LIBERIA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00225R000100020003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Direct of Secret
Intelli?~ e
for Stability
Liberia: Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
Secret
ALA 82-10015
February 1982
Copy 2 7 0
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Direc a of
Intelli e ` Secret
Liberia: Prospects
for Stability
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 1 January 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was re r y
the Office of African
and Latin American Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
West and East Africa Division, ALA,
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations, the Offices of Soviet Analysis, Near
East-South Asia Analysis, and Central Reference,
and the National Intelligence Officer for Africa.
Secret
ALA 82-10015
February 1982
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Liberia: Prospects
for Stability 25X1
Key Judgments Head of State Doe's mounting frustration with the job of governing Liberia
for the past 20 months prompted him last December to commit his regime
to a date for returning Liberia to civilian rule. Chances for a smooth
transition to civilian rule-now set for 1985--depend on Doe's ability to
maintain civil order and placate the military in the interim. To do this, he
will need substantial foreign aid to sustain the economy and to provide
money for military programs and equipment. The regime probably will
have difficulty attracting enough foreign aid to do both adequately.
If economic conditions worsen, Doe may accelerate the timetable for
civilian rule. This is likely to produce open resistance from some in the
military who are jealous of their power and perquisites, but Doe probably
retains enough loyalty in the military to thwart a coup attempt. Even so, an
early return to civilian rule also could result in the premature installation
of a weak regime.
Liberia's financial resources are depleted as a result of long-depressed
world demand for its chief exports, iron ore and rubber. Doe's government
has been plagued by corruption and incompetence, and efforts to restore in-
vestor confidence have been undercut by the arbitrary actions and petty
harassment of government officials. Doe looks to the United States and
other Western benefactors to help stabilize the economy with substantial
increases in economic assistance.
The drafting of a new constitution for civilian government may be finished
by April, and civilian pressure could grow on the military to lift the ban on
political activity and hold elections. This will test the resolve of Doe and
the military to surrender power.
A change to civilian government would provide new opportunities for
Libyan and Soviet meddling in Liberia's internal affairs. It could also
increase chances for at least a minor downturn in close US-Liberian
relations. A leftist civilian regime could try to extract additional US
assistance by threatening to turn to Libya or the Soviet Union, or to close
US communications facilities in Liberia. But poor Libyan and Soviet aid
records, Liberia's lack of a large Muslim majority, and its pro-Western
military would probably inhibit a radical tilt in Monrovia's foreign policy.
Secret
ALA 82-10015
February 1982
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25X1
for Stability
Head of State Doe's pledge in late December to
return Liberia to civilian rule by 1985 is fraught with
risks, but it will boost his re ime's sagging popularity
at least over the short term.
Precipitous
efforts to reintroduce civilian rule, wit out adequate
political and economic groundwork, could generate
serious military opposition and result in the installa-
tion of a weak civilian government no better prepared
than the Doe regime to address the country's prob-
lems.
The announcement of a target date for civilian rule
came in response to growing pressure from Liberia's
urban and educated population on Doe's 20-month-
old military regime to make its intentions known. Doe
probably intended originally to stay in power for as
long as eight years to put Liberia's house in order, but
has now grown tired of the burdens of office. Al-
though Doe has strengthened his grip on the govern-
ment by eliminating or intimidating all immediate
rivals, he has come to recognize that in the absence of
any substantial improvement in living conditions the
military government faces an erosion of popularity
over the longer run.
Doe's frustrations grow mainly out of the inability of
his military colleagues and civilian advisers to remedy
the country's chronic economic ills and his recognition
that the government is running out of promises it can
fulfill. Doe's search for solutions to Liberia's problems
is not being helped by his relative isolation from the
majority of the 22-member People's Redemption
Council (PRC) and the Liberian people in general.F
Liberia's bleak economic situation-unimproved since
the 1980 coup-poses the chief threat to the country's
political stability. Weak demand for Liberia's exports
(iron ore and natural rubber) and rising operating
costs for the country's energy-intensive mining indus-
try, coupled with inept financial management, have
produced ever worsening economic dislocation. Mon-
continues to face a minor financial crisis over
rovia I
each government payroll or payment for imported oil, 25X1
and it needs continual and substantial foreign assist-
ance. 25X1
Economic Woes
The PRC is unable to deal effectively with the
country's economic difficulties. The council is made
up of former enlisted men lacking in talent, discipline,
education, and experience, who have often put their
personal interests first. For example, individual PRC
members have frequently sought personal gain by
forcing civil servants and private businessmen to make
specific financial decisions.
