DIPLOMACY OF THE KAMPUCHEA CONFLICT: KEY DOCUMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200130002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Diplomacy of the KampucheaT,
Conflict: Key Documents
The documents assembled in this special issue of
Indochinalssues have been chosen to show the evolution
of the diplomatic impasse over Kampuchea during the
pav eighteen months. From the key documents of the
major actors, we have extracted those parts which
convey official positions regarding negotiations on
Kampuchea and the wider regional problem of Viet-
nam-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
relations. What the documents show is that none of the
parties is ready to offer a real compromise on Kam-
puchea. Instead Vietnam and ASEAN each wait for the
other side to signal its readiness to make serious
concessions.
Vietnam's diplomatic strategy, as shown in these
documents, is to blunt pressures for a political compro-
mise on Kampuchea by offering to satisfy many of the
past concerns voiced by the ASEAN states about
Vietnamese intentions toward the region. Meanwhile,
Vietnam has begun defining the conditions under which
its troops would withdraw from Kampuchea. In effect,
Vietnam is offering ASEANfriendship and cooperation
in return for acceptance of the political status quo in
Kampuchea.
ASEAN, however, is holding out an olive branch to
Vietnam on the condition that Vietnam give up its
dominant position in Kampuchea. ASEAN's 1980
demand that Vietnam withdraw its forces from Kam-
puchea in advance of a U.N. -sponsoredpolitical settle-
ment was neither altered nor clarified by the July
international conference on Kampuchea. ASEAN has
tried unsuccessfully to sweeten the pill for the Viet-
namese by recognizing Vietnamese security concerns in
Kampuchea and by suggesting that economic assistance
from the international community could beforthcom-
ing if Vietnam yields on Kampuchea.
China, on the other hand, has avoided giving any
assurances to Vietnam that Pol Pot will not replace the
Vietnamese-sponsored regime in Phnom Penh. Beijing
offers only the resumption of negotiations toward
normalizing relations with Vietnam in return for a
Vietnamese military withdrawal from Kampuchea-not
a pledge to forego the use of military force and other
pressures against the Indochinese states.
The United States has made no proposal of its own on
Kampuchea, but instead has supportedpositions worked
out by ASEAN and China. Washington has expressed
strong support for pressures on Vietnam to agree to the
demands of the international community, including
China's threat to Vietnam's northern border and Chinese
arming of anti- Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, but
avoids any commitment to help provide positive incen-
tives to Vietnam to agree to a compromise settlement.
Statement by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry,
April 22, 1980
Shortly before Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen
Co Thach embarked on visits to several A SEA N nations
in May, 1980, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement
ruling out any Vietnamese participation in an interna-
tional conference on Kampuchea which did not have the
approval and participation of the Vietnamese-sup-
ported Heng Samrin regime. The statement was evi-
dently aimed at reassuring Phnom Penh that no political
settlement would be negotiated over its head.
The Vietnamese Government fully agrees with and
resolutely supports the correct stand of the Kampu-
chean People's Revolutionary Council. All matters
concerning Kampuchea must be solved by the Kampu-
chean people, whose sole, legal, authentic representative
is the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council. All
international conferences to discuss the matters concern-
ing Kampuchea must be held with the agreement and
A publication of the Center for International Policy, Indochina Project
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participation of the Kampuchean People's Revolution-
ary Council which is handling Kampuchea's internal
and foreign affairs.
Stemming from its desire to join other Southeast
Asian countries in building and developing long-term
friendly and cooperative relations in the interest of each
country and for the sake of peace and stability in the
region and in contributing to the defense of world peace,
Vietnam is ready to hold bilateral discussions with other
countries in the region.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Asia
and Pacific Daily Report, April 22, 1980, p. K1.
Address by Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co
Thach to the United Nations General Assembly,
September 26, 1980 (extract)
In July, 1980, following Vietnam's brief incursion into
Thai territory, the three Indochinese foreign ministers
proposed a demilitarized zone on the Thai-Kampu-
chean border, with some form of international controls,
to be negotiated directly or indirectly between Thailand
and Kampuchea. In September, Vietnamese Foreign
Minister Thach offered, in a meeting with Thai Foreign
Minister Sitthi Sawetsila in New York, to withdraw part
of the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea in response to a
restoration of security on the Thai-Kampuchea border.
