CHINESE CIVIL DEFENSE: AN ADJUNCT OF WARFIGHTING POTENTIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00227R000100090005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
9:'\ Intelli?ence
' 1 1b,
Chinese Civil Defense:
An Adjunct of
Warfighting Potential
Secret 25X1
March l 2
Copy 3 4 i
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Directorate of , Secret
Intelligence
Chinese Civil Defense:
An Adjunct of
Warfighting Potential
Information available as of December 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Geographic and Societal Research
Comments and queries may be directed to
the Chief, China External Division Office of East
Asian Analysis This paper was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia, the Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research, and with the former Office of
Secret
EA 82-10034C
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Secret
Chinese Civil Defense:
An Adjunct of
Warfighting Potential
Unlike the USSR and many Western powers, China intends its civil
defense effort as a means to continue armed resistance, preserve manpower
for military roles, and minimize damage to the nation's warmaking
potential. China's multifaceted program has several specific objectives:
? Protect the leadership.
? Defend urban areas.
? Preserve scientific and technical personnel.
? Provide additional space for commercial or industrial use.
? Reduce losses to the industrial base.
? Shelter some of the general populace in the event of nuclear or
million people and possess almost one-third of the nation's industrial
wealth.
The People's Liberation Army exerts firm control over China's civil
defense system. Garrison commanders in important cities control civil
defense through the militia commands and through the Municipal People's
Air Defense (civil defense) Offices. These organizations build shelters,
supervise civilian aspects of the system, and train the Armed Militia that
will use the underground shelter system as part of an urban defense.
Construction of shelters occurs throughout China, but emphasis is given to
the major cities of northeastern China that together contain nearly 30
prospects of a military stalemate favorable to China.
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Though China's civil defense preparations have important deficiencies,
they provide a substantial measure of protection against enemy attack.
Under most circumstances the Chinese could achieve several of their
specific wartime objectives. Furthermore, control of the facilities by the
PLA contributes to a coordinated and stubborn defense, raises the price in
time and troops required for a successful Soviet invasion, and increases the
iii Secret
EA 82-10034C
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Secret
Role of Civil Defense in Chinese Strategy
Organization and Control
Command Structure 6
Construction 6
Effectiveness 8
Value in Defending Urban Areas
Demographic and Industrial Profile of Key Northern Cities 13
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Figure 1
Likely Soviet Avenues of Approach
/Lake
Baikal
eijing
Secondary approach route
Approximate Soviet
garrison area
Military region boundary
h f U \ . ~/ North
~' \ f Korea
SEOUL N
South
rv Korea
Primary approach route
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Chinese Civil Defense:
An Adjunct of
Warfighting Potential
Role of Civil Defense in Chinese Strategy
It is necessary to build our country's People's Air
Defense system into an "Underground Great
Wall". . . for people to live in, engage in produc-
tion, defend themselves, launch offensives, and
carry out tunnel warfare and street fighting at the
same time.
We should ... build our strategic rear into a
powerful, solid base ... capable not only of sup-
porting protracted war, but of fighting the war
independently.
Xu Xiangqian
Former Minister of Defense
Army Day 1978
Although the Chinese term for civil defense, renmin
fangkong (literally, "people's air defense"), normally
is translated as "civil defense," the Chinese meaning
extends beyond the usual Western understanding of
the term. In the West, civil defense implies passive
measures to protect unarmed civilians from the effects
of attack. Although the Chinese do intend their
massive network of civil defense shelters and tunnels
to protect civilians somewhat, the structures are built
primarily to cover and conceal urban militia and PLA
stay-behind troops who would conduct tunnel warfare
and streetfighting. As such, civil defense preparations
contribute to China's overall deterrent to conventional
attack and help improve the PLA's prospects for
stalling or defeating an invader.'