The Doe government's failure to bring spending under
control, despite the deepening financial crisis, has
produced consistent deficits and foreign payments
problems. Some ministries subvert spending controls
by purchasing goods with credits against future tax
liabilities. Adding to widespread resentment of cor-
ruption, others simply do not process bills for pay-
ment. Doe has depended on eleventh-hour maneuver-
ing, foreign aid, and heavy guidance from the US
Embassy to avoid massive default. The targets im-
posed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
repaying loans to international banking concerns by
30 November 1981 were met only through short-run
austerity measures which included a temporary ban
on nonsalary expenditures and $10 million in US aid.
The recent action by the United States and other
industrialized countries to reschedule Liberia's offi-
cial debt and continue the oil credit facility should
give Monrovia some breathing space. The official
creditors offered a favorable rescheduling of all debt
payments coming due through June 1983 on the
condition that Liberia continue to satisfy IMF re-
quirements. This accord is likely to ease the harsh
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Head of State Doe (second
from right) with members of the
People's Redemption Council.
Nationwide address by Head of State,
23 December 1981
terms being called for by bankers in commercial debt
rescheduling talks and further improve Monrovia's
shaky foreign exchange picture. The continuance,
after protracted negotiations, of Liberia's $50 million
oil credit line prevented serious payment problems.
Had the credit facility collapsed, the Doe government
probably would have gone into default, activating
cross default clauses for other loans made by banks in
the group and inhibiting further access to internation-
al credit
Domestic credit shortages for the private sector, a
problem since the coup, have recently intensified,
slowing the importation of goods and stifling normal
business. Immediately after the coup, capital flight
diminished the country's cash supply by nearly one-
fourth. Liberia, which uses the US dollar as legal
tender, cannot run the printing presses to ease the
cash shortage, and US banks there have refused to
make up for the outflows. Bankers, moreover, are
refusing to accept public corporation accounts be-
cause they are continually overdrawn, and thus
amount to unauthorized loans.
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"We hereby pledge to hand over authority to a
civilian government on 12 April 1985, the fifth anni-
versary of our revolution. We feel that during the
next three years we will have become sufficiently
determined that a government by the people, of the
people, and for the people should emerge.
The sooner we can realize true signs of rapid and
sustained progress, the sooner we are prepared to
return to the barracks. We therefore use this occasion
to once again appeal to our traditional friends to
come to our rescue in these critical times. We urge
the following nations to commit themselves to the
Liberian economy in this way: The United States-
$1 billion; the European Economic Community-
$1 billion; Japan and South Korea-half a billion
dollars. "
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Liberia's financial picture also is clouded by the
increasing need to import rice, the major staple.
Domestic production of rice, almost entirely for farm
consumption, has stagnated. On the other hand, de-
mand for rice-pushed by high population growth and
accelerating urbanization-has risen steadily. As a
result, imports of rice have grown at an average
annual rate of 22 percent since 1975. Despite several
minor shortages, therefore, the Doe government has
been able to maintain rice supplies as well as to
weather the repercussions of a 20-percent retail price
hike. Doe almost certainly remembers that ill-advised
plans by former President Tolbert to increase rice
prices in April 1979 precipitated large-scale rioting
and extensive property damage in Monrovia. This
event undermined Tolbert's authority, and the politi-
cal unrest that followed led to his ouster a year later.
Popular Attitudes
The PRC's performance during its first 20 months has
tarnished Doe's "heroic" postcoup image as Liberia's
first leader of indigenous tribal descent, replacing the
Americo-Liberian settler elite. Conditions in rural
areas have changed little since the April 1980 coup.
Doe, in turn, has preferred to remain in Monrovia,
spending relatively little time upcountry with his rural
constituencies.
