FOOD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05108: CIA-RDP83B00551
TO : Amb . Richard Vine
State/ RP
Rm. 7526, State 81dg.
Tele. 632-5230
FROM:
D
Asst. PJIO/EA
Rm. 7E62 CIA H Bldg.
Tele.
1/13/82
 Approved For Release ~0{~7i~i1~8 TdIA-RDP83B00551 ROOIQ200130001-3 ~~~
7 JAr; 1982
FOOD SITUATION
The amount of rice produced during Kampuchea's 1981 rainy
season is estimated to be significantly less than the amount
produced during the 1980 rainy season. The fall-off in rice
production is attributable to unfavorable weather conditions that
affected the primary rice crop throughout the June-October
planting period just passed. As a result, a rice shortage of at
least 277,000 metric tons (about 30 percent of estimated minimum
needs) is anticipated for 1982. The shortage may prove to be
larger -- upwards of 350,000 metric tons -- if output from late
plantings and the minor, dry season rice crop fail to meet
expectations. In the absence of assistance from abroad,
exhaustion of domestically-produced rice supplies is estimated to
occur no later than the July-August period of 1982. Hungry and
destitute people continue to arrive at the Thai-Kampuchea border
in search of assistance.
Rice Production
Sn December 1980,. Phnom Penh authorities announced that the
planting goal for the 1981 rainy season rice crop would be 1.7
million hectares, a 13 percent increase over the unmet 1980
goal. -- Prospects _for meeting the increased goal -were not good
even at the time it was announced, and during the spring and
summer of 1981 adverse weather conditions further reduced chances
that the planting goal could be met. While little could be done
about continuing shortages of draft animals, farm machinery, and
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fuel, the early arrival of rains gave reason to hope for a
The negative effects of weather-related problems are
successful crop.
The early rains proved to be heavier than usual and resulted .
in extensive flooding before rice could be planted, especially in
areas bordering the Tonle Sap. The early rains were also short
lived and gave way to a period of drought that lasted throughout
most of the regular planting season. To be sure, some portions
of the country did receive rainfall during the summer months, but
the drought was sufficiently widespread to result in serious crop
losses. In addition, the dry .conditions made land preparation
extremely difficult -- draft animals were hard put to turn the
sunbaked soil.
25X1
Crop-limiting drought problems were compounded by the early
rise of the Mekong River. Seavy rains in Laos and southwestern
China fed large amounts of water into the upper reaches of the
Mekong in July and early August. By mid-August Phnom Penh
authorities were calling not only for increased efforts to combat
drought, but also for measures to be taken to save the capital
city from being inundated. The Mekong had reached flood stage
more,~..than a month earlier than usual _ and .the Tonle Sap rose once
again.. Rice .and other crops planted near the river and the lake
~were,:~either._washed away or_submerged. Kampuchean peasants were.
confronted with the paradox of seeing rising floodwaters while
standing under a blazing sun.
apparent when results of the 1980 rainy season crop are compared
with estimates of the likely results from the 1981 crop. Data
given to representatives of the United Nations' Food and
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Agriculture Organization (FAO) during their 23 October-4 November
1981 food assessment mission to Kampuchea indicate that 1.23
million hectares of rice were harvested from the 1980 rainy
season rice crop. The 1981 rice crop is estimated to total only
1.07 million hectares (13 percent less than the 1980 crop
area). Addition of the area harvested from the 1980/81 dry
season crop and that estimated to be harvested from the coming
1981/82 dry season crop raises total harvested areas for the two
crop years to 1.32 million hectares during the 1980/81 crop year
and only 1.1'9 million hectares during the current 1981/82 crop
year -- a 10 percent decrease from the year-earlier
performance...
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Not~only is the harvestable area down from that of a year
ago, but yields from the main, rainy season. rice crop are also
expected to be lower this year because of the adverse weather
conditions. The 1980 rainy season crop yielded an average of
1.19 metric tons of paddy rice per hectare of land harvested.