Thach then made the proposal public in a U. N. speech.
He also made it clear that a complete Vietnamese
withdrawal would depend on China ending its "threats"
against both Kampuchea and Vietnam.
[... ] we have notified the UN secretary general of the
following agreements between the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Council of
Kampuchea:
-The presence of Vietnamese armed forces in Kam-
puchea is aimed at opposing the Chinese threats to
Kampuchea and Vietnam and is at the request of the
People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea [KPRC].
When these threats no longer exist and at the request of
the KPRC, the Vietnamese armed forces will leave
Kampuchea.
-The strained situation along the Kampuchean-Thai
border is threatening peace in this region. The estab-
lishment of a demilitarized zone along both sides of the
Kampuchean-Thai border is the best measure for
ensuring peace, security and stability in the border areas
of Kampuchea and Thailand. With the help of the UN
secretary-general, Kampuchea and Thailand will hold
negotiations to settle the tense situation along the
Kampuchean-Thai border on the basis of respect for
each other's interests.
-Proceeding from the situation of peace, security
and stability along the Kampuchean-Thai border, the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will
hold discussions with the People's Revolutionary Coun-
cil of Kampuchea and decide on the withdrawal of part
of Vietnamese armed forces from Kampuchea.
FBIS, 'Asia and Pacific Daily Report, September 29,
1980, pp. K7-8.
Statement of Foreign Ministers of Vietnam,
Laos and Kampuchea, January 28, 1981 (extract)
In January, 1981, the three Indochinese foreign
ministers defined the phrase "ending the Chinese threat"
for the first time by proposing agreements between
China and each of the three countries on "peaceful
coexistence. " The statement also proposed for the first
time a regional conference between the Indochinese and
ASEAN countries, with the agenda to be agreed upon
between the two groups of states. The proposal en-
visioned an international conference to ratify the re-
gional agreement. ASEAN rejected the proposal as
failing to address the.issue of the Kampuchean conflict.
[... ] 3. The basic factor for restoring peace and
stability in Southeast Asia at present is that China must
terminate its hostile policy toward the three Indochinese
countries and its policy of interfering in other countries
in this area. The three Indochinese countries and China
are neighbors with age-old relations. The Vietnamese,
Lao and Kampuchean people have always cherished
their traditional friendship with the Chinese people.
Proceeding from their policy of peace and friendship
and their attitude of good will, the SRV [Socialist
Republic of Vietnam], the LPDR [Lao People's
Democratic Republic] and the PRK [People's Republic
of Kampuchea] declare their readiness to sign bilateral
treaties of peaceful coexistence with the PRC [People's
Republic of China] on the basis of the principles of
absolute respect for each country's independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression,
nonintervention in each other's internal affairs; equality;.
mutual benefit; good neighborly relations and- the
settlement of all bilateral disputes through peaceful
means.
The SRV once again calls on the PRC to resume at an
early date the Vietnam-China talks in order to resolve
the problems in their mutual relations. The Vietnamese
side once again reaffirms that in the framework of these
talks, it is ready to discuss the problems raised by the
Chinese side, and demands that the Chinese side adopt
the same attitude toward the problems of interest to
Vietnam.
In the interests of the two peoples of Laos and China,
the LPDR demands that the PRC respect the indepen-
dence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Laos; stop
supporting, assisting and fostering the reactionary Lao
exiles in Chinese territory and other countries; terminate
its armed threats along the Lao-Chinese border areas;
stop sending spies and commandos into Laos and stop
spreading slanderous propaganda against the LPDR.
The LPDR deems that a response to these points will
serve as a basis for restoring normal relations of
friendship between the two countries.
