THE LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SETTING THE STAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00232R000100150003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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;E E Directorate of Secret
I
~~
nacnigence -
The Lebanese Presidential
Election: Setting the
Stage
An Intelligence Assessment
MASTER FILE COPY
CO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
Secret
NESA 82-10185
May 1982
Copy 268
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Lebanese Presidential
Election: the
Stage
Information available as of 7 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared b
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be dir ~ctc In
the Chief. Arab-Israeli Division, NESA
This report has been coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations and the National Intelligence
Councill
Secret
NESA 82-10185
May 1982
25
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Sperpt
The Lebanese Presidential
Electipne Setting
Stage
Key Judgments The presidency is Lebanon's most important remaining symbol of national
unity, and Muslims and Christians alike are looking to the presidential
election this summer as the country's last chance to achieve national
reconciliation and avert partition. The official campaign has not yet begun,
but the looming Syrian-Phalange deadlock is likely to jeopardize the
election and lead to renewed violence. 25
The campaign has already developed into a contest between the Syrians
and the Christian Phalange-dominated Lebanese Front. So far, both are
holding to inflexible positions, and neither appears to subscribe to the
widely held belief that they will have to compromise on a candidate.
Without a dialogue between the two sides, an attempt by Damascus to
impose a pro-Syrian candidate or the refusal by the Phalange to tolerate
anyone except its own candidate is likely to result in new Syrian-Phalange
fighting, pogible i , and an increased risk of Israeli-Syrian conflict
in Lebanon]
The Phalange wants the election to serve as the basis for restoring
traditional Maronite political dominance and for reducing Syrian and
Palestinian influence in Lebanon, but few Phalangists appear to believe
that such an outcome is likely. The Phalange's campaign strategy will
largely aim at blocking the election of a pro-Syrian candidate. 25
The Syrians will try to use the election to forge a Lebanese coalition
amenable to Syria's direction and will support a candidate who will agree
to normalize bilateral ties between the two countries, concede a larger
political role to Lebanese Muslims, and use the authority of the govern-
ment to reduce the Phalange's military and political power base. At a
minimum, Damascus will seek to prevent the Phalange from maneuvering
within the election process to restore Maronite dominance over Lebanon or
to carry the country and establish a ministate dependent
on Israel 25
The United States has emerged in the eyes of most Lebanese and Arab
leaders as a key player in the campaign, and some Lebanese leaders believe
that Washington will have to "select" a candidate and help oversee the
process to ensure that the election is held. Phalange leaders know that they
do not have the military strength to challenge the Syrians over the
iii Secret
NESA 82-10185
May 1982
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presidency, and they will look to the United States to intervene to help
them stave off a pro-Syrian candidate. The Syrians will view a US role that
is not closely coordinated with them and does not ensure the severance of
Israeli-Phalange ties as another sign of a US-Israeli-Phalange plot to
reduce Syrian influence, restore Christian dominance, and restrict Pales-
tinian activity in Lebanon
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The Lebanese Presidential
Election: Settin the
Stag
Lebanon's presidential election is scheduled to take
place between 23 July and 23 August. The official
campaign has yet to begin, but the election issue has
been the focus of Lebanese domestic politics since last
fall when hopes for a national reconciliation promoted
by the Arab Conciliation Committee on Lebanon
began to fade.' Most major Lebanese factions and
political leaders have publicly staked out their posi-
tions on the election, but few have named their
preferred candidates for fear of exposing them to
opposition fire. Although statements by leading Mus-
lims and Christians continue to betray the deep-
seated confessional mistrust that led to the civil war of
1975-76, most Lebanese view the presidency as an
important symbol of national unity and appear to
want the election to take place under the terms of the
constitution.
Syria, whose troops have controlled most of the
country since they intervened in the civil war in 1976,
is widely viewed as the major player in the election.
