VISIT OF CHINESE VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA OCTOBER 29-30 - SCOPE PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000100100008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 22, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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921, OCT 26 PIA 7 ~8
I
October 22,1981
BUS=:.1' ; ST S!,,N
'.t ' ..it IC ;,FF
TO: The Secretary
FROM: EA - John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: Visit of Chinese Vice Premier/Foreign Minister
Huang Hua, October 29-30 - Scope Paper.
SUMMARY
Huang Hua's visit will be a critical follow-up to
discussions with Premier Zhao Ziyanq in Cancun, possibly
affording the last, direct, high-level contact with the
Chinese leadership before we make a final decision on
replacement aircraft for Taiwan. The visit reciprocates
your June trip. It will provide the first opportunity to
expose Huang to a range of top USG leaders from this
administration. In addition to meeting with you, Huang
will have a meeting with the President, lunch with the
Vice President, and separate meetings with Secretary
Weinberger
Department meetings will permit a fuller exchange of
views on bilateral issues raised at Cancun and a venue
for policy discussion on a broad range of international
questions: European and Soviet affairs, post-Sadat Middle
East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Korea, and Southern Africa.
I. OBJECTIVES
1. Follow up on Reagan-Zhao Ziyang meeting in Cancun.
2. Discuss European issues: TPJF, Poland, Arms Control,
etc.
3. Discuss and, where appropriate, seek to coordinate
policy on international issues: Afghanistan, Namibia,
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Korea.
4. Reaffirm US willingness to begin an arms transfer
relationship with China-and receive LIU Huagina.
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
XDS-l 10/22/01
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SECRET
-2-
U.S.
The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Clark
Asst. Secretary Holdridge
Ambassador Hummel
Deputy Asst. Secretary Shoesmith
EA/C Director Rope
Vivian Chang - Interpreter
CHINA
Vice Premier Huang Hua
Foreign I'iinister
Pu Shouchang
Vice-Foreign Minister
Ambasador Chai Zemin
Director Han Yu
Americas Dept., PIFA
Deputy Director Zhang Zai
Americas Dept., PIFA
Deputy Div. Chief Lian Zhengbao
Americas Dept., PIFA
Yang Jiechi - Interpreter
Third Secretary Zhang Zhenxiong
Secretary to Foreign Minister
Protocol, . PIFA
Gu Huaming
Huang Hua has been Foreign Minister since 1976. He was
elevated to Vice Premier in September of 1980. He is an
experienced diplomat and an acknowledged expert on US
affairs. He was intimately involved in the normalization
negotiations. His son is presently attending Harvard University.
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IV. Discussion of objectives
1.Follow up on Reagan-Zhao meeting in Cancun.
This will be added after 10/26.
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IV. Discussion of Objectives
2. Discuss important European issues, such as
U.S.-Soviet relations, Poland, TNF, and arms control.
Expand on the readout provided to Ambassador Chai earlier
and in your letter to Huang of your meetings with Gromyko.
It is important for Huang to understand that while our
Soviet policy has fundamentally and durably changed, we
feel improved relations are possible if the Soviets will
restrain their international behavior and accept the
principle of reciprocity in bilateral relations. Our
approach to the Soviets in a variety of fields, including
key European questions such as TNF, arms control and
Poland, will be a tough one. To be successful, we will
need the support of ou' friends and allies; the display
of continued solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance
will be particularly important. FYI. German Foreign
Minister Genscher visited China October 5-7 and saw a
number of China's top leaders, including Huang Hua.
-- AS I INDICATED IN MY LETTER TO YOU, THE MAIN
PURPOSE OF MY MEETINGS WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
AT THE UNGA WAS TO DRIVE HOME TO THE SOVIETS THAT OUR
EAST-WEST POLICY HAS FUNDAMENTALLY AND DURABLY CHANGED,
THAT SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND LACK OF INTERNATIONAL
RESTRAINT WILL HENCEFORTH BE MET WITH DETERMINED AND
APPROPRIATE U.S. MILITARY AND POLITICAL RESPONSE.
-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE WANT TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS
THAT WE ARE SINCERELY INTERESTED IN IMPROVED RELATIONS,
INCLUDING RENEWED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT
PROGRESS HINGES ON GREATER SOVIET RESTRAINT AND RESPECT
FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OTHER STATES.
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-- GROMYKO'S REACTION WAS SOBER AND NON-POLEMICAL.
HE GAVE NO GROUND, AND HE LEFT ME WITH NO ILLUSIONS ON
PROGRESS IN THE FUTURE.
-- WE DID REACH AGREEMENT ON OPENING TALKS ON
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF) ON NOVEMBER 30, AND WE
AGREED-TO MEET AGAIN EARLY IN 1982. WE WILL CONTINUE
OUR TOUGH APPROACH IN THESE FUTURE CONTACTS.
