THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO PLAN FOR ITS OWN SUCCESSION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B00551R000200190001-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 3, 2007
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
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Body:
Approved For Release 2007/05103: CIA-RDP83B00551R000200190001-7 ~~
The Chinese leadership .continues to plan for its own succession.
Although the aging Deng Xiaoping remains preeminent, his economic development
policies favoring agricultural and light industry have produced only modest
results. Moreover, Deng and his allies oust still restore institutions
damaged during .the Mao era and build support for a reform program that
minimizes the role of ideology. Some military leaders and many middle-level
bureaucrats have reservations about some of Deng's policies. If a smooth
succession to Deng is implemented, Soviet capabilities to expand their
influence at China's expense will be minimized; a failed succession, on the
other hand, would present the Soviets with tempting opportunities. China-US
relations remain heavily influenced by Taiwan. As a result, mutually acceptable
management of the Taiwan arms sale issue tops the Chinese-US agenda for 1982.
The military stalemate in Kmapuchea has led to increased political
maneuvering among Communist and non-Communist resistances forces and their
supporters outside Kampuchea. Although the military balance still favors
Vietnam (180,000) and their Kampuchean puppets (IS-20,000), they are unable
to consolidate control. Singapore and Thailand are pressing far a loose "
coalition of Communist and non-Communist resistance forces with the objective
of forcing Hanoi to seek a political solution. Both the Soviets and the
Chinese also have equities in Vietnam and Indochina. The Soviets. keep Vietnam
.afloat economically by.contributing $2-iii per day and gain the use of facilities
in Cam Ranh Bay. The Chinese, for their part, continue to support the resistance
forces while occasionally threatening to "teach Vietnam a second lesson" along
their common border. These measures are designed to force the Vietnamese out of
Kampuchea and the Soviets out of Vietnam, but they are unlikely to succeed.
0200190001-7 ~ --.~ _. ~_"'`~