REVIEW OF AGENCY USE OF CRYPTONYMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000100010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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MEM01 DUM FOR: Executive Director
VLA:
SUBJECT:
EFFFEENCE
ottl'
puty Director for Plans ii?-
Ieview of Agency Uie of Cryptonyrna
rxecutive Director Memorandum of
19 November 1963
1. Reference memorandum recommends a critical look
be taken at the Agency use of cryptonyms in cable traffic. The
recommendation proceeds from a premise that Agency corn .
munications and physical security have tightened considerably
since the last review of this subject.
Z. This memorandum is a sta,terrient of the CI Staff views
regarding the various points raised in reference memorandum.
3. The Director of Communications has stated in substance
as follows:
a. There is no technical security requirement for
the use of cryptonyms in Agency cable coiramanications.
b. Garbled cables can be degarbled more easily
if the meaning is not made unclear by the use
of eryptonyrns, and cryptonyms do not neces-
sarily result in a reduction of the length of
the cable; thus, the clearer the n-,eaning of the
cable, generally the shorter is the processing
time.
No exception can be taken to the foregoing statements. It is
observed from experience, nowever, that a communications
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system which is secure today may not be so twenty years from
today, and that the use of cryptonyms is a form of insurance
against future contingencies.
4. Reference queries ' where we must use cryptonyms for
security reasons and where we can eliminate cryptonyrns with
no sacrifice of security . A reply is succinctly orovidpri in
Such use, however, is not
a guarantee of security and does not obviate the need for
additional security measures. Cable security does not term-
inate with the transmission of the message. The information
contained in the document requires constant protection and the
presence of codes in the document is one way of providing a
measure of security.
5. Recent study and observation in the Cl Staff indicates
that there is not an 'overuse of cryptonyrns where there is no
longer a valid security reason for doing so . We have noted,
however, an occasional misuse of cryptorlyrns in that a
cryptonym will be used and that cryptonyrn will be compromised
Lu the text of the same cable, e.g.;
a. Use of cryptonyms in the summarization
of an identified newspaper atticle.
b. Use of cryptonyxns for Ambassadors, Prime
Ministers, domestic or foreign organizations
in reporting their activities, when the activity
has been publicized or serves in and of itself
to identify the performer.
Correction of such errors is a matter of training and discipline
for individuals, rather than the abandonment of the security ob-
tained through the use of cryptonyrns.
6. As to the slow-down in the administrative process
occasioned by the use of cryptonyms in cables, it has been
determined that Area Division Officers, and CS Staff Officers,
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who take and coordinate action ou operational cables, are
knowledgeable of the meaning of each cryptosayrn. The Cable
Secretariat 'breaks out' the cryptonyrns for the DCI,
FDCI, 10, LLI)/P. and ADD/P. Beyond that point it is believed
that the security of the message, even within the Headquarters
building, takes precedence over the necessity for priority
collateral administrative processing. In exceptional situations
the break out by Cable Secretariat can be extended.
7. Operations officers in the field stations are fully
knowledgeable of the meaning of the cryptorzyms with which
they deal. Though physical security may 'have tightened
considerably since the last review, it was established in a
security seminar, which took place in Headquarters in Novem-
ber 1963, that physical security in the field is considerably less
than clearable for a variety of reasons. The complexities of
security in the field require constant review. Classified
documents maintained in field stations must have the protection
obtained through the use of cryptonyms. The matter of building
? facilities, local hires, char people, and penetrable safe equip-
ment, Is a continuing problem.
8. Possibly the most significant factor to be considered
In the examination of this issue is that the Clandestine services
? Records Committee in 1963 took action to incorporate cable
traffic into the WALNUT system in the field, in order to reduce
the volume of records maintained in the field and to provide for
easy destruction in the event of emergency. Cables are micro-
filmed and placed on aperture cards at Headquarters and pouched to
the field. Pouch security procedures require the sterilization
of the material contained on the aperture cards. Thus, any
consideration of a reduction in the use of cryptonyrns becon es
moot in tern,* of controlling decisions already reached.
9. if we assume for the moment, for the sake of discussion,
that there is in fact an excessive use of cryptonyms, pseudo-
nyms, and identity cables, we are immediately confronted with
the point of how to correct the situation. Accepting the premise
that we will not discontinue the use of code designations, the
question of what constitutes 'excessive use becomes a matter
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of interpretation in each individual cable. Correction can come
about only through the creation of an awareness of the problem
on the part of those employees preparing and releasing cables.
Such action was taken in 1957 through the issuance oil
We would concur in the re-issuance of a similar notice at the
present time.
oeueve mat a general review of this alleged problem could
result in any material improvement.
11. As to the compromise of cryptonyms, it has been
determined that compromised cryptonyrns relating to agents
and operations are promptly replaced by operational components.
The possible exception exists in the case of cryptonyms relating
to the Agency and certain of its components, and to other U. S.
and foreign government agencies. For example, by strict
interpretation it can be accepted that KUBARK, ODACIO, and
several others readily in mind, have been compromised in
many ways over a period of years. They are in such constant
use, however, that if they were changed, the new cryptonyrn
would become similarly polluted in a very short time. M by
then continue the use of such crvotonvros? Only lior=?410
12. In conclusion the Cl Staff recommends that this
general issue is not one calling for specific correction in the
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Chief) Counter Intelligence Staff
Director of Communications
Review of Agency Use of Cryptonyms
IF Action Memorandm No. 315
!f.JV
1. Having reviewed the reference, I wish to mire two comments
from the standpoint of the Office of Communications:
a. Since CIA cable comnaunications are enciphered in
category A cryptographic systems, there exists no technical
communication security requirement for the use of cryptonyms
in CIA cable communications.
b. It is a fact that the clearer the meaning of a
eable, generally the shorter is the processing time ale
reason for thia is twofold. First, cables which are
mutilated in transmission are more easily and quickly
degarbled when the clear meaning of the text is Apparent.
Second, ,the apparent reduction it cable length which the
use of cryptonyms affords is often negated by the requirement
to repeat seldom used or unusual words.
2. Recognising that there are ma other factors which bear
on the decision to employ cryptonyms in CIA cable communications,
/ am forwarding the foregoing for consideration in your review
of the subject.
G
friPutratici
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