-- WE SEEK GLOBAL LIMITS ON TNF, RECOGNIZING THAT
THE SOVIETS ENJOY GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES IN DEPLOYING
THEIR THEATER FORCES.
-- WE NEED TO BACK UP OUR APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS
WITH CONVINCING DISPLAYS OF SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE. IN THAT CONNECTION, WE CONSIDER PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE DEPLOYMENT TRACK OF
NATO'S 1979 LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE DECISION.
-- AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS ANNOUNCED A
COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
FORCES. THIS WILL MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF OUR DETERRENT IN THIS DECADE AND THE NEXT.
-- OUR IMPROVED MILITARY POSTURE WILL ENABLE US TO
APPROACH STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS'FROM A
POSITION OF STRENGTH. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT
SECRET
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THE BALANCED, MILITARILY EFFECTIVE, AND VERIFIABLE LIMITS
WE SEEK WILL BE EASILY OBTAINED. ON THE CONTRARY, WE
ARE PREPARED FOR HARD NEGOTIATING.
-- THE POLISH EXPERIMENT SERIOUSLY WEAKENS MOSCOW
MILITARILY, AND IT COULD STRONGLY AFFECT OTHER STATES IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND EVEN THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF.
-- WE SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF PLURALISTIC DEVELOPMENT
IN POLAND, AND TOGETHER WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES WE
WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO REPRESS THE
POLISH PEOPLE FORCIBLY.
SECRET
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SECRET
IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES:
3. Discuss and, where appropriate, seek to coordinate
policy on international issues: Afghanistan, Namibia,
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Korea. On issues like
Namibia, China, with its Third World ties can be a strong
and helpful voice for moderation. China remains a staunch
opponent of Soviet and Soviet-backed aggression in Southwest
and Southeast Asia. In the Middle East, China, while dis-
agreeing over the degree of US support for Israel, is
pushing strongly for an overall peaceful settlement. During
PLO leader Yasir Arafat's visit to Beijing, China pressed
for PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist by urging
acceptance of the Saudi eight points. During Egyptian
President Mubarak's recent visit, the Chinese urged Egypt to
rekindle its ties to Saudi Arabia and assume a more active
leadership role among the moderate Arab camp. We, however,
oppose China's sale of small arms to Libya. We want to
encourage China in efforts of moderation and coordinate
China's approach with our own policies.
TALKING POINTS:
-- I RAISED AFGHANISTAN IN MY MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO.
DESPITE INDICATIONS OF INCREASING SOVIET FRUSTRATION OVER
INABILITY TO MAKE MILITARY HEADWAY, THEY SHOW NO SIGN OF
FLEXIBILITY.
-- WE INTEND TO KEEP UP PRESSURE INTERNATIONALLY ON THE
SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN.
-- WE ARE WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN
NAMIBIA THAT WOULD INVOLVE A CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM
ANGOLA, SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN
(SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435) FOR NAMIBIA.
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-- WE NEED CHINA'S HELP IN RALLYING THE SUPPORT OF
MODERATE AFRICANS FOR THIS APPROACH ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.
-- IN THE MID EAST, MUBARAK HAS MOVED SWIFTLY AND
EFFECTIVELY TO TAKE CHARGE OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT. WE
EXPECT NO MAJOR CHANGE IN EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY,
ESPECIALLY IN HELPING SUDAN WARD OFF LIBYAN THREATS.
-- WE EXPECT THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS TO CONTINUE.
WE ARE GRATIFIED BY THE-MANNER IN WHICH EGYPTIANS AND
ISRAELIS HAVE RESUMED THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.
-- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER NOT
BE ENCOURAGED TO RALLY BEHIND ANY PARTICULAR COMPETING
APPROACH, INCLUDING THE SAUDI EIGHT POINTS.
-- WE FOLLOWED YOUR ARAFAT MEETINGS CLOSELY AND
APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE MODERATION ON THE PART
OF THE PLO.
-- WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL STOP SELLING ARMS TO LIBYA IN
CONSIDERATION OF LIBYA'S CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT IN INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM, AND CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH SOVIET
MOVEMENTS IN THE AREA.
-- IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE BELIEVE THAT A STRONG NON-
COMMUNIST COMPONENT IN THE KHMER RESISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO
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4. Reaffirm US willingness to begin an arms transfer
relationship with China and receive LIU Huaging. Tell Huang we
are ready for the Liu Huaging visit when the Chinese are, and
will be able to address concrete Chinese requests for sales of
weapons and technology on the Munitions Control list. We are
also prepared to discuss.-other forms of bilateral security
exchanges and technical assistance. Reiterate that we do not
seek to press arms on Beijing, but are willing to contribute to
improving China's defense capabilities and defense industries
modernization, within the framework of the regulations and
practices applicable to all other friendly non-aligned nations,
whenever the Chinese want to discuss it.
EXTENDING OUR BILATERAL TIES FURTHER BY INCLUDING THE MILITARY
AREA.