The Syrians had hoped that the election of President
Sarkis in 1976 would serve both to end the fighting
and as a basis for national reconciliation. They soon
became discouraged by what they perceived as Sar-
kis's inability to confront the militant Maronite fac-
tions as they grew increasingly opposed to the Syrian
presence in Lebanon and his unwillingness to press for
major political concessions for Muslims. They were
also disappointed by his reluctance to ally Lebanon
more closely with Syria. By early last year it was clear
that the Syrians had written Sarkis off and were
looking toward this summer's election to install a new
man bef new political initiatives in
Lebanon] I
' The Arab Conciliation Committee was formed in 1976 to help
facilitate national reconciliation in Lebanon after the civil war
ended. It was reconvened last summer after the heavy Syrian-
Phalange fighting in Zahlah and Beirut. It currently consists of the
Saudi
Foreign Ministers of Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, an as
well as the Secretary General of the Arab Leaguel
' Under the terms of the unwritten National Covenant of the
presidency is reserved for the Maronites, the prime ministry for a
Sunni d h sition of speaker of parliament for a Shia
Muslim
Secret
The Contending Parties
Syria's goals in Lebanon have not changed since it
intervened in the civil war in 1976. Damascus wants a
stable Lebanon with Christian-Muslim power more
evenly balanced and closely tied to Syria so that
Syrian military access to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley,
which Syrians consider a likely avenue of Israeli
attack, is assured. The Syrians also want to keep the
Palestinians in Lebanon on a short leash to prevent
them from accepting a settlement with Israel that
does not include a return of the Golan Heights to
Syria or embroiling Syria in a war with Israel that is
not of its own choosing
Above all, however, the Syrians want to prevent the
creation on their western border of a potentially
hostile, Palestinian-influenced, radical Muslim state 25
or a Christian state dependent on Israel. They inter-
vened in the civil war in 1976 to prevent an alliance of
Lebanese Muslim leftists and Palestinians from de-
feating Christian forces. That done, the Syrians
shifted the focus of their policy in Lebanon to prevent-
ing the principal Maronite groups, led by the Pha-
lange. from establishing a ministate allied with Israel.
I
We believe the Syrians see the election of a new
Lebanese president this summer as a key element in
attaining their goals.
they want a president who will be more amenable to
their guidance than Sarkis has been. They will expect
him to allow them a hand in rebuilding the Lebanese
Army and to take a firm position against the Pha-
lange-dominated Lebanese Front. They will expect
the new president to be willing to use the Syrian- 25
manned Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to establish
government control over the Phalan e-controlled
Maronite heartland.
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Phalange Proposal for Partition
Phalange
Dominated
Traditional
I Christian Area
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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The Christian Lebanese Front, led by Phalange mili-
tia chief Bashir Jumayyil, will provide the main
opposition to Syria's candidate for the presidency.
According to senior Phalange officials, Phalange
strategists fear that the Syrians intend to use the
election to strip the Lebanese Front of its military and
political power by proposing a candidate who would
outlaw the Phalange and employ Syrian troops
against it. The Phalange has threatened to block the
election if such a candidate is likely to win, and it
insists that the election should got e e so ong as
Syrian troops remain in Beirut.
We believe that Jumayyil would like to have a strong-
willed Maronite elected president who would use the
authority of his office to restore Maronite dominance
over Lebanon. He would look to such a president to
press Damascus for a complete withdrawal of Syrian
troops and to reach a new agreement with the Pales-
tinians that would establish tight control over their
actions. According to senior Phalange officials
Jumayyil believes that if the government can end
Palestinian guerrilla activity against Israel, it could
gain Israeli acquiescence to extending its authority
throughout southern Lebanon, including the border
enclave controlled b former Lebanese Army major
Saad Haddad
Phalange officials indicate that Jumayyil would like
to form a coalition with Lebanese Muslims from the
more conservative elements in the Druze and Shia
communities as well as from the Sunni political
establishment that would support a Front candidate
and Phalange policies toward the Syrians and the
Palestinians. In return, the new president would agree
to a broader Muslim role in the Lebanese political
power structure.
It is not clear what concessions Jumayyil is prepared
to offer. In a pamphlet published in late 1980 entitled
"The Lebanon We Want To Build," leading Christian
politicians close to or members of the Front presented
a confederation plan under which major confessional
areas of the country would have a wide range of
autonomous powers within the framework of a unified
state. Although some older Muslim politicians have
warmed to the idea of decentralization as an answer
to Lebanon's problems, most Muslims fear that any
scheme for autonomous regions is merely a precursor
to partition.
Lebanon's Muslims are split between conservatives
who largely want to preserve Lebanon's confessional
structure and radicals who want the elect' v
2
as a transition to a secular, socialist state 2
many who would like to see the
selection of a moderate who would restore the author-
ity of the presidency and lead the country toward
national reconciliation fear that the hardline positions
of the Phalange and the Syrians will lead to new
violence and the breakdown of the election process.
