KAMPUCHEA: LOOMING FOOD AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00227R000100200005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Kampuchea: Looming Food
State Dept. review
completed
and Refugee Problems
An Intelligence Memorandum
MASTER FILE COPY
CO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
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 Directorate of Secret
Kampuchea: Looming Food
and Refugee Problems
An Intelligence Memorandum
Information available as of 20 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This memorandum was prepared by
This memorandum has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and with the National
of the Office of East Asian Analysis and by
f the Office of Global Issues.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division,
OEA
Intelligence Council.
Secret
EA 82-10064
June 1982
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.
Aranyaprath,
Gulf
of
Thailand
Romping SS
E Khmer refugee concentration
? Major rice producing area
100
Kilometers
Tonle
Sap
Speu, ,PHNOM tl
Komponp Speu?
SO U:h
Chini
Sea
Non do1kirI
Indonesia )UI
1000 Kilometers
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Secret
Kampuchea: Looming Food
and Refugee Problems F_
Summary Kampuchea's 1981-82 rice harvest is inadequate to feed the population.
While only scattered shortages are now reported-the crop season ended in
April-we expect that a widespread shortage will develop in the months
preceding the next major harvest in December.
Phnom Penh cannot count on external help to cover a major shortage. The
Soviets delivered only half the food aid they pledged last year and are
shifting emphasis to technical and developmental support. Vietnam will be
no help; it still cannot produce enough to meet domestic needs. Western do-
nors are reluctant to make up the difference, mainly because they do not 25X1
want to shore up the Heng Samrin government.
In the absence of substantial external food aid, there will probably be a
large flow of Kampucheans to the Thai border later this year. The border
camps, which now hold about 290,000 Kampucheans, had up to a million
refugees following the 1979-80 exodus. Although the influx this year will
not match that of 1979-80, it could still cause sufficient security problems
for the Thai that they might try to push Kampucheans back across the bor-
der. In any event, the Thai will be looking for more aid from the West to
feed the refugees.
iii Secret
EA 82-10064
June 1982
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Agricultural Problems
Since guerrilla activity picked up in the early 1970s, the food situation in
Kampuchea has been tenuous. In a good year the country can barely
produce enough rice to meet subsistence needs. In a poor year the crop can
easily fall to levels that mean famine.
Food production is hampered by problems stemming from social upheaval
and a decade of war. Since the early 1970s, an estimated two-thirds of the
draft animals have been lost, and nearly all farm machinery has been
destroyed. A farmer without draft animals is only about 10 percent as
productive as a farmer with a pair of water buffalo. Even rudimentary
tools are in short supply; the government estimates there are only 800,000
hoes for 1.3 million families. Seed and fertilizer are scarce. In addition,
only about half of the prewar area is being cultivated. Some fields were
ruined by an ill-conceived and poorly executed effort under Pol Pot to
change irrigation patterns to large-scale operations. Other areas, particu-
larly near the Vietnam border, are not used because landmines, punji
sticks, and other battle debris have not been cleared.
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Kampuchea: Looming Food
and Refugee ProblemsF-
The 1981-82 Harvest Analysis of available evidence on the 1981-82 rice harvest indicates the
crop probably came in 20 percent below last year's harvest and 30 percent
below domestic needs.
Allowing for milling losses, spillage, and similar problems, it appears the
crop will yield about 580,000 metric tons of milled rice. Analysts generally
assume 12 kilograms per person per month is a minimum if not totally ade-
quate rice ration, implying that at least 850,000 tons are needed to sustain
the 5.9 million people under Phnom Penh's control. 25X1
Weather crippled the 1981-82 rice harvest. Heavy rains at the start of the
planting season reduced the area sowed; a late spring and summer drought
further cut the area planted and reduced yields; and a mid-August flood
washed away or submerged many fields. As a result, we estimate that the
wet-season crop, which was harvested in December and January, fell 30
percent below the 1980-81 level-itself insufficient to feed the population.
Government reporting indicates that the dry-season crop, which was 25X1
recently harvested, was up sharply from last year because a much larger
area was planted and yields improved. This year's crop, however, account-
ed for only about 15 percent of total annual rice output.