Chinese strategists believe that in an attack the
Soviets would employ fast-moving armored forces to
seize the principal cities of northeastern China that
' China's intended use of tunnels and shelter systems in urban
warfare is well described in an article entitled "Cities To Become
Stalingrads in the Event of Invasion" carried in Liberation Army
Daily, 17 April 1978:
The major cities in the path of an enemy attack are prime
objectives the aggressor wants to take and which have political,
military, and economic significancefor us. These cities have all
been built up for many years and have strong ranks of
workers ... and many sturdy above-ground structures and under-
contain nearly 30 million people, the nation's political
center-Beijing-one-third of the nation's industrial
capacity including many key defense industries, and
most of China's better rail lines (see figure 1 and
annex). Acutely aware that existing PLA forces are no
match for the highly mobile Soviet forces, the Chinese
have chosen to trade space for the time required to
move in massive reinforcements from central and
southern China. The Chinese, however, hope to inflict
on the Soviets the heaviest possible losses of men,
materiel, and time and to prevent them from gaining
control of the population, industrial wealth, and the
important rail lines. To this end, they have built
hundreds of miles of tunnels, shelters, and firing
positions beneath key cities to enhance their defensive
potentiall 25X1
Because the Chinese perceive the greatest threat to be
to their political and industrial heartland in the
northeast-the Beijing and Shenyang Military Re-
gions-they have emphasized building shelters and
tunnels in cities such as Beijing, Shenyang, Harbin,
and Dalian. Many northeastern cities have tunnels
capable of carrying vehicular traffic that support the
interconnecting network of tunnels to be used by 25X1
defenders. Although other important cities such as
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xi'an, and Chongqing have
well-developed shelter systems, only that in Shanghai
appears comparable to those in the north.
ground construction works. Therefore, use of the cities is another
aspect of adhering to an active defense. For these strategically
important cities, there will be Stalingrad-like holding actions
characterized by a powerful defense and a dogged fight. Cities
which are significant to campaigns and battles must be held for a
certain period of time. Defending the cities cannot be considered
passive defense but rather a way to disperse and weaken the enemy
in coordination with main force units which will destroy the enem
in mobile warfare
a
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Organization and Control
Command Structure. The military firmly controls
China's civil defense system. The system's structure is
part of the People's Liberation Army chain of com-
mand, thus ensuring that civil defense functions are
coordinated with broad military plans. Orders origi-
nate in the General Staff Department (GSD) and flow
downward through the military region and military
district headquarters to the garrison commands in
special cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai) and military
subdistrict commands elsewhere (figure 5). Each re-
gion and district has a People's Air Defense Office,
which is probably part of the PLA's Operations
Department, to handle civil defense information.
Command and control of the civil defense system
appears to be well defined, though the rigid hierarchi-
cal system might slow the flow of orders and informa-
tion in an emergency
under the administrative control of the municipal
government, operationally it is subordinate to the
local garrison commander and is headed by a PLA
general officer. The municipal office prepares civil
defense contingency plans for the city, supervises
construction of civil defense shelters, and oversees
requisite training. Its seven departments in effect
determine the extent and quality of civil defense work
at the lowest levels throughout the urban area.
Each PLA garrison commander controls civil defense
operations through two parallel structures, the Dis-
trict Arms Department and the Municipal People's
Air Defense Office. Through the District Arms De-
partment he commands all militia units in the area,
and he heads or advises the municipal air defense
office (often colocated with the District Arms Depart-
ment), which manages the shelters and administers
civilian participation in the civil defense program.
Because the garrison commander has effective control
over both the shelters and the militia that will defend
them, defense within a city probably would be well
At the national level, the party's Military Commission
establishes policy and provides guidance on civil de-
fense.
the Military Commission also maintains a
special account to aid construction and maintenance
of shelters. Routine administration of civil defense
programs is performed by the National People's Air
Defense (civil defense) Leadership Group set up under
the PLA General Staff Department.
