IRAN: A HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00232R000100110002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
Iran: A Handbook
Secret
NESA 82-10167
May 1982
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Iran: A Handbook
Information available as of 15 April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Division, NESA,
Asia Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf
Council
This paper has been coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations and with the National Intelligence
Secret
NESA 82-10167
May 1982
the Office of Near East-South
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Introduction Iran's rich natural and human resources and its location in the Persian
Gulf region give it strategic importance in the East-West rivalry. Until
1978 Iran seemed solidly in the Western camp. The Shah intended Iran to
be a model of Third World development and a reliable link in the Western
chain of defenses. Tehran was using its income as the world's second-
largest oil exporter to develop what it hoped would be a self-sustaining
industrial base and as the basis for a major role in the international arena.
The Shah commanded the region's largest and most sophisticated armed
forces and communications network.
The political upheaval of late 1978 led to the creation in early 1979 of the
Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran became an international
maverick fueled by religious fervor and actively opposed to US interests.
The Soviets had made a major strategic gain; even if Moscow failed to win
influence with the new Iranian regime, the United States had lost a major
ally in the region.
The Iranian revolution was a genuinely popular movement. It included a
visceral revulsion against Western-particularly US-influences that were
perceived as destroying basic Iranian religious and cultural values. During
the past three years the clerical activists who played the leading role in the
upheavals have, through repression, eliminated their most powerful secular
and leftist allies. They have exploited:
? The emotional and symbolic appeal of Shiism, especially its anti-Western
aspects.
? Khomeini's personal charisma.
? A nationwide organization centered on local mosques and charitable
foundations.
The clerics' fear of and lack of interest in a modern economy and armed
forces led to extensive purges of experienced civilian and military person-
nel. Their extremist foreign policy initiatives and determination to "export
the revolution" isolated Iran from its neighbors and the industrial states
that had earlier backed its development. The economy is in disarray-oil
exports are one-third of prerevolutionary levels, foreign exchange reserves
have declined by 85 percent, and yearly inflation is at least 70 percent.
Nonetheless the Khomeini regime has muddled through. The regime
provides the basic necessities, especially to the lower classes who comprise
its power base. The middle and upper classes have left Iran or are cowed.
The regular armed forces and Revolutionary Guard, though antagonistic to
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NESA 82-10167
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each other and ill supplied, have proved responsive to the regime's demands
and capable of defending it against Iraq and internal threats.
Tehran has turned to the USSR and its allies for arms and civilian goods
largely because other sources are unavailable. The Soviets, for their part,
are eager to improve relations. Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, has
not been allowed a full political role, but it has had some success in
penetrating key sectors of the society, despite deep suspicion in. Iran of
Soviet aims and of the Communist threat to Islam.
The Khomeini regime enters its fourth year with a sense of confidence and
coherence noted by most recent visitors to Tehran. It is engaged in a
diplomatic offensive designed to open political and economic contacts with
a wide range of nonaligned and European states. Iranian troops have seized
the initiative in their war with Iraq. Tehran maintains contacts with
international mediators but has not relaxed its terms for a settlement.
Important legislation seems to be moving through parliament after negoti-
ated compromises between rival pro-Khomeini factions.
Iranian attitudes toward the United States and the West show few signs of
softening. But, economic need and Iran's newfound self-confidence could
eventually lead to some moderation of its anti-Western rhetoric.
Iran has the potential to resume playing a dominant role in the Gulf in the
1980s unless its revolution degenerates into civil war. Its two rivals, Iraq
and Saudi Arabia, probably will strengthen cooperation against this
danger, but the Gulf's weaker states have historically sought to establish a
working relationship with both Baghdad and Tehran in an attempt to play
off contending ambitions.
Domestically, the Islamic Republic is still fragile. To survive, its clerical
leaders must:
? Control the various regular and irregular armed forces and not allow
them to exacerbate factionalism within the ruling group.
? Make better use of technocrats and other experts trained at home and
abroad.
? Provide the prospect of economic and social betterment to the lower
classes.
? Sustain an ability to compromise among themselves.
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Their most intractable problem may be legitimizing their authority after
Khomeini dies. He symbolizes the aims of the revolution and, like other
charismatic leaders, is irreplaceable. Rival factions seem to have reached
agreement-with his blessing-on how to proceed with selecting the senior
cleric or clerics who will eventually inherit his power. Iranian spokesmen
have indicated that this individual or individuals should be named by
midyear. If the clerics manage an orderly transition to the post-Khomeini
era, their chances of retaining power will be considerably enhanced.
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Figure 1
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1. OPEC Crude Oil Production Excluding Natural Gas Liquids 18
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Geography '
Location
Iran is located in the highlands of southwest Asia
between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Iran's
area is 1.6 million km, about one-fifth that of the
United States. It has a northwest-southeast extent of
about 2,250 km and an east-west extent of about
1,450 km.
Topography
Iran consists of rugged hills and mountains that form
a wide rimland nearly enclosing an interior area of
plains, hills, and mountains; discontinuous low plains
fringe the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf.
The sparsely populated desert plains of the interior
range from about 200 to 1,500 meters above sea level.
Intermittent small streams carry runoff inland to low-
lying salt lakes. During dry periods the salt lake beds
have a firm crusty surface underlain by miry soil.
Dunes and unstable sand are located in many parts of
the plains. The interior highlands rise above the plains
in steep rocky slopes and rugged crests of 750 to 2,400
meters. Grass, trees, and crops are common only in
the northwest. Irrigated crops are grown near settle-
ments in the southeast. The growing season is general-
ly between April and October. A few scattered rural
settlements are located along the periphery of the
interior basin connected by a few dirt and gravel
roads.
The rimland of high rugged mountains and narrow
valleys comprises about one-half of Iran. The crests-
1,100 to 4,000 meters above adjacent valley bot-
toms-average at least 1,800 meters above sea level
and reach over 5,500 meters in the Elbruz Mountains
in the northwest. Included in the mountain rimland
are small plains, mostly scattered throughout eastern
Iran. In the north and west a few deeply incised
perennial streams flow in narrow, intensively cultivat-
ed valleys. Runoff drains into them during the wet
season from early December to April.
Most towns and transportation facilities in the rim-
land are located in the north and west. The few main
roads are asphalt or gravel; the narrow connecting
roads are dirt or gravel.
A narrow flat plain edges the coast of the Caspian Sea
and extends along the Rud-e Gorgan into the USSR.
Vegetation consists of shrubs, sparse grass, crops, and
a few trees adjacent to watercourses. There are
several perennial streams, most of which have low
banks, and many small, shallow irrigation ditches.
Flooding occurs sporadically during April, May, Sep-
tember, and October. Several minor fishing ports and
trading centers along the Caspian coast are connected
by a hard-surfaced road that roughly parallels the
coast. It connects with the scattered rural villages by a
sparse network of mostly dirt or gravel roads.
The Khuzestan plains in the southwest are an exten-
sion of the eastern part of the Tigris-Euphrates basin
of southeastern Iraq. The plains are flat to rolling and
are covered by small areas of loose sand, cultivated
crops, and desert grass. Several large perennial
streams flow southward across the plains into the
Persian Gulf. Low areas are inundated or miry from
early March through May; this includes large
marshes, mudflats, and areas of tall grass and reeds
found along the lower reaches of streams and along
the Gulf coast. Most of the major oilfields of Iran are
located in this area and are connected with processing
and storage facilities by several aboveground pipe-
lines. A fairly extensive system of asphalt and gravel
roads and a rail line connect the large urban centers.
Climate
Most of Iran is arid or semiarid with marked seasonal
extremes of temperature. Winters are characterized
by passage of lows and frontal systems. Summers are
monotonously sunny, dry, and hot almost everywhere.
Topographical features strongly influence all aspects
of the climate, causing variation according to location.
'A detailed summary of Iran's military geography is available from
the Persian Gulf Division of the Office of Near East-South Asia
Analysis.
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In winter mean daily maximum temperatures vary
from 0?C to 10?C; mean minimums range from
-10?C to 0?C. At the highest elevations tempera-
tures usually remain below freezing all winter, and
some minimums register well below -20?C. In the
south the average daily temperatures in winter range
from 10?C to 20?C. Iran is one of the hottest
countries in the world from June through August.
Heat is most intense on the Khuzestan plains at the
head of the Persian Gulf, where daily maximum
temperatures exceed 45?C throughout most of the
summer. Afternoon temperatures reach above 30?C
almost daily in the rest of the country except along
the Caspian Sea and at the highest elevations. The
most humid parts of Iran are the coastal regions along
the Caspian Sea and Gulf of Oman. In the interior
relative humidity is moderately high during winter
but is very low in summer.
Precipitation on parts of the Caspian littoral and
adjacent mountain slopes, particularly in the western
sections, exceeds a mean of 115 cm. Most of the
remainder of the country receives scanty precipitation
except for a few mountain areas in the west and north.
The extensive interior basins and the lowlands along
the Gulf of Oman are the most arid, averaging less
than 15 cm of precipitation annually. Monthly
amounts during periods of maximum precipitation are
3 to 10 cm except at some Caspian locations in
autumn, when monthly means can exceed 25 cm.
Natural Resources
Petroleum and Minerals. Iran's oil and gas reserves
are among the largest in the world, with major inland
oilfields running for 160 km in the southern Zagros
Mountains. The US estimate of Iran's proven oil
reserves is 60 billion barrels. Gas reserve estimates
range from 390 to 600 trillion cubic feet, about 15
percent of the world total. (For further details, see
Economy: Main Sectors of the Economy-Petro-
leum.)
The country's other raw materials are varied but
relatively undeveloped. Discoveries and exploitation of
many of the mineral deposits have been made only
recently. Coal deposits range between 300 and 400
million tons; undiscovered reserves may be as high as
4 billion tons. Proven reserves of copper are estimated
at 630 million tons and iron ore at 840 million tons
(potentially 2-4 billion tons). Other significant mineral
deposits are lead and zinc (10-50 million tons), man-
ganese (720,000 tons), sulphur (12 million tons), and
antimony (12,000 tons). Minor quantities of mercury,
ferrous oxide, nickel, quartz, silver, and borax have
been found.
Agriculture and Livestock. Agriculture has tradition-
ally been Iran's largest employer despite generally
unfavorable environmental conditions. Less than one-
fourth of the country has the potential to produce
crops, and less than 10 percent of the land is under
cultivation at any one time. Each year 40 to 75
percent of the total cultivated area is left fallow to
permit the soil to absorb moisture and regain fertility.
Only the Caspian coast and the western mountain
ranges receive enough rainfall to support nonirrigated
agriculture. The most productive croplands are in the
northern and western provinces, where precipitation
patterns favor winter grain production (see Economy:
Main Sectors of the Economy-Agriculture).
Staple Crops. Iran's principal crops are wheat and
barley, predominantly winter varieties. Wheat is the
country's basic food, accounting for at least half of
the energy value in the diet; of late it has become even
more important because shortages and higher prices
of other foods are increasing the demand for bread.
Barley is the major feedgrain. Other major crops
include sugar beets, rice, cotton, tea, oil seeds, and
pistachio nuts. Corn, tobacco, potatoes, and onions are
also grown.
Livestock. The livestock industry plays an important
role in the Iranian economy, contributing approxi-
mately 40 percent of the value of total agricultural
output. The performance of the livestock sector in
recent years reflects poor feeding and shelter condi-
tions, which make the animals susceptible to disease.
By the mid-1970s, 80 percent of the pasturage in Iran
was overgrazed. Sheep, goats, cattle, and poultry are
the principal livestock animals.
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Figure 2
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Main gas pipeline
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11
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RAG-E SAPID / Gachsar8
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Figure 3
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n'et necessarily authontstrve:
Iran
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Industry and Mining
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Coalfield
Sugar mill
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Soviet Union
& L. ?Bandar-e 'Abbas
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Figure 4
Land Utilization
Agriculture
Grazing and scattered
areas of cultivation
Wasteland
unduy nt amn u
ni.
Arabian
Sea
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Figure 5
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Saudi Arabia
Major Crops
LJ Wheat
Barley
Wheat and barley
Rice and tea
.~.... Northern limits of dates
Kerman.
Afghanista v
!heal a\
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Fish. The Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf are rich in
fish, but commercial fishing is not well developed in
Iran. Caspian waters are mostly exploited by the
USSR. Over 100 species of fish can be found in the
Caspian Sea including white salmon, pike, perch,
carp, herring, and sturgeon. The Persian Gulf is
believed to have some 200 largely unexploited varie-
ties of fish, the most significant being sardines, mack-
erel, tuna, and shrimp.
Human Resources
Population. Iran's population was estimated in 1977
at over 34 million and growing at a rate of 2.7 percent
per annum. At this rate the population would now be
almost 39 million. But the growth rate has almost
certainly increased since the Islamic revolution be-
cause family planning programs have been aban-
doned. The Khomeini regime, however, claims a
population of only 36 million. The median age is
slightly over 17, compared to a median age of about
19 in Egypt and 30 in the United States.'
Iranian society is characterized by ethnic and linguis-
tic diversity. Around a central core of Persians who
speak the Persian language (Farsi) are a number of
minority groups of diverse origin and differing lan-
guages. Some of these groups form virtually separate
enclaves, while others are in varying stages of absorp-
tion into the Persian majority. Poverty and illiteracy
are pervasive and severe.
Islam is the strong unifying force-only about 2
percent of the population is non-Muslim. The vast
majority of Iranians belong to the heterodox Shia
branch of Islam. Iran's rich cultural heritage and long
tradition serve to perpetuate a sense of national
identity, although the Khomeini regime emphasizes
Islamic rather than nationalist themes. A strong sense
of individualism pervades the society, and primary
loyalties are focused on the family.
Although Iran is a conservative, tradition-bound soci-
ety based on agriculture, significant social change had
taken place before the Islamic revolution, primarily as
' Median ages for Iran and Egypt are based on 1976 data; for the
United States, on 1980 data.
