RECOMMENDATION FOR SNIE ON THE PHILIPPINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200100016-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 30, 1981
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310
SUBJECT: Recommendation for SNIE on the Philippines (S/NOFORN)
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
Rm. 7E62
CIA Headquarters Building
Washington, DC 20505
3 0 NOV 1981
1. (S/NOFORN) The inclosed paper, prepared by a member of my staff, is
forwarded for your information. While coordinating the draft, it
became apparent that the situation on the Philippines is very much on
the minds of analysts in the Washington area. Independent reviews of
the problem are being conducted by several agencies.
2. (S/NOFORN) In view of the growing concern, and noting that it has
been almost two years since the last interagency study was completed,
it is my recommendation that consideration be given to initiating a
SNIE to further assess the situation in the Philippines and the
potential threats to US interests.
1 Incl
Philippines: Potential Threat
to US Interests
WILL.IA.M E. O'DOM
Bri3adi6r Gener1al, USA
ACof S for Intelligence
ARMY review completed.
CLASSIFIED BY Multiple Sources
REVIEW ON 25 Nov 2001
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F0nEICN NAT10NYA
PHILIPPINES: POTENTIAL THREATS TO US INTERESTS (U)
(S/NOFORN) SUMMARY: A variety of studies produced by the US intelligence
community within the past five years predicted continuance of the Marcos
regime, a continuing but manageable problem with the Communist and Muslim
insurgencies, and a continuing close relationship between the Philippines
and the US. The key threat to Philippine stability and thus to US interests
was thought to be an ailing economy that might lead to mass dissent and
revolt. Since these documents were published in the late 70's and early
1980, there has been a deterioration in the state of the Philippine economy,
a significant growth in the Communist insurgency, a change in population
demographics resulting in a swell of politically aware and idealistic young
people, and the beginnings of a more radicalized Catholic clergy. These
changes are occurring slowly, but are inevitably altering political and
economic conditions in the Philippines. Growing disenchantment with the
Marcos regime, coupled with rising nationalism and protest over the US
military presence, warrants increased US concern. These trends, while not
yet of such magnitude as to constitute a near term threat, do indicate that
US interests and the overall tone of the Philippine/US relationship may
suffer erosion. A careful US interagency review should be made now in order
to provide policymakers with a current assessment of these threats. END
SUMMARY
(S/NOFORN) Key factors affecting the political/economic/military situation
in the Philippines today include the continued grip of the aging President
Marcos on the helm of leadership, the growth in strength of the Communist
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New Peoples' Army, deterioration of the economy, a change in population
demographics, and new strains in the often cited "lovel/hate" relationship
existing between the US and the Philippines. Each of th~se factors has been
reported on extensively both within the US intelligence community and public
media. Taken individually, no single factor stands qut as an alarm of
imminent danger. Considered together, however, they suggest a gradual
erosion of stability.
(S/NOFORN) The Marcos Regime: Approaching his aid-6O'a, President Marcos
continues to govern the Philippines
opposition. With some notable
!
unopposed by an effective political
exceptions in the f inance and economic
sector, the government continues to be administered by political cronies,
Lamily_iaembers, and persons of proven personal loyalty to President Marcos.
This situation has perpetuated corruption and concentra ad economic power in
the hands of a favored few. Additionally, even though be surrounds himself
with loyal advisors and administrators, Marcos has not ret molded this group
to serve harmoniously as a successor government in the event of his death,
incapacitation, or retirement. Indeed, one of the key
potential threats to
stability is the lack of a clearly defined-successor government. Rumore.of
ill-health concerning Marcos continue and, on the basis of age alone, a
change in leadership could occur with little or no warning. Supported by a
military establishment often accused of being corrupt and abusive, Marcos
has successfully retained control of the Philippine government although
popular dissent appears to be growing.