-- WE PUT IN MUCH WORK THIS SUMMER ON THIS ISSUE AND WE ARE
READY TO DISCUSS WITH LIU CHINESE INTERESTS IN ARMS AND
TECHNOLOGY SALES.
-- ROUTINE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES-CAN BE EXPANDED
IN ANY CASE, AND WE SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE SUCH INTERACTION. WE
HAVE ENCOURAGED GENERAL JONES, OUR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS, TO GO TO CHINA IN DECEMBER. BUT, OTHER EXCHANGES
SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE -- IN THE FIELDS OF MILITARY EDUCATION AND
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MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR ASEAN STRATEGY AND TO
ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA.
-- WE URGE YOU TO PRESSURE THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS TO BE
MORE COOPERATIVE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON A COALITION GOVERNMENT.
-- FAILURE OF THE TALKS AMONG THE MAJOR FACTIONS TO
PROGRESS WOULD LEAVE THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA WORSE THAN
IF EFFORTS TO UNITE THEM-HAD NEVER COMMENCED. CHINA WILL BE
BLAMED BY ASEAN FOR WANTING TO RESTORE POL POT TO POWER.
-- IN KOREA WE NOTED VICE FOREIGN MINISTER PU'S COMMENT
TO DAS ALBRECHT THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE A
POSITIVE STEP TOWARD THE SOUTH IF WE MADE A GESTURE TOWARD
THE NORTH. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW MORE SPECIFICALLY
WHAT YOU HAVE IN MIND.
-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE KEY TO PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF THE KOREAN QUESTION LIES IN DIRECT DIALOGUE
BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH. OUR FIRM POLICY IS NOT TO
ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH UNLESS THE ROK IS A FULL
PARTICIPANT.
-- MUTUAL DISTRUST AND SUSPICION REMAIN STRONG ON BOTH
SIDES. RECIPROCITY IS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE AND
AVOID FEAR THAT EITHER SIDE WILL GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.
THE WILLINGNESS OF THE MAJOR POWERS TO DEAL WITH CURRENT
REALITIES IN KOREA CAN BE HELPFUL IN REDUCING THE TENSIONS.
SECRET
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Scope Paper for the Secretary
Drafted:EA/C:KPowel Clearances:A/C:WRope
10/23/81 Ext:21322 EA:TShoesmith
EA/C:DGHarter
P:RPerito
C:JMartin
T:SSnecht
S/P:SRandolph
Th
EA/VLK:LDAnder son
NEA/EGY:ELPeck
NEA/IAI:CHill
NEA/PAB:ESHeck/WLSimmorjs
AF/S:RFrasure
PM/P:RClarke
EA/K:DRasmussen
Attachments: Background Papers
1. China: Internal Political Situation
2. PRC-Taiwan: Reunification Issues
3. The Sino-Soviet Relationship
4. China and the Koreas
5. China and Afghanistan/Pakistan
6. China and Kampuchea/Vietnam
7. Japan-China Relations
8. Sino-Indian Relations
9. China and the Middle East
10. US-Chinese Cooperation in Science and Technology
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
PRC - TAIWAN: REUNIFICATION ISSUES
Beginning in 1978 the Chinese position on unification
with Taiwan moderated substantially, shifting from a call
for the "liberation" of Taiwan to stressing "peaceful reunifi-
cation." On January 1, 1979, at the time of US-China normali-
zation, Beijing issued a reunification appeal, coupled with
a general easing of military tensions. Beijing developed a
position seeking Taiwan's acceptance of the PRC flag and
name, and its recognition of Beijing as China's central gov-
ernment. Beijing offered to allow continued Kuomintang(KMT)
rule over Taiwan, including preservation of a capitalist
ecclnomy, undisturbed trade and foreign investment, continued
unofficial representation abroad, and maintenance of armed
forces at current levels. In the interim, Beijing offered
direct tariff-free trade, travel, family reunification,
air, sea and postal/telecommunications links.
On September 30, 1981 China issued a highly publicized
"Nine Point Proposal" for reunification which proposes talks
on a "reciprocal" basis and offers Taiwan's leadership par-
ticipation in the national government. No mention was made of
the requirement that Taiwan adopt the PRC flag and name.
Beijing's proposals are aimed at several audiences,
seeking to make clear that Beijing is willing to acquiesce
in the continued separation of Taiwan in virtually every
sense in return for Taipei's agreement to respect the prin-
ciple of Chinese unity under some limited PRC aegis. Although
Beijing's offer has put Taipei in an awkward position with
respect to foreign opinion, the KMT leadership has flatly
rejected it and reiterated its public position that reunifi-
cation can only take place after the mainland abandons
communism.
Taiwan's reasons for avoiding reunification, or even
negotiations, are complex. The leadership fears engaging in
talks would seriously undercut its legitimacy, and ultimately
its power, as well as foreign perceptions of Taiwan's need
for defensive weapons. Moreover, given Beijing's pattern
of periodic instability, and record in dealing with
"automonous" areas, it is difficult for Taiwan to take
the current Beijing initiative at face value.