Figure 6
Iran: Population Growth, 1940-85
Millions
a result of land reform, industrial development, ur-
banization, and increased educational opportunities.
These changes weakened the landlords, improved the
lot of many peasants, and expanded the middle class.
Accelerated rural-to-urban migration, however, in-
creased the already large rootless lower class of
unskilled and illiterate workers.
The population's growth rate, its youth, and urban
migration are causing serious social and economic
problems. There are severe housing and food short-
ages and high unemployment. The Islamic revolu-
tion's disruption of the economy and society have
deepened these problems.
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Population
Persons per square kilometer
0 10 20 40 8
0 26 52 104 207
Persons per square mile
Census-1966
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Society. Iranian society is in transition. Social change
gained momentum early in this century with the
spread of Western ideas and technology; it was accel-
erated by Reza Shah's modernization program and
further speeded by the last Shah. Reaction to this
rapid modernization and Westernization was a driv-
ing force behind the Islamic revolution. The revolu-
tion has sought to return Iranian society to more
traditional ways with all aspects of life governed by
Islamic teaching, tradition, and law.
Land is the traditional basis of wealth. After the turn
of the century, however, new sources of wealth in
trade, manufacturing, finance, and real estate specu-
lation created a commercial and industrial stratum-
a new upper middle class-located in the urban
centers. This group, which included many individuals
of middle or lower middle class origin, increased
substantially as a result of the extensive economic
development that accompanied the expansion of the
oil industry after World War II.
The Islamic revolution drastically changed all this.
The Shah, his family, and his court, once the apex of
the social pyramid, are now dead or in exile. The
wealthy elite (Westernized importers, industrialists,
bankers, and high government officials) and the mid-
dle class have been eliminated by the revolution or
maintain a low profile out of fear. Urban middle class
groups of industrial managers, engineers, technicians,
skilled workers, and intellectuals which multiplied as
a result of economic development and increased edu-
cational opportunities have been largely replaced by
petty merchants, craftsmen, Muslim clergy, and
Islamic revolutionaries.
At the bottom of the urban class structure are the
street vendors, service workers, day laborers, and an
increasing number of industrial workers. The urban
lower class continues to swell as large numbers of
peasants migrate to the cities in search of employ-
ment. The incidence of unemployment, however, is
high; and despite the regime's social welfare pro-
grams, the economic plight of the lower classes is
often desperate.
and day laborers at the bottom of the village social
scale. The landowners frequently owned whole or
parts of villages; many were absentee landlords resid-
ing in the cities. Today, in addition to the headman,
the mullah, schoolteacher, and local leaders of various
Islamic "revolutionary" organizations constitute a
village leadership of sorts. Most communities have an
Islamic komiteh, some have an Islamic court, and a
few have village councils.
The Islamic government continues to try to come to
grips with the divisive land reform problem. Much of
the holdings of the large landowners were taken by
the clergy after the revolution, and current attempts
by the government at land redistribution are being
resisted by conservative clerics.
Loyalty to family and devotion to Islam form the
basis of the traditional value system. For most the
first allegiance is to the immediate kinship group,
then, in lessening degrees, to more distant relatives, to
the community or tribe, and finally to the nation.
Economic, political, and social activities are largely
family affairs, and family honor is zealously protect-
ed, particularly among tribespeople. Whatever its
ethnic, linguistic, or tribal affiliation, the traditional
family, with few exceptions, is extended, patriarchal,
patrilineal, endogamous, and occasionally polygynous.
Women occupy a subordinate position to men.
Family relationships, along with most other aspects of
life, are largely regulated by the precepts of Islam.
Islamic values are puritanical, emphasizing good
deeds in anticipation of a final judgment and stressing
resignation to the will of God. While aspiring to a
better life, the devout poor are convinced that the
division of worldly goods is ordained by the Al-
mighty-a belief that helps the impoverished accept
gross economic inequalities.
Most members of the urban upper and middle classes
subscribe only nominally to Islamic beliefs and prac-
tices, finding them incompatible with the partially
Westernized lifestyles and secular values that they
were adopting before the Islamic revolution.
Traditionally, rural society has been less stratified
than urban, but a wide gap has existed between the
wealthy landlords and the lower class tenant farmers
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Many of the urban poor, on the other hand, are
devout to the point of fanaticism. Rural people in the
traditional mold tend to accept the premises and
prescriptions of Islam to the extent that they are
familiar with them, but they are not rigid in their
religious practice.
Iranians regard themselves as an individualistic peo-
ple; this fosters a strong sense of personal worth and
an extreme sensitivity to insult or lack of respect.
Skillful politicians and others have been able to
exploit the apparent readiness of mobs to respond to
remarks or actions deemed insulting by invoking what
is known as qeyrat, or zeal in defense of honor.
Iranian individualism has helped foster a habitual
distrust of outsiders, often construed to mean all but
family. This in turn has impeded the development of a
deep sense of community. Honesty is a highly regard-
ed ideal, and there is considerable respect for a man
who refrains from making illicit gains. Shrewdness,
however, is valued as a weapon in interpersonal
struggles involving the exploitation or manipulation of
others, and many display a certain admiration for the
adroit rascal. There appears to be an ingrained cyni-
cism regarding official motives and the processes of
government. Forcefulness and strength are seen as the
most important qualities for leadership. The forceful
man emerging in the role of leader has been a
frequent feature of Iranian history.
The idea of progress, defined as material advance-
ment, is regarded with some suspicion by devout
Muslims since it is almost inevitably followed by a
decline in religious observance and a breach in tradi-
tional Islamic values. The more fanatical orthodox
adherents, including ultraconservative religious lead-
ers, view any change as anathema.
Ethnic Groups. Almost all of the Iranian people are
descendants of invading Indo-Europeans, Turks,
Mongols, and Arabs. The largest group are the so-
called ethnic Iranians whose Indo-European, or
Aryan, progenitors probably settled in present-day
Iran in the second millennium B.C. Predominant
among the ethnic Iranians are the Persians, who
comprise 65 percent of the population and are concen-
trated in the country's large central plateau.
The Turkic peoples, who invaded Persia between the
10th and 13th centuries, are the second-largest ethnic
group, accounting for an estimated 18 percent of the
population. Chief among them are the Azarbayjanis
found in the northwestern provinces of East and West
Azarbayjan (Azarbayjan-e Khavari and Azarbayjan-e
Bakhtari, respectively) and Gilan. Largely settled
farmers or townspeople, they belong to the same
ethnic group as the, Turks of Anatolia and those of the
Azerbaydzhan Republic in the USSR. The most
important tribally organized Turkic groups in Iran are
the Turkomans and Qashqai. The former, who include
both pastoralists and farmers, reside in Khorasan
Province and the eastern half of Mazandaran Prov-
ince; others live in the Turkmen Republic in the
Soviet Union and in Afghanistan. Mostly nomads, the
Qashqai are concentrated primarily in Fars Province
in central Iran. Two smaller nomadic Turkic tribes
are the Shahsavan and the Afshar, most of whom
inhabit East Azarbayjan.
The third sizable ethnic group, the Arabs, entered the
area during the rapid expansion of Islam in the
seventh century. Now estimated to comprise 3 percent
of the population, they constitute the majority of the
inhabitants of Khuzestan Province and also dwell in
Fars and Khorasan Provinces, in the cities of Yazd
and Kerman, and along the coast of the Persian Gulf.
Smaller ethnic groups include the Kurdish, Lur,
Bakhtiari, and Baluchi tribes and the Gilani and
Mazandarani peoples. The Kurdish tribes have a
strong ethnic identity and inhabit Iraq, Turkey, and
Syria as well as Iran. Most Iranian Kurds live in the
mountainous area of the northwest, while the remain-
der reside in the north-central portion of Khorasan
Province. Formerly a nomadic people, the majority
are now farmers; a few have migrated to the cities.
Lur and Bakhtiari tribespeople live in the Zagros
Mountain region, with the Bakhtiari inhabiting an
area southeast of the Lurs. The Bakhtiari are semino-
mads; the Lurs mainly farmers.
Among the most backward and impoverished of the
ethnic Iranian minorities are the nomadic Baluchis
who dwell in the eastern half of Baluchestan va Sistan
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SAKHTIARI
Iran
Arabian
Sea
Ethnic Groups
KURDS Ethnic Group
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Province in the southeast. They are part of a larger
group, being closely related to the Pushtu speakers of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have a strong ethnic
identity. The Gilani and Mazandarani peoples, resid-
ing in Gilan and Mazandaran Provinces, respectively,
on the coast of the Caspian Sea, have been settled
farmers and fishermen for centuries. They do not
differ markedly from the Persians.
Ethnic minorities, particularly the nomadic tribal
groups, have been a source of difficulty for Iranian
governments. Until the 1920s most tribal leaders
exercised a large measure of independence, control-
ling routes to their respective areas, extorting pay-
ment from travelers, and indulging in pillage and
banditry. Reza Shah Pahlavi tried to solve the prob-
lem by undermining tribal organization and attempt-
ing to convert the nomads to sedentary farming. The
upshot was economic disaster for the tribes. Toward
the end of his reign, Reza Shah was forced by
economic considerations to modify his approach.
After his abdication in favor of his son in 1941, tribal
groups were able to resume their traditional way of
life, but most never fully recovered from the effects of
the repression. In 1946 the Bakhtiari and the Qashqai
staged open rebellions that were suppressed only with
considerable bloodshed. A limited and unsuccessful
uprising among the Qashqai occurred as late as 1968.
Control of the central government over the Iranian
periphery has weakened since the Islamic revolution.
Ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, have moved to
assert more local control as Tehran's power has
weakened. The range of their political concerns, how-
ever, will remain limited by parochial goals. The
ethnic minorities, as a rule, will exploit rather than
instigate political change (see Opposition: Ethnic
Groups for more on minority political activity; reli-
gious ethnic groups are discussed in Geography: Hu-
man Resources-Religion).
Language. Most Iranians speak standard Persian, or
Farsi, the official language of Iran and the second
language of a majority of non-Persians. Promoted by
the Pahlavi government to foster unification among
the country's diverse ethnic groups, it is the language
of the government, the military, and the schools.
An Indo-European language, Persian is written in a
variation of the Arabic alphabet and contains a large
Arabic vocabulary as well as some Turkish words,
especially military terms. Spoken Persian has several
dialects, ranging from the speech of Tehran and other
urban centers to peasant dialects.
Other Indo-European languages spoken in Iran in-
clude Kurdish, Gilani, Mazandarani, Luri, and Balu-
chi, each of which has several dialects. Except for
Kurdish, these non-Persian languages are rarely
written.
The Turkic dialects of Iran, which belong to the
Altaic family of languages, differ from standard
Turkish but are mutually intelligible to a considerable
degree. Azarbayjani, or Azari, the most important of
the Turkic dialects, is similar to the vernacular of
Soviet Azerbaydzhan. In the northeast the Turko-
mans speak a different Turkic vernacular that is
nearly identical with that spoken by their counter-
parts across the border in the Soviet Union.
Arabic dialects spoken in Iran are modern variants of
the older Arabic that formed the base of the classical
literary language and all Arab dialects in the Middle
East. The Khuzestan Province dialect is similar to
that of Iraq. Most Iranian Muslims have some famil-
iarity with Arabic as the language of the Koran.
The language of Iran's small Armenian community,
although Indo-European, is unintelligible to Persian
speakers. Members of the country's small Assyrian
minority speak Syriac, a modern variant of Aramaic,
an ancient Semitic language. Iran's Jews speak He-
brew and an old, Hebrew-flavored Persian dialect,
while the small Gypsy population speaks Romany,
originally a language of northern India.
Educated Iranians are often literate in one or more
Western languages, primarily French, English, and
German. Russian is widely understood as a second
language in Gilan and Mazandaran Provinces. The
Islamic government has decreed that all students
must study Arabic as their second language. The-
ological students, in Qom at least, must learn English
or French.
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Religion. Muslims comprise over 98 percent of the
country's inhabitants.' More than 93 percent of the
population belong to the heterodox Shia branch of
Islam, while no more than 5 percent of the total,
mainly Turkomans, Baluchis, Arabs, and some Kurds,
are orthodox Sunni Muslims.
When Muhammad died in 632, a dispute over his
legitimate successor developed into the Sunni/Shia
split. The Sunnis insisted that the successor should be
chosen according to Arab tribal custom by agreement
of the community. The Shias believed that Muham-
mad should be followed by his son-in-law and cousin
Ali ibn Abu Talib.
Since the 16th century Iran has been the citadel of the
Shia world, which comprises perhaps 8 percent of all
Muslims. The Shia faith has tended to isolate Iran
from the rest of the Muslim world, and pan-Islamic
sentiment accordingly has not been widespread. In the
past, friction between Shiites and Sunnis was pro-
nounced, but it subsided during the 20th century only
to be revived under the new Islamic Republic.
At the heart of Shia doctrine-and not accepted by
Sunnis-is the primacy given to the role of the
Imams, who are considered to be infallible and the
successors of Muhammad appointed to guide the
Muslim community. Ithna-Ashariyah Shiites believe
in the existence of an immortal Hidden Imam, the
12th, who went into concealment as a child about 878
A.D., and who will reappear one day as the Mahdi
(divinely guided one) to establish peace and justice
throughout the world. Official Iranian media often
refer to Ayatollah Khomeini as the deputy of the
Hidden Imam.
Besides the predominant Ithna-Ashariyahs, there are
two other small Shia sects in Iran, neither of which
has more than a few thousand adherents. The Ismai-
lis, sometimes known as Seveners, since 1957 have
had as their international spiritual head Aga Khan
IV. Fewer in number than the Ismailis, the Sheikhis
are followers of Sheikh Ahmad Ahsai, who claimed
direct contact with the Hidden Imam.