Although many Muslims share Christian disgruntle-
ment with Syrian influence in Lebanon, in our opinion 25
most view the Syrians and, to a lesser extent, the
Palestinians as necessary protection against the Pha-
lange. Because Syrian troops occupy almost all Mus-
lim areas of Lebanon, we believe that most Muslims
realize they cannot afford to oppose Syrian policy on
the election.
Interested Bystanders
The Palestinians want to retain maximum freedom of
action in Lebanon and view the approaching election,
like any other potential major change in the Lebanese
political scene, with some unease. The Palestine Lib-
eration Organization (PLO) will attempt to stay out of
the campaign, but we believe it clearly prefers the
election of a neutral or moderate candidate who 25
would allow the Palestinians' current freedom of
movement in Lebanon to continue. The PLO would
view with concern the election of a dynamic president,
whether pro-Syrian, pro-Phalange, or independent,
and considers any expansion of central government
authority as coming at Palestinian expense. The PLO
fears that the election of a candidate sympathetic to
the Phalange would be used against them by the
Israelis and suspects that a pro-Syrian president
would rpove to bring em under tighter Syrian 25
control. 25
We believe the Israelis would like to see the election
of a strong-willed president who would reduce Syrian
influence in Lebanon, disarm the guerrillas, and
restrict Palestinian activity as a prelude to signing a
peace treaty with Israel. They will probably settle for
a renewal of President Sarkis's term second-best
outcome I the 2
Israelis believe that Syria intends to dominate the
election in order to consolidate and formalize its role
in Lebanon and turn it into another confrontation
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The Lebanese presidential election is governed by
Article 49 of the constitution, which says that "the
President of the Republic shall be elected by the
Chamber of Deputies by secret ballot and by a two-
thirds majority of the votes. Amer the first ballot. an
absolute majority will be sufficient.'
Lebanese parliamentary elections, which are sched-
uled every four years, have not been held since 1972
because of security conditions. The current body
extended its tenure last year until June 1983. Seven
of its 99 members have died, prompting a debate
about the definition of a quorum. Those who favor a
quorum based on the full, 99-member body argue fo,
a "strict" interpretation of Article 34, which stipu-
lates that "the Chamber shall not be validly consti-
tuted unless the majority of its lawful members are
present. " Those who believe a quorum should be
based on the 92 surviving deputies argue that Article
34 can only be interpreted on the basis of living
members since security conditions have p
elections to replace those who have died.
Based on 99 deputies, a candidate would have to
receive 66 votes on the first ballot or 50 on subse-
quent ballots to win. With only 92 living deputies, it
would therefore take only 27 votes to block a candi-
date on the first ballot. If the vote is based on 92
deputies, which according to some Lebanese deputies
has been generally accepted in parliament, a candi-
date would need only 62 votes on the first ballot or 47
state. In our opinion the Israelis can be expected to
press the United States to help the Phalange ward off
the imposition of a Syrian-backed president and to
provide military assistance to the Phalange if the
campaign leads to new fighting with the Syrians.
We believe that the Saudis, like other moderate Arab
states, would like the election to serve as a basis for
reducing Syrian influence in Lebanon and promoting
Muslim-Christian reconciliation. They recognize that
on subsequent ballots to win. An effort to block a
candidate in this case would take 31 votes on the first
ballot. Of the 92 deputies, the Lebanese Front can
probably count on about 30 votes. The Syrians can
probably control 50 to 60 votes.
The venue of the balloting will be important. The
Lebanese parliament building, located in the former
commercial district near the confrontation line be-
tween East and West Beirut, has not been used since
the civil war, and the deputies currently meet in
"Mansur Palace, " once the home of one of their
number. It is also located near the confrontation line,
however, and most factions in Beirut can affect
security conditions in the area.
Damascus holds most of the cards, bu
they increasingly blame Leban-
ese politicians for not taking meaningful steps toward
reconciliation. We believe the Saudis are unhappy
with the prospect of a Syrian-dominated election.
They show, however, little willingness to confront
Damascus on the issue and, like other moderates, will
increasingly look to the United States to broker a
compromise.
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Beirut: Areas of Control
35. 30 M e d i t e r r a n e a n
Former Commercial
us District
Ameriewt
35 2 S,don 27 Km
y ,1I M?