The U.S. position throughout has been that we maintain
an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question,
but that there is no role for us to play. This is an issue
for the Chinese people to decide among themselves.
CONFIDENTIAL
(GDS - 10/22/87)
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Background Paper - PAC-Taiwan Reunification Issues
Drafted: EA/RA/TC: JTacik
Clearance: EA/C: SHallford
P: RPereto
T: SSpecht
C: JMartin
S/P: MMinton+:
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INR: GFox
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
China and Afghanistan/Pakistan
China and Pakistan have a close relationship based almost
entirely on a concern about India and the Soviet Unon. The
relationship has deepened since the 1978 Afahan Revolution
and the Soviet invasion of Af hanistan. The common threat
supersedes all differences between the two countries. Although
Chinese material aid is limited, Pakistan considers the PRC to
be its most reliable ally. Pakistan contrasts Chinese stead-
fastness with what it sees. as US "unreliability."
The PRC supplied military equipment, including tanks and
jet fighters, to Pakistan without charge until 1979. At that
time the Chinese informed Pakistan that because of internal
constraints they would have to charge for their weapons. Sales
are, however, made on a highly concessionary basis. Pakistan's
Chinese equipment is now largely outdated and cannot compare
with the modern Soviet arms acquired by India. China has
emphasized to Pakistan the necessity of.building up Pakistan's
defense industry. - The PRC helped Pakistan to develop several
heavy manufacturing and maintenance facilities.
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Chinese have
increased their military aid. They will deliver several squadrons
of Mig-19 fighters this year. They have also exhorted Western
countries, particularly the US, to increase aid to Pakistan.
They have emphasized that we should not let other factors, such
as Pakistan's nuclear program, stand in the way of strong
resistance to the Soviets. Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Pakistan
in June 1981 and reportedly made a commitment to come to
Pakistan's aid in the event of a major attack on Pakistan. The
exact circumstances under which china would do so were, however,
probably left undefined. The Chinese have been encouraging
Pakistan to mend relations with India, and Pakistan has supported
China's own efforts in that direction.
Chinese opposition to Afghanistan's Karmal regime and its
Soviet-backed predecessors has been implacable. The Chinese
have consistently held that only strong pressure will force the
Soviets to leave Afghanistan., They have stated that they do not
oppose a "political" solution in principle, but they have come
out against both the recent EEC initiative and. the mission of
the Secretary General's personal representative. They believe
t Iat no negotiations of any type s ould e held before complete
Soviet withdrawal, and have emphasized this with both Western
nations and Pakistan.
October 22, 1981
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China and Afghanistan/Pakistan
Drafted:INR/NESAzJLunstead
x28574 10/22/81
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NEA/PAB:WSi_mmons
PM/RSA:JMcNaughton
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EA/C:SHallford
C:MSafford
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[DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
China and Kampuchea/Vietnam
The.-poor relations' between China and Vietnam are a product of
'the 'Sino-Soviet conflict, competition for re Tonal influence, and a
history -of enmity between the two
Sion of Kampuchea in December 1978, theeexisting opoor relations de-
generated into intense hostility and finally, in February 1979,
China's "first lesson" military incursion into Vietnam. The first,
lesson while costly to the Vietnamese, exposed serious deficiencies
in China's military structure.
Although withdrawing one month later, Beijing has maintained
2.50, 000 troops near the Vietnamese. border, where they keep some
285,000 of Hanoi's best soldiers tied down. Accusations traded
between Beijing and Hanoi describe a series of border clashes in :Tay,
August and September more serious than any since the "first lesson."
However, no evidence from any reliable source s u g g e s t s that a "second
lesson" is in the offing. Propaganda from both sides indicates that
tree clashes were related to diplomatic maneuvering in preparation for
the international conference on i:amauchea and the UNGA. Each side is
using the border conflict to prove that the other is the main danger
to peace in Southeast r_sia.
China and Vietnam held two rounds of bilateral ralks in 1979, but
China has declined Vietnamese invitations to resume the talks. China's
replies to Vietnam increasingly explicitly state that talks could be
resumed and relations normalized if Vietnam withdrew its troops from
Va:mpuchea-and ended -threats to Thailand and along the Sino-Vietnamese
border. Vietnam, reversing the sequence, contends that its withdrawal
rrDm Kampuchea must follow termination of an alleged "China threat,"
which.Hanoi has said could t-ake the form of a bilateral "non-aggression
Pac:t." Hanoi argues that the "China threat" to Vietnam would not end
if Vietnam pulled out of Kampuchea without such an agreement.
China's long term objective is a regime-in Hanoi which is at least
neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict. But a Kampuchea settlement, if
accompanied by -a reduction 'of 'the' 'Soviet presence, might make possi-
ble restoration of the pre-1978 modus vivendi, including a pull-back
zvrces from the border and a resumption of cross-border trade.