Like all Muslims, the Shiites accept certain basic
articles of faith and religious practice. These include
belief in one eternal god, Allah; recognition of Mu-
hammad as the special Prophet of God and of his
teachings as recorded in the Koran and the Hadith
(traditions); and observance of the "five pillars" of the
faith-recital of the creed "There is no God but God,
and Muhammad is His Prophet" to which Shiites add
"and Ali, God's friend"; performance of prayer and
ritual; almsgiving; fasting; and pilgrimage (haj) to the
holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
For many Iranians the five pillars represent only the
formal aspect of Islam. The popular religion of the
peasants and urban lower classes combines supersti-
tious beliefs and rites, many of them pre-Islamic, with
Islamic tenets and practices. In contrast, neither
formal Islam nor folk beliefs seem to have had much
appeal to better educated urban Iranians. Most West-
ernized Iranians appear to be only nominal Muslims,
but they generally avoid displaying their disregard for
the custom of fasting during Ramadan.
Iran has about 20,000 mosques, ranging from rela-
tively primitive and unadorned mud or brick struc-
tures in the rural areas to elaborate domed edifices in
the cities. Village mosques frequently serve as local
community centers, while religious schools are often
conducted within both rural and urban mosques.
Mosque functionaries vary in number from one for
each village mosque or group of mosques to several in
each of the larger urban mosques.
Attendance at formally designated "Friday mosque"
services is a religious duty. The Friday prayer service
had both religious and political significance when it
was created in the seventh century to distinguish the
Muslim community from unbelieving Arabs, Chris-
tians, and Jews. Mention of the ruler during the
prayer for all Muslims was an important symbol of
the ruler's sovereignty in all Muslim states, and any
loss of his power was immediately reflected in the
Friday sermons.
Under the Shah the Friday services declined in
significance. Friday prayer leaders were appointed or
confirmed by the Shah, and many were objects of
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local disdain. Sermons from that period focus almost
entirely on moral exhortations and laments for the
martyred Hussein, whom the Shias consider one of
Muhammad's rightful heirs.
The Khomeini regime has replaced prayer leaders
appointed by the Shah, established new Friday
mosques where none had been, returned the weekly
service to its former importance, and maintained the
symbolic linkage to Shia struggles. Government policy
makes the Friday Imam the senior local representa-
tive of the regime and requires that local officials
meet weekly under his auspices to coordinate their
activities. Emphasizing the importance of the ceremo-
nies, the government's official newspaper, Islamic
Republic, always labels prayer leaders Imam Jomeh
(Friday prayer leader) rather than using a more
pedestrian, but historically accurate, term meaning
preacher. These individuals are almost always cler-
ics-usually with the middle-level rank of Hojjat ol-
Eslam.
The popular base of support for the clergy remains in
the traditional bazaar areas of Tehran and other large
cities. The piety of some shopkeepers and artisans
borders on fanaticism; historically their zeal has been
exploited by extremist clerics against the government
or other visible targets (such as the "British imperial-
ists" during the 1950s and the "US Satan" now). The
bazaaris provide financial support to the clergy by
paying a religious tax called khums. The khums,
discontinued by the Sunnis after the death of Mu-
hammad, is one-fifth of yearly cash income payable to
Ali and his descendants, the Imams. The clergy,
acting in the absence of the Imams, receive this tax.
Most Shia clergy are conservative, if not reactionary,
in political-religious outlook. Three characteristics of
Shia doctrine not shared with Sunnis have allowed
them to assume popular and political leadership:
? The khums, which gives the clergy some financial
autonomy from the state.
? The concept that some individuals, mujtahids, have
the authority to make creative interpretations of
religious law.
? The concept that the believer must follow the
religious guidance of a mujtahid.
The revolution in Iran is the most conspicuous exam-
ple of an "Islamic resurgence." It is too early to know
if recent developments mark a genuine return to Islam
or are merely a temporary setback in the trend toward
complete secularization. There seems little doubt,
however, that religious considerations will play a
predominant role in government actions and policies
for the foreseeable future.
Adherents of Iran's minority religions-Christianity,
Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Bahaism-altogether
number no more than 2 percent of the total popula-
tion. Scattered throughout the country, these minor-
ities reside largely in the cities, particularly Tehran.
The great majority of Christians are members of the
Assyrian and Armenian minorities. Assyrians are
divided among the Nestorian, Catholic, and Protes-
tant churches, while most Armenians belong to the
Armenian Orthodox, or Gregorian, Church.
The Iranian Jewish community-primarily in Tehran,
Shiraz, Hamadan, Esfahan, and Abadan, with small-
er numbers in other urban centers-is one of the
oldest in the world, dating back 2,600 years. Their
population has dropped from an estimated 80,000 in
1978 to about 32,000 in 1980 as a result of the
Islamic Revolution. Iran's Jews are orthodox in reli-
gious practice, and their communities are governed by
rabbis administering Mosaic law. Since the mid-
1950s both US and international Jewish organizations
have provided medical and educational assistance to
impoverished Jews, with the result that the communi-
ty today is fully literate, and under the Shah was able
to support its own schools, medical facilities, and
religious personnel.
Zoroastrians live in close-knit communities mainly in
Tehran, Yazd, and Kerman. Their contemporary
religious tenets and practices are similar to those that
prevailed in the past. Zoroastrianism was the domi-
nant religion in Iran from the sixth century B.C. until
the victory of Islam in 641 A.D. During the late 1960s
Zoroastrians financed construction of one of Tehran's
modern middle class suburbs.
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Bahaism, whose following is estimated to number
about 60,000, is the only minority religion not recog-
nized by the Khomeini government. It originated
during the mid-19th century in Iran as an offshoot of
the persecuted Babi sect. The urbanized Bahai com-
munity is relatively well educated, and most of its
adherents have been engaged in business or the
professions. The Khomeini regime insists it is not
persecuting the Bahais, but it has moved forcefully
against Bahai interests.
Education. The Islamic revolution has virtually elimi-
nated secular education in Iran. All foreign educa-
tional groups have been expelled. Unrest at the uni-
versities resulted in their closure, but some have
recently reopened. Attendance at elementary and
high schools has been reduced. Literacy, 40 percent
before the revolution, probably is decreasing.
Efforts are under way to change the Shah's educa-
tional system, which had become increasingly West-
ernized, into an Islamic system. Teachers are being
retrained in Islamic methods, and university texts in
36 fields are being revised. Medicine, agriculture,
engineering, and Islamic jurisprudence are being giv-
en priority. New restrictions are being implemented to
reduce the number of Iranians studying abroad-
currently about 150,000 to 200,000.
Health. Iran suffers from a severe shortage and poor
distribution of medical personnel and rural ignorance
of proper health practices. Medical facilities, in much
better supply than medical personnel, are available to
meet most health needs.
The doctor shortage is particularly acute in rural
areas where life, death, health, and sickness are often
attributed to God and fate. Medical aid in these areas
is sought only when illness is so severe as to interfere
with work, and then use of midwives, village herba-
lists, barbers (for dental extractions), and practitioners
with limited medical education are common.
Major causes of mortality in the 1970s were infant,
gastrointestinal, respiratory, and parasitic diseases.
Drug addiction also is a serious health problem,
opium being plentiful and its use traditional. The
infant mortality rate was estimated at 100 per 1,000
in 1971, the last year for which statistics are
available.
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Economy
Iran is richly endowed with oil, mineral, power, and
agricultural resources. Oil contributes by far the most
to the country's GNP, but agriculture provides the
main occupation for the Iranian population. Despite a
large labor base and rich resources, economic develop-
ment has been slow. Factors that have hindered
development include lack of capital, aridity of the
land, great distances between areas under cultivation,
and prolonged periods of revolution and anarchy.
The first efforts to modernize the economy began in
the early 1800s. Modern production techniques,
equipment, and skilled labor were imported from
Europe. Social, political, and economic conditions
were unfavorable to modernization, however, and by
1920 there were only a few large plants producing
simple commodities, such as textiles, bricks, and flour.
The bulk of the population remained illiterate, impov-
erished, and engaged in subsistence agriculture.
In 1925 Iran began to modernize its economy under
Reza Shah. Priority was given to transportation and
communications; the trans-Iranian railroad, running
from the Persian Gulf to Tehran, was constructed. By
the time Reza Shah abdicated in 1941, only a handful
of industrial plants had been established.
Planned economic development in Iran began after
World War II. In its early stages the program
suffered because of competing personalities and ideas
within the Iranian political hierarchy. Iran's first two
development plans (1949-55 and 1956-62) concen-
trated on providing the country with modern roads
and dams. Because of a lack of funds, the first plan
was almost a complete failure and the second was only
a partial success. The third and fourth plans (1963-67
and 1968-72) attempted to develop the transportation
network gradually, to induce major transformations in
the pattern and methods of agriculture, and to en-
courage industrial growth.
a growth rate of 10 percent, while total GNP rose 11
percent in 1968 and 13 percent in 1972, and per
capita income rose from $307 to $504. Despite these
high growth rates, many of the social indicators
(illiteracy, birth, and mortality rates) in 1972 still
showed a society facing problems and an economic
structure in which industry contributed only 19 per-
cent of nonoil gross domestic product. Iran also began
to run into serious manpower and transportation
bottlenecks.
The fifth plan (1973-78) was revised in 1975 because
oil price increases had sharply increased foreign ex-
change earnings allowing a doubling of the allocation
for development ($70 billion). Spectacular goals were
set, with the bulk of investments made in housing,
manufacturing and mining, oil and gas, and transpor-
tation and communications. Major problems soon
appeared because of the tremendous scale of the plan.
Transportation bottlenecks developed despite consid-
erable expansion of capacity. Labor shortages, infla-
tion, and profiteering also developed. The revised
goals were not met, but substantial growth was
achieved despite the problems.
The Islamic revolution in 1979 severely depressed the
economy, and the war with Iraq has added to the
disruption. Political infighting at the top slows the
formulation of coherent economic policies, and inter-
mittent purges of the civil service have removed
qualified personnel. Industry is plagued by abysmal
labor productivity, worker and clerical interference in
management, a lack of competent technical and man-
agerial personnel, and shortages of raw materials and
spare parts. Agriculture is suffering from shortages of
capital, raw materials (such as fertilizer, seed, and
fuel), and equipment. The war has caused inflation
and unemployment to worsen due to shortages and
displacement of workers. Basic needs are being met,
but much depends upon the level of oil exports.
Largely because of the spectacular rise in oil revenues
(from $310 million in 1962-63 to $2.6 billion in 1973),
the fourth plan met its basic objectives. Iran achieved
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Figure 9
Iran: Crude Oil Production and Exports'
Million b/d
0 1980 1981
8/23 9/23 10/23 11/22 12/22 1/22 2/20 3/21 4/21
Main Sectors of the Economy
Petroleum. Petroleum has been important to the
economy since the early 1900s, but the effect of its
revenues on the economy and Iran's large population
was limited until the early 1970s. In 1960 oil contrib-
uted only 16 percent of total GNP. Agriculture's
contribution to the GNP exceeded that of the oil
sector until 1970. In 1974 as a result of sharp oil price
increases, 85 percent of total government revenue
came from oil. By 1976 oil contributed 40 percent of
GNP.
Before the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran was the
world's fourth-largest producer of crude oil and the
second-largest exporter of petroleum. In 1978 oil
production was 5.2 million barrels per day, and
exports were 4.7 million barrels per day. Oil produc-
tion and exports declined precipitously after the revo-
lution and the outbreak of the war with Iraq in
September 1980. A modest recovery during the first
half of 1981 was followed by steadily declining pro-
duction and exports during the latter part of that
OPEC Crude Oil Production
Excluding Natural Gas Liquids
OPEC
31,225
29,807
22,500
Algeria
1,100
1,161
1,154
1,012
800
Ecuador
183
202
214
204
200
Gabon
222
209
203
175
200
Indonesia
1,686
1,635
1,591
1,577
1,629
Iran
5,663
5,242
3,168
1,662
1,300
Iraq
2,348
2,562
3,477
2,514
1,000
Kuwait
1,784
1,894
2,213
1,387
900
Libya
2,063
1,983
2,092
1,787
1,100
Neutral Zone
393
473
568
538
400
Nigeria
2,085
1,897
2,302
2,055
1,400
Qatar
445
487
508
472
400
Saudi Arabia
9,017
8,066
9,251
9,631
9,600
UAE
1,998
1,830
1,831
1,709
1,500
2,238
2,166
2,356
2,167
2,100
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Light 12.81 12.81
34? API 1.35% sulfur
Heavy 12.49 12.49
311 API 1.60% sulfur
year. The regime's refusal to lower oil prices in a
depressed market and, to a lesser extent, buyer appre-
hension about the dependability of Iranian supplies
were largely to blame. Until late October 1981 the
Iranians charged $36.50 per barrel, well above prices
for comparable crude elsewhere, and many West
European and Japanese customers canceled scheduled
liftings.
Iran's agreement in late October to bring its prices in
line with the OPEC benchmark price of $34 per
barrel resulted in a resumption of unfulfilled liftings
by former customers and the signing of new contracts,
raising December 1981 exports to about 800,000
barrels per day. Tehran needs oil sales of at least
1.1 million barrels per day to balance its hard curren-
cy trade even at the present level of depressed eco-
nomic activity.
The Khomeini regime has announced anticipated oil
revenues of $18 billion during 1982, entailing exports
of 1.7 million barrels per day of crude oil at Iran's
current price of $29 per barrel. To spur sales further,
however, Tehran is discounting much of its crude on
the spot market. The Iranians also have expressed a
willingness to drop oil prices to as low as $26 per
barrel to achieve revenue goals. At the $26 per barrel
price, Iran would need to export about 2 million
barrels per day of crude oil to meet its financial
requirements.