I I
The national leadership group, which is headed by a
GSD officer and includes the chief of the PLA
Engineer Corps, establishes technical standards for all
civil defense construction and directs the system
through People's Air Defense Offices at the military
region and district levels. The leadership group studies
foreign civil defense programs, arranges for special-
ized technical assistance to PRC civil defense by
nonmilitary organizations such as the State Capital
Construction Commission and Ministry of Health,
and apparently acquires special civil defense materials
such as blast doors, ventilation and water systems,
ob-
and nuclear detection equipment that Cann
tained easily through local supply channels
The Municipal People's Air Defense Office is the key
entity linking the national leadership group with its
shelter complexes. Although the municipal office is
coordinated and stubborn)
Construction. Chinese civil defense construction has
steadily improved in quality since the mid-1970s, when
better materials and state-established construction
standards became available. The Municipal People's
Air Defense Office constructs civil defense shelters
using militia labor, PLA engineers, plans and special
materials furnished by Beijing, and local construction
materials that meet the high national standards.' Over
the last several years, there has been an upsurge in
technical competence, standardized designs, and pre-
fabricated structural components associated with tun-
nel construction as China has incorporated shelters
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Secret
Chinese Civil Defense Command Structure
Military Commission of the
Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee
General Staff Department
Chief of Staff-Yang Dezhi
Senior Deputy Chief of Staff-
Yang Yong
National People's Air Defense
Leadership Group
Director, NPADLG-
Wang Wenxian
PLA Air Force Air Military Regions (11)
Surveillance Organizations Operations Departments
People's Air Defense Offices
Commanders of Military Districts
(Provinces)
Operations Departments
Commanders of Garrisons
(Major Cities)
Operations Departments
Provincial People's Municipal People's District Arms
Air Defense Offices Air Defense Offices Departments (Militia)
Military Subdistrict Municipal Ward CD
CD Organizations CD Organizations Organizations
Street Committees Factories and
Enterprises
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into most new construction projects.' Once built, the
underground facilities are linked by interconnecting
tunnels some of which can accommodate vehicular
traffic.
Warning and Alert Procedures. China depends on an
extensive but only partially effective network of air
surveillance radars and communications facilities to
provide warning of an air attack. Chinese officials
recognized the need for more timely relay of air
surveillance information for civil defense as early as
1969
and other devices-such as loudspeakers-in rural
areas. An authoritative Chinese newspaper, Guang-
ming Ribao, claimed that 93.1 percent of all produc-
tion brigades and 87.6 percent of the production
teams across the country had wire broadcasting facili-
ties and that the number of wire broadcasting loud-
speakers in use exceeded 100 million by early 1977. In
addition, China's urban dwellers are served by an
extensive public address system and most of them
possess radio setsi 25X1
China probably could alert most of its civilians to an
impending air attack once hostile aircraft were detect-
ed and their destinations predicted. A combination of
traditional and modern communications systems
seemingly could reach as much as 90 percent of the
country's 1 billion people. China has developed exten-
sive wire and microwave broadcasting systems, and an
authoritative manual on public civil defense warning
methods, Air Defense Common Sense, states that
central and regional authorities, after learning of an
imminent air attack, would inform and direct subordi-
nate organizations via those systems. The manual
further states that air raid warnings would be dissemi-
nated to the general public by radio, wire, television,
' A Chinese official, citing official policies of "combining peacetime
with wartime" and "making one thing serve two purposes," pointed
out that including shelters in all new building plans reduced
construction costs, increased the space available for productive
_tn
purposes, and above all provided better and deeper footings
improve the survivability of the structure in an earthquake.)
Effectiveness
Value in Defending Urban Areas. Chinese military
planners believe that, if the Soviets moved into north-
ern Manchuria, they would attempt to seize control of
major railways to ease the logistical burden of sup-
porting their rapidly advancing armored and mechan-
ized forces. Nearly all the railways in the northeast,
however, pass through large cities. In heavily built-up
areas, such as the extensive industrial complexes
surrounding Harbin and Changchun, armor would
have limited usefulness. Hence, Soviet infantry most
likely would be used to seize the cities and ensure
control of the rails. The Chinese reason that Armed
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Figure 6. Underground tunnel
system ianmen District, Beij-
ing.
Militia and PLA troops would be of considerable
value in opposing enemy infantry from the buildings
and streets of a major city.'
The urban shelter complexes-defended by troops
and Armed Militia-would be used to hold the cities
and impede the Soviet advance. The Chinese have
taken care to construct fighting positions in many of
their shelters. In addition, the shelters provide excel-
lent cover and concealment and, because they often
are linked together by underground passageways,
would permit swift movement of troops and militia
from one part of the city to another (see figure 6). In
such circumstances, Soviet infantry might become
bogged down in lengthy-and costly-street fighting
that would slow the rate of advance and produce
considerable battle losses. Bunkers would have to be
taken street by street from tenacious Chinese defend-
ers (see figure 7).