The 1981 crop is estimated by the FAO to yield only 1.08 metric
tons per hectare. The combined effect of reduced harvestable
area and .lower yields is to decrease the estimated output from
the 1981 rainy season rice crop to 1.16 million metric tons of
paddy, 21 percent less than the 1.47 million metric tons
,.The FAO estimated that part of production gap would be
filled by improving output from the 1981/82 dry season rice crop
now being planted. Both the area planted and. yields are to be
increased, resulting in 23 percent more area available for
harvest and yields 96 percent higher than for the 1980/81 crop.
If the FA0 projections are realized, paddy output from the dry
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season rice crop will be more than double that achieved a year
ago -- 293,000 metric tons as compared with 114,500 metric tons
25X1
Even with a successful dry season crop, however, estimated
total paddy production will still be less than that achieved in
during the 1980/81 crop year -- 1.45 million metric tons as
compared with a total of 1.58 million metric tons from last
year's crops. The amount of consumable milled rice derived from
the harvest will also be lower-- 691,000 metric tons from the
from the 1980/81 crop.
1981/82 crop as opposed to 757,000 metric tons a year ago'.
Rice Requirement and Deficit
25X1
Estimation of the total rice requirement for Kampuchea is
heavily dependent on the numbers used to represent the size of
the country's population and ration size. The numbers provided
by Phnom Penh authorities (6.59 million in 1981, and an estimated
6.79 million in 1982) have been criticized in recent months as
being too high. Phnom Penh's 1981 population figure is reputed
to have been arrived at as part of the preparations for elections
conducted in May 1981, and the 1982 figure was projected assuming
=.a 3 percent population growth rate. While we have no firm
.:-Phnom~Penh authorities and accepted by the FAO will be-used
also, have no basis for affirming them.* In~ the absence of a firm
alternative, therefore, the 1982 population figure provided by
?information upon which to base a challenge to these figures, we
December 1980
*On the basis of the 1962 census and events that have occured
since then, we estimated Kampuchea's population to have been
5.565 million eo le as of 1 January 1981. See GSM 80-10207,
S E C R E T
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As in the case of population figures, there has been
disagreement about the ration size used to calculate rice
requirements for Kampuchea. The FAO has used a ration of 12
kilograms of rice per person per month as the basis for
estimating the.country'stotal rice requirement, describing that
amount as a minimum emergency ration." This ration, equivalent to
about 400 grams per day, has been criticized in recent months as
being too large and thus serving to inflate the estimated amount
of rice needed to feed the country -- the argument being that the
ration should be reduced to reflect consumption of non-rice
The FAO itself has stated. that historical data indicate
average per capita rice consumption of 600-700 grams per day .
during the 15 year period ending in 1960, and that the emergency_
ration of about 400 grams per day "...is expected to be
supplemented by other local food supplies such as fish, poultry,
maize, manioc, fruit, vegetables, sugar, etc." (emphasis
added). The World Food Program's 1980 "Khmer Food Programme
Handbook" sets forth a basic ration consisting of 400 grams of
rice plus 110 grams of beans, fish, and cooking oil per day for
border camp residents -- people not normally engaged in the
nutritionally more demanding work associated with raising crops.
and tending fields. A variety of sources indicate that
Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, as well as their PRK
counterparts, are provided with 20-24 kilograms of rice each
month, or 660-790 grams per day.
In another Asian setting, research has indicated that the
average citizen of China consumes 470 grams of grain. (rice,
wheat,. corn, and/or other grains) each day plus about 540 grams
 650 grams per day in order to assure proper nourishment.
Approved For Release 2007/05108: CIA- 00200130001-3
of vegetables, potatoes, fruits, meat, fish, and eggs. Indeed,
the United Nations' Disaster Releif Organization (UNDRO)
recommended. in 1981 that people in two flood and drought stricken
provinces of China be provided with grain supplements in order to
raise their "...already minimal ration of 400 grams..." to about
Given the considerations noted above, we feel that use of
the 12 kilogram ration in calculating Kampuchea's emergency rice
requirements is justified. Any reduction in the ration size
would result in underestimating minimum needs.