Organizational problems in the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) and inadequate maintenance of
production facilities probably will prevent Iran from
exceeding 3 million barrels per day after the war,
despite the capacity of Iranian oil reservoirs to sustain
production of as high as 4-5 million barrels per day
for several years. The Iranians can repair, replace,
and maintain most of the production facilities left
behind by foreign companies, but sabotage, low mo-
rale, worker recalcitrance, and purges of experienced
managers have had an adverse impact on operations.
Because NIOC currently has only a few operable
drilling rigs, its well workover and drilling program
has all but collapsed. Also, NIOC has been unable to
restart some wells that were shut down when produc-
tion was initially reduced.
In any event, the present regime has shown little
interest in increasing exports much beyond 2-2.5
million barrels per day after the war. To do so
probably would require the return of some foreign
technicians as well as expensive repair and mainte-
nance efforts, both of which the present regime wants
to avoid (see Geography: Natural Resources-Petro-
leum and Minerals).
Agriculture. The Islamic government is committed to
giving greater emphasis to domestic agriculture. Nev-
ertheless, strong direction and a coordinated policy
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Average 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1970-75 (Estimated)
are lacking. Primary responsibility for agricultural
policymaking lies with the Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development. The top positions in the
ministry, however, have been taken over by mullahs
who lack agricultural expertise. For ideological rea-
sons the mullahs support a move away from the
Shah's goal of large centralized agricultural units
toward support of small holdings and traditional
farming. The Planning Authority opposes this shift, as
do many technocrats within the ministry. Agri-
businesses and large capital-intensive projects have
received little government support since the revolu-
tion, and projects under construction at the time of
the revolution have been dropped or are in disarray.
Confusion over land ownership is widespread because
there is no clear national policy. Land tenure commit-
tees have been set up in several areas to redistribute
land that is underutilized. They probably are taking
land primarily from the large landholders who did not
redistribute their land during the Shah's land reform
programs, but medium and even small farmers may
be losing land as well. Many farmers who have not yet
lost their holdings fear expropriation, which inhibits
them from trying to expand production. Meanwhile,
mullahs-many of whom lost land as a result of the
Shah's reforms-reportedly are regaining or extend-
ing their holdings.
Ineffective Programs. The clerical government has
given the provinces substantial economic autonomy,
allowing them to establish their own banks and devise
independent development budgets. It also has raised
procurement prices, made credit available to farmers,
and facilitated increased imports of seed, fertilizer,
and farm machinery. Despite these measures, com-
mercial agriculture is depressed. In 1980-81 output of
cottonseed, soybeans, and sunflower seeds-produced
primarily by commercial farmers-dropped to less
than half that in 1979-80, probably because of the
reluctance of farmers to invest and plant at previous
levels. The drop led to a sharp decline in Iran's
vegetable oil consumption in 1980.
The government reportedly plans to promote grain
production in rain-fed areas at the expense of expand-
ing irrigated agriculture. Such a policy will heighten
dependence on weather and aggravate the existing
problems of wide annual fluctuations in yields and
output. At the same time, the government is encour-
aging poultry and livestock production, which will
greatly expand feedgrain requirements. Breeding
stock are to be imported to replace stock killed for
food, even though shortages of fodder already have
been reported.
Finally, the government is encouraging reverse migra-
tion from the cities back to the villages, but without
much success. The population of Tehran and its
suburbs, for example, has ballooned to a reported 6.7
million and continues to grow rapidly. A lack of
incentives for farmers to stay on the land and the
perception that they can make more money in urban
areas-even if in illegal activities-continue to spur
migration to the cities.
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Figure 10
her r
hsii va 3 ?Yazd
73k
Qoundary representation is
t necenarey authwitatrve
JHormoPg 3) ; va Sistan
Agricultural Areas
and Rainfall
Main agricultural area
Rainfall in millimeters
-?- Province boundary
0 Kilometers 150 Oman
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Impact of the War. The war with Iraq has depressed
Iranian agriculture in a number of ways. Although
most of the Iraqi-occupied region in western Khuzes-
tan is normally not cultivated, in areas near Abadan,
Ahvaz, and Dezful at the eastern edge of the war
zone, fields usually planted in cash crops had to be
abandoned. Sugar beet fields west of Ahvaz were
intentionally flooded. Croplands near Kermanshah
suffered some damage. An additional I million hec-
tares (15 percent of the total farmland) reportedly
were not planted last fall because of the war. Many
farm workers have been called into military service,
which could result in a rural labor shortage. The war
also has created fuel shortages that may limit distri-
bution of the harvest. Overall, however, the war has
caused relatively little permanent harm to agricultur-
al areas. Most farmland could easily be returned to
production once the war ended.
Outlook. Iran will continue to rely heavily on imports
to meet food requirements. Although the country's
agricultural performance may improve somewhat, lit-
tle if any increased output will reach the cities. The
total agricultural import bill may reach $3.8 billion in
1982. The US share of the Iranian agricultural import
market has been rising since the resolution of the
hostage crisis, despite the antipathy of the Iranian
Government and the availability of grain from other
foreign sources. US sales of white wheat are already
back to pre-1980 levels. In 1982 the US share of
Iran's total agricultural imports could rise to about 15
percent-worth more than $500 million-if Iran im-
ports as much as now seems likely.
Over the longer term Iran's domestic production is
unlikely to keep pace with demand-much less
achieve food self-sufficiency-so long as political and
infrastructural problems remain unresolved. Expan-
sion of agricultural production will depend largely on
increased productivity because the growth of the
agricultural labor force is slowing. That would require
strong policy direction in a stable political climate.
Without these conditions farmers are unlikely to
invest in improved technology, and agricultural devel-
opment efforts will flounder.
In the livestock sector, while resolute restocking and
stricter controls on range use could at least ensure a
stable (if still inadequate) meat supply, continued
1977
1978
1979
1980
(Estimated)
Wheat
1,277
1,206
1,200
2,000
Wheat flour a
45
52
56
42
Rice
630
367
440
470
334
467
200
600
328
283
600
897
Other cereals
233
283
50
100
Total cereals
2,797
2,709
2,546
4,109
a In wheat equivalent. (1 ton of flour equals 1.39 tons of wheat
equivalent.)
overgrazing of the range will ultimately lead to a
decline in livestock production. The outlook, there-
fore, is for even greater dependence on agricultural
imports, given expected increases in population, an
emerging urban majority, and likely changes in diet in
the years ahead (see Geography: Natural Resources-
Agriculture and Livestock).
Industry (Nonpetroleum). The Shah's fifth plan in-
creased the importance of industry in Iran's economy.
By 1979 Iran was producing a wide variety of goods
such as paper, fertilizers, steel pipes, aluminum, diesel
engines, electric fans, detergents, glass, gas stoves,
passenger cars, television sets, and refrigerators.
Nearly all products were absorbed by the domestic
market, and petroleum remained the country's main
foreign exchange earner.
Overall industrial activity in Iran probably has de-
clined to one-fourth to one-third of the prerevolution-
ary level. Government attempts to use the war to
cajole increased production from workers have been
ineffective. Aside from low labor productivity there
are acute shortages of fuel, skilled labor, spare parts,
raw materials, and technical and managerial exper-
tise. The war has caused most industries in Khuzestan
Province to close down because of war damage or the
wholesale exodus of the working population.
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Secret
Income Distribution
Iran's per capita income in 1979 was $2,179, but this
has dropped significantly since the revolution. We
have no current figures but believe it could be as low
as half the 1979 figure. Rural income is considerably
lower than urban, and 30 percent of the urban work
force is unemployed. Many of the needs of the lower
classes are satisfied through the distribution of food
and other supplies by the government, largely through
the local mosques. Inflation, officially estimated by
the government at 30 percent, probably is closer to
100 percent. The government consumer index gives
disproportionate weight to housing expenses, which
have remained stable since the revolution. In addition
only the price of basic commodities sold at govern-
ment-subsidized prices is factored into the food por-
tion of the index. Black-market prices are not includ-
ed, and they have more than doubled in the last year.
Transportation and Communication
Iran has 71,000 km of roads, 26,700 km of which are
asphalt surfaced. Some areas still lack roads and
modern transport. There are 154 usable airfields
throughout the country. Of these 18 are major air-
ports, two of which are international. Tehran is linked
to the Persian Gulf ports by 4,300 km of railroad.
There are rail connections with Turkey and the
USSR, and track was extended to Kerman in 1977.
Iran is experiencing difficulties in obtaining equip-
ment to keep the rail lines operating. Shipment of
most of the crude oil, petroleum products, and natural
gas is through 8,200 km of pipeline (1976 figure).
Iran's port capacity now stands at 10.35 million tons
per annum. Major port expansion projects at Bandar
Khomeini and Bandar Abbas have been slowed be-
cause of the war and financial constraints.
Adequate information on Iran's communications net-
work has been unavailable since the revolution. The
regime claims to be expanding the system. In 1978
Iran had the most advanced telecommunications sys-
tem in the Middle East with over 550 microwave
stations in a 17,700-km network. Transmission capa-
bility included telegraph, television, and data commu-
nications. Television transmissions could reach 60
percent of the population, and 11 cities had computer-
ized telex links to major countries. In 1978 there were
approximately 800,000 telephones and international
links via satellite.
Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments
Steadily declining oil revenues during the second half
of 1981-from monthly earnings of $1.1 billion dur-
ing May to $500 million in November-put a severe
strain on Iranian finances and forced the government
to impose stringent measures. By September 1981 oil
earnings were covering only about half of estimated
monthly import expenditures.
Iran has had to rely increasingly on its already slender
official reserves. Iranian gold and foreign exchange
reserves may have declined from $7 billion in mid-
1981 to below $3 billion in December-less than $1
billion in foreign bank accounts and perhaps $2 billion
in government securities, gold, and International
Monetary Fund deposits. Current reserve levels repre-
sent about three months of imports at austere levels.
Tehran also has $5-6 billion in nonliquid assets. These
are primarily in the form of loans Iran extended to
other developing nations, many of which will never be
repaid, and equity investments that probably could be
liquidated only at substantial loss. The drain on Iran's
official reserves will ease once hard currency flows
from larger oil liftings begin entering government
coffers.
The Iranians are also attempting to reduce hard
currency spending by expanding barter arrangements.
Tehran is conducting a substantial barter trade with
Communist countries-with Romania, for example,
for refined oil products, machinery, and tools, and
with North Korea for armaments. It has approached
several Western countries, such as New Zealand, a
major supplier of foodstuffs, with a proposal to ex-
change oil for their goods.
Exchange
Bank Markazi is responsible for issuing money and
has the authority to control variables affecting the
value of the currency. The official exchange rate is
70.5 rials to 1 US dollar. The black-market rate far
exceeds this. The fiscal (and Islamic calendar) year
runs from 21 March to 20 March.
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Secret
In September 1941 Muhammad Reza Pahlavi be-
came Shah of Iran upon the forced abdication of his
father, Reza Shah. A relatively weak and uncertain
ruler, he was ousted for four days in 1953 by Muham-
mad Mossadeq. Restored to power, a newly confident
Shah reduced the substantial power of the Majles
(parliament) and affirmed his authority over every
aspect of government, becoming one of the most
powerful rulers in Iranian history. By 1963 the Shah
had stabilized the political scene and begun a 15-point
program of reforms and modernization called the
Shah-People Revolution (first known as the White
Revolution).
A persistent rhetorical theme of the Shah's political
program was the need for popular participation. But
he was unwilling to reduce his power sufficiently to
permit genuine political activity until the people
became "politically educated." In what the Shah
termed an effort to educate the people, he abolished
all political parties in 1975 and established a single
government-sponsored party called the Rastakhiz
(Resurgence). It was the political arm of the Shah,
and all "loyal" Iranians were expected to join and
participate. The Shah's hope that Rastakhiz would
provide a mechanism for broad political participation
and education was never realized.
In 1978 a downturn in the economy, tensions pro-
duced by social modernization, and longstanding re-
sentment over repression and corruption led to riots
and calls for the Shah's overthrow. His hold on
political life was so complete that discontent could be
expressed only through the religious community. The
result was a coalition of secular moderates, leftists,
and both hardline and moderate clerics. The emer-
gence of a vengeful and charismatic Ayatollah Kho-
meini to lead the revolt, his use of modern communi-
cations techniques to organize and mobilize the
masses, and an ineffectual response by an isolated and
seriously ill Shah resulted in a cycle of violence and
protest that ultimately led to the Shah's overthrow in
1979.
The revolutionary coalition that swept the Shah from
power was united only by a desire to topple the
monarchy and soon began to disintegrate. Khomeini's
religious and lay supporters gradually eliminated their
more moderate secular rivals and now monopolize the
formal reins of power. They have apparently crushed
their leftist opponents and have consolidated a clergy-
dominated authoritarian regime, for which Khomeini
is the source of legitimacy.
Despite continuing assassinations resulting in the
steady depletion in the clerical leadership ranks of the
Islamic Republic Party, the regime has been able to
hold elections and produce new officeholders. The
Khomeini regime has dealt swiftly and ruthlessly with
its opponents. It controls a network of mosques and
various revolutionary organizations such as the Revo-
lutionary Guard, Hezbollahis (fundamentalist thugs),
and komitehs (local revolutionary cells) and is able to
manipulate the media and financial institutions. It has
neutralized the military through infiltration, execu-
tions, purges, and promotions.
Clerical Factionalism
The Iranian clerical community is divided by the-
ological, political, geographic, generational, and edu-
cational rivalries. A large proportion of the clerical
community remains politically inactive. Those who
are active and support Ayatollah Khomeini's regime
are divided roughly into three groups: the Islamic
Republic Party, the Qom theological community,' and
the moderates. The other most senior ayatollahs
oppose the Khomeini regime in varying degrees, but
they have been effectively outmaneuvered by Kho-
meini's supporters.
The Islamic Republic Party dominates the govern-
ment but does not fully control the executive and
legislature. It has at least three subfactions whose
' Qom is the most important Shia religious center in Iran, and the
major Shia clerics resident in Iran either live there or spend much
of their time there.