The PRK demands that the PRC stop using the
reactionary Pol Pot-leng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique
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and other groups of Khmer reactionaries to oppose the
PRK; and that the PRC respect the independence and
sovereignty of the PRK-with the KPRC [People's
Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea] being the sole
genuine and legal representative of the Kampuchean
people-and stop interfering in its internal affairs. The
PRK deems that these points serve as a basis for peace
and stability in Southeast Asia as well as a basis for
normal relations between the PRK and the PRC. [ ...]
4. The Indochinese and the ASEAN countries, de-
spite their different social systems and their disagree-
ment on a number of questions, share the same basic
benefit of regional peace, stability, friendship and
cooperation, which is an essential condition for protect-
ing independence and security as well as for each
country building a prosperous and happy nation in its
own way. In the interest of their own peoples and in the
common interest of building a peaceful, stable and
prosperous Southeast Asia, the Indochinese and the
ASEAN countries must eliminate all the schemes of
interference and division by foreign countries and must
not let relations of friendship and cooperation between
the two groups of countries be affected by their
differences and disagreements. [... ]
The persistent policy of the three Indochinese coun-
tries in pursuing a dialogue to settle all disputes through
negotiations has been realistically proven as a correct
way to guarantee peace, stability and cooperation in the
region. According to the above spirit, Vietnam, Laos
and Kampuchea propose that:
A. A regional conference between the Indochinese
and ASEAN countries be held to discuss the problems
concerning them for the benefit of peace, stability,
friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia based on
the principle of equality in achieving mutual agreement,
of respect for each country's independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity, of non-imposition of the will of
one group of countries on the other, and of no outside
interference. For the sake of the common interests of the
region, the Indochinese and ASEAN countries must
quickly eliminate the obstacles to and discuss those
problems concerning the holding of this conference. The
agenda, the timing and the venue will be agreed upon by
the two groups of countries. [ ... ]
B. After the countries of these two groups have signed
an agreement on Southeast Asian peace and stability, an
enlarged international conference will be held to endorse
and secure this agreement. In order to prepare for a
regional conference between the two groups of coun-
tries, the representatives of the three-country Indochi-
nese group and those of the five-country ASEAN group
will meet in a preparatory conference. The three Indo-
chinese countries nominate the LPDR as their repre-
sentative in this preparatory conference.
FBIS, Asia and Pacific Daily Report, January 28, 1981,
pp. A 1-3.
Statement of the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam,
Kampuchea and Laos, June 14, 1981 (extract)
In a revision of their regional conference proposal, the
Indochinese foreign ministers suggested that ASEAN
and the Indochinese states could alternate in establish-
ing the agenda for discussions, thus allowing A SEA N to
raise the issue of a political settlement in Kampuchea
and Vietnamese troop withdrawal. They moved slightly
closer to the idea of an international conference by
proposing that some outside states and the U. N.
Secretary General could participate as observers, and
that the international conference to ratify the regional
agreement could be U.N. -sponsoredprovided that Pol
Pot was first derecognized.
[ ... ] With the desire to bring the process of dialogue
quickly to positive results beneficial to peace, stability,
friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia, the three
Indochinese countries propose the following:
A) A regional conference to be held between the two
groups of Indochinese and ASEAN countries to discuss
regional issues of bilateral interest with the participation
as observers of the UN Secretary General himself and a
number of other countries to be agreed upon by the two
sides. The agenda would be presented in turn by the two
groups of Indochinese and ASEAN countries for dis-
cussion on the basis of rotation and equality. The
Indochinese countries propose that this conference be
convened in mid-July 1981 at Rangoon or a capital of
another Asian country that may be mutually agreed
upon by the two sides.
B) In case the ASEAN countries are not yet ready to
attend the proposed regional conference, the three
Indochinese countries propose that bilateral or multi-
lateral regional consultations be continued among coun-
tries in the region, as proposed by some ASEAN
countries, in order to discuss and reach mutual agree-
ment on various regional issues of mutual interest.
C) An international conference with a broad compo-
sition of participants to be mutually agreed upon by the
two sides to be convened to acknowledge and guarantee
various treaties mutually agreed upon by the two sides at
the regional conference or regional consultations. If the
United Nations ceases to recognize Pol Pot and his
colleagues, the Indochinese countries will consider the
possibility of the United Nations convening such an
international conference.