Armed Forces
(LAF),,
Crowing point
Government building
I Main urban area
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Syrian Strategy for the Election
The Syrians are trying to form a coalition of Lebanese
Muslim and Christian leaders such as former Prime
Minister Rashid Karami, Druze chieftain Walid
Junblat, Shia leader Nabih Barri, and Phalange rival
and former President Sulayman Franjiyah, around
whom they would organize their electoral campaign.
We believe they will attempt to use this coalition to
isolate the Phalange as "unrepresentative" and will
depict the pro-Syrian alliance's candidate as having
widespread support in both the Muslim and Christian
communities.
Damascus has always opposed "Arabizing" or "inter-
nationalizing" the Lebanese problem, and we believe
that the Syrians will attempt to prevent the introduc-
tion of other outside influences into the election
process. Syrian leaders have already made clear to
other key Arab statesi that they
expect them either to support Syria's candidate or
stay out of the election altogether. They will similarly
oppose efforts to establish election commissions or
other international bodies designed to guarantee fair-
ness in the election.
We do not believe that internal difficulties in Syria
will persuade Syrian President Assad to accept a
compromise in Lebanon unless the resulting unrest
threatens his imminent ouster. Syrian policy toward
Lebanon was not altered substantially during the
sustained clashes in Aleppo between mid-1979 and
mid-1980 nor during the disturbances in Hamah
earlier this year.
To support their contention that the Phalange repre-
sents only a segment of Lebanon's Christians, the
Syrians will probably seek to assemble the necessary
two-thirds of parliament for a first-ballot victory.
They took similar steps in 1976 when they sought to
isolate the Muslim left b lectin Sarkis with the
largest majority possible.e
Phalange Strategy
Phalange strategists are concerned that, if the election
is held, the Syrians will try to outmaneuver them by
presenting a stalking horse who is anathema to them
with a view toward "compromising" on a weaker
candidate who will still acquiesce in most Syrian
conditions. Senior Phalange officials suggest that, in
such a situation, Jumayyil fears that Muslim and
independent Christian deputies, hoping to avoid a
Syrian-Phalange showdown, would eagerly choose to
interpret the Syrian offer as a conciliatory gest
proceed to ratify the "compromise" candidate.
The Phalange, therefore, may move to block the
election by preventing a sufficient number of pro-
Syrian deputies from assembling in the hope that this
would force Syria to accept a genuine compromise
candidate or lead to a crisis that would prompt outside
intervention. Such a strategy would almost certainly
require kidnapings,'killings, and other forms of intimi-
dation and could lead to Syrian retaliation
In trying to block the election, the Phalange would be
playing upon fears among Lebanese politicians that a
delay could hasten partition by leading to a so-called
constitutional vacuum that would exist if no election
were held before the end of President Sarkis's term on
23 September. Under such circumstances, unless a
constitutional amendment was passed extending Sar-
kis's term, the government would be run by the
Council of Ministers until an election could be held.
I I
Some of Jumayyil's opponents suspect, however, that
his strategy for delaying the election through the end
of Sarkis's term is the result of a tacit agreement with
Sarkis to appoint a Christian prime minister before he
leaves office to safeguard the Front's interests. Al-
though this would run counter to the unwritten
National Covenant of 1943, hardline Maronites could
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be expected to argue that, in a government of minis-
ters, the Prime Minister is the head of state and
therefore, should be a Christian.
opponents of the Pha-
lange will attempt to counter such a strategy by
calling for the election process to begin early in the
period prescribed in the constitution to give the
deputies as much time as possible to assemble a
quorum before Sarkis's term ends. Such an early
election could be dangerous for the Phalange by
setting the stage for a Syrian effort to assemble a
quorum and ratify their candidate quickly before the
Phalange can mobilize its assets and focus interna-
tional attention on the situation] I
Moreover, if the Syrians believe that the Phalange
can prevent a quorum from assembling in Beirut, we
believe they may try to move the venue of the election
to an area firmly under Syrian control. Speaker of
Parliament Kamil al-Asad, who sets the date for the
election, is being wooed by the Phalange because of
the venue question, but he has long been supported by
the Syrians, and his pronouncements on the election
echo the Syrian line.