Should strong public opposition to military rule devel-
op, it would probably start in the capital in response to
agitation by potentially volatile segments of the popu-
lation, such as students, intellectuals, or labor. Such
agitation, in turn, could strike a responsive chord
among urban slum dwellers. All these elements are
frustrated with their economic lot and resent increas-
ing corruption and unemployment. They also share a
growing perception that Doe is granting political and
economic favors to his own Krahn tribe at the expense
of others.
? Secret
criticism of the government and have so far muted
their concerns. Even so, without some economic prog-
ress, popular dissatisfaction is likely to mount.
Return to Civilian Rule
As a first step toward eventual civilian rule, Doe set
up a commission in April 1981 to draft a new
constitution. Public hearings began on a preliminary
draft in November 1981 and could be completed by
the end of February. So far, public hearings on the
constitution have been well attended, and the commis-
sion is meeting its deadlines. The final step in the
ill be the ratification of the constitution b
process w
the PRC and possibly by a national referendum 25X1
m run. g 25X1
tional commission's work and to lead the military
Despite Doe's public commitment to a 1985 target
date, there are signs that-because of his frustrations
in Liberia-he hones to speed the constitu-
back to the barracks possibly in 1983. Some members
of the constitutional commission believe that the
constitution could be ready for submission to the PRC
by April 1982, to be followed by the organization of
political parties and the scheduling of elections possi-
bly as early as October. This is the date that presiden-
tial elections would have been held had the former
Tolbert regime remained in power
Constraints and Challenges
Doe faces several potentially serious obstacles to
returning Liberia to civilian rule, particularly if he
pushes for a date earlier than 1985. The decision to
relinquish power within the next three years reported-
ly was made by Doe and his four senior colleagues on
the PRC apparently with little or no consultation with
the council's junior members or the Army's rank and
file.
Many junior members of the PRC have grown used to
As a start toward easing
ower
ites of
i
h
.
p
s
e perqu
t
25X1
junior PRC members back to the barracks, Doe last
So far, Doe has intimidated or adroitly manipulated
dissidents into inaction despite their occasional rum-
blings. Labor has been quieted by wholesale firings in
response to strike actions. Students and intellectuals
are aware of Doe's penchant for responding harshly to
December ordered the abolition of the PRC s many
standing committees. These committees were chaired
by junior PRC members who oversaw virtually all
aspects of Liberian social, political, and economic life,
and used their positions to harass businessmen and
citizens for personal gain and power.
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Doe may have to provide substantial incentives to
entice PRC members to step down by 1985. In
addition, living standards for enlisted men will have to
be raised. It will be difficult to meet these conditions
quickly and Doe's position could be threatened by
PRC members determined to stay in power, or by
enlisted men whose potential power has been in-
creased by the government's lax attitudes toward
military discipline and command control. In addition,
enlisted men would be dubious of a civilian govern-
ment's willingness to better their condition.
Doe is aware of these potential pitfalls and seems to
have made a return to civilian rule by 1985 condition-
al upon his ability to stabilize the economy. In
announcing the date for a return to civilian govern-
ment, Doe called upon the United States, the Europe-
an Community, and Japan to provide $2.5 billion in
grant aid to ensure a smooth transition. Prospects for
substantial increases in foreign assistance are uncer-
tain. By seemingly linking a handover of power to
significantly increased aid levels Doe will be able to
put the blame on the parsimony of aid donors should
he decide or be forced to retain power for a longer
period. At present, the Liberian economy is almost
wholly dependent on financial assistance from the
United States and the IMF. The fund will provide up
to $65 million during 1982 and US aid could reach
$80 million during the current US fiscal year. Other
donors (mainly West Germany, Japan, and the Neth-
erlands) provide development assistance at substan-
tially lower rates
Once a date for elections is set, several challenges are
likely to arise. Politicking-now dormant-will be
revived, causing more headaches for the government.
Some in the military probably will be attracted to one
or another of the political parties that emerge, thus
confusing their loyalties. The military regime's poli-
cies could become a preelection issue. Any resulting
political ferment directed against the military regime
may test Doe's resolve to relinquish authority.
At present, there are no strong civilian political
leaders on the scene who could generate broad public
appeal in Liberia's tribally fractionalized society.