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positions range from advocating radical social and
economic change to backing more conservative poli-
cies. Clerics associated with the Qom theological
community are the party's primary rivals. They take
the hardest line on Iraq, are responsible for indoctri-
nating the Revolutionary Guard, dominate the judi-
ciary and educational system, and control many local
clerical posts. Proregime moderates oppose radical
domestic changes and seem to have been willing to
work with some of the secular politicians ousted by
the party.
Clerical rivalries already have found expression in the
debates over the land reform program that will define
the access of each faction to crucial political and
financial resources. Restructuring the Revolutionary
Guard also has aroused controversy. Its backing is
viewed by many prominent political figures as crucial
to the success of their political ambitions and to the
longevity of the Khomeini regime itself. Khomeini has
avoided choosing between factions by delegating to
each group important and overlapping authority. He
does not want to acknowledge that there are insoluble
disagreements within the clerical community over the
structure of the Islamic government. If the clerical
factions are able to negotiate their major differences
within the legislative process in the Majles, for exam-
ple, the Khomeini regime will be significantly
strengthened (see Opposition: Clerical Opposition).
The Constitution
The Iranian constitution, which defines the political,
economic, and social order of the Islamic republic,
grants broad powers to the Islamic clergy. Leadership
of the republic is entrusted to a religious leader-
Ayatollah Khomeini is specifically mentioned-or, in
the absence of a single leader "enjoying the confi-
dence of the majority of the people," to a small
council of religious leaders. The procedures for select-
ing the leader or council of leaders are ambiguous.
The powers of the leader or council of leaders over-
shadow those of the other institutions of government.
The leader or council is empowered to appoint a
"Council of Guardians," which must review all legis-
lation for fidelity to the principles of Islam; appoint
the highest judicial authorities, who must themselves
be religious jurists; command the armed forces; and
approve the competence of candidates for the presi-
dency of the republic.
The constitution provides for an executive composed
of both a president and a prime minister. The presi-
dent is elected to a four-year term by an absolute
majority of the voters and supervises the affairs of the
executive branch, "with the exception of the tasks
delegated directly by this law to the leadership." The
prime minister is nominated by the president and
approved by vote of the Majles. He supervises the
Council of Ministers, coordinates government deci-
sions, and decides which government policies will be
debated in the Majles.
The constitution provides that Shia Islam will be the
official religion of Iran. Other Islamic denominations
"enjoy complete respect," and recognized minority
religions are "free within the limits of the law to
perform their religious rites and act in personal
matters according to their religious regulations."
"The people of Iran, regardless of ethnic and tribal
origin, enjoy equal rights," but the constitution does
not formally grant the ethnic minorities the autono-
mous status within the Islamic republic that many
desire.
Provisions relating to human rights are ambiguous in
several respects. Freedom of the press, for example, is
guaranteed, provided that the views expressed are not
"contrary to Islamic precepts or public rights." Simi-
larly, the right to form political parties is guaranteed,
"provided that they do not harm the principles of
freedom, sovereignty, national unity, Islamic stand-
ards, and the foundation of the Islamic Republic."
The military is charged by the constitution with
defending Iran's borders and maintaining internal
security. The Revolutionary Guard is charged with
acting as the "guardian of the revolution."
The Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles)
The constitution of the Iranian Islamic Republic
established the single-chamber, 270-member Majles
as the legislative branch of the new government.
Members are elected for four-year terms by direct
and secret ballot, though conditions affecting the
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eligibility of both voters and candidates are deter-
mined by a separate law. The executive and judicial
branches are charged with implementing the direc-
tives of this branch. The constitution gives the Majles
the power to:
? Initiate "resolutions" and introduce legislation on
the initiative of 15 members.
? Enact laws and ratify treaties, contracts, and ac-
cords negotiated by the executive.
? Approve the appointments of the prime minister and
the cabinet.
? Censure and remove the prime minister, govern-
ment, or a single minister through a vote of no
confidence-apparently supported by a simple
majority.
? Establish investigatory bodies to monitor any aspect
of national affairs.
? Approve employment of foreign nationals (presum-
ably by the government and major industries) which
is "prohibited unless deemed necessary."
The Majles cannot enact any law that contradicts
Islamic or constitutional principles. A Council of
Guardians, composed of six clerical jurisprudents
named by Khomeini and six secular legal experts
chosen by the Majles, was established by the constitu-
tion to review all legislation and nullify whatever it
deems unacceptable. A majority of the Council's six
religious members is required for passage of most
legislation. The Majles may require the president, the
prime minister, or any minister to attend a session to
answer questions and may allow them to make state-
ments in support of their positions.
The Majles is not allowed to impose formal martial
law. In wartime it can "approve" government regula-
tions establishing "temporary restrictions" lasting a
maximum of 30 days. The Majles must approve any
extension of such restrictions. Members cannot trans-
fer their individual responsibilities, and the assembly
as a whole cannot delegate its power to make laws.
The Majles cannot debate an "urgent project or
bill"-the implementation of which cannot be delayed
for the Council of Guardians' customary 10-day
review period-unless the Council is present during
the debate and presents its views on the acceptability
of the text under consideration.
Clerical and secular supporters of Khomeini who are
either members of the Islamic Republic Party or are
sympathetic to it dominate the assembly. Political
rivalries and insecurities are often so intense that the
Majles cannot either address substantive issues on
their merits or make decisions on controversial mat-
ters without explicit guidance from Khomeini or
behind-the-scenes direction from parliamentary lead-
ers. Most members are inexperienced and feel com-
pelled to play to what they believe are Khomeini's
desires, to underscore their own revolutionary creden-
tials, and to discredit political rivals. Debate has been
heated; individual members have occasionally come to
blows. Speaker of the Majles Hashemi-Rafsanjani
controls the course of debate and has prevented some
representatives from raising local problems that would
highlight the regime's shortcomings.
The Judiciary
The constitution provides for the establishment of a
judicial system "based on Islamic rules and stand-
ards." The highest judicial body is the "High Council
of the Judiciary," consisting of the head of the
Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, and three
"religious and just judges chosen by the judges of the
country." The head of the Supreme Court and the
Prosecutor General must be religious jurists (mujta-
hids) whose piety and knowledge of Islamic law
authorizes them to make interpretations of the law
which in turn have the force of law.
The High Council of the Judiciary is charged with
establishing necessary organizations within the Minis-
try of Justice, drafting laws on the procedures for
selecting the members of the Supreme Court, prepar-
ing other bills having to do with the judiciary, and
appointing and dismissing judges. The term of office
for the Council is five years, but members can be
reelected. Procedures for the election of members are
not specified in the constitution.
Internal Security
Iran's internal security forces consist of the National
Police, the National Gendarmerie, and a main intelli-
gence organization still in the formative stages. The
National Police and the Gendarmerie are dealt with
in the Armed Forces section under Paramilitary
Organizations.
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In August 1980 a new intelligence organization,
SAVAMA, was established to replace the Shah's
hated organization, SAVAK.
In early 1982 the government proposed legislation
authorizing a Ministry of Information and Security to
focus on leftist activity in Iran and coordinate the
intelligence activities of the Revolutionary Guard,
komitehs, and other government offices.
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Secret
Opposition
Ethnic Groups
The Iranian constitution of 1979 revealed that the
new regime would have little sympathy for regional
autonomy aspirations. Nonetheless, government con-
trol over the Iranian periphery has weakened, and the
tribal groups have moved to assert more local control.
The range of their political concerns will remain
limited by parochial goals. Left to their own devices,
the ethnic minorities will tend to exploit rather than
instigate political change (see Geography: Human
Resources-Ethnic Groups).
The Kurds in the northwest have been in revolt
against the Khomeini regime since it assumed power
in February 1979. With as many as 20,000 armed
combatants, the various Kurdish groups control much
of the countryside and some towns. While many of the
leaders have had longstanding contacts with the
USSR (the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was estab-
lished by the Soviets in 1945-46 in Iran's Kordestan
Province), some also fear the Soviets and occasionally
cooperate with moderate opposition groups claiming
to sympathize with their desire for local autonomy.
The largest group, the Kurdish Democratic Party, has
been cooperating with the Mujahedin and with Iraq,
which has provided some material aid.
The Azarbayjanis of north central Iran are the largest
minority. They are integrated into society and have
few armed bands. But opposition groups operating in
their homelands have staged the largest antigovern-
ment incidents since mid-1981. Some Iranian exiles
who fled Iran after the collapse of the Soviet-spon-
sored Azarbayjan Democratic Republic in 1946 have
returned and may become a source of instability.
Most look to their spiritual leader, Ayatollah Shariat-
Madari, for guidance, but the regime seems to be
succeeding in discrediting him. Shariat-Madari has
consistently opposed the Khomeini regime and is
under house arrest in Qom. Until recently he had
been in contact with exiles, moderates still in Iran,
and members of Turkic minorities in the military and
the bureaucracy. In early 1982 the Speaker of the
Majles characterized much of the Azarbayjani-popu-
lated northwest as a "Communist stronghold."
The Qashqais, who inhabit the central southwest,
have the most Western-oriented leadership of any
Iranian minority. Unlike other ethnic chiefs, the
Qashqai leaders hope to gain influence in national
politics. They are anticlerical, activist, have sought
ties with some of the exiles, and are close to Ayatollah
Shariat-Madari. The Qashqais have an estimated
20,000 fighters, but lack of adequate weaponry and
insufficient training prevent their being a major
threat to the regime as they were under the Shah
when they revolted in the 1960s.
The Turkomans, who live along the Caspian coast, are
reportedly left-leaning, but we have little information
on their current attitudes. Following clashes with the
government in 1979, the Turkomans may have
worked out an arrangement that allows them some
autonomy. They probably have fewer than 5,000 men
under arms.
The Baluchis, in the southeast, control most of their
area except for the largest towns. The Baluchis are
divided, but most tribal elders are pro-West and have
sought aid against the Khomeini regime. They could
muster fewer than 5,000 lightly armed men. There
are low-level contacts between the Iranian Baluchis
and those in Pakistan, but there is no evidence of
significant involvement in each other's affairs.
Arab and other ethnic dissidence in Khuzestan largely
ended in mid-1979 when Arab dissidents were
crushed under the administration of now exiled pro-
vincial Governor General Madani. Most of the subse-
quent terrorist incidents in their homeland probably
were carried out by Iraqi agents or radical Iranian
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leftists. There has been no significant Iranian Arab
cooperation with the Iraqi invasion forces despite
Baghdad's claim to support local Arab autonomy.
Non-Communist Leftist Groups
Mujahedin. The Islamic leftist Mujahedin-e Khalq
(People's Crusaders) emerged in mid-1981 as the
leading opponent of the Khomeini regime. Many
Iranians apparently appreciated their courage and
persistence in resisting the regime, but that did not
translate into lasting political allegiance, because
many of these Iranians mistrusted the Mujahedin's
youth and its leftist ideology. The group has been at
least temporarily thwarted by the regime's strong
repression. One leader, Masud Rajavi, fled into exile
in France in mid-1981 with former President Bani-
Sadr, and a number of the group's other leaders, still
in Iran, have been killed or arrested by the regime.
The Mujahedin was founded in 1963 by disaffected
young members of the Liberation Movement of Iran
and began terrorist operations in Iran in mid-1971
with efforts to disrupt the Shah's celebration of the
2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy. Al-
though the Mujahedin played an important role in the
upheaval that brought Khomeini to power, the clerics
consistently excluded them from a political role after
the revolution. In mid-1980 Mujahedin leaders re-
sponded by gradually increasing pressure against the
Khomeini regime and in May 1981 launched a major
terrorist campaign.
At the height of its strength in the spring of 1981, the
Mujahedin included approximately 10,000 well-
armed and highly disciplined cadre and showed it
could bring out crowds of over 100,000 people for
demonstrations in Tehran. Its blend of reformist
Islam and new-left concepts strikes a sympathetic
emotional chord among politicized Iranian youth.
Groups advocating a similar ideology are likely to be
prominent on the Iranian political scene regardless of
the fate of the Mujahedin.
A Marxist faction-mainly in Tehran-broke away
in 1975 and murdered several leaders of the Islamic
faction. After the revolution the Marxist faction
adopted the name Sazeman-e Paykar Bara-ye Azadi-e
Tabaqeh-e Kargar (Fighting Organization for Lib-
erating the Working Class), or commonly, Paykar,
and declared itself at odds ideologically with the
Mujahedin.
The Mujahedin are not openly pro-Soviet but rarely
criticize the USSR. The group's leaders may original-
ly have sympathized with most Soviet positions, but
Rajavi now emphasizes nationalist themes. On some
issues, however, the Mujahedin seem more inclined
toward a stubborn independence directed against all
industrialized nations. The Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization has provided training, supplies, and informa-
tion since the early 1960s.
Fedayeen. The Fedayeen was formed in 1970 from
three separate radical leftist student groups; by late
1975, it had divided into two factions. Since the
revolution it has split several times. The majority
factions have followed the Tudeh line giving qualified
support to Ayatollah Khomeini's regime. The minor-
ity, however, has called for a full worker-peasant
socialist revolution and is in armed opposition to the
regime.
Communist Tudeh Party
Since the fall of the Shah, Iran's pro-Soviet Tudeh
Party has sought to establish itself as a junior partner
of the clerics by publicly backing Ayatollah Khomeini
while slowly building its strength and attempting to
infiltrate the regime. Tudeh's support for Khomeini is
consistent with the party's longstanding policy of
calling for a national front of all popular forces. The
Tudeh recognizes its weakness and has never tried to
seize power for itself, but it has sought to form
alliances that it hopes, in time, to dominate.