FBIS, Asia and Pacific Daily Report, June 15, 1981, pp.
A3-5.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 35/6,
October 22, 1980 (extract)
The ASEAN states agreed in September, 1980 to call
for an international conference under U. N. auspices and
to demand total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops,
establishment of a U. N. peacekeeping force to keep law
and order in Kampuchea and U. N.-supervised elections.
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The ASEAN draft of a United Nations General As-
sembly resolution to this effect was altered in one
important respect before becoming resolution 35/6: the
call for a U. N. peacekeeping force was deleted, pre-
sumably at the insistence of China.
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 34/ 22 of 14 November 1979, [...]
2. Decides, taking into account paragraph 12 of
resolution 34/22, to convene early in 1981 an inter-
national conference on Kampuchea which should in-
volve the participation of all conflicting parties in
Kampuchea and others concerned, with the aim of
finding a comprehensive political settlement of the
Kampuchean problem;
3. Decides further that the conference should nego-
tiate with a view to reaching agreement on, inter alia:
(a) Total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kam-
puchea within a specific time-frame to be verified by the
United Nations;
(b) Measures by the United Nations to ensure law and
order and the observance of the fundamental principles
of human rights in Kampuchea;
(c) Measures by the United Nations to ensure non-
interference by outside Powers in the internal affairs of
Kampuchea;
(d) United Nations-supervised free elections in
Kampuchea;
(e) Guarantees against the introduction of any foreign
forces in Kampuchea;
(/). Guarantees to respect the sovereignty, indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of Kampuchea;
(g) Guarantees that an independent and sovereign
Kampuchea will not be a threat to its neighbours;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take all appro-
priate steps for the convening of such a conference;
5. Calls for, pending the settlement of the conflict:
(a) The stationing of a United Nations observer team
on the Thai side of the border in order to observe the
situation along the border and to verify that only civilian
Kampucheans obtain international relief aid;
(b) The establishment of safe areas under United
Nations supervision in western Kampuchea for the
uprooted civilian Kampucheans encamped near the
Thai-Kampuchean border and those in Thailand who
wish to return to their homeland;
6. Urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a
comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean
conflict is achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish
a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East
Asia; [ ... ]
United Nations Department of Public Information,
Press Release GA / 6375 (1981)
Declaration of the International Conference
on Kampuchea, July 17, 1981
ASEAN's draft declaration for the international
conference represented a step forward in defining a
realistic alternative to the continuing presence of Viet-
namese troops in Kampuchea by calling for the disarm-
ing of all Khmer factions and the setting up of an interim
administration, presumably to be negotiated as part of
the overall settlement. But these provisions, which
would have ruled out the return of Democratic Kam-
puchea to power, were strongly opposed by the Chinese
delegation. The substitute provision for "appropriate
arrangements " to maintain law and order and to prevent
disruption of free elections, left the issue in doubt (see
Indochina Issues #18, July, 1981). The declaration, as
adopted by the conference, also straddled the issue of
whether the U.N. presence would be a "peacekeeping
force" or an "observer group." ASEAN efforts to
provide "carrots "in the document for the Vietnamese to
make concessions on Kampuchea were severely cut back
before the conference began.
1. Pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the
United Nations and to General Assembly resolution
35/6, the United Nations convened the International
Conference on Kampuchea at its Headquarters in New
York, from 13 to 17 July 1981, with the aim of finding a
comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean
problem.
2. The Conference reaffirms the rights of all States to
the inviolability of their sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity and stresses their obligation to
respect those rights of their neighbours. The Conference
also reaffirms the right of all peoples to determine their
own destiny free from foreign interference, subversion
and coercion.
3. The Conference expresses its concern that the
situation in Kampuchea has resulted from the violation
of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of States, non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of States and the inadmis-
sibility of the threat or use of force in international
relations.