Under these circumstances, a return to democratic
rule could result in a weak civilian government with
inexperienced leaders. If current problems with mili-
tary indiscipline and economic decline persist, the
postelection period is likely to be marked by a belea-
guered civilian government heavily dependent on mili-
tary good will for its survival.
Additional problems would ensue if the mood of
frustration among the economically disadvantaged
resulted in a leftist election victory. Two of the parties
likely to be in the running are the Marxist-oriented
Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) and the more
moderate but avowedly socialist Progressive People's
Party (PPP). The chance that one of these parties
could come to power is a source of concern to many in
the largely pro-American military. A leftist victory
could even cause the Army to void the elections and
quickly reinsert itself into politics
Potential for Soviet and Libyan Meddling
The transition to civilian rule may offer new possibili-
ties for foreign meddling. Libya, as it has done
elsewhere in West Africa, is likely to offer financial
assistance to political parties Tripoli feels it can
influence. A weak civilian government beset with
financial problems could also seek Soviet and Libyan
aid as a means to expand its base of foreign economic
donors, or as a ploy to extract more assistance from
the West.
In the aftermath of the 1980 coup that brought Doe to
power, Libya and the Soviet Union saw an opportuni-
ty to expand their influence and to weaken Liberia's
traditionally close relationship with the United States.
Some of Doe's more radical civilian Cabinet appoint-
ees initially aided these efforts, inviting the Libyans to
establish an Embassy, attempting to forge closer links
with the Soviets, and allowing the Ethiopians to train
some 60 Liberian student teachers. The strongly pro-
Western Doe reversed this trend in early 1981 by
expelling the Libyan Embassy after only a few
months of operation, demanding the reduction of the
Soviet Embassy staff to six, and ordering the firing of
the Ethiopian-trained teachers. Doe's stand has an-
tagonized many of his leftist political opponents who
favor a more genuinely nonaligned foreign policy to
reduce Liberia's image as a US client state in Africa.
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Qadhafi's attempts to subvert West African govern-
ments have had their greatest chance of success in
countries with substantial Muslim populations. Even
in these areas his efforts have not been notably
productive. In the period leading up to the 1979
elections in Nigeria, for instance, he attempted-
unsuccessfully-to buy influence through campaign
donations to Nigeria's two northern Muslim-dominat-
ed political parties. Elsewhere in West Africa, he has
sought with limited success to undermine Western
influence with lavish promises of money and support
for leaders potentially sympathetic to Libyan aims.
Libyan attempts to gain influence in Liberia will
probably be thwarted by the limited appeal of Qadha-
fi's brand of radical Islam to its predominantly con-
servative and non-Muslim population. Promises of
substantial economic assistance by the Libyans and
Soviets could bring short-term diplomatic gains, but
this advantage would quickly erode in the face of
unfulfilled expectations
The Soviet and Libyan records elsewhere on the
continent suggest that offers of military and security
assistance are the most likely form of aid a potentially
exploitable new regime in Monrovia can expect. De-
spite a Liberian desire to upgrade the status of its
armed forces, tendencies to turn away from Washing-
ton will be impeded by the fear of a strong negative
reaction by the United States and by pro-American
sympathies among key Liberian military officials.
Even in the unlikely event a radical civilian regime
won election and was allowed to take office by the
military, it would perceive that dramatic moves to-
ward closer ties with Libya and the USSR would
damage US Liberian relations and undermine
to attract further US financial assistance
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Implications for the United States
The transition'to civilian rule increases chances for at
least a minor downturn in the current close relations
between Liberia and the United States. A radical or
leftist successor government might be inclined to use
the presence of important US installations in Liberia
as a point of pressure in dealing with the United
States.' Such a regime could threaten to close the
installations in an effort to extract more US aid or to
secure rent for the facilities that are currently pro-
vided gratis. Even a moderate successor regime might
be tempted to burnish Liberia's nonaligned creden-
tials and to bring it more into line with the African
mainstream by distancing itself somewhat from
Washington. But the temptation of any successor
government to be less accommodating toward Wash-
ington almost certainly would be tempered by the
realization that US aid is critical to Liberia's eroding
economy and by the absence of alternative benefac-
tors of proven reliability.
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