Canyersely,'China -would most likely follow through on its "second
lesson" threat if the Vietnamese launch a jr maoattack into Thailand.
Such an attack is not likely. PRC military countermeasures also could
be t'i,ggered by a major SRV assault against Khmer resistance forces
(which the PRC supports) straddling the Thai-Kampuchea border.
Vietnamese forces along the Chinese border are now well-entrenched and
well-equipped. - -(by the Soviets), and an effective -second lesson would
reauire a massive Chinese buildup. In the-past year, Beijing has
increased its aid to Vietnamese resistance forces on a cheap alterna-
t~ye form of pressure against Hanoi.
October 22, 1981
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Background Paper for Visit of PRO Vice Premier and ~c= sign .-_inister
Huang Hua, October 29-30, 1981
China and Kampuchea/Vietnam
Drafted: EA/VLK:BSHarv AFBurghardt:jy
10/22/81:x23132
Clearances: EA/VLK:LDAndel on
P: RPerito
PM:DClark ~
S/P:SRandolph -
C:JMartin
T:DRanganathan
L:TFortune
EA/C: SHallford
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DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS
Japans leaders
with China, which theare committed to s lea% drelations
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CONFIDENTIAL
RDS 10/15/01
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Drafted:EA/C:NSilver Clearances:EA/J:TFarran
10/23/81 21004 EA/C:WFRope
EA/T:TShoesmith
EA:JHoldridge
P:RPereto
T:SSpecht
C:JMartin
S/P:SRandolph
PPM RClarke
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
SECkr, ~'/1; OFOr~;V/;,~OLONZ,RA
CT/ORCON
DEp'4RTM
BRiEF+NG P F S Tg7-E
AFER
ino_Ind Sino-Indian Rel
ian ra atio
ies resumed pprocheme ns
?nces have d full di
! plomat1C s Proceeded
ved Si revolved relay fififull
stan, wh-Indian bord round close Ions in 1976.y since the two
ive securit India and Chi spate The an-Soviet ties standing
in and Ne~`' Y interests in na fear cOUlsoviet invasiand the
In Delhi to mend Sdi Aia' Prodermine thei of
dians Pl omati ides
ffor Y to believe s fen an incentive
t that bett
insulate er ces.
relati
theregion e maintainin SOUth Asian ou s with China
lamabad ~,,il1 im Delhi g Sndia's posibcontinent fronhance New
regional infl improve Pakiparticular i on as the suPer-
ion in llence and tan s ability concerned Predominant
south Asia, enhanc to that US
Portunities of the The Chine e the prospects omPete with for Ministe SO Viet union to their part wan perPOWer
r Huan encir to
re-
agreement Hua 's V cle China,
The to begin i to In a
bilateral re for the efi t ations aimed his Past June
atiest1On? ions Cannot d me accepted r educing ma
ons (Be
sho ijing had vance wi he jor
Indian
er dispute uld be stren Prev1OUSl thout some con-cTth
ficali ) The two erred bef argued that movement
se se Y to discuss the Sides e will meet tthis f UP the econ neral
em in a question, all at
as has aPparentl greater hurr than
with Y decided to India to r
pre Par
Ina the s' The Chin iens an a Benda efO 11 r to Beij inq a of ve the border
Indthe side e had
eXpected a Si bsequent 1m et en el
iubstantiv Chinese Tare Idean Proe gher level r g
o e issues prepare Minister epre-
1pb?sal that each begs Newd to compromis rePOrtedlY
oundary, side accept the line eof cts China rs
tion on the control as
i n Polic border
arms to Y On the US P ue underscores her
owards Stan will ae ol n securit rel t decision to
Y
ognition. o f n Pakistan to ad Pt is .
Indian
has a nfo?rmed k improved i relhies regardi
e their differIndia of Bei.ations with Ne g Pakistan,
ences with J1n Delhi.
Ind g s efforts to
urge
as Pakis ritical bOrder a by peaceful means the
g to i
ss
ue
that
n is viewed as with
the China is-
es bOrder talks a s e are anxious 4-_ _ CouI g 1f leant sera,: , likely
Ural ar Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R000100100008-0
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
Sino-Indian Relations
Drafted:INR/NESA/SOA:WKAndersen
x28575 10/22/81
Approved:INR/NESA:MLGreene
x22757
Clearances:C:CTeicher
EA:SHallford
NEA:SEisenbraun
P:RPareto
S/P:FFukuyama
T:SSienkiewicz
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHINA AND THE KOREAS
As China has expanded trade with the Republic of
Korea (ROK), it has stepped up its public support of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Beijing may
hope to assuage Pyongyang's concerns about PRC intentions
toward the US and Seoul.
