CHINA AT THE UN: BEIJING AND THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200010015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 8, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Central intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 June 1982
CHINA AT THE UN: BEIJING AND THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE
SUMMARY
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Beijing, however, remains basically uneasy about the
disarmament issue. The Chinese view US arms control policy as an
important indicator of Washington's intentions toward Moscow.
They are highly skeptical about the value of disarmament
negotiations and worry that accommodating Moscow in any new arms
control agreements could bring other changes in the US
over the control of nuclear weapons.
China will use its independent stand on arms control issues
to clearly distinguish itself from the superpowers and curry
favor with a broad Third World constituency during the UN Second
Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD). Foreign Minister Huang
Hua and the Chinese delegation are certain to question the
sincerity and value of Soviet and US proposals for nuclear weapon
reductions. In reiterating their critique of strategic arms
negotiations, the Chinese will portray themselves as champions of
the Third World's efforts to alter the superpowers' dominance
This memorandum was prepared by Foreign
Affairs Branch, China Division, Office of East Asian Analysis,
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and questions may be
addressed to Chief, Foreign Affairs Branch, China Division, OEA,
State Dept. review completed
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relationship with the USSR and, in turn, alter the US-China
tie. In short, Beijing will do nothing to encourage Progress
during US-Soviet talks on disarmament. F_ F
China's Disarmament Policy
Chinese views on disarmament have changed little since the
mid-1960's. Like their position at the inaugural SSOD in 1978,
the Chinese officials this year have said they will support
"genuine" disarmament, including simultaneous reductions in
conventional and nuclear weapons. Beijing will call on the US
and USSR to begin the disarmament process while reserving the
right for China and all other countries to arm in self-defense
against the superpowers.
The Chinese have used these principles and their own public
pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons to justify a
persistent unwillingness to participate in arms control
negotiations. In general, the Chinese media and, in private,
Foreign ministry officials have characterized these negotiations
as efforts to ensure US and Soviet nuclear superiority--over each
other and the world--and they have taken a similar tack on recent
initiatives. In addressing the current US and Soviet postures,
for example, Beijing has called the behavior of both Washington
and Moscow "hegemonist". China's interests, of course, are well
served by its aloofness from arms talks, because Beijing can
criticize the superpowers' arsenals while continuing the
development of its own nuclear program.
Playing to the Third World
The Chinese see the SSOD this year as an ideal forum to
publicize their renewed attention to the Third World, where
China's foreign policy has displayed a closer identification with
the political, economic and military interests among developing
countries. China appears unlikely to take the lead on pending
proposals during the special session, but it may well be more
active in endorsing and promoting Third World positions on
The Chinese may try to capitalize on their somewhat higher
profile on disarmament issues in the past few years. Since 1980,
China has backed various arms control resolutions in the UN
Conference on Disarmament--an international forum that does not
focus primarily on the US-Soviet nuclear balance--and it can
presumably publicize Chinese activities there on behalf of Third
World interests. The Chinese may also point to their more recent
public support for the anti-nuclear and peace movements in
Western Europe and the US.
There is, however, no evidence that China has a well-
developed or sophisticated view of alternative arms control
strategies. Although officials in Beijing are probably genuinely
concerned about the dangers of an arms race and nuclear
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CONFIDENTIAL
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governments interested in possessing a nuclear capability.
proliferation, they continue to insist publicly that "medium and
small" countries have the right to maintain whatever defense
forces they deem necessary--an implicit support to Third World
Concern for the US and USSR
China's position on arms control also reflects Beijing's
basic concerns about its position in the US-Soviet-China
triangle. Most obviously, the Chinese want to prevent a US-
Soviet bilateral agreement that could result in increasing the
Soviet strategic threat against China. At the same time, they
are wary of talks that might seek to draw China into such
negotiations--the Soviets have argued that any nuclear limitation
talks should include Britain, France, and China--because of the
desire to insulate Beijing's own nuclear d opment program from
any external limitations.
Most important, the Chinese regard the disarmament issue as
a potential bellwether of US-Soviet relations. Given the crucial
role assigned the US in opposing the USSR by Chinese strategy,
Beijing, at a minimum, is likely to view a more forthcoming US
attitude on arms talks as a move that tacitly encourages US
allies and others to reach an accommodation with Moscow. China's
concern is already evident in its statements regarding recent US
and Soviet proposals for strategic talks.
Beijing's public portrayal of the need to maintain a solid
international front and strong defenses is likely to become more
prominent as the give-and-take on a format for arms negotiations
proceeds. The Chinese recently asked their US counterparts in
Beijing about press reports that US policy toward the USSR may
change and about the possibility of separate US-Soviet
discussions at the SS-OD to convey such official concern. In the
final analysis, Beijing will assess any movement toward new
strategic arms talks in terms of both US resolve to sustain its
position vis-a-vis Soviet military capabilities and Washington's
continued willingness to accommodate China's strategic
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DATE
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CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION:
Department of State
Original - Mr. William F. Rope, Director, Chinese Affairs,
Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Room 4318
1 - Mr. Richard R. Burt, Director, Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs, Room 7317
1 - Mr. Melvyn Levitsky, Director, Office of UN
Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau
of International Organization Affairs, Room 6334
1 - RADM Donald S. Jones, Director, East Asia and
Pacific Region, International Security Affairs,
Room 4C839
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
1 - Mr. James George, Assistant Director, Bureau
of Multilateral Affairs, Room 5499
1 - Mr. Louis Nosemzo, Assistant Director, Bureau
of Strategic Programs, Room 4498
Central Intelligence Agency
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