The Islamic regime has tolerated the Tudeh more
than other leftist groups. The regime, however, has
not allowed it a full political role, and it has no seats
in the Majles or any known voice in formulating
policy. In general Khomeini has been sharply anti-
leftist and has often ordered crackdowns on leftist
activity. The Tudeh has generally-but not always-
been spared in these crackdowns. The Tudeh's news-
paper, Mardom, is officially banned, but other Tudeh
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Secret
publications are still published. Tudeh offices have
been ransacked or occupied by fundamentalist mobs,
and some members have been purged from schools
and the bureaucracy, arrested, or executed.
The Tudeh has traditionally been the best organized
political group in Iran, emphasizing tight discipline
and clandestine organization. The party has numerous
front organizations, including one for women, another
for students, and several workers' associations. In
1980 the party had an estimated 5,000 hardcore
members.
Activities Among Minorities. The Tudeh has long
tried to develop a base among Iran's numerous ethnic
minority groups. The party's support for Khomeini
has hurt its efforts to build links to the minorities, but
the party continues to try to curry favor.
Relations With Foreign Communists. The Tudeh's
only significant foreign supporters since its creation in
1941 have been the Soviet Union and its allies. The
party looks to Moscow for guidance, and the Soviet-
controlled National Voice of Iran radio based in Baku
enunciates policies close to the Tudeh line, although it
does not often mention the Tudeh by name.
Prospects. The Tudeh's greatest weakness will con-
tinue to be its lack of popular backing because of its
ties to Moscow and its atheist image in a deeply
Islamic society. Without support from other leftists
like the Mujahedin or the minorities, the party could
probably only seize power through a military coup
during a period of extreme confusion and political
unrest in Tehran. Even then, the Tudeh would require
significant outside assistance from the Soviets to hold
on to power.
Exiles
Leading Iranian exiles have been ineffective and
unwilling to unite. Virtually all have pegged their
return to Tehran on the hope that popular support for
Khomeini will wane as chaos in Iran grows. They are
attempting to convince a number of Arab and West-
ern governments to support them. Their inability to
agree on a single leader or to cooperate in even the
most general way has prevented the formation of a
viable opposition movement abroad.
Clerical Opposition
Many in the clerical community are alienated by the
political activism of the clerics who support Ayatollah
Khomeini. Several young clerics have been executed
for opposing the regime, and some of the teachings of
others have been banned. Nonetheless, clerical opposi-
tion activities generally are low key and restrained,
despite the belief that many of the government's
actions are not compatible with Islam.
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Shapur Bakhtiar Last Prime Minister Officer corps; middle class
under Shah
Qolam Ali Ground Forces Com- Military
Oveisi mander under Shah
Ahmad Madani Defense Minister Military; anticlerical
under Khomeini elements
Fereydun Jam Chief of Staff under Military
Shah
Hasan Nazih Head of National Azarbayjanis
Iranian Oil
Company
Ahmad Bani- Azarbayjani political Azarbayjanis
Ahmad leader associated with
Muslim People's Re-
public Party in Azar-
bayjan
Bahram Ariana Chief of Staff under Military, some wealthy
Shah exiles
Rahmatollah Aide to Ayatollah Azarbayjanis
Moqadam- Shariat-Madari, offi-
Maraqei cial of the Muslim
People's Republic
Party
Abol Hasan President of the Military, educated, those
Bani-Sadr Islamic Republic disenchanted with clerical
control
Masud Rajavi Continues as head of Radicalized students, sym-
Mujahedin pathy (if not support) of
those opposed to clerical
control
a By 1982, three years after the revolution, none of these exiles retain
significant support inside Iran. For further details on those exiles, see
Personalities.
The half dozen most senior Shia clerics in Iran have
remained outside the political structure under
Khomeini. They are Ayatollahs Golpayegani,
Khonsari, Marashi-Najafi, Ruhani, Shariat-Madari,
and Shirazi. They do not accept Khomeini as the Shia
leader and oppose clerical activism in politics. Some,
whom the regime is trying to discredit, are under
house arrest. A minority cooperate somewhat with
Khomeini's supporters, but-like other top ayatol-
lahs-they are using their considerable influence to
help lesser clerics' efforts to resist and modify some of
the regime's proposals (see Political Situation: Cleri-
cal Factionalism).
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The clerical leadership has organized the armed
forces and redefined their missions. The regular forces
still consist of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but
paramilitary forces-especially the Revolutionary
Guard-have acquired major roles in defending the
country against ground attack and maintaining order.
The Gendarmerie and the National Police have been
considerably weakened since the revolution, and infor-
mation on their current situation is sketchy. The
Iranian constitution directs the military to become an
"Islamic Army." The missions of Iranian men under
arms are to defend Iran's border, conduct "holy war
in the way of God," and "expand the rule of God in
the world."
Ayatollah Khomeini, as armed forces Commander in
Chief, in April 1982 gave the Chief of the Joint Staff
authority over the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran). At the same time,
the Interior Minister was given command of the
Gendarmerie, police, and forces associated with the
"Islamic revolutionary committees" (komitehs). The
regime maintains control over the military through
extensive purges and by the establishment, at all
major levels of command, of cleric-led komitehs,
which review orders of the commanders prior to
implementation.
Once one of the largest and most powerful conven-
tional forces in the world, the Iranian regular armed
forces were devastated by the Khomeini revolution in
1979, but they probably have been saved from com-
plete collapse by the war with Iraq. Before the war the
Army had been reduced by half, many experienced
commanders had been executed, exiled, or purged,
and all combat elements were under strength and
suffered critical shortages of trained technicians. The
new regime had placed a stigma on service in the
conventional military forces, reducing their ability to
recruit and retain capable personnel. Fearing the
potential political role of the military, the clerics have
emphasized the role of the "politically reliable" Revo-
lutionary Guard and increased the Guard's capabili-
ties at the expense of the regular armed forces.
Operations against Iraq and the Kurds engage the
bulk of Iran's regular and irregular forces and have
revealed both strengths and weaknessess. After initial
setbacks in the war with Iraq, the Iranians have
brought equipment to operational status, reestab-
lished command structures, and coordinated activities
of regular and irregular forces. Effective planning,
Iranian superiority in artillery and infantry, and
tactical flexibility have resulted in some major suc-
cesses. A key factor has been the tenacity-motivated
by fanatical religious fervor-and aggressiveness of
the Iranian soldiers and their willingness to become
martyrs for the Shiite cause. Iran's success also is a
result of Iraq's weaknesses in command and control
and artillery and its unwillingness or inability to stage
major offensives over wide areas of the front.
Army
The Iranian Islamic ground forces, the largest of the
three military services, had a prewar strength of
approximately 150,000 but probably has been ex-
panded to about 200,000 as a result of the war with
Iraq. It is composed mostly of conscripts. In addition
to defending Iran against aggression, the Army is
charged with assisting the Gendarmerie and the Na-
tional Police in maintaining internal security.
The major combat maneuver elements of the Iranian
ground forces are four armored divisions and four
infantry divisions. Major nondivisional tactical units
include an independent armored brigade, five field
artillery groups, a special forces brigade, an airborne
infantry brigade, and an army aviation command.
Iran's ground force equipment was acquired primarily
from Western sources-the United States, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany-but includes some
major items from the USSR.
The Army maintained some of its operational capabil-
ity following the revolution despite purges, poor lead-
ership, manpower shortages, and logistical and equip-
ment problems. Iranian troops have operated well
against Iraq.
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Air Force
Besides defending Iranian airspace, the Iranian
Islamic Air Force is charged with tactical support of
ground forces, reconnaissance, and rescue operations.
The revolution and war with Iraq have drastically
reduced the Air Force's ability to perform its mission.
Because of its relatively large inventory of sophisti-
cated equipment, it has been hurt by the revolution
more than the other services. Lack of a source of spare
parts has required cannibalization of some aircraft to
keep others flying, but logistical problems, slipshod
maintenance, and combat losses left fewer than 100
aircraft operational in early 1981. Even if Iran gained
access to sufficient supplies of spare parts and brought
all remaining aircraft to full operational status, years
will be required to replace pilot losses.
Prior to the revolution, Iran had about 350 fully
qualified fighter pilots. Purges of officers during the
initial stages of the revolution probably reduced the
number of pilots by at least 100, and combat losses
probably have been around 160. Although the Air
Force has been training fighter pilots since the middle
of 1981, efforts have been limited to upgrading
previously trained pilots.
The Air Force's ability to conduct sustained offensive
and defensive operations has been severely circum-
scribed. It can still conduct limited strikes against
strategic targets throughout the Gulf. Its fighter fleet
consists of US-built F-5s, F-4s, and F-14s.
Navy
The Iranian Islamic Navy emerged from the chaos of
the revolution with a changed mission and a battered
self-image. Mainly because of policy decisions by
government authorities, but also because its capabili-
ties have diminished, the Navy is now limited to
defending coastal areas and support tasks. It remains
the most powerful naval force in the Persian Gulf
despite purges of nearly all flag officers, a high
desertion rate, a disproportionate number of unedu-
cated personnel, serious maintenance and equipment
problems, and shortages of technicians. The Navy can
still inflict damage to port or offshore facilities and
remains a threat to the Gulf states. During the war it
has prevented ships from using Iraqi ports and denied
the Gulf to Iraqi ships.
Inventory of Selected Military Equipment
Sep 1980
Feb 1982
(Estimates)
Tanks (M-60, Chieftain, M-47) 1,765
1,000
APCs and ARVs (M-113, BMP, 3,195
BTR-60, BTR-50, Scorpion)
2,900
Artillery (M-109, M-107, M-110, 1,375
M-46, BM-21)
1,000
ATGM ground launch systems 2,883
(TOW, Dragon, Sagger)
Unknown
Destroyer (Sumner, battle-class) 3
3
Frigates (Mark IV) 4
4
Missile boats (La Combattante) 9
11
Other patrol craft/combatants 48
41-45
Minesweepers 5
5
Fighter/fighter-bomber (F-4, F-5, 450
260-280
F- 14) (including reconnaissance and
combat-capable jet trainers)
Transports 94 91
Tankers 14 14
Attack helicopters (Cobra/TOW) 132 Unknown
Transport and utility helicopters 845 Unknown
(including Army and Navy versions)
a These estimates of equipment remaining in the inventory in early
1982 are tentative because little firm data on combat losses are
available. Even so, shortages of spare parts and lack of maintenance
may mean that 40 to 60 percent of some categories of equipment is
not operational.
Iran has 20 major naval combatants including guided-
missile destroyers and frigates, corvettes, and missile
attack boats. The missile attack boats-the units most
frequently deployed in the Persian Gulf-have main-
tained a higher level of readiness than most other
ships and are the main fighting force of the Iranian
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Navy. The operational effectiveness of its patrol and
gun boats, its five minesweepers, and the Hovercraft
fleet have been greatly diminished by frequent me-
chanical breakdowns, the disruption of maintenance,
and the lack of spare parts. The Navy also has a
helicopter fleet and a P-3F Orion long-range patrol
aircraft which suffer from the same problems as the
rest of the service.
Paramilitary Organizations
The Revolutionary Guard: The Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Engelab-e Islami)
was hastily pulled together from trusted anti-Shah
groups, local clerics' militias, and ex-servicemen in
May 1979 under the auspices of the then governing
Revolutionary Council. Its mission was to restore and
maintain order.
The Guard is a loosely knit collection of units and
private armies gathered around various mullahs and
administrators. It probably consists of a disciplined
core of about 30,000 and counts at least 200,000 to
250,000 members, most of whom have joined since
the war with Iraq began.
The role of the Guard as one of Iran's main fighting
forces in the war with Iraq has forced it to expand and
to accept members who are less committed to the
revolutionary ideology of the regime than the original
Moreover, the Guard includes large numbers of
apparently self-appointed participants not controlled
by any formal structure.
As the Guard has expanded, it has assumed the brunt
of the fighting against dissident Kurdish and Baluchi
minorities and leftist opposition groups. During the
summer of 1981, for example, the Guard was mainly
responsible for the suppression of the antiregime
activities of the Mujahedin.
In addition to its many other functions, the Guard is
charged with exporting the revolution. Its members
have distributed literature on Shia Islam and the
revolution to pilgrims on the Haj in Saudi Arabia.
The Guard also has attempted to form "revolution-
ary" groups to mobilize Shia communities throughout
the Gulf.
Although the Guard has helped sustain the govern-
ment by intimidating most political oppposition
groups, its zeal has brought it into conflict with
government officials, clerics, and other security
forces. The Guard has been accused of torturing
prisoners in jails, brutality in the streets, and confisca-
tion of property-the same accusations that were
made against the Shah's intelligence organization
SAVAK. Repeated efforts to purge elements of the
Guard, however, have failed.
Friction between the Guard and the Army has not
abated as the Guard has expanded and become more
involved in the war. The Guard and the Army have
separate commanders, control procedures, communi-
cations networks, and weapons. The regime originally
intended to replace the Army with the Revolutionary
Guard but instead was forced by the war to expand
the Army.
"Islamization" of the Army remains an important
goal of the regime.' Purges have replaced key com-
manders loyal to the Shah with those who have at
least not been identified as opposing the Khomeini
regime. the govern-
ment is succeeding in creating a Revolutionary Guard
"mentality" in the lower ranks and that some Revolu-
tionary Guards have been assigned to regular Army
units. The Guard probably also has representatives
that perform liaison and political monitoring of Army
staffs in brigades and divisions. The overall progress
of Islamization, however, is not clear.
The Guard remains equipped predominantly for guer-
rilla and light infantry operations, but some units
have been trained in the use of heavy artillery and
tanks. The number of units equipped with heavy
weapons and armor is unknown, but one Guard tank
battalion with Soviet T-54/55 tanks reportedly par-
ticipated in the capture of Bostan in December 1981.
The pace at which the Guard receives major military
equipment relative to the regular Army may indicate
the extent to which the regime views the Guard as a
conventional force.
' Islamization refers to the process of integrating clerics and
Pasdaran into the regular armed forces to create a military
establishment loyal to the regime.