An attempt by the Lebanese Front to employ legal
tactics or the threat of partition to block or postpone
the vote could prompt Damascus to proceed with the
election in an area under Syrian control. If the
Syrians could assemble the deputies necessary for a
quorum, they could maintain that actions taken to
block the election were illegal and could be expected
to press other Arabs to recognize their candidate as
President of Lebanon. This would enable them to
brand the Lebanese Front as "outlaws" and give them
grounds for military action, if necessary, against
Phalange territory] I
Alternative Scenarios
A Preelection Coup. Some Lebanese Muslims fear
that hardline Maronites might use the possible elec-
tion of a Syrian-controlled president as an excuse to
' There is a precedent for the appointment of a Christian prime
minister as a caretaker. Bishara al-Khuri appointed Fuad Shihab
prime minister when he resigned in 1952, and Shihab acted as
temporary head of government until arliament elected Camille
Shamun President a few days late
have elements of the Lebanese Army carry out a coup
against the Sarkis government. They would argue
that "the Army could not stand by" while the Syrians 25.
imposed a "puppet" as the next president. Under this 2
scenario the new military government would sus end
the constitution and postpone the election. 25"
There is no evidence that the Phalange or its sympa-
thizers within the Army are planning such a coup.
Phalange leaders, nevertheless, maintain close ties
with the Maronite leadership of the Army and can
depend on considerable support within the military for
their cause
Partition. Although Phalange spokesmen pay lipserv-
ice to a united Lebanon and deny they seek partition,
some have already issued thinly veiled threats that the
election of an unacceptable candidate will lead to
partition. A major element of Jumayyil's election
strategy appears to be to play upon Lebanese Muslim
and Arab fears of the creation of a separate Christian
state to force them to compromise on the presidency.
25
25
Since the end of the civil war the Phalange has
gradually taken steps to give credence to the idea of a
separate state by assuming government functions or
establishing parallel services throughout the Maronite
heartland. Recently Jumayyil ordered the reorganiza-
tion of the Lebanese Forces, largely composed of
Phalange militiamen, along the lines of a regular
army. As the Phalange has tightened its hold over the
Maronite heartland, it has also gained control over
rival groups within the Front.
Basically, the Phalange concept of partition appears
to call for the creation of a largely Christian state
encompassing most of the Maronite heartland north 25
of Beirut and the Shuf and Aley regions south of the
city to Sidon and Jazzin. In return, the Syrians would
be allowed to annex northern Lebanon and the Biqa
Valley. The Phalange would guarantee that its terri-
tory would not be used as a base for anti-Syrian
activities.
' The Lebanese Front is an umbrella organization consisting of the
Phalange, the National Liberal Party, the Ord
Monks, r aj~
MonkGuardians of the e Cedars, , and and Tanzim zim
H
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The Syrians will almost certainly oppose-by military
means if necessary-any effort by the Phalange to
establish a de facto Christian state. They have reacted
vigorously to efforts by Jumayyil to expand the area
under his control since the civil war and have effec-
tively cordoned off the Maronite heartland with elite
special forces and a loosely based alliance of anti-
Phalange Lebanese militias. The Syrians would also
cite a unilateral step by the Maronites to establish a
state as giving the Syrian-manned Arab Deterrent
Force-as a recognized force of the central govern-
ment in Beirut-the right to take militar action
against the secessionist area.
Extending President Sarkis's Term. As the presiden-
tial campaign unfolds, more attention is being given to
a one- or two-year extension of President Sarkis's
term as the compromise most likely to head off a
confrontation between the Phalange and the Syrians.
Although almost all Lebanese factions oppose such a
move, many observers believe this could change if the
alternative was renewed civil war.
Damascus has remained silent on the issue, but the
vigorous opposition of Syria's Lebanese allies strongly
suggests that the Syrians also are cool to the idea. The
Syrians clearly prefer a new president more amenable
to their direction. They are likely to accept an exten-
sion of Sarkis's term only as a last resort to prevent a
major outbreak of fighting or if they conclude that a
continuation of the internal political deadlock is pref-
erable to the prospect of major changes in the political
landscape
The Phalange's official line toward the presidential
campaign-opposition to the election of a "colorless,
tasteless, meaningless" candidate who would only
An extension of President Sarkis's term would re-
quire an amendment to Article 49 of the constitution
that states that "a president may not be reelected
except after a break of six years. " Adopting such an
amendment requires passage by a two-thirds vote in
parliament. Any move to extend Sarkis's term would
have to have the support of the Syrians, who could
prevent a quorum o deputies from assembling if they
chose]
There is a precedent for amending Article 49. In 1948
Bishara al-Khuri, Lebanon's first President after
independence and one of the architects of the Nation-
al Covenant, persuaded parliament to allow him to
serve a second, consecutive term. Nonetheless, tam-
pering with the constitution and granting a president
more than his allotted six years has provgd to he a
dangerous flashpoint in Lebanese history.