A population of 6.79 million people consuming i2 kilograms
of rice each month will require a total of 978,000 metric .tons of
rice during the course of a year. Since anticipated output from
the 1981/82 rice crops will total to only 691,000 metric tons of
consumable rice, a shortage of 287,000 metric tons is expected to
occur. Late deliveries of food aid in the form of rice from the
1981 allotment are expected to reduce the shortage by 10,000
metric tons, leaving a net rice deficit of 277,000 metric tons or
nearly 30 percent of the 1982 requirement. This deficit is
equivalent to emergency rations for 107 days and implies that
supplies will be exhausted sometime in late July or early August
1982, well before the start of the next major harvest in
November.
The main, rainy season rice crop is only now (mid-December)
being harvested and the dry season crop is in the process of
being planted. None of the estimated yields or outputs are yet
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in hand nor are they guaranteed. Any number of contingencies
could arise that would act to reduce the amount of rice that
ultimately becomes available for consumption. Two distinct
possibilities are that weather conditions will diminish the
harvest from the main crop and that the prospective dry season
crop might not meet expectations.
Weather conditions in Kampuchea have been rather wet since
the beginning of the harvest period in early November. Indeed,
the return of rains sparked hopes that late plantings of rice
might help reduce the size of the deficit. At the same time,
however, peasants are trying to harvest grain amid rains that
threaten knock down ripened stands or, worse, flood fields once
again: Grain already harvested must be dried and wet weather
delays that vital procedure, increasing the possibilities for
spoilage or sprouting of the the grain. The Phnom Penh media
reported local flooding in some parts of the country in November
and southeastern Thailand suffered extensive flood damage from
heavy downpours in mid-December. Cloud cover associated with the
storms in Thailand extended over Kampuchea and may well have
brought heavy rains to that country as well. At this time it is
not. possible to estimate the amount of grain that may be lost to
such .adverse conditions.
The increase of more than 150 percent in expected output
from the dry season rice crop is based on several optimistic
assumptions. The most important. of these are that more than
.9,000 metric tons of suitable rice seed, almost 20,000 metric
tCns of fertilizers, numerous pumps, and sufficient amounts of
fuel will be made available to farmers when and where they can be
best used. Given the difficulty Phnom Penh authorities have had
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 Approved For Release 2007/051o8E G~,
with similar requirements in recent months, there is little
reason to be sanguine about prospects for the current effort
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Should the dry season rice crop now being planted turn out
to be similar to that raised a year ago instead of markedly
better, output will still be increased but not to the level
projected by the FAO assessment mission. Given an average yield
identical to that of a year ago and a like proportion of the
.planned area actually harvested, output from the dry season crop
will total only about 142,000 metric tons of paddy {up 24 percent
over last year's 114,500 metric tons) instead of the projected
293,000 metric tons. Output of consumable milled rice for the
entire crop year will be reduced from the 691,000 metric. tons now
anticipated to only 617,000 metric-tons. The rice deficit will
be enlarged by 74,000 metric tons to 351,000 metric tons, pushing
the date when domestically produced rice supplies are exhausted
back into early July 1982.
Finally, the Phnom Penh media have been unusually quiet
about harvest prospects in recent weeks. Not since late
September when it.was announced that 60 percent of the rice
planting target had been fulfilled has there been reporting about
planting progress on a nationwide basis. Instead, reporting has
been limited to plans for the dry season crop and sketchy
descriptions of conditions and achievements in individual
districts and a few provinces. Since a lack of reporting via the
met3ia has usually indicated problems in the past, the current
virtual silence about the size and success of the 1981 rainy
season rice crop is not encouraging. Indeed, Khmer arriving at
the Thai border recently have been described by UNICEF officials
as hungry and raggedly dressed people, some showing signs of
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 Approved For Release 2007i051R08E C;IA~RDP83B00551 ROOD200130001-3
malnutrition, and most in despair over prospects for the
future. The concurrent Iow volume of media reporting on
agricultural progress and the appearance of destitute people at
the Thai-Kampuchea border does not augur well for the food supply
outlook in Kampuchea during 1982.
S E C R E T
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