South Korea. Chinese initiatives toward Seoul have
been primarily economic. Trade between the two countries
has increased dramatically, from $400,000 in 1978 to
nearly $400 million last year. Both countries conduct
this trade unofficially, with Beijing denying reports of
"official trade" carried in the western media and replayed
critically by Moscow. Ten percent of the trade over the
past year, however, was direct. The trade balance was
nearly even in 1980, with the ROK's main exports elec-
tronics, fertilizer, and textile goods. Coal was the
primary PRC export.
Beijing's economic pragmatism does not appear to pre-
sage any diplomatic overtures to Seoul in the near term.
Although the PRC now permits Chinese officials to meet
with ROK diplomats at official receptions overseas, it
continues to prohibit official travel to South Korea.
Beijing's political initiatives remain hostage to North
Korea's opposition and to fears that the Soviet Union
would exploit any strains in PRC/DPRK ties.
North Korea. Although China's overriding interest
remains stability on the Korean peninsula, Beijing has
historically supported North Korean demands for the
withdrawal of US forces from Korea and Pyongyang's
reunification policies. The PRC has appeared increasingly
anxious to demonstrate greater support for Pyongyang on
these issues, with Chinese media criticizing the US for
impeding the reunification of the two Koreas. Beijing has
also urged the US to move toward contact with North Korea
and promised to reciprocate with a Chinese gesture toward
South Korea. The proposal may reflect DPRK pressure on
the PRC for assistance in arranging talks with the US and
serve to compensate for Pyongyang's opposition-to the
ROK/PRC trade.
Pyongyang remains concerned that China's ties with
the US and Japan will lead to relations with the ROK,
regardless of North Korea's objections. It also fears
that the reformist direction of China's current leadership
could undercut the rigid authoritarian system, personality
cult, and succession plans of Kim Il-song.
October 21, 1981
T+`YTlTC /CP('P '.T /MnPr)VM /N(1(1(lhi?'PA('m 1(lP(1(l1
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
Drafted by: INR/EAP/NA - Dean Welty JW
Clearances: P - R. Perito
T - M. Marks
C - J. Martin
PM/RSA - (draft) J.H. McNaughton
EA/K - D. Rasmussen
INR/EAP - W. Gim
EA/C - W. Rope
October 21, 1981
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R000100100008-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
Sino-Soviet relations have been frozen for almost a
decade and are likely to remain so. The USSR fears the
potential threat China poses to the Soviet Far East while
China considers itself threatened by Soviet expanionist
aims in Asia. Neither wishes to see hostility flare into
open warfare, however. Despite mutual polemics and
frictions the two states seem pre ared to accept a rela-
-----------------
tionshi of hostile coexistence for the indefinite future
The Soviet Union recently invited the Chinese to
resume border talks. However, Bei'in is unlikely to
respond to Moscow's'proposal in a manner that will lead to
meaningful negotiation. Chinese views on possible border
talks, set forth in a People's Daily article last June,
were couched in terms that Moscow found unacceptable.
Since then, mutual antagonism, as reflected in propaganda
and diplomatic exchange, has intensified. China also has
publicly protested the recent treaty between the USSR and
Afghanistan delineating their boundary in the Pamirs,
which falls in a disputed area that China claims.
Moscow is clearly disturbed by the new security com-
ponent of Sino-US relations. It fuels the Soviets' long-
standing fear that an anti-Soviet alliance, including
Japan, is in the making. The prospect of greater US China
military cooperation is an important calculation in Soviet
foreign policy decision-making On China's part, Soviet
support of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea has intensified
Beijing's fears.
Meanwhile, China and the USSR retain sizeable mili-
tary forces on their respective sides of the frontier.
China has more than 1.5 million men in the regions closest
to the USSR. The USSR has a quarter of its arm arra ed
against China and enjoys a significant qualitative superi-
ority.
As long as the USSR remains a clear military threat
and pursues expansionist policies which threaten China's
interests, the leadership will remain anti-Soviet. Mscow
maintains it is prepared for better relations with China,
but has yet to make the changes necessary to encourage
Beijing to reconsider its course. The Soviets would
perceive a worsening of US-China relations as a fortuitous
opportunity to seek an improvement_in relations with
China, no matter how superficial.