"manage" rather than try to solve Lebanon's internal
problems-is widely interpreted by Lebanese political
observers as rejection of an extension of Sarkis's term
as well as of "neutral" candidates. The Phalange,
however, may prove more amenable to extending
Sarkis's term than the Syrians. Over the last several
months senior Phalange officials have indicated that
they believe Sarkis has become more sympathetic to
their position, particularly in light of Syria's refusal to
allow the Arab Conciliation Committee to promote a
national dialogue in Lebanon. In our opinion Bashir
Jumayyil realizes that accepting an extension of
Sarkis's term would not only buy time but would
allow him considerable room to maneuver before a
rescheduled election could take place
Sarkis is adamantly opposed to an extension of his
term and has made his feelings widely known. He is
tired of the strains of the presidency and frustrated by
his inability to achieve national reconciliation. He has
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threatened to resign on several occasions, coming
closest to doing so during the heavy Syrian-Phalange
fighting in mid-1978. It is unclear whether Sarkis can
be persuaded to change his mind, although he is
clearly a Lebanese nationalist and wants to avoid a
resumption of civil war
Sarkis has intimated that he plans to leave Lebanon
at the end of his term in September. If he perceives
pressures building for an extension, he might leave
Lebanon before the end of his term and resign from
abroad. Such a development would force parliament
to recognize the Council of Ministers as an interim
government
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Both the Syrians and the Phalange want the election
to serve as the basis for a major political realignment
in Lebanon-the Syrians to gain control over the
Phalange and reduce Israeli influence in Lebanon and
the Phalange to reduce Syrian influence and gain
control over the Palestinians in Lebanon. At this
point, neither side has shown much interest in a
compromise. Syrian leaders have dropped hints to
other Arab leaders that they intend to dominate the
election, while Phalange militia leader Bashir
Jumayyil continues to maintain that a S rian-backed
candidate is unacceptable. 1 -1
Neither the Phalange nor the Syrians are likely to
warm to prospective candidates who show themselves
independent of both sides, and a compromise, if
possible, will most likely have to be fashioned around
a weak, neutral candidate or a transitional president
who would preside for a limited time while new
attempts to reconcile Muslims and Christians took
place. But the obstacles are formidable. At the least, a
transitional president would have to meet the mini-
mum requirements of the Phalange, which would look
upon his limited term as additional time to maneuver
against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Syrians
would probably have to receive guarantees from such
a president that he wou~lange agreement 25
to sever ties with Israel. 25
Both the Syrians and the Phalange will be carefully
watching US policy toward the election. Phalange
leaders calculate that their main hope for staving off
the imposition of a pro-Syrian president lies in per-
suading the United States to play a major role in
overseeing the process and perhaps guaranteeing a
"fair" election. Therefore, a large part of Jumayyil's
election strategy will focus on attempting to involve
the United States in the campaign. Jumayyil may
calculate that this can best be done by manipulating
the security situation to brin on the threat of Israeli
intervention against Syria
The Syrians undoubtedly realize that the few options
the Phalange has to prevent a Syrian candidate from
winning depend largely on outside intervention. Thus,
a primary Syrian concern as the election approaches
will be to derail Phalange efforts to involve others
such as the United States or the Saudis in the election
process.
The Syrians already believe that the US position in
Lebanon has changed to encompass a closer relation-
ship with the Phalange. They are likely to interpret
US interest in the election outcome as foreshadowing
US intervention on behalf of the Phalange and the
Israelis. The Syrians may take advantage of their
ability to create tensions in Lebanon to persuade the
United States that they, not the Phalange, are the key
players whose interests must be considered
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP83B00232R000100150003-4
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP83B00232R000100150003-4
_'y`' For. Rele.ase_:2007/02/16,, CIA-RDP83B00232 8000100150003-4.