied
attitudes and how can we gain their support?
g. identify a set of arms control objectives which the
West can pursue in the present military environment?
Describe optimal timing and leverage to pursue these
goals. Will we be in a better! position to achieve
these goals after we improve the military
balance (e. g. five years from now) than today?
h. How should we manage the atmospheric and style of
US/Soviet relations to keep from regenerating illusions
of detente, from frightening away our allies and friends
and from stimulating the Soviets toward greater military
efforts? What should be our strategy for public
diplomacy toward Moscow, our allies and developing
countries to counter Soviet propaganda and sell our own
policies.
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i Should our policy in Eastern Europe be designed to
weaken the USSR regardless of the impact on individual
Eastern European countries, or should we continue our
policy of differentiation in order to encourage greater
foreign policy independence and domestic pluralism in
Eastern Europe? What are the limits of Soviet tolerance
of East European interaction with the West?
What strategies (including resources) are needed to
deal with the problems of local instability in WCs
and with Soviet efforts to exploit those instabilities?
How can we reverse recent Soviet gains (a is Egypt) and
impose costs on Soviet proxies (such as Cuba and Libya)?
How far should the US, its allies and possible surrogates
go to prevent Soviet supported "wars of national liberation"?
12. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations.
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