October 21, 1981
SECRET
RDS-1,2 (10/21/01)
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
e Sino-Soviet Relationshi
Drafted by:
Clearances:
INR/EAP/NA - Will g! Duncan
PM/RSA ennedy
T - J.H. McNaughton
M? Marks
e
INR/SEE PCrum
EUR/SOV - L? K P
INR/EAP - W. dim
P - R. Perito
C - J. Martin
EA/C - W. Ro
October 21, 1981
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
ENT 0 F=. 'S 6R'EPING APE:R I E:
F ~
CHINA; INTE
RNAL POLITICAL SITUATION
Chairman
and Vice C
loyal coil
eagues hair inDen Xiao in has
the govern key positions
i Moved
steadil
y to put
initiative, ment. His coalit1Onn the party. the
ies ahead Nevertheless holds the army,
Par
t Con as Deng tries tojntense olitical ?lltical
Power press a vehicl e Make the approach. maneun
veri
and to ensure the long th to C hisdatehiS 12th
Den # evity of f his hold on
i
S r o rm
is coalition i
down rade s coalition i reform s Policies,
P
olic
f
orm f
o socialism, Itst"ideolo a ro ram desi ned to
bureaucrat wants in favor of
e ui e t
d that is Over- O overhaul a market
to deal with moed, undereducatn entrenched
drnization. ed and ill-
Den ~
the
s ? Ositio
militar n
i
I
ncludes
orrettl and ciim ort
an b
ant
and status that
ureaucracies se meets of
his reforms who see
grounds They have also WOUld erode
social charging his attacked their aut
rent ism and toward ca rogram is leading China away from
Protect their Powerful, but[- -
cur
and interest.' Politburo members
Deng has his
quarter of the po Opposition
honorable reti litburo is on the defe
the policie rement syste over 80 and some
ne `"
strabl s Pursued m seems Some form Of
exte Y failed to by his bureaucratic in order. Furthermo
nt that Den ProduceeSahims moderniz
makes his Identifi atents demon-
coal
ion.
too failed Lion vulnerable elf Yet to te
s efforts to ' over uPotn owa
to deli ve modernization~tl r on its econoa f wuittuh re char he
h mic romises,
Man e that
es- .
F
inethemY represents
defense militar a Particular
Lien ex enditures are disruntled Concern
I I'll, 11 , Zn
tyres to recentl s olitic on, and
level of the military ? as the conciliato Deng
ship changes A to Push throe search for the necessary
Den 1 reforms and leader-
Olic setback
CONFIDENTIAL October 21, 1981
GDS 10/21/87
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 .. Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
.China and the Middle E
ast
Drafted by: INR/EAP/NA
Clearances: p _ R. Sarah-Ann Smith
Pe
rito
T
C M ? Mark:,
Ma
rtin
PMA/RSA
EAZqEA//AP,N- (draft) _N. Howell' H? McNaught
Rope on
IR
/NESA
_ L.
INR/P
Harris
INR/EAP Miller
W. G.
October 21, 1981
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
China's goal in the Middle East is to limit Soviet
involvement. Beijing believes the Middle East must make
progress on the Palestinian problem if Soviet influence is
to be restricted. The Chinese view Israeli policies as
the main obstacle to this objective.
China supports Washington efforts to strengthen US
ties with Arab states, but feels that US policy is
bedeviled by the close relationship with Israel. Chinese
media commentary has-been moderately optimistic that the
US is moving closer to direct contacts with the PLO, a
step the Chinese consider necessary. China seeks to use
its influence with the PLO to encourage a negotiated
settlement.
To this end, Chinese media hailed the recent Saudi
peace proposal's stress on safeguarding Palestinian
interests and its "realistic" recognition of the existence
of Israel.- During Yasir Arafat's October visit to Beijing
the Chinese reiterated public support for the Palestinian
cause. They encouraged Arafat to follow the Saudi example
in accepting the fact of Israel's existence.
The Chinese supported Sadat's strong anti-Soviet
stance but were anxious about his lack of popularity in
the Arab world. They are cautiously hopeful that Mubarak
will continue Sadat's policies, and perhaps be able to
bridge the rift between Egypt and the other Arab states.
The Chinese have urged the Egyptians to cooperate with
Saudi Arabia to improve the cohesiveness of moderate Arab
forces.
Although the PRC supplies arms to the Middle East to
help counter Soviet activities there, recent Chinese arms
sales seem almost entirely motivated by a desired to raise
foreign exchange. China maintains public neutrality on
the Iran-Iraq conflict, but it has supplied military
material to Iraq through third parties. There is no firm
evidence that any deals have been completed with Iran.
The Chinese have provided military assistance to Egypt.
China also has a limited arms relationship with the PLO.
October 21, 1981
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
RDS-2 (10/21/01)
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 , Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R000100100008-0
China: Internal Political Situation
Drafted by: INR/EAP/NA - Daniel Kiang
Clearances: P - R. Perito
T - M. Marks
C - J. Martin
EA/C - W. Rope
INR/EAP - W. Gim
October 21, 1981
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHINA-LATIN AMERICA
China has diplomatic relations with fourteen Latin
American nations, including every South American nation
except Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In Central America,
however, there is not a single PRC Embassy.. in t He
Caribbean, the PRC has relations with only Jamaica, Cuba,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados.
China's diplomatic relations with Latin American
nations have in general been good, correct and low-key.
Beijing has not taken a high profile in romotin
anti-Soviet policies in the host countries. Trade
relationships have not been significant thus far, and there
have been few exchange programs. Perhaps because of the
reasonably brief period of diplomatic relations in most
cases, China appears much less comfortable in its rapport
with Latin America than with Arica as partners in third
world struggles. Chinese media give little coverage to
events in Latin America, in sharp contrast to that accorded
Africa. China provides little economic aid and, to the
best of our knowledge, has no military training, aid, or
supply relationship with any Latin American nation or
insurgent group.