4. The Conference takes note of the serious inter-
national consequences that have arisen out of the
situation in Kampuchea. In particular, the Conference
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notes with grave concern the escalation of tension in
South-East Asia and major Power involvement as a
result of this situation.
5. The Conference also takes note of the serious
problem of refugees which has resulted from the
situation in Kampuchea and is convinced that a political
solution to the conflict will be necessary for the long-
term solution of the refugee problem.
6. The Conference stresses its conviction that the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the
restoration and preservation of its independence, sover-
eignty and territorial integrity and the commitment by
all States to non-interference and non-intervention in
the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal
components of any just and lasting solution to the
Kampuchean problem.
7. The Conference regrets that the foreign armed
intervention continues and that the foreign forces have
not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus making it
impossible for the Kampuchean people to express their
will in free elections.
8. The Conference is further convinced that a com-
prehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean
conflict is vital to the establishment of a Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality in South-East Asia.
9. The Conference emphasizes that Kampuchea, like
all other countries, has the right to be independent and
sovereign, free from any external threat or armed
aggression, free to pursue its own development and a
better life for its people in an environment of peace,
stability and full respect for human rights.
10. With a view to reaching a comprehensive political
settlement in Kampuchea, the Conference calls for
negotiations on, inter alia, the following elements:
(a) An agreement on cease-fire by all parties to the
conflict in Kampuchea and withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Kampuchea in the shortest time possible
under the supervision and verification of a United
Nations peace-keeping force/ observer group;
(b) Appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed
Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or
disrupt the holding of free elections, or intimidate or
coerce the population in the electoral process; such
arrangements should also ensure that they will respect
the result of the free elections;
(c) Appropriate measures for the maintenance of law
and order in Kampuchea and the holding of free
elections, following the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from the country and before the establishment of a new
government resulting from those elections;
(d) The holding of free elections under United Nations
supervision, which will allow the Kampuchean people to
exercise their right to self-determination and elect a
government of their own choice; all Kampucheans will
have the right to participate in the elections.
11. The Conference appreciates the legitimate security
concerns of all States of the region and, therefore, deems
it essential for Kampuchea to remain non-aligned and
neutral and for the future elected government of Kam-
puchea to declare that Kampuchea will not pose a threat
to or be used against the security, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of other States, especially those
sharing a common border with Kampuchea.
12. The Conference also deems it essential for the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, all States of South-East Asia as well as other
States concerned to declare, in conjunction with para-
graph 11 above, that?.
(a) They will respect and observe in every way, the
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
aligned and neutral status of Kampuchea and recognize
its borders as inviolable;
(b) They will refrain from all forms of interference,
direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;
(c) They will not bring Kampuchea into any military
alliance or other agreement, whether military or other-
wise, which is inconsistent with its legislation under
paragraph 11 nor invite or encourage it to enter into any
such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;
(d) They will refrain from introducing into Kam-
puchea foreign troops or military personnel and not
establish any military bases in Kampuchea;
(e) They will not use the territory of any country,
including their own, for interference in the internal
affairs of Kampuchea;
(f) They will not pose a threat to the security of
Kampuchea or endanger its survival as a sovereign
nation.
13. The Conference expresses the hope that, following
the peaceful resolution of the Kampuchean conflict, an
intergovernmental committee will be established to
consider a programme of assistance to Kampuchea for
the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic
and social development of all States of the region.
14. The Conference notes the absence of Viet Nam
and other States and urges them to attend the future
sessions of the Conference. In this context, the Confer-
ence takes note of the current bilateral consultations
among the countries of the region and expresses the
hope that these consultations will help to persuade all
countries of the region and others to participate in the
future sessions of the Conference.
15. The Conference expresses the hope that Viet Nam
will participate in the negotiating process which can lead
to a peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem and
to the restoration of peace and stability to the region of
South-East Asia. This will enable all the countries of the
region to devote themselves to the task of economic and
social development, to engage in confidence-building
and to promote regional co-operation in all fields of
endeavour, thus heralding a new era of peace, concord
and amity in South-East Asia.
United Nations General Assembly document Al CONF.