25X1
The alternative to securing the major cities would be
semipermanent deployment of Soviet forces to sur- 25X1
round and isolate them. If the Soviets were unwilling
to pay the price of clearing the enemy from their
shelters, they would face rear area security problems
and degradation of their logistical support system.
Chinese defenders could hold out almost indefinitely
in their tunnels and bunkers against conventional
bombing or artillery fire, though they might succumb
to nuclear fallout or to attacks by chemical or biologi-
cal weapons. Aside from the boost to morale and
propaganda of holding a major city such as Harbin
against the Soviets, a city's defenders would serve as a
constant threat to the Soviet Army's rear, tying down
units that could be used elsewhere. Additionally, the 25X1
Soviets would have to forward bulky supplies such as
petroleum and ammunition and to evacuate casualties
with only limited use of the rails.
-The militia consists of three components: Armed Militia, Back-
bone Militia, and Ordinary Militia. The Ordinary Militia has little
if any military training and probably is of use primarily as corvee
for construction projects. The Backbone Militia consists of some
demobilized PLA soldiers and cadre. As such, it constitutes a
manpower pool to replenish battle losses. The Armed Militia, a
force of about 7 million, consists of PLA veterans and party
personnel. It is reasonably well trained and would be the militia's
primary contribution to urban defense
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Figure 9. Newly designed concrete and steel door
in shelter beneath se Academy of Sciences.
China's lack of attention to civil defense training for
the general public contrasts the occasional drills of the
militia in urban defense. Chinese civil defense offi-
cials and the public apparently have not taken civil
defense exercises seriously since about 1971, when 25X1
training was more frequent. We judge that Beijing
now believes that a Soviet attack is not likely within
the next few years, and it probably wishes to reduce
disruptions to production that would result from a 25X1
more ambitious drill program. Continued improve-
ments to the shelter systems, however, suggest that
the Chinese still value them as a contingency measure
should the threat of hostilities with the USSR in-
crease. 25X1
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Annex
Demographic and Industrial Profile
of Key Northern Cities
Military District City Area (sq km)
Population
Major Industries
5 henyang Military Region (17 percent of China's total industrial production)
Heilongjiang Harbin a 150
2,500,000
Electrical equipment, bearings, and heavy
machinery.
Qiqihar b 55
1,000,000
Railroad cars, machine tools, ,and heavy
machinery.
Mudanjiang 20
500,000
Tires and aluminum.
Jiamusi 20
400,000
Aluminum.
Anda Fragmented
650,000
Oil (site of Daqing), refining, and
petrochemicals.
Changchun 120
1,500,000
Trucks and railroad cars.
Jilin 60
1,000,000
Chemicals and iron and steel.
Shenyang c 155
2,750,000
Machine tools, heavy machinery, steel, and
electronics.
Dalian d 80
1,500,000
Shipbuilding, railroad cars, and diesel
locomotives.
Fushun 85
1,500,000
Coal, aluminum, steel, and oil refining.
Anshan 70
1,250,000
Iron and steel.
Beijing Military Region (13 percent of China's total industrial production)
Beijing garrison
Beijing e 200
5,000,000
Machine tools, electronics, and iron and
Tianjin garrison
Tianjin 125
3,500,000
Steel and electronics.
Shanxi
Taiyuan 85
2,000,000
Iron and steel, chemicals, and heavy
machinery.
Datong 25
500,000
Cement, diesel engines, and steam
locomotives.
Baotou f 50
1,000,000
Iron and steel and aluminum.
_
Hohhot g 40
800,000
Machinery and electronics.
a Important producer of light tanks, military aircraft, and helicopters.
b Produces bulk of China's long-range artillery.
Key producer of military aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.
d )Important naval facilities are located here.
e Produces nearly all of China's armored personnel carriers.
f Leading producer of medium tanks and antiaircraft artillery.
g Producer of solid propellants for strategic missiles.
Italics denote cities with well-developed tunnel and shelter systems.
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