(S/NUFORN) The New'People's Army (NPA): As the military arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP), the NPA is now acknowlejiged as the principal
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internal security threat to the Philippine government. Since its founding
as a rural based, Beijing oriented insurgency in 1969, it has continued to
grow in strength, expanding its activities throughout the Philippine
islands. Significantly, although foreign (PRC) support has ceased, the NPA
has not only survived, but has in fact doubled its armed strength since
1979, and now appears to be attracting support even from the moderate
opposition to Marcos. NPA units can be found throughout the Philippines,
but the majority of their activities occur in northern and central Luzon,
Samar, and eastern Mindanao. Identifying with the legitimate grievances of
the populace and killing particularly corrupt or abusive local officials are
methods used by the NPA to gain popular support. Though armed NPA actions
have not been directed against US personnel or military installations, NPA
units have conducted operations nearby. Clark Air Base is viewed as a prime
source of supplies and funds. Ideological arguments are unlikely to sway
the majority of the Filipinos to support the NPA, however, skillful
manipulation of the populace's real economic and social issues can be
effective. In this regard, NPA efforts to radicalize students is
particularly worrisome.
(C/NOFORN) Social Demographics: The changing nature of Philippine
demographics is an issue not often addressed, yet it is crucial to an
examination of trends and warnings for the future. A 7 Nov 81 issue of the
Economist points out that the Philippines did not initially slow its
birthrate while infant mortality dropped in the 1960's. As a result, 46% of
the 48 million Filipinos are under the age of 15. This is in contrast to
the 24-27% in all the larger advanced Pacific countries. The article also
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notes that the Philippines claims an 87% adult literacy rate and points out
that "literacy leads to a lower birth rate later but a greater passion in
young people's revolts now." It is significant that this swell of
politically aware young Filipinos will be of university age at the same time
sensitive US base negotiations are to be conducted, and at a time when
Marcos could choose to retire from office. Their attitudes toward the US
could be a critical factor in setting the tone for negotiations and even
government-to-government relations.
(C/NOFORN) The Economy: Perhaps more than any other factor, the economy
holds the key to stability in the Philippines. Despite the support of
skilled financial and economic technocrats who have succeeded in maintaining
a high level of foreign borrowing, Marcos has not been able to score strong
economic gains. A growth rate of only slightly over 5% may be achieved in
1981; below the 5.8% goal that the Philippines had set and the lowest growth
rate among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Continued dependence on expensive foreign oil, coupled with an export
profile dominated by vulnerable commodities such as coconut and sugar, has
caused balance of payment deficits projected at over $500 million for 1981
alone. Coconut products are the Philippines' leading export, accounting for
13% ($781.5 million) of total export earning last year, yet coconut oil
prices abroad plunged by more than 50% between 1978 and 1981, affecting the
lives of many Filipinos.
(S/NOFORN) The Threats to US Interests: Judgments regarding threats to
Philippine stability and US interests have heretofore been couched generally
in terms of "could happen". It now appears that the above described
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destabilizing factors are combining in such a manner that an assessment of
"happening now" may be a more accurate statement regarding the increase in
threat indicators. Admittedly, there are still powerful forces in-being to
preserve stability and the status quo: the military, the majority of the
Catholic clergy, the business community, and the normal ties that bind a
society together. Nonetheless, as economic ills worsen, the temptation to
blame the Marcos regime--and the US as its principal supporter--will become
more attractive to a new generation of young people. The Filipino youth
today do not have the shared experience of WWII to tie them to Americans,
and neither do they perceive an external threat of sufficient magnitude to
warrant a continued US military presence.
(S/NOFORN) Outlook: These factors of social and political unrest are not
yet of such proportion as to result in the overthrow of Marcos or to
immediately threaten the US military presence in the Philippines. Left
unchecked, however, it seems likely that the impact of these forces on the
Marcos regime will be sufficient within the next 3-5 years to force
concessions by the government to accommodate opposition aspirations--perhaps
significant concessions if made in conjunction with efforts to establish a
successor government. In that situation, appeals to nationalism, or similar
rhetoric, will probably result in calls for further restriction of US
operational freedom at American bases, and some restructuring of the
US/Philippine relationship--although it is unlikely that a fundamental
change would occur from such restructuring. A careful evaluation by the US
intelligence and foreign policy community at this time may be warranted to
more accurately assess the growing threats to US interests in the
Si CRh
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1 LIO' f.2,N F:.II Ti1J:L S
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Philippines and the steps or new directions the US should take to counter
SECRET
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