THE CONFLICT IN KAMPUCHEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200190003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Conflict in Kampuchea
There has been no meaningful change in the overall strategic military
situation in Kampuchea during the past year. Over the past three months, haa-
ever, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) has worked hard to replenish and
reorganize its forces in Kampuchea, to strengthen and broaden its logistics
routes tra the Thai border, and to improve troop morale. With little advance
warning, the Vietnamese could carry out sharp, hard-hitting thrusts against
several vulnerable Khmer resistance camps. Recent Vietnamese reconnaissance
probes and limited offensive initiatives along the border have raised tensions,
but actual fighting has been light.
Military Balance in Kampuchea
Vietnam has 18-20 divisions (an estimated 180,000 troops) in Kampuchea.
Nearly half are near the 'Thai border. These troops are well aimed and equipped
with conventional weapons provided primarily by the Soviet Union. They
control major population centers, most principal lines of cc~anunication, and
are effectively protecting key rice-gracing areas.
Vietnam could draw on reserves to reinforce its position in Kampuchea
if challenged by greater resistance activity. Vietnam will be able to meet
the costs of occupation as long as Soviet aid bolsters it against the domestic
and international pressures that might otherwise alter its behavior.
L~snocratic Kampuchea (DK} guerrilla forces (estimated to be at least
35,000 troops) bear the brunt of fighting against the Vietnamese. Small DK
units operate in virtually every region of Kampuchea but they do not att~npt
to hold territory or expel the Vietnamese from major positions.
While the DK are nac stronger than at any time over the past three
years, they are totally dependent on Chinese financial and military support
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and on Thai cooperation. 'The DK does not have sufficient recruits to exp~-ind
its forces rapidly, and conservation of manpaver is an overriding DK concern.
In general, the DK aim to keep up the military pressure shat it has
applied over the past three years. Zhey are seeking to wear down the Viet
namese physically and mentally through sustained but law level conflict.
Zhe Khmer People's National Liberation Force (KFNLF) is the largest
and most active non-Cca~anlnist resistance group operating in Kan~uchea. The
KPNT.F forces (estimated at 6-8,000 troops) will not. soon achieve military
parity with the DK. 2he majority of the KpNLF's armed forces lack training,
cc~nbat experience, and leadership. While the nucleus of a good I~NLF guerrilla
force (2,000 troops) is developing along the 'Thai border, growth is hindered
by recruitment, financial and. supply problens.
Zhe KPNLE does not have the potential to develop into a force strong
enough to challenge the Vietnamese in Kampuchea.
Non-Comtmzni.st resistance forces loyal to Prince Sihanouk number
less than 1,000 troops, These troops do not carry out any meaningful military
operations and are not a factor in the Kampuchean conflict.
Status of Coalition Talks
There have been numerous attempts to get the various Khmer resistance
factions too form a united front to add political pressure on Vietnam. Thus
far, all have failed. Political maneuvering currently is focused on Singapore's
loose coalition proposal. The non-C~nunists support the proposal. The DK
are expected to reject it because they believe it assigns them a subordinate
role in the resistance.
Zhe DK, nonetheless, believe some form of united front is essential
to defeat the Vietnamese, and are expected to make a counterproposal during
the next faa weeks.
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die prospects for an of fective coalition of the divided and antagonistic
Khmer resistance groups are not good. Negotiations are likely to be prolonged.
Even if scene form of association among their is eventually established, the
groups will--for all practical purposes--continue to operate as separate entities.
Soviet and Chinese Goals in Indochina
In att~iipting to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, bbscow's principal
concerns are to contain China and diminish US influence, for the present ccsir-
plementing Vietnam's national interests in the region. For their sizable
economic investment in support of Vietnamese policy in Indochina, the Soviets
have already realized substantial returns that further their regional interests.
They have a highly visible advisory presence throughout Indochina, and have
gained access to Vietriamese air and naval facilities which enhance their
military capabilities in Southeast Asia. Zhese facilities enable the Soviets
to better support Indian Ocean deployments and to expand intelligence
collection capabilities in the region. Nbscow will seek greater influence in
Southeast Asia over the longer term by using Vietnam and the neighboring Indo-
china stages to strengthen its presence in the region.
China's principal goal in Kampuchea is to prevent the expansion of
Vietn~se and Soviet influence throughout Indochina. Beijing probably
perceives little alternative to a relationship with Hanoi marked by long-term
hostility and has sought fe~a alternatives to a policy aimed at keeping pressure
on Vietnam from as many sides as passible. Trie Chinese believe such a strategy
will eventually force Hanoi to retrench in Kampuchea, loosen its ties too the
Soviets, and recognize Chinese security interests in the region. Chinese
interests thus are served by protracted warfare in Kampuchea-it weakens Vietnam,.
creates opportunities to strengthen Chinese influence in Thailand, and gives
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Beijing the opportunity to visibly demonstrate its support for ASEAN policies.
Gina will support a coalition that it sees as adding pressure on the
Vietnairese without weakening DK military capabilities.
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