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Little is known of how the Guard and Army coordi-
nate wartime operations, but it is clear that little
integration of command and control exists at battal-
ion, brigade, and division levels. We believe, however,
that important operations require coordination of
combat objectives at the headquarters level and at
least minimal contact between commanders of adja-
cent tactical Army and Guard units tasked with the
same objective. Battlefield successes in the last half of
1981 suggest better coordination than earlier in the
war.
The National Gendarmerie. The National Gendar-
merie is divided into 15 districts, each of which has
battalion and regimental level units. These, in turn,
control company headquarters and posts. The Gen-
darmerie also has a coast guard unit responsible for
surveillance of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman
and navigable rivers in southern Iran.
The new mission of the Gendarmerie remains unde-
fined, but it is being used for border control, safety on
intercity roads, and some anti-insurgent operations.
Some 2,230 Gendarmerie posts throughout the coun-
try maintain daily contact with village and tribal
people in the remote areas of Iran and are usually the
sole governmental representatives in these rural areas.
The National Police. The National Police force col-
lapsed after the revolution. Police stations and weap-
ons were seized by revolutionary committees (komi-
tehs), and many police were killed or arrested. In
April 1980 an amnesty decree was issued and at-
tempts were made to rebuild the force, but purges of
the once 40,000-man force continue. Relations with
the community and clerics remain poor, and police
effectiveness is low.
Police have been responsible for handling guard du-
ties, traffic accidents where injuries occur, and minor
crimes. Each police station reportedly has a komi-
teh-headed by a cleric-which controls all major
criminal investigations and limits police involvement
in them.
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Foreign Relations
Iran's strategic location and in more recent times its
rich oil deposits have caused it to be the subject of
rivalry between the great powers since the early 19th
century. Iran's overwhelming foreign policy preoccu-
pation has been with Russia, whether Czarist or
Soviet, on the one hand, and Britain-and then the
United States-on the other. Tehran's early political
and economic weakness precluded strong initiatives,
and intrigue rather than diplomacy was the common
practice.
The Islamic revolution of 1979 changed Iran's pro-
Western foreign policy to one of nonalignment. Inter-
nal security and domestic political problems, however,
have circumscribed Iran's ability to project its policy
views. Even bilateral relations are often confused and
contradictory. Iran's goals are dominated by the
desire to eliminate great power influence, to encour-
age Islamization of governments in the Persian Gulf
region, especially where substantial Shiite communi-
ties exist, and to export its revolution.
The War With Iraq
The Iran-Iraq war is only the most recent manifesta-
tion of a historical enmity and competition for region-
al dominance between the two countries. When the
war ends, it will be followed by a fragile peace which
probably will leave one of the parties bitter and intent
on reversing the outcome at the first opportunity.
Nonetheless, Baghdad and Tehran have enjoyed pe-
riods of relative calm and accommodation in their
relations. Such a period began in 1975 with the
signing of the Algiers Accord, which effectively ended
the latest round of Kurdish rebellion. The calm was
broken with the revolution in Iran, which rekindled
efforts by each side to undermine the other. Iraq
began its anti-Iranian efforts not long after Khomeini
came to power. It began aiding Iranian exiles and
dissidents in their activities against the Khomeini
Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 in the hope of
precipitating the overthrow of the Khomeini regime.
It publicly declared three less ambitious goals: Iranian
recognition of Iraqi claims to disputed border territor-
ies and the Shatt al Arab waterway, an Iranian pledge
to refrain from interfering in Arab affairs, and the
return to Arab control of three Gulf islands that the
Shah had occupied in 1971. The initial Iraqi ground
campaign was moderately successful, but Iran has
slowly been pushing the Iraqi forces back.
Relations With the West
Iran's revolution was not just a change of elite groups,
but a genuinely popular upheaval that included an
emotional revulsion against the West. This continues
to set important limits on relations with the West,
particularly with the United States. The United
States is the "Great Satan" and is blamed for almost
all antiregime activity (see US Interests).
Western countries in general are suspect because of
their ties to the United States. Nonetheless, Iran is
attempting to establish correct relations with some of
them to reduce its diplomatic isolation and reestablish
economic ties. This effort will be constrained, howev-
er, by Iran's attempts to export its revolution and its
continuing anti-US attitude.
Despite cool relations 65 percent of Iranian trade
remains with the West because of mutual need and
habit. The West is Iran's main food supplier, and Iran
needs Western help to expand its oil industry. Iran is a
major source of oil for Europe and Japan. West
Germany and Japan continue to be strong economic
partners with Iran, and Iran is seeking military
assistance from the United Kingdom. Sweden's and
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Switzerland's less visible ties with the United States
have encouraged Tehran to increase economic agree-
ments with them. Iran also sees Italy as a relatively
neutral Western state and has continued its tradition-
ally extensive economic and military supply agree-
ments. Relations with France are strained as a result
of French ties with Iraq and Iranian exile activity in
France.
Relations With Communist Countries
Iran's need for economic assistance and military
equipment has led it to expand its contacts with
Communist countries, despite Khomeini's strong op-
position to Communism. The major contacts are with
the USSR, North Korea, East Germany, Hungary,
and Romania.
The Soviets consider Iran a major geopolitical prize,
and they view the ouster of the United States as a
major strategic gain. Since the fall of the Shah, the
Soviets have curried favor with the Khomeini regime.
They have established a bilateral relationship with the
government that they hope will pave the way for
broader Soviet influence in Iran, even after Khomeini.
They also have expanded their trade relationship with
Iran to deter any move by Tehran toward the West
and at the same time tried to prevent that relationship
from jeopardizing ties with Iraq. They have tried to
maintain the appearance of evenhandedness in the
Iran-Iraq conflict. Moscow has been frustrated in part
by Tehran's continued xenophobia and its wary atti-
tude toward the USSR.
Iran recently has increased contacts with the USSR
despite a variety of bilateral problems, including the
flow of Soviet arms to Iraq, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and Tehran's concern about Soviet in-
terference in Iran's internal affairs. For Iran the
Soviet Union is a "lesser" satan than the United
States and one with which relations are possible.
Apart from economic necessity, Tehran's increasing
receptivity to improved relations may stem from the
influence of new leaders who have taken office since
the wave of assassinations in the summer of 1981.
There are now some 2,000 Soviet advisers in Iran
engaged in a wide variety of economic and technical
projects. This is about the same number as under the
Shah but a substantial increase over the number
present in the early days of the revolution. Soviet
arms supply to Iran has been expanded; and econom-
ic, technical, scientific, and cultural contacts have
increased.
Non-Arab Islamic Neighbors
Turkey has adopted a cautious approach toward the
Khomeini regime and encourages its allies to do
likewise. The Turks want to maintain a businesslike
relationship with whatever regime is in power in
Tehran. They fear Iranian export of Islamic militancy
and believe an isolated Iran is more susceptible to
Soviet exploitation. Iran and Turkey collaborate to
prevent cross-border operations aimed at either gov-
ernment and have concluded some substantial trade
agreements. Ankara hopes these ties will help reduce
Iran's isolation from the West and reduce Iran's need
for Soviet economic agreements.
Pakistan and Iran have sought to improve their
technically correct but cool relations. Khomeini's
influence in Pakistan is considerable, and Pakistan
hopes closer ties will discourage Iranian interference
in Pakistani affairs. Pakistan also believes that the
potential for Soviet meddling and a Communist take-
over is greater as long as Iran remains isolated from
moderate and Western states. Both countries are
traditional allies and have economic objectives that
can be furthered by closer bilateral ties. Iran is a
potential market for Pakistani goods that are not
selling well in world markets, and Pakistan provides a
potentially expanding market for Iranian oil.
The Iranians have consistently denounced the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and have rebuffed all Soviet
efforts to have Tehran deal with the Babrak regime.
Tehran is unlikely to participate in any scheme or
conference which implies de facto recognition of the
present Kabul government and which does not require
as a precondition the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Arab States
Iran has pursued an almost schizophrenic policy
toward the Persian Gulf states. Statements expressing
a desire for good relations have been followed by
derogatory and menacing comments. The Iran-Iraq
war intensified this tendency.
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Iran's revolution is seen as a major source of regional
destabilization by the other countries of the Persian
Gulf. The revolution has opened regional regimes to
some of the same charges that the Iranian clergy used
so effectively against the Shah-corruption and the
failure to adhere to Islamic principles. All Gulf states
must cope with problems of social and economic
dislocations associated with modernization and oil
wealth that undermined the Shah's regime. Most of
these countries have Shia communities and large
expatriate populations open to outside manipulation.
The Iranian-backed coup attempt in Bahrain in
December 1981 illustrated the danger to Gulf re-
gimes. Nevertheless, the various regimes have been
slow in developing strategies to deal with these prob-
lems or with the new regime in Tehran.
Tehran has sought practical alliances with some
radical Arabs. Ties between Syria-Iraq's traditional
ideological rival-and Iran were cordial even before
the war with Iraq. Syria has provided Iran with small
arms and ammunition and has served as a transship-
ment point for supplies from East European countries
to Iran. Tehran's relations with Libya improved, at
least temporarily, as a result of the war. Libyan leader
Qadhafi has long expressed support for Iran's Islamic
revolution, and Libya has provided arms and eco-
nomic assistance to Iran.
The war with Iraq has complicated Iranian ties with
the Palestine Liberation Organization because the
PLO must also preserve its ties with Arab Baghdad.
PLO leader Arafat initially hoped to mediate the
differences between the two sides and traveled to both
capitals in the early days of the war, but his mission
failed and led to further strains with both countries.
Other States
Since the revolution Iran has unilaterally abrogated
its agreements with the United States and the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) and joined the non-
aligned movement. Third World countries, however,
especially those in Asia with large Muslim popula-
tions, tend to be cool in their relations with Iran.
India, Bangladesh, and Nepal are privately critical of
Khomeini but are silent in public. China is viewed
along with the United States and the USSR as a
"satan," but the Iranians have sought to obtain arms
from Beijing.
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The United States' relationship with Iran has disinte-
grated since the 1979 revolution. Iranian attitudes
toward the United States and the West show little
sign of changing appreciably. Although the pro-West-
ern Iran of the last generation is gone, the country
remains important to US strategic and economic
interests in the area because of its location and its oil
resources.
Iran's common border with the Soviet Union and
increasing Soviet economic activity in Iran make it
susceptible to Soviet blandishments. The presence of
substantial Soviet military forces on Iran's northern
border also gives the USSR a major lever for exerting
pressure on Tehran, influencing US policy options,
and, as a last resort, for intervening in Iran. Despite
widespread suspicion of the USSR, Iran's need for
manufactured goods and particularly military equip-
ment has forced it to turn to Moscow and its allies.
Tehran's continuing economic and political turmoil
has enhanced the power of those most opposed to the
West in general and the United States specifically.
Moreover, a shortage of oil revenues has forced Iran
to increase its use of barter in trade relations, and
such arrangements have been received more favorably
in the East than in the West.
Iran already has the military and economic power to
resume playing a dominant role in the Gulf. If Tehran
were to become pro-Soviet, Iran would be even more
threatening to moderate governments in the Gulf and
to Gulf shipping. Iran is capable of threatening oil
shipments through the Strait of Hormuz as well as
production facilities on the Gulf littoral. These capa-
bilities would probably be reinforced in a pro-Soviet
and possibly more strident Iran. Half of Europe's and
most of Japan's petroleum requirements come from
the Gulf area.
The revolution in Iran and its war with Iraq have
advanced some US interests notwithstanding the seri-
ous security problems facing the Arab Gulf states.
The increase in concern for the security of the Gulf
area and growing appreciation of its strategic impor-
tance have raised the possibility that other nearby
states-principally Egypt-would contribute to the
defense of the region. Iraqi dependence on moderate
Arab states-including Egypt-has been established,
reinforcing a trend toward a more cooperative atti-
tude in Baghdad on regional issues. Internal political
maneuvering and the war with Iraq have deflected-
but not eliminated-Iran's efforts to export its
Islamic revolution to neighboring countries. The belief
has been heightened among the moderate Arab Gulf
regimes that their security ultimately lies both with
strengthening ties among themselves and with the
West. These states have attempted to formalize their
ties by establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council,
which excludes both Iran and Iraq, something long
desired but always avoided for fear of angering either
country.
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Personalities
An opposition politician in exile in Paris, Amini was Prime Minister during 1961-
62. A power broker, he is trying to unify exile groups. He undoubtedly would like a
high position in a government after the Islamic Republic is overthrown, but his
considerable wealth, his service under the Shah, and his lack of a real power base
seem to preclude it. He is about 74.
Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff under the Shah, Ariana now lives in ex-
ile, mostly in Turkey. He heads an organization of fellow officers dedicated to the
overthrow of the current regime. At his advanced age (over 75), however, he seems
unlikely to play an active role in a counterrevolution.
The last Prime Minister under the Shah and now in exile in France, Bakhtiar
heads the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance, a loose collection of
organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Khomeini regime. His appeal has
generally been limited to the middle and upper classes.
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Head of the Union for Freedom Movement since at least November 1978, Bani-
Ahmad was a vocal opponent of the Shah in the Majles. Arrested by the
revolutionary government in early 1979, he fled to Paris on his release. From exile
in southern France he has called for the formation of a patriotic front of all groups
opposing the regime. His leftist/socialist organization, regarded as elitist in
nature, has failed to attract much support. Bani-Ahmad is 62.
The first President of the Islamic Republic, Bani-Sadr fled to Paris in 1981 and
formed the National Resistance Council. He contends that he is legally still the
President of Iran by virtue of his election to a four-year term in January 1980.
While President in Iran, he established his image as deeply religious and hostile to
the United States. Whether that image reflects current reality is uncertain. He is
48.
Speaker of the Majles since its establishment in 1980, Hashemi-Rafsanjani is one
of the most militant leaders of the regime. He is also a member of the Central
Committee,of the ruling Islamic Republic Party and a leading Islamic scholar. He
is about 48.
