CHINA: DENG WORKS TO MAKE HIS POLICIES SURVIVE HIM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200190007-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05103: CIA=RDP83B00551 8000200190007;
7~I
China: Deng Works to Make His Policies Survive Him
Deng Xiaoping remains the dominant, driving polity.cal force
in China. At 77, his first priority is to ensure that reliable'
successors will continue his work after he dies. In the last
eighteen months, Deng has engineered the removal of Mao's
successor, Hua Guofeng; from hi..s top jobs and replaced him with a
party chairman and premier of Deng's own choos~.ng. To keep his
designated heirs in power. Deng is spearheading efforts to reform
the bureaucracy and economy and to reduce further the po~itica?.
influence of the army.
Resistance to Deng`s Reforms
There is strong resistance to Deng's personnel appointments
and reform program. Party conservatives object to the pace and
scope of the changes in China's economy and society since 1979-
fearing they will threaten the party's grip on power as in
Poland. To a certain extent, Deng shares these concerns himself.
Gc~v o C a~
"Leftist leaders," who Mao's radical
policies of the late 1960s, are fundamentally opposed to Deng's
reforms, but they are relatively few in numberfl ~^~ ^?*ti o
s-mad-~Er ai 1 the t-~e~. Millions of mi.d-level officials who feel
threatened by Deng's changes are a far greater obstacle to Deng's
policies?
In order to win key jobs for hi.s own men, Deng compromised
on his more controversial policies with his critics, particular
part y c o n s e r v a t i v e s. This -limits Deng' s freecl~t to maneuver.
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The Military
The military poses special_ problems, Elements within the
army leadership are unhappy with~choi_ce of Hu Yaobang to be Party
Chairman. Because of Hu's low standing with the military. Deng
has had to take charge of the party's military commission
himself. Armymen have argued with the reformers on some br_ead-
and-butter issues including cuts in defense spending, and
accommodations have been made. The m~_litary would also like to
see more emphasis on ideology, and many are unhappy with the
criticism of Mao that has occured since J.980. While it requires
special attention, the army at present does not constitute a
dangerous unified opposition.
Deng is also trying to upgrade the quality of the military
a program that has considerable military support. Bloated units
of the army are being pressed to meet higher performance
standards, retire elderly commanders, and demobilize excess and
unskilled troops.
Mixed Results in the Economy
The party's leaders have resigned themselves to another year
of low growth and a sizeable budget deficit. Economic
policymakers had originally ~Choped to complete a readjustment of
the economy by next year, but they now realize that it will take
significantly longer. The emphasis will remain on consumer-
oriented programs, but economic leaders agree that the large cuts
made i.n heavy industry investment were too great. This slow-
growth scenario leaves little cushion for exigencies and will
make restructuring the economy more difficult. Attempts to
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restrict the size of bonuses or to raise the price of some
staples to reduce the deficit run the ris~ of worker unrest.
Government Reorganization
With his men in place at the top, Deng is moving to reduce
opposition to his program in the middle levels of the
bureaucracy. Beijing has announced its intention to reduce the
size of the bureaucracy and the number of ~ agencies.
Essentially a purge of political enemies in the guise of
disinterested reform, this will be a maior test of Deng's
group. Given the compromises Deng has made to get this far, ~.t
is extremely unlikely he will reach his maximum goals.
By pressing ahead- Deng nonetheless retains political
momemtu~Y. With his opponents on the defensive, Deng intends to
divide and neutralize enough of them to reduce the threat to hs
chosen successors.
What if Deng Leaves the Sce~?
Deng needs the next several years to accomplish his basic
objectives. If he departs in the next few years, party Chairman
Hu Yaobang may have a hard time hanging on. S~ould the reform
coalition fall apart, the outlook would not necessarily be
drastic for the U$. Beiji.ng's fundamental anti-Soviet
orientation appears firm. The Chinese appear more determined
than ever to expand their trade and technology transfer with the
West, although they are concerned about the social consequences
of such contacts.
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The lack of a coherent coalition to step into the breach,
however, would complicate China's dealings with the US. As
leaders struggled for dominance, US-China relations wou?d
encounter indecision, delay and increased caution.
~n dQ~r?-Ra1
--Ct~E Pgb~tE 1S G1aS~1 fe_c~ T'
Approved For Release 2007/05103: CIA-RDP83B00551 8000200190007-1