109/L.1 /Add. 1, July 17, 1981.
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Speech by Chinese Acting Foreign Minister
Han Nianlong at the International Conference on
Kampuchea, July 13, 1981 (extract)
China insisted at the conference that no international
body interfere with the internal affairs of Kampuchea,
rejecting any infringement on the legal claim of the Pol
Pot regime to be the legitimate government of Kampu-
chea. And despite pressures from ASEAN countries
that China offer to withdraw the threat of force against
Vietnam in return for a Vietnamese military withdrawal,
the Chinese delegate, Acting Foreign Minister Han
Nianlong, offered only to resume bilateral negotiations
with Vietnam, broken off unilaterally by Beijing in
March, 1980. China would thus retain its military
pressure on Vietnam after a Kampuchean settlement to
extract concessions from Hanoi on other issues.
[ . . . ] In our opinion, a comprehensive political
settlement of the Kampuchean question must include
the following elements:
First, the Vietnamese troops must withdraw com-
pletely from Kampuchea within a time limit. As is
known to all, the continued presence of 200,000 Viet-
namese troops in Kampuchea is the main obstacle to a
fair settlement of the Kampuchea question. The Chinese
delegation believes that the primary task of this confer-
ence is to discuss and work out ways for the total
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.
This is not only the key to and basis for the settlement of
the Kampuchean question,but also an essential prere-
quisite to easing the tension in Southeast Asia. We
propose that the conference call on Vietnam to pull out
all its troops from Kampuchea within six months.
Second, the Kampuchean people's right to self-
determination must be fully respected. General As-
sembly Resolution 3516 affirms the right of the Kampu-
chean people to determine their future free from outside
interference. In our view, after the total withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops, it is up to the Kampuchean people
themselves to decide through genuine free elections
under UN supervision such internal affairs as to what
kind of government and political system are to be
established in Kampuchea and who are to be chosen to
form the government. We hope that the patriotic forces
in Kampuchea will consult among themselves genuine
free elections without any threat of force so as to give full
expression to the will of the Kampuchean people.
Third, necessary international guarantee of the inde-
pendent, neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea
should be provided.
The Chinese delegation wishes to propose that, after
the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kam-
puchea, the permanent member states of the Security
Council, together with Vietnam, the ASEAN and other
countries concerned undertake the following:
1. To refrain from any interference in Kampuchea's
internal affairs;
2. To respect the independent, neutral and non-
aligned status of Kampuchea;
3. Not to use Kampuchea as a base for aggression
against other countries or for interference in their
internal affairs; and
4. To respect the results- of the genuine free elections to
be held by the Kampuchean people under UN
supervision.
On the basis of the UN Charter, the norms of
international relations and the resolutions adopted at
the last two sessions of the General Assembly, the
Chinese government has put forward the above three-
point proposal with a view to reaching a just and
reasonable settlement of the Kampuchean question. We
are prepared to discuss and consult with all of you on
our proposal.
In our opinion, any political settlement of the Kam-
puchean question should be in conformity with the
fundamental principles of the UN Charter and the
norms of international relations. It should not depart
from the General Assembly resolution, and certainly not
infringe upon the fundamental interests of the Kampu-
chean people. Historical experience shows that when a
small and weak nation is subjected to aggression,
compromises or concessions will only court greater
harm. Today, on the Kampuchean question, to condone
the Vietnamese authorities' hegemonist behaviour of
bullying the weak or to seek a compromise at the
expense of the interests of a small and weak nation such
as Kampuchea will only serve to further embolden the
aggressors and, far from achieving a lasting settlement
of the Kampuchean question, will bring serious conse-
quences to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia and
Asia as a whole.
[ ... ] We hope that Vietnam will become a factor
conducive to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. We
are only opposed to the policies of aggression and
expansion pursued by the Vietnamese authorities.
Should they withdraw all their troops from Kampuchea
and abandon their policies of aggression and expansion,
the Chinese Government would be prepared to start
negotiations with Vietnam on the restoration of normal
relations between the two countries and the conclusion
of a treaty of mutual non-aggression and peaceful
coexistence.
