U.S. CSC NEWSLETTER, OCT. 1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000100150007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 27, 1968
• Content Type: PREL

FOR RELEASE:
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ADVANCE FOR MONDAY MORNING P!EWSPAPERS
NOT TO BE USED BY PRESS, RADIO, OR TV BEFORE
6:30 P.M., EST, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 27,
The Civil Service Commission has issued uniform minimum criteria to be
a
information to enable agency o
fitness of persons entering critical-sensitive positions. Fitness includes
both security and suitability considerations. Whenever practicable, the
investigation should be conducted before employment, and investigative re-
ports should be used as a personnel selection device,
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000`TU %007-4
Key elements of the new standards and procedures are as follows:
1, Scope and coverage of full-field investigations.
Basically, full-field investigations are designed to develop sufficient
ls to determine the employability or
ffi i
used-by all agencies which conduct full-field investigations of employees
and applicants for appointment to critical-sensitive positions in the com-
petitive civil service.
There has been a substantial degree of uniformity inhpast, but this
is the first time Government-wide standards have been issued.
full-field
The standards include the minimum and scope coverage of
criteria for the selection,
investigators, and strong safeguards against unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy, including restrictions on the use of the polygraph.
In approving the recommendations of an interagency committee represent-
ing the major agencies which conduct full-field investigations, CSC Chairman
John W. T'iacy, Jr., noted the extensive interest that has been given the
subject by Members of Congress and the judiciary, civil rights and Federal
He expressed
employee organizations, and other groups and individuals.
keen satisfaction that the new procedures will apply to all agencies which
conduct full-field investigations for the competitive service.
Regarding the sanctions against unwarranted invasion of privacy, he
said: "While the new policy applies to the investigation of persons for
the nceteconductlinwould hope vestigationseof same pwill be I
by agencies which
service."
 Approved FoX_,ase 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00
0100150007-4
80
.Character, habits, morals, associatiorn.s, and reputation will be
investigated generally. Loyalty should be stressed particularly, and
if a question is raised concerning the subject's loyalty, the case should
be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The affirmative qualities and qualifications of the subject should be
developed fully. Over and above the minimum standards, the full-field
investigation may be tailored to obtain information in depth concerning
special attributes and qualifications required for proper performance in
the particular kind of position being filled.
Full-field investigation of competitive service employees and appli-
cants for critical-sensitive positions will be personally conducted in-
vestigations which cover the life of the individual, with emphasis on
the person's background and activities during the most recent 15 years
or since his 18th birthday, whichever is the shorter period. Particular-
ly intensive investigation coverage will be obtained for the last 5-year
period, and in addition, a thorough personal investigation will be made
of any materially derogatory matters developed which may require investi-
gation before the 5-year period.
Basic elements of the investigation will include appropriate name checks;
personal interviews; checks of police records, credit records whenever
practicable and justified, and other pertinent records as appropriate; veri-
fication of vital statistics and military service; verification of education
claimed; and neighborhood investigation for the past 3 years.
2. Selection, training, and supervision of investigators.
Selection of investigators should be based upon sound indications of
above-average mental capacity and verbal ability. Candidates should have
demonstrated ability to meet and deal with people of all social and economic
levels. They should themselves be the subjects of full-field investigations
before appointment, They should demonstrate potential for growth.
Training and supervision of personnel investigators should meet three
minimum requirements: initial training to provide a thorough grounding
in the fundamentals of personnel investigations and agency missions; peri-
odic refresher training to update skills and assure continuing competence;
and supervision that is sufficiently close -- with review that is suffi-
ciently frequent and thorough -- to assure good quality of investigating
and reporting on a timely basis at a reasonable cost.
;3. Avoiding unwarranted invasion of privacy,
Inquiries concerning an applicant will be limited to matters relevant
to a determination of fitness for the position, including a determination
as to whether his employment is clearly consistent with the national secu-
rity. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000100150007-4
 Approved For RelS 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823RQ 00150007-4
Investigators are not authorized to:
--Inquire about race, religion, national origin, union'membership,
fraternal affiliations, political affiliations, or the constitutionality
or wisdom of legislative policies except when such information constitutes
it bona fide qualification or fitness requirement for specific employment,
is required to establish identity, or directly relates to security fitness
or subversive activities.
--Investigate any case or person other than those official}y assigned
within their lawful duties.
--Interview witnesses without first showing credentials giving proper
identification and informing the witness why the investigation is being
conducted.
--Furnish information or ask questions in such manner as to indicate
the investigator is in possession of derogatory. information concerning
the subject of investigation.
--Llake covert or surreptitious investigations, or use such devices or
techniques as mail covers, inspection of trash, or paid informants, except
as any of the foregoing may specifically and individually first be autho-
rized by the head of the agency or his designee.
--Use telephone or wire taps or covert listening or recording devices.
--Use the polygraph or other so-called lie detectors e::cept as indicated
below.
--Interview applicants or appointees to the competitive service concern-
ing their sexual behavior or attitudes concerning sexual conduct in the
absence of allegations or information indicating sexual misbehavior.
-Express opinions about the person under investigation.