Chinese foreign policy aims in Latin America generally
parallel their "third world" aims, but also largely accord
with US interests. Chinese foreign policy stands buttress
US interests by encouraging resistance to the Soviets and
the Cubans.
Despite some recent high-level exchanges such as the
visits by the Venezuelan and Colombian Foreign ministers to
China in early 1981 and the trip of Huang Hua to Colombia
and Venezuela this August, Chinese Foreign Ministry
officials readily admit to knowing too little about Latin
American affairs. For the forseeable future, Chinese se "trip
diplomacy" will attempt to find agreement on broad
principles while gradually expanding trade, and other
exchange ties.
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS 10/2078-7
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
Drafted: EA/C:NESi eb: ~ V
ced
10/20/81:ext. 21004
Clearances:EA/C:SSHallford
ARA/PPC:GEBrown
EA:TPShoesmith
S/P:MMinton
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PERFORMANCE AND PLANS FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY
China's declining oil production is creating strains on the
domestic economy and having a major impact on import plans.
Crude oil output leveled-off in 1980 at 2.12 million barrels
per day (b d) and declined 5% to an average 2.02 million b/d in
the first three months of this year. This slow down -- because
of its impact on feedstock capabilities and foreign exchange
earnings -- was a major factor in Beijing's January 1981
decision to unilaterally cancel more than $2 billion in
petrochemical plant and steel mill contracts with Japanese and
West German firms. It also played a role in Beijing's decision
to channel national investment away from heavy industry -- a
large energy consumer -- toward light industry and agriculture.
Although the Chinese have relied mainly on their own
efforts to develop their existing oil capacity, foreign firms
are now playing an increasing role. US firms sold China
offshore drilling rigs and other oil-related equipment in the
mid and late 1970's. In 1979, foreign oil companies --
including seven US consortia -- signed agreements to do seismic
exploration in the South China Sea and the southern part of the
Yellow Sea. With the seismic work now completed, the Chinese
are expected to begin accepting bids for offshore exploration
early next year. In the northern offshore areas, French and
Japanese firms--with the strong support of their governments--
have already signed exploration agreements; the French have an
additional contract to explore near Hainan Island. .China also
has producton-sharing arrangements with the US, Japan and
France to develop onshore fields in the Western provinces.
In 1979, the United States made its first purchase of
Chinese crude and petroleum products, $72 million and
$25 million respectively. Last year the mix shifted with our
imports of products reaching $115 million, far outdistancing
the $19 million in crude imports. Over the next few years,
China's production problems bode poorly for any pick-up in
exports to the United States or other countries.
UNCLASSIFIED
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
Performance and Plans for the Oil Industry
Drafted :
EA/C:DCarver
Cleared:
EA/C:SSHallford
EA:TPShoesiqith
S/P :MMintoiR~
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
US-CHINESE COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Science and technology cooperation has played a key
underlying role in the rapid expansion of Sino-US ties. S&T
development is fundamental to China's modernization program and
the Chinese very much value their burgeoning S&T relationship
with us.
The US began discussions with China on cooperation in
science and technology during the July 1978 visit of the
President's Science Advisor to Beijing. An Agreement on
Cooperation in Science and Technology was signed on
January 31, 1979 when Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
visited the US. This agreement formalized scientific
cooperation between the US and China and established a Joint
Commission on Science and Technology to review and oversee the
government-to-government programs as they emerged.
The Joint Commission held its first meeting in Beijing in
January 1980. The second meeting was held in Washington
October 15-17, 1981. The next meeting is planned for early
1983 in Beijing.
Since the inception of our cooperative S&T program with
China, seventeen implementing protocols have been concluded
under the umbrella of the S&T Agreement. These include:
student and scholar exchanges, agricultural exchanges, space
technology, high energy physics, management of science and
technology information, metrology and standards, atmospheric
science, marine and fishery science, medicine and public
health, hydroelectric power and related water services,
earthquake studies, earth sciences, environmental protection,
basic sciences, surface water hydrology, nuclear safety
matters, and construction and urban development.
Under these protocols both countries have engaged in a wide
variety of scientific and technological exchanges--including
hundreds of visits by US and Chinese scientists, scholars and
technicians--which have been of benefit to both countries.
Despite current budgetary constraints, we expect the
relationship to continue to flourish and to expand into
additional areas.
UNCLASSIFIED
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83B00551 R0001 00100008-0
Background Paper - US-Chinese Cooperation in Science F Technology
Drafted: EA/C - BSchrage
Clearance:EA/C -
EA
OES
P
T
C
S/P
SHaliford
JHoldridge
LPeters
RPereto
SSpecht
JMartin
MMinton
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