Battambang Province, located in the west along the border with Thailand,
illustrates the setbacks encountered nationwide. Battambang normally
produces about one-fifth of the country's wet-season rice and had a wet- 25X1
season planting goal of 300,000 hectares for 1981. In January 1982,
however, the Phnom Penh media reported that only 260,000 hectares had
been planted, of which 37,000 hectares were lost because of drought and
flooding.
tends to substantiate, yields of less than a 25X1
metric ton per hectare-21 percent below the yield claimed for the
province's 1980 crop. Media reporting and relief agency observers have
indicated similar results elsewhere, particularly in the southern and
southeastern provinces, which have been hardest hit by the whipsaw effects
of drought and flooding. 25X1
If the overall crop assessment is accurate, there will be serious problems for
much of the population. The estimate of a 30-percent rice deficit uses a
minimum figure for domestic needs. Nutritionists say 15 kilograms of rice
per person per month are needed to sustain a working population. We have
used only 12 kilograms per month in the estimate because it is sufficient to
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Judging the 1981-82 Crop, Evidence and Uncertainties
The Kampuchean Government maintains an extensive village reporting
network. Its estimate of area planted is in line with the areas viewed by the 25X1
FAO team. Crop yields have been reported by each of the villages and to-
taled by Phnom Penh.
As to the smaller dry-season crop-only 10 to
15 percent of the yearly total-recent government estimates of area
harvested and total output were used.
Also, there are indications that the government will try to
double crop some areas during the current wet season. Some of these areas
will be planted with a high yield strain of rice. The country has been using
high-yield rice in some areas for two years and may have accumulated
enough seed for a significant increase in area planted with the strain this
year. It is not clear, however, to what extent double cropping with regular
and high yield strains will be done and, if successful, how much it will
ameliorate the anticipated shortage.
The appendix contains detailed information on the elements of the crop
estimate.
sustain life. Consequently, there would be hardship even if the crop were
much larger. Shortages obviously will be more severe in areas where the
harvest was particularly poor, and the government compounds the problem
by giving preference for food to members of the government, particularly
the military.
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There is some disagreement on the quantity of rice per capita that should
be used to calculate Kampuchean needs. The FAO survey team uses an in-
dividual requirement of 12 kilograms per month to provide minimum
sustenance. This level provides only about half of the caloric requirement
of a working adult and assumes that the diet is supplemented by other lo-
cal foods. Other analysts use 15 kilograms per month as a more normal
level of consumption. Even this level is below the average consumption in
Kampuchea during the 1960s. In this paper we use 12 kilograms as a
conservative estimate for the minimum needs of the population.
Food needs are the key uncertainty in linking a rice shortage to migration.
While 12 kilograms per month (8 cups of cooked rice per day) is taken as a
rockbottom ration, people can live for short periods on less. It is possible
that many Kampucheans will choose to remain in their villages eating less
than 12 kilograms per month even though they suffer debilitating effects.
Moreover, it is not possible to estimate the availability of supplemental
foods such as vegetables, fruit, fish, and other items, which usually
account for roughly half the diet.
Politics of Food Phnom Penh can hope for little additional food assistance from its Soviet
and Vietnamese patrons to fill this gap. The Soviets, who suffered their
own third bad harvest in a row last year and who are trying to force more
rational agricultural policies on the Kampucheans and Vietnamese, deliv-
ered only 55,000 of the 100,000 metric tons of food they had originally
pledged. Furthermore, the Soviets are shifting away from emergency aid
toward long-term developmental and technical assistance to strengthen
their leverage and role in Kampuchea. 25X1
Nor is Vietnam in a position to help; Vietnam's food production is still be-
low domestic needs. the Vietnamese have even 25X1
diverted foreign food assistance for Kampuchea to their own use. As in the
past, Hanoi will probably donate token amounts of food aid for propaganda
purposes. 25X1
Western nations are reluctant to fill the gap because they do not want to
subsidize Vietnam's puppet regime in Kampuchea and because they doubt
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Kampuchea: Supply and Demand for. Rice a
Area harvested (1,000 hectares)
2,200
690
1,320
1,260
Yield (tons/hectare)
1.22
0.92
1.20
0.98
Output (1,000 metric tons)
2,690
640
1,580
1,230
Milled (1,000 metric tons)
1,490
310
760
580
Estimated population (millions) d
6.4
5.4
5.7
5.9
Rice requirement e
(1,000 metric tons)
1,400
780
830
850
Surplus (deficit)
(1,000 metric tons)
90
(470)
(70)
(270)
a Data are rounded to the nearest 10.
b Average of six crop years for which data are available. Crop year
begins on 1 May.
c Postharvest losses from spillage and spoilage, seed reserves, milling
losses involved in removing husks from grain, and, for the 1981-82
crop year, set-asides for seed exchange program.
d The 1960s population estimate is for the entire country. The most
recent three years are for the portion of the country under Phnom
Penh's control and are based on data released at the time of the 1981
spring elections.
e Requirement based on 144 kilograms per person per year. The
1960s "requirements" are based on average consumption of 219
kilograms per person per year.
the reliability of Phnom Penh's information on internal conditions. Futher-
more, Western donors are aware that Phnom Penh gives precedence to the
military, party cadre, and other government workers in distributing relief
supplies.