FBIS, PRC Daily Report, July 14, 1981, pp. K8-10.
Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
John H. Holdridge, July 15, 1981 (extract)
Under the Reagan Administration, the U. S. policy of
joining hands with China in order to put pressure on
Vietnam has become more explicit than it had been
under the Carter Administration. In testimony before
the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge en-
dorsed China's military pressure on Vietnam while
disclaiming any "permanent hostility" toward Hanoi.
To the demand for Vietnamese willingness to withdraw
from Kampuchea, Holdridge added the undefined
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requirement that Hanoi cease "being a source of trouble
to the entire region. "And he avoided any commitment
to normalization of relations if Vietnam "changes its
present policies. "
[ ... ] But the central issue in U.S. policy toward
Vietnam is the occupation of Kampuchea, and that is
why we will continue to keep pressure on Hanoi. In this
we and ASEAN are in full agreement: The course of
action most likely to result in the removal of Vietnamese
troops from Kampuchea is to make the occupation as
costly as possible for Hanoi. We will continue a process
of diplomatic isolation and economic deprivation until
Hanoi is prepared to follow the will of the world
community as expressed in two consecutive U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions and agree to troop with-
drawal, free elections, and an end to outside interference
in Kampuchea. This policy of isolation and pressure is,
of course, supplemented by the presence on Vietnam's
northern border of hundreds of thousands of Chinese
troops and the continuing guerrilla activity of several
resistance groups inside Kampuchea.
When Hanoi is prepared to withdraw from Kampu-
chea and when it is no longer a source of trouble to the
entire region, the economic and political pressures
7
which now weigh heavily upon that country can be
lifted. It is Vietnam which has chosen its current
isolation and its heavy dependence on the Soviet Union.
Only Vietnam can end that isolation. It is in no one's
interest to have a permanently hostile Vietnam on the
borders of ASEAN and neither ASEAN nor the United
States seeks permanent hostility. But I want to make it
clear that the United States will not consider normal-
izing relations with Vietnam until Vietnam changes its
present policies.
[... ] Our concern with Vietnam is a function of the
threat which Vietnam poses to ASEAN through its
aggression in Kampuchea and through its relationship
with the Soviet Union. The latter has established its
military presence in Vietnam and is clearly bent upon
expanding its political influence in Laos and Kampu-
chea. ASEAN understands fully the nature of this
bargain between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which
is costing the Russians millions of dollars per day, and
the threat it poses to the region's non-Communist states.
"U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia, " U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 295,
July, 1981.
Publications
20-More Troubles Ahead for Kampuchea's Econ-
omy, Joel R. Charny (October, 1981).
19-How Vietnam Negotiates: A Personal Glimpse,
J. Michael Myers (September, 1981).
18-Kampuchea Conference: Cracks in the Coalition,
Gareth Porter (July, 1981).
17-The Unfinished Business of America's MIAs,
Bill Herod (June, 1981).
16-Vietnam in Kampuchea: Aims and Options,
Gareth Porter (May, 1981).
15-The Food Weapon: Can Vietnam Be Broken?
Murray Hiebert (April, 1981).
14-ASEAN and Kampuchea: Shadow and Sub-
stance, Gareth Porter (February, 1981).
13-Democratic Kampuchea: The Regime's Post-
Mortem, Steve Heder (January, 1981).
12-Vietnam's Troubled Economy, John Spragens,
Jr. and Ngo Vinh Long (December, 1980).
11-The "China Card" and U.S. Indochina Policy,
Gareth Porter (November, 1980).
$1.00 for single copies; ten or more $.50 a copy: 100 or
more, $.25 each.
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Indochina Issues is part of the Indochina Project of the Center for International Policy,
120 Maryland Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. This publication is funded by a grant from
the Christopher Reynolds Foundation.
Staff: Linda Gibson Hiebert, Murray Hiebert and Gareth Porter
? 1981 by the Center for for International Policy. All
rights reserved. The Center encourages quotation of any
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