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Jam, Fereydun
Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff under the Shah, Jam had a reputation
for ability, honesty, and integrity. He now lives in London and is only a
background figure in the exile opposition. Many exiled aspirants for leadership in
Iran would like to see him accept the top military post in their prospective regimes.
He is 67.
Khamenei, All
Elected President of Iran in October 1981, Khamenei is the first cleric to hold that
position. One of the founders of the ruling Islamic Republic Party, he became its
secretary general in August 1981. A hardline fundamentalist, he is an implacable
enemy of government critics and virulently anti-American. In an assassination
attempt in June 1981, he suffered throat injuries and lost the use of his right arm.
Khamenei seems generally recovered but suffers considerable pain in his arm. He
returned to his post as Tehran's Friday Imam once in March 1982.
Khomeini is the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. In February 1979 the charismatic and intransigent symbol of opposition to
the Shah returned from 15 years of exile in Turkey, Iraq, and France. He is Iran's
most exalted spiritual guide and its final temporal authority. Beset by physical
infirmities associated with mild coronary heart disease and somewhat diminished
in appeal since the revolution, he nonetheless remains the dominant force in Iran
today. Khomeini is about 81.
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Kianuri, Nur-ed-Din
Kianuri was elected first secretary of the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran in
1979 with strong Soviet backing after returning from 30 years of living abroad,
mostly in East Germany. He has consistently expressed his support for the Islamic
Republic and claimed an identity of interests with the regime. He holds a Ph. D. in
architecture from the University of Berlin. 'He is about 66 and speaks fluent
Russian.
Madani, Ahmad
Madani served at various times as Commander of the Navy, Minister of Defense,
and Governor General of Khuzestan. Madani fled to West Germany in 1980.
Intensely ambitious, he sees himself as a soldier-statesman to whom Iranians will
turn in disaffection with theocratic rule. His source of support is largely confined
to middle and upper class elements; his naval background diminishes his appeal to
dissidents in the Army and Air Force. He is 53.
A senior ayatollah, he is fundamentalist in his religious outlook and a hardliner in
politics. In April 1982 Khomeini's son said that Montazeri should be Khomeini's
successor. This is the strongest indication to date that Khomeini and other senior
clerics have given their blessing to him as heir apparent. Montazeri's health is
poor, and he has been unimpressive in addressing crowds and on television. He is
about 60.
Secret 46
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Musavi-Khamenei, Mir Hosein
Musavi-Khamenei has served as Prime Minister since October 1981. Musavi-
Khamenei had little professional experience to recommend him for his present
post. He is, however, a "dedicated Muslim" with impeccable revolutionary
credentials. A member of the Central Committee of the ruling Islamic Republican
Party, he has a longstanding anti-American bias. He believes that the United
States is moving toward a confrontation with the Islamic world from which Islam
will emerge triumphant. He is about 40.
Oveisi, Qolam Ali
A former commander of the Army and Martial Law Administrator under the
Shah, Oveisi had a reputation as a competent soldier. Now in Paris, he is a leader
among the many exile groups working to overthrow the regime in Iran. His close
association with the former monarchy and his sanctioning of the repressive actions
of his troops during the last months of the former regime weigh heavily against
him in the eyes of many Iranians. He is 63.
Reza Pahlavi is the eldest son of the Shah. In exile in Cairo, he proclaimed himself
Shah in 1980 and took the name Reza II. No country acknowledges his claim.
Reza is backed by many Iranian monarchists. He is 20. He is now resident in
Rabat.
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Qasemlu, Abdol Rahman
Qasemlu has served as Secretary General of the Kurdish Democratic Party since
1971. In this position Qasemlu heads the oldest and most important Kurdish
organization in Iran. A socialist with pro-Soviet sympathies, he spearheads the
struggle to create a democratic state in which Iranian Kurds would enjoy political
and cultural autonomy. He opposes the present Iranian regime largely because of
its refusal to loosen central control of minorities and has allied his party with the
Mujahedin. He is 51.
Rajavi has been head of the Mujahedin, the strongest opposition force in Iran. He
fled to Paris in mid-1981 just as his group's campaign of terror against Iranian
Government leaders began. He claims still to direct Mujahedin activities but may
be losing his influence. Rajav_ is also head of the National Resistance Council, de-
scribed by him as a transitional government. Together with former President Abol
Hasan Bani-Sadr, he has continued to work to overthrow the regime, but their fu-
ture cooperation is problematic. Rajavi is about 34.
Shariat-Madari, Kazem
The senior ayatollah, a symbol of moderate domestic opposition to the Khomeini
regime, and regarded by many Iranians as more learned and spiritual than
Khomeini, Shariat-Madari believes that the present pervasive clerical control of
the Iranian Government and society will eventually lessen the high regard that
many Iranians have for religion. He has differed with Khomeini on many issues
but has been unwilling to challenge him directly. The regime has apparently
successfully reduced his influence by implicating him in recent coup plotting and
stripping him of his religious authority. He is about 80.
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Chronology
550-330 B.C. The first Persian empire, founded by Cyrus the Great of the Achaemenid dynasty,
eventually extends from what is now Afghanistan to the Mediterranean and
Aegean Seas.
330 B.C. Alexander the Great is crowned King of Persia.
250 B.C. Revolt against Greek rule leads to establishment of Parthian dynasty.
226-651 A.D. The Sassanian rulers restore the Persian empire to greatness.
All Sassanian domains come under Arab Muslim control, marking an almost 900-
year period of political decline, disunity, and disorder under the Arabs, Turks, and
Mongols.
1502-1736 Under the Safavid dynasty, internal order and unity are restored, and Shia Islam
is established as the state religion.
1795 Turkic Qajar dynasty begins.
1797 Treaty of Gulistan cedes Georgia to Russia; intense rivalry begins between Russia
and Great Britain for Iranian interests.
1857 Afghanistan severed from Iran by Great Britain.
1906 Fundamental laws (national constitution) adopted by Majles under Qajar dynasty
monarch.
1907 Iran divided into spheres of influence by Russia and Great Britain.
1914-17 Iran declares itself neutral in World War I and is occupied by Russia and Great
Britain.
1921 Successful coup led against Qajar monarchy by Reza Khan, leader of an Iranian
Army Cossack brigade. Treaty of Friendship signed with the USSR.
1925 Coronation of Reza Khan, henceforth known as Reza Shah Pahlavi.
1941 Great Britain and the USSR invade Iran to counter threat of expanding German
influence. Reza Shah abdicates in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Shah.
USSR withdraws its troops from Iran after Iran complains to the UN Security
Council. Soviet-supported Kurdish Democratic Republic and Azarbayjan Demo-
cratic Republic collapse.
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Tudeh Party, the Communist party in Iran, outlawed for alleged involvement in an
attempt to assassinate the Shah.
British-owned oil industry nationalized; oil production ceases; anti-British street
demonstrations threaten national security. Muhammad Mossadeq becomes Prime
Minister.
Mossadeq ousted by coup, and the Shah, who had fled to Europe after an abortive
attempt against Mossadeq a few days earlier, returns to Iran.
Iran joins Baghdad Pact, which in 1959 became the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO).
Bilateral defense agreement signed with the United States.
Ali Amini appointed Prime Minister, initiates widespread political, economic, and
social reforms at Shah's behest.
Unilateral declaration by Iran, for the benefit of the USSR, that Iranian soil will
not be used by foreign powers for missile bases.
Khomeini exiled to Iraq. Shah represses opposition.
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey establish Regional Cooperation for Development
(RCD).
Prime Minister Hasan-Ali Mansur assassinated by member of a fanatical Muslim
group. Attempt on Shah's life by a conscript member of Imperial Guard.
Constituent assembly amends constitution to provide for succession to Shah;
Empress named Regent. Coronation of Muhammad Reza Shah. US economic aid
to Iran officially ends.
British announce they will pull forces out of Persian Gulf at end of 1971.
Iran abrogates 1937 agreement with Iraq over border in the Shatt al Arab because
of alleged Iraqi violations.
Celebration of 2,500th anniversary of Persian monarchy. Iranian forces occupy
Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.
Up to 3,000 Iranian troops support Oman's armed forces against rebels.
Border clashes with Iraq.
Iran-Iraq border treaty signed.
Anti-Shah movement gains strength; Khomeini leaves Iraq for France; martial law
declared in Iran.
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January: Shah leaves Iran.
February: Bakhtiar regime collapses; Khomeini returns to Iran; US Embassy
seized.
November: US Embassy seized a second time; hostages taken.
December: New constitution approved.
January: Bani-Sadr elected President.
March-May: Fundamentalists dominate two-round Majles elections.
April: Unsuccessful US effort to rescue hostages.
July: Shah dies in exile in Egypt.
August: Mohammad Ali Rajai named Prime Minister.
September: Iraq invades Iran.
January: US hostages released after 444 days.
April: Mujahedin stage largest demonstration in Tehran in almost a year.
May: Leftist paramilitary groups open terrorist campaign against the regime.
June: Khomeini dismisses Bani-Sadr.
July: Bani-Sadr and Mujahedin leader Rajavi flee Iran.
August: President Rajai and Prime Minister Bahonar killed.
October: Leftist street violence abates.
November: Ayatollah Khamenei elected President, Musavi declared Prime
Minister.
March-April: Iran defeats Iraq in biggest battle of the war and regains over 1,000
square kilometers of occupied territory; Khomeini regime radicals consolidate
power and discredit leading moderate clerics.
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Statistical Summary
Agricultural 14 percent
Cultivable with irrigation 16 percent
Forested 11 percent
Grazing 8 percent
Desert, waste, or urban 51 percent
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 nautical miles (fishing zone, 50 nautical
miles)
People Population: about 39,100,000 (January 1981)
Average annual growth rate: 2.9 percent
Ethnic divisions: 62 percent Persians
18 percent Turkic
13 percent other Iranian
3 percent Kurds
3 percent Arab and other Semitic
1 percent other
Religion: 93 percent Shia Muslim
5 percent Sunni Muslim
2 percent Zoroastrians, Jews,
Christians, and Bahais
Language: Persian (Farsi), Turkish dialects, Kurdish, Arabic
Literacy: 37 percent of those seven years of age and older (1976 estimate)
Labor force: 12 million (shortage of skilled labor substantial)
Agriculture 33 percent
Manufacturing 21 percent
Legal name: Islamic Republic of Iran
Capital: Tehran
Type: Republic.
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Legal system: Constitution codifies Islamic principles of government
Government leaders: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, President Ali Khamenei,
Prime Minister Mir-Hosein Musavi-Khamenei, Speaker of Parliament Ali Akbar
Hashemi-Rafsanjani.
Political parties: Islamic Republican Party; Tudeh Party (Communist)
Member of: Colombo Plan, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAC, ICAO, IDA, IFC,
IHO, ILO, IMCO, IMF, IPU, ITU, NAM, OPEC, RCD, UN, UNESCO, UPU,
WFTU, WHO, WMO, WSG, WTO; continued participation in some of these
organizations under the Islamic constitution may be doubtful
Economy GNP: $81.7 billion (1979), $2,170 per capita; 1979 real GNP growth, -24 percent
Agriculture: Wheat, barley, rice, sugar beets, cotton, dates, raisins, tea, tobacco,
sheep, and goats
Major industries: Crude oil production (1,098 million b/d in 1979) and refining,
textiles, cement and other building materials, food processing (particularly sugar
refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating (steel and copper)
Electric power: 10,300-kW capacity (1979); 45,016 million kWh produced (1979),
1,180 kWh per capita
Exports: $19.8 billion (f.o.b., 1979), 96 percent petroleum; also carpets, raw cotton,
fruits and nuts, hide and leather items, ores
Imports: $8.7 billion (f.o.b., 1979); machinery, iron and steel products, chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, agricultural products
Major trade partners: Exports-Japan, West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, UK,
Spain, France; imports-West Germany, Japan, UK, Italy
Budget: (FY 1980/81) proposed revenue of $33.9 billion, current expenditure
$25.8 billion, development expenditure $14.4 billion; actual expenditures likely to
total about $32 billion
Monetary conversion rate: 70.5 rials = US $1
Fiscal year. 21 March-20 March
Secret 54
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Communications Railroads: 4,600 km total; 4,500 km standard gauge (1.435 m), 100 km 1.676
meter gauge
Highways: 81,800 km total; 36,000 km gravel and crushed stone, 15,000 km
improved dirt
Inland waterways: 900 km, excluding the Caspian Sea, 100 km on the Shatt al
Arab
Pipelines: Crude oil, 3,425 km; refined products, 4,120 km; natural gas, 3,280 km
Ports: Seven major, six minor
Merchant Marine: 55 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 1,048, 160 GRT,
1,743,428 DWT
Civil air: 53 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 181 total, 154 usable; 71 with permanent surface runways; 13 with
runways over 3,660 meters, 17 with runways 2,440 to 3,659 meters, 66 with
runways 1,220 to 2,439 meters
Telecommunications: Advanced system but not properly maintained, only partly
operative, further degradation expected. Tehran principal center and hub of
critical relay, radio lines; 828,000 telephones (2.2 per 100 persons) troposcatter,
about 35 AM, two FM, and 65 TV stations, Atlantic and Indian Ocean
INTELSAT stations
Defense Forces Personnel: Joint Staff 3,750; Ground Force 200,000; Navy 20,000; Air Force
85,000 (1,500 pilots); Gendarmerie 75,000; Revolutionary Guard 200,000 to
250,000
Military manpower: Males 15 to 49, 8,621,000; 5,131,000 fit for military service
Military equipment: See table 6
Supply: Mostly from United States, some equipment also from UK, France, Italy,
and USSR
Intelligence and Security Islamic Revolutionary Guard, Iranian National Security and Intellience Organi-
zation (SAVAMA), National Police, National Gendarmerie
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