Largely at ASEAN urging, donors last fall split what had previously been
a single UN aid program for Kampuchea into two separate funding
programs, one for the Thai border area and the other for the interior via
Phnom Penh. This year, Western donors have committed only about $8
million for some 31,000 metric tons of rice for the interior compared with
70,000 tons last year. Donor countries at recent pledging conferences
generally agree with UN aid officials that the potential for serious food
shortages still exists but argue that this reduced program is adequate to
maintain the structure of the UN relief pipeline in case additional
emergency aid becomes necessary. Such a limited program, however,
allows for no slack should conditions deteriorate rapidly. The UN World
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Food Program, the lead agency for Kampuchean relief, estimates that a
minimum of three months would be required to gear up assistance and get
it to the Kampuchean countryside in the event of serious food shortages.
Donor support for the Kampuchean refugees along the Thai border
demonstrates, in part, their commitment to Bangkok. This year's border
relief budget of $26 million is, however, based on the needs of the present
refugee population. It does not include contingency funds for a substantial
refugee influx. Nor does it allow for the cross-border distribution of aid to
transient refugees as in past years.
The View From Phnom Penh has few options available to meet the expected food crisis.
Phnom Penh Among the courses under consideration are:
? Travel restrictions on civilians aimed at preventing migration to urban
areas as shortages develop.
? Coercive grain procurement-such as agricultural taxes and forced sales
to the state-to procure food for government personnel and the urban
population.
? Relocation of nongovernment personnel to the countryside in an effort to
increase the agricultural labor force. 25X1
So far the regime has avoided heavyhanded polices so as not to alienate the
populace. Elsewhere in Indochina, forced collectivization and grain sales 25X1
have failed to provide substantially more food. Furthermore, adopting such
measures would undermine the regime's efforts to build public support.)
On 4 May the government announced a farmland
reclamation program that will encourage relocation from urban centers to
the countryside. The plan is based on incentives such as loans, agricultural
supplies, food, and money. 25X1
As for Western aid, Phnom Penh and its Soviet and Vietnamese mentors
are not willing to meet the conditions the Western donors have laid down:
? Allowing the World Food Program to monitor internal aid distribution
more closely.
? Targeting vulnerable population groups in specific areas.
? Obtaining a pledge of matching food aid from the USSR.
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The Exodus The number of Kampucheans who move to the Thai border this fall will
depend on Phnom Penh's actions. Any forced resettlement program would
induce many to flee. Other coercive measures, such as forced rice sales,
would also add to an exodus. On the other hand, the government may try to 25X1
contain the problem by limiting internal movement and migration.
In any event, improved internal conditions make it unlikely the exodus will
equal that of 1979-80. This year's crop, although short, is almost double
the disastrous harvest of 1979-80. Also, many Kampucheans have resettled
in their home villages and are attempting to reestablish a livelihood.
Futhermore, the regime has made some progress in restoring agricultural,
manufacturing, health, and transportation facilities. 25X1
Thailand currently has 185,000 Indochinese refugees, including 90,000
Kampucheans, within its borders, and 200,000 more are camped across the
border on the Kampuchean side. In discussions with donor countries, the
Thai have indicated they view the looming refugee problem with mixed
feelings. They see the presence of border refugees and the attending
international workers as a buffer between their forces and those of the
Vietnamese, but they are concerned that the involvement of resistance
forces with the refugees might spawn attacks by the Vietnamese. They also
fear retaliation by the Vietnamese against border relief operations in
response to the cutback in international aid to Kampuchea via Phnom
Penh. More important, they feel threatened by the apparent declining
support from other countries for the refugees-fearing they could get stuck
with many Kampucheans with little financial help to feed or house them.
Bangkok views very negatively those Kampucheans seeking to remain in
Thailand indefinitely.
If large numbers of refugees arrive at the border this fall, Thai authorities
probably will try to keep them on the Kampuchean side. Since mid-1981 no
Kampuchean refugees have been permitted into Thailand except those
temporarily pushed across by fighting. In the long run, Thai hospitality will
depend mainly on the continued full funding of border-relief operations by
Western donors. Bangkok has received sufficient resources to handle its
current refugee population but will insist on increased funding for new
arrivals and probably for a renewed cross-border "land bridge" of food aid.
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Longer Term Phnom Penh recently announced its intentions to restore agriculture to the
self-sufficiency level enjoyed during the 1960s-planning to more than
double the area planted over the next five years. The intent is to motivate
some of the urban populace to reclaim fallow land by offering financial in-
centives, agricultural supplies, and equipment and food.
Given the lack of resources, this goal will be difficult to meet. Rebuilding
the draft animal herd is the key to expanding area and yields, but this re-
quires many years. Following World War II, a number of war-ravaged
Asian economies required a decade to rebuild their herds, even with the in-
fusion of substantial amounts of foreign aid and imported livestock. Labor
shortages and a scarcity of trained administrative and technical personnel
resulting from Kampuchea's substantial loss of population will also hamper
national recovery.
7 Secret
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Phnom Penh
Media Reports
(May 1982)
FAO Estimate
(November 1981)
Planted area (hectares)
1,350,000
1,199,700
Flood and drought losses (hectares)
197,000
166,300
Other losses (hectares)
30,670
29,300
Late plantings (hectares)
68,100
Harvestable area (hectares)
1,122,300
1,072,200
Yield (metric tons per hectare)
0.920
1.082
Paddy output (metric tons)
1,032,544
1,160,120
Dry-season production
Planned area (hectares)
150,000
150,000
Planted area (hectares)
137,000
150,000
All losses (hectares)
35,000
Harvestable area (hectares)
137,000
115,000
Yield (metric tons per hectare)
1.460
2.550
Paddy output (metric tons)
200,000
293,250
Total 1981-82 rice production
Paddy output (metric tons)
1,232,544
1,453,370
All losses and deductions (metric tons) a
649,363
762,425
Milled rice for consumption (metric tons)
583,181
690,945
a Postharvest losses from spillage, spoilage, and seed reserves (20
percent), set-asides for seed exchange programs (30,000 metric tons),
and milling losses involved in removing the husks from the grain (39
percent).
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Appendix
In December 1980 Phnom Penh set the planting goal for the 1981 wet-
season rice crop-Kampuchea's major harvest-at 1.7 million hectares, a
13-percent increase over the unmet 1980 goal. Even with good weather, the
goal was ambitious given the shortages of draft animals, farm machinery,
and fuel. During the spring and summer of 1981, adverse weather reduced
chances that the planting goal could be met. Early rains were heavier than
usual and caused extensive flooding, especially in the areas bordering the
Tonle Sap. A subsequent drought lasted throughout the summer and was
followed in mid-August by heavy flooding, which washed away or sub- 25X1
merged crops near the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap. As a result, we
estimate that the number of hectares of harvested wet-season rice fell from
1.23 million in 1980 to just over 1.12 million this year.
Yields per hectare were down sharply during the wet-season. Last year's
crop yielded an average of 1.19 metric tons of paddy rice per hectare of
land harvested (mt/ha). Phnom Penh recently reported the 1981 crop
yielded only .92 mt/ha. A long dry spell during the summer was the major
reason for the reduced yields.
The UNFAO's earlier hopes that the smaller dry-season rice crop would
make up the wet-season loss have not been met. The FAO's optimistic
projection for a 293,000-ton harvest was based on the assumed availability
of seed, fertilizer, fuel, and pumps sufficient to assure timely planting and
successful propagation of the crop. The assumption has not been realized.
One member of the World Food Program team that visited Kampuchea
during January 1982 reported that fuel and fertilizer were in short supply,
and Phnom Penh media reports indicate that fertilizer was concentrated in
the two provinces expected to account for half of the crop instead of being
distributed to all growing areas. Figures attributed to the Kampuchean
Ministry of Agriculture indicate that only 137,000 hectares out of the
planned 150,000 hectares had been planted. 25X1
The Phnom Penh media have reported that the current dry-season rice crop
yielded a total of 200,000 metric tons of paddy-a 75-percent increase over
last year's dry-season production of 114,500 metric tons, but only about
two-thirds of what the FAO had anticipated. Even adding output from this
relatively more successful dry season crop, however, total paddy output for
the 1981-82 crop year will amount to only 1.23 million metric tons. This is
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more than 20 percent below the 1.58 million metric tons harvested in
1980-81 and less than half the annual average production of the 1960s-a
period when the population was roughly the same size as it is today.
Subtracting for seed reserves, post harvest losses, milling losses, and other
deductions, the net amount of milled rice available for consumption will be
about 580,000 metric tons-about 25 percent less than the 760,000 metric
tons of milled rice derived from the 1980-81 crops and significantly short of
the amount needed to meet Kampuchea's minimum requirements.
25X1
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