SOVIET POLICY AND AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000200100029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: March 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP ?RET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20SOS
E'tAR 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Counsellor to the President
Chief of Staff and Assistant
to the President
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Council
Memorandum: "Soviet Policy and Africa"
I would like to call to your special attention the
attached paper "Soviet Policy and Africa," published this
week by the National Intelligence Council. I especially
invite your attention to the paper's summary overview
and the section on important Soviet vulnerabilities in
Africa subject to exploitation by t.ie US. I believe
the paper will inform our deliberations about US policy
in Africa and, in its more detailed assessment, will
serve as useful basic documentation of Soviet activities-
there across the board. rI
Attachment:
NIC M 81-10003J
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National
Intelligence
Council
Soviet Policy and Africa
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Top Secret
Top Secret
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0 0
Warning Notice Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National
Intelligence
Council
Soviet Policy and Africa
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Information available as of 23 February 1981
was used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
This memorandum is based on substantial con-
tributions by the Offices of Political Analysis,
Economic Research, and Strategic Research in the
National Foreign Assessment Center and by the
Directorate of Operations, and has been co-
ordinated with these components. It was prepared
b the Analytic Group of the
National Intelligence Council under the supervision of
the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR
and Eastern Europe, with the cooperation of the
National Intelligence Officer for Africa.
Top Secret
NIC M 81-10003J
I
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? To Secret
Soviet Polic
and Africa
Soviet policy toward Africa represents more than the mere exploitation of
opportunities. It is driven by objectives that have remained reasonably stable
over the years:
? To offset and undermine Western political, economic, and military
influence.
? To expand the Soviet presence on the continent.
? To facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence in North Africa, the
Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean littoral.
? To promote specific Soviet military interests.
? To enhance Soviet claims to a global superpower role.
? To gain political support from African countries for Soviet undertakings in
international forums.
? To stimulate changes advantageous to the USSR in African regimes. (c)
Soviet success in achieving these aims has been mixed. For a variety of
reasons, the Soviets suffered a number of setbacks before 1974: the over-
throw of Nkrumah in Ghana (1966); the coup against a pro-Soviet regime in
Mali (1968); a decline in Soviet influence in Guinea; the failure of a
Communist coup in Sudan (1971); and the expulsion of the USSR from
Egypt (1972). More recently, the Soviets have been confronted by:
? The loss of use of the naval and air facilities at Berbera, resulting from the
Soviets' decision to pursue what they viewed as greater opportunities and
stakes in Ethiopia, although they knew this would put their gains in
Somalia at serious risk.
? The transfer of power in Zimbabwe in 1980 to a black majority govern-
ment controlled by Robert Mugabe's ZANU rather than the Soviet-
backed Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU.
? Termination by Guinea in 1977 of the right to stage TU-95 maritime
reconnaissance flights from Conakry.
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? The refusal by Cape Verde in 1980 to grant the USSR naval access rights.
Since 1974, Moscow has been able to take advantage of a confluence of
circumstances that offered new opportunities and tools with which to pursue
its aims, particularly in countries experiencing new nationhood-the type of
African country in which the Soviets scored gains in the 1960s. Soviet
activity from 1974 to date has marked a new phase in Soviet relations with
Sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting:
? Major openings presented by the collapse of the Portuguese empire,
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the fall of the Haile Selassie
regime, and growing black opposition to white rule in southern Africa.
? A Soviet perception that the United States has, until recently, been
unwilling or unable effectively to contest the spread of Soviet influence in
Africa, and that such expansion would accordingly entail little military
risk.
? A Soviet assessment of the enhanced strategic significance of the Horn of
Africa-with respect to the promotion of Soviet interests on the Arabian
Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions generally.
? The need to compensate for the reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle
East occasioned by the deterioration of relations with Egypt beginning in
1972 and by the Camp David accords of 1978.
? A greater willingness on the part of some African states as well as
insurgent groups to accept Communist military assistance and support,
and of Africans to tolerate large-scale and overt combat involvement by
Communist states in African affairs.
? The availability of a proxy-Cuba-especially well suited to the military
and political requirements of the situations at hand.
? Possible heightened Soviet concerns about future deployment to the
Indian Ocean of US strate is systems-both ballistic missile submarines
and carrier-based aircraft.H
Under these changed circumstances the Soviets managed to achieve major
gains and significantly strengthened their position in Africa, although they
were not immune to reverses. Since 1974 the Soviets have:
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? Used their airlift and sealift capabilities to provide large-scale military
assistance, military advisers, and technicians to clients at great distances
from the USSR.
? Helped keep in power pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia.
? Signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mozambique, although
so far they have neither gained access to military facilities nor entrenched
themselves in the government structure.
? Exercised command and control functions for Ethiopia in its war with
Somalia.
? Gained the use of an austere naval facility on Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in
the Red Sea as a support facility for the USSR's Indian Ocean naval
contingent, partly compensating for the loss of better facilities at Berbera
in Somalia.
? Used their presence in Ethiopia to conduct reconnaissance flights over the
Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean from Asmara, continuing
activities they formerly staged from Berbera.
? Used Luanda in Angola as a naval facility and staging point for recon-
naissance flights over the South Atlantic, compensating for the loss of
Conakry.
? Greatly increased military assistance and arms sales to Sub-Saharan
Africa: from $715 million in the period 1959-74 to $4.74 billion in 1975-80
(half of which went to Ethiopia).
? Profited from the employment in combat operations of large numbers of
Cuban proxy military personnel in Angola and Ethiopia. (In 1980 there
were 15,000 to 19,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola and 11,000 to 13,000 in
Ethiopia.)
? Encouraged and coordinated the placement of hundreds of East Germans
in security, organizational, and propaganda training jobs in Angola,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and other countries.
? Channeled arms to insurgents operating in Namibia, Rhodesia (Zim-
babwe), and South Africa.
? Quietly begun to provide technical military assistance and even military
advisers to the Libyan forces now in Chad.O
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r
The new Soviet activeness in Africa does not signify that the region as a
whole has any higher priority in Soviet eyes relative to other regions than it
had previously. Sub-Saharan Africa still ranks lower than the United States,
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, China, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia,
and the Middle East as an area of Soviet foreign policy concern. The USSR
has no truly vital security interests at stake in the region that it must defend.
Soviet military objectives in the area are-aside from Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf concerns-of a regional rather than global strategic character;
peacetime designs are probably more important than those keyed to a
general East-West war- and desired political gains are just as salient as
purely military ones.l
Whether the circumstances that permitted Soviet gains since 1974 will
persist in the years ahead is uncertain. There will clearly be continuing
opportunities for the USSR and its proxies to fish in troubled waters. The
potential openings are many:
? The political, economic, and social weaknesses that will continue to afflict
Africa.
? The tendency of African military organizations to acquire as much
weaponry as possible regardless of the real level of threat.
? Abiding African suspicions of Europe and the United States.
? The presence of apartheid in South Africa and its impact on the domestic
and foreign policies of other countries in Africa. Clearly, the Soviets view
support for the African struggle for majority rule in Namibia and South
Africa-in all of its political, economic, military, and diplomatic
dimensions-as a key element in their approach to Sub-Saharan Africa
over the next decade.=
Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may create
for the United States in the next several years, the most acute could be:
? Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by providing
military assistance-either directly or through the Cubans-to Soviet
clients in the event of internal instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe,
or by collaborating with the Libyans to exploit instability in Chad or
Sudan.
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Allwop Secret
? Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment,
or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up Moscow's "own"
regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if they were threatened
with internal collapse, whether provoked or not by US assistance to
dissident elements.
? Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third country-with
or without Soviet encouragement. For example, Ethiopian encroachment
on Somalia, or-less likely-fighting between Angola and South Africa
linked with Namibia.
? Soviet acquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.
? An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region, if the Soviets
were successful in obtaining access to port facilities and airfields in various
countries
We do not believe, however, that Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa is
likely to present a frontal challenge to the West in the areas of access to
strategic metals or oil. Even under circumstances favorable to the Soviets
they would not be able either to seize Sub-Saharan strategic metals for
themselves, or-barring a collapse of political order in South Africa-to
impose a prolonged denial of them to the West; nor does Soviet behavior to
date suggest that the Soviets themselves are currently pursuing either a
seizure or a denial strategy in the near or middle term. Likewise, Soviet
naval activities around the Horn and off the coast of East Africa do not
signal an active intention of interfering with the flow of oil supplies for the
West, given the supremely high risk this would entail and Soviet naval
inferiority in the region. Rather, these activities are intended to promote
essentially political objectives-as well as enhance the USSR's future
strategic capabilities in the area.^
Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily assure
greatly heightened future Soviet influence. Indeed, during the past year
Soviet comment has betrayed a sense of frustration over Moscow's loss of
initiative in the region. The Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of
a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by their own failure to
back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a grant of
military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and by
the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to seek greater
economic ties with the West
F
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?
In the future, as the Soviets encounter new opportunities, they will also face
old constraints:
? Foremost among these is the preference of virtually all African regimes,
including recipients of Soviet and proxy assistance, to manage their own
affairs.
? Virtually all African regimes are suspicious of Soviet motives.
? The Soviets and their proxies are not alone in Africa. Most African
countries operate within a Western-oriented international economic order,
and receive sizable assistance from the major Western powers and interna-
tional organizations, which the Soviets cannot match.
? The difficulty of translating military or economic assistance into lasting
political influence, a problem the Soviets have always faced in Africa
0
But, in addition, there are new factors that could seriously impair the ability
of the USSR in the 1980s to extend its gains:
? South African intervention against the MPLA forces in Angola and
Somalia violation of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia made it possible
for the USSR and Cuba to introduce their military contingents in those
countries while remaining on the "right" side of the Africans. Such
fortuitous circumstances might not be repeated in the future.
? Africans may be more chary now of superpower involvement than they
were in the 1970s.
? The Soviets are encountering difficulties in consolidating their influence in
Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Existing frictions may well multiply
as Moscow attempts to impose a pattern of institutionalization of power
favorable to its own interests, while failing to respond adequately to the
economic needs of its clients.
? The Cubans are more than Soviet agents; they have their own policy aims,
which have conflicted with Soviet aims in the past and could do so in the
future
Despite the opportunities already mentioned for maneuver in Sub-Saharan
Africa which the Soviets may be able to create or exploit, and despite the ex-
panded means at their disposal to do so, the Soviets in the 1980s will
nevertheless be vulnerable to Western counteraction, particularly with
respect to:
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? The Soviet inability to compete with the West in trade and economic
development assistance.
? The dissatisfaction of African military forces with the quality of Soviet
arms, availability of spare parts, level of maintenance provided, and
training.
? The dependence of the Soviets on Cuban proxy military forces. It could
force difficult and potentially embarrassing choices on the Soviets if, for
whatever reason, the Cubans decided to remove or substantially reduce
their troops in Angola or Ethiopia when this was not desired by the host
regime.
? The incompleteness so far with which Soviet-style political controls have
been institutionalized in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and the
consequent potential for leadership defection from Soviet tutelage and for
divergence of the system from the Soviet-preferred model.
? Suspicion among Africans of Soviet intentions, which has been reinforced
by Moscow's arm-twisting attempts to exploit dependency relations for
short-term tactical gains, and by African awareness of attempted Soviet
subversion.
? The perception widely held by Africans that "Russians" harbor racist
attitudes.
? Soviet lack of leverage to encourage the sort of negotiated resolutions of
the Namibian and-perhaps eventually-South African problems that
many leaders of black African countries would probably prefer to see.
D
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