POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000200100034-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 20, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/0rO115~C ZDP83B0014OR000200100034-6
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TS-815783
DOC. DATE 20 Mar 81
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 Approved For Rese 2007/04/11: CIA-RDP83B00140R000200100034-6
Re
THE DIR?OR OF
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI
FROM : DD/NFA
While Dick is well ahead of the remainder
of the Community, that is the NIO/Warning func-
tion. If you agree, I am prepared to circulate
the attached to Haig, Weinberger, Allen and any-
one else you should wish, simply saying that the
DCI thought the paper might be of interest. We
could get it out by LDX tonight.
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Attachment
TS-815783
 Approved For Release 2007 OR000200100034-6
? SECRET ?
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for National Foreign Assesment
FROM Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Poland
1. This is to inform you that I believe the present relaxed atmos-
phere in Washington with regard to Poland is unjustified. In making
this judgment, I face a dilemma. Despite the events of last night,
analysts apparently believe that somehow the Polish regime will, once
again, defuse a prospective crisis. The general view is that a formal
Alert Memorandum is not warranted at this time. Nevertheless, a few of
us for some time have had strong visceral sensations that the analysts
are wrong and that a move against the leaders of Solidarity and/or KOR
is a live possibility. It could occur as early as this weekend. Our
views are strengthened by the events of last night.
2. I believe the Community judgment is flawed for a number of
reasons:
With a few exceptions, analysts are not privy
tol and this is
fundamental to an understanding of the present
situation. We know that detailed preparations
have been made for the imposition of martial
law, although we have no evidence that a
decision to implement it has as yet been
taken.
-- They are over-emphasizing the possibility of
Soviet intervention as the threat to be
concerned over and under-emphasizing the
possibility of preemptive measures by the
Poles, although the latter is likely to
precipitate the former.
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
TS-815783
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The ups and downs of the protracted crisis
have given it a routine character in the eyes
of many, and they are perhaps insensitive to
its progressive deterioration.
We may be the target of Soviet or Polish
deception. (The publicity that has been given
to intelligence findings on events in and
around Poland has given the Soviets and Poles
excellent instruction in what they need to
conceal if they want surprise. Indeed,
maximum surprise would be essential if there
were any hope of avoiding bloodshed.)
3. There is another interpretation, plausible at least to me, that
can be given to recent events.
Developments in Poland since the summer are
clearly unacceptable to the Soviets, at least
in the long run. The Soviets almost brought
themselves to the use of force in early
December, but were persuaded by Kania that he
could bring the situation under control if
given time.
Since the Warsaw Pact meeting of 5 December
Soviet readiness has been lowered and the
situation in Poland has not again reached the
boiling point, as leaders on both sides work
for calm. No fundamental change in the situ-
ation has occurred, however. Moreover, the
Polish government has backed down on every
issue that threatened confrontation until last
night. (If Kania, however reluctantly, has
capitulated to Soviet demands and plans a
preemptive declaration of martial law, he will
continue to back down in the interim so as not
to create an incident and tip his hand prema-
turely.)
On the other hand the Polish government
conducted an exercise Ito review
its state of readiness to implement martial
law. During January and February a number of
moves were made to place military and internal
affairs officials in key points in transport
and communications networks.
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On 4 March Kania met with the Soviet leader-
ship. There is some fragmentary evidence that
he was given an ultimatum at this time.
In subsequent days the Polish regime began
moves against certain dissident leaders, but
failed to follow through when these leaders
defied its orders. It also backed down to the
workers in Radom.
Most agree that if martial law is declared, it
will occur when the factories are unoccupied,
probably on Sunday.
4. This sequence of events is quite suggestive. Against it,
however, must be placed the reassurance given us by the Soviets and the
Poles and the obvious interest of the Polish government, church, and
Solidarity in keeping the situation under control. In sum, while we
have no evidence that the Polish regime will crack down and declare
martial law in the near future, and while we feel this would be Kania's
last resort, there is evidence that some contingency measures have been
taken already, and there are good reasons to think we may be approaching
a most advantageous time to preempt. The events of last night could be
interpreted as a deliberate provocation. Should martial law be declared
and Polish armed forces lose control, Soviet intervention will follow.
Richard Lehman
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The Director of Central Inngence
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary_ of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Attached is a memorandum from Dick Lehman,
the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. He
is out in front of the remainder of the Community,
but that is his job. I am forwarding the paper to
you as a matter of interest.
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Attachment
TS-815783
 Approved For Rgps~ 04/11 : CIA-RDP83BOO140 000200100034-6
SUBJECT: Poland (TS-815783)
C/NIC:RL:lm (20 Mar 81)
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