--Investigate any case in which the investigator knows of circumstances
which might adversely affect his fairness, impartiality, or objectivity,
without first making this fact known to his superiors.
--Divulge any investigative information outside official channels.
--flake unauthorized intrusions on private property.
The new rules limit the use of the polygraph in the competitive service
to agencies and parts of agencies which have intelligence or counter-
intelligence missions directly affecting the national security and approach-
ing in se~~~~~~,~~ei~400~~D~IbB :QEK1~'~P$8~?D8Q~E3Qfl~1p7-4
 Approved For R+e ? 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823ROO* 150007-4
Even when the use of polygraph ectir.tination: is authorized for competi
tive service positions by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
the methods to be utilized in administering the examinations would be
circumscribed, and polygraph procedures would be monitored to prevent
abuses.
Written consent must be obtained from the person to be examined, and
he must be apprised of his right to counsel.
Refusal to take the examination may not be recorded in the employee's
personnel file.
Questions asked the employee or applicant must have specific relevance
to the subject of the inquiry.
Charts and files resulting from administering the examinations-rust be
properly safeguarded.
Each year, the head of an agency which has been granted authority to
use the polygraph on competitive service employees and applicants must
re-certify the facts on which permission was based. Polygraph operators
must be fully qualified in their specialty.
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000100150007-4
 Approved For RereaA01/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823Rt01?50007-4.
FEDERAL PERSCUNETi 10JUAL SYSTEW
SUBJECT: Full Field Investigations on. Competitive Service
FPM LETTER NO. 736--
Employees and Applicants for Critical-Sensitive Positions
HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT ESTADLIS}IIIilEN'1.'S: '
investigations by agreement with the Commission.
particular application to those agencies which conduct full field
Section 8(b) of Executive Order, 104.50 dated. April 27, 1953. They
are binding on all agencies which make competitive appointments, with
ante with the delegation of authority to the Conun:ission cont d.nec1 in
study by an interagency committee representing the major agencies
which conduct full field investigations. They are issued in accord-
invasion of privacy. These standards are the result of a careful.
supervision'of investigators; and safeguards to avoid unwarranted
This letter announces minimum standards relating to full field
investigations for appointment to critical-sensitive'positions in
the competitive service. Included are standards on scope and
coverage of full field investigations; the selection, training and
Scope and Coverage of Full Field Inventi.tion3
for Critical-Sensitive Positions
Full field investigations on competitive service employees arid
applicants for critical-sensitive positions shall. be personally
conducted investigations which cover the life of the individual
with emphasis on the person's background and activities during the
most recent fifteen years, or since his eighteenth birthday, which-
ever is the shorter period. Particularly intensive investigative
coverage is obtained for the last five-year period. In addition,
a thorough personal investigation shall be made of any materially
derogatory matters developed, requiring investigation before the
five-year period.
FBI name check
A National Agency Chock as follows:
he.,, basic elements of investigation, are:
FBI fingerprint check
CSC Security File check
CSC Security Investigations Index check
Defense Central Index of Investigations check (covering
military service or defense employment)
House Committee on Un-American Activities check as appropriate
;.,State Department Passport files (covering foreign travel)
proy,$41&~12~i1/d$tiS2'-t$~~583f~OD0:15658Qfl1 citiz,cns)
 Approved .F r Releas 01/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R0001p50007-4
personal interviews with 'present and. former. employers; super-
visors; fellow workers; referenccs, when available; neighbot~s;
school authorities; and associates.
~oli.ce credit trlte~ti ~.cl,:i.c:!.l and jttsti.ficd), art}
checks of. ; , ( r ..
l
other pert:i neat record,,_-, as apl"re):?ri;,I.t?e, sur.i7 as P13:t :I; fi.elc:
offices, vital statistics (to .rc,:o]xc c1isc rpancies), mi:i.i.tar;,~
service, and the like.
Personal interviews as appropriate, for the proximate five-year
period, should be scheduled with employers, supervisors, and work
associates to verify and obtain pertinent details for all .employ-
ments in that investigative period. Particular care shall be taken,,
also to verify the fact of unemployment or self-employment claimed by
the subject of investigation during the proximate five-year period
Significant education at a college level should be verified by a
check of the school records. Secondary education should or-
gated when the subject is young and has had no subsequent schooling.
-Personal interviews should be conducted with available witnesses such
as school authorities, professors and former students who.were a.sso-?
ciated with the subject during recent schooling.
Neighborhood investigation should normall.y?be conducted on civilian
employees and applicants to cover residence during the most recent
u
ght
three years. Testimony of neighbors before that period may be so
to 'verify periods of unemployment or self-employment, or. to resolute
questionable matters which have been raised from other sources.
The number of witnesses interviewed cannot be reduced to a fbr.mit].a
but in each case should depend upon the diversity of the subjects
experience, and places of residence, as well as upon the depth of
knowledge shown by witnesses concerning the subjects character.,
habits, and background. The objective of the investigation should
be to obtain a comprehensive and well-rounded picture of the
individual's background and activities.
Matters Covered in Full Field Inver ya.tions
Basically, full field investigations are designed to develop suffi-
cient information to enable agency officials to determine
the employability or fitness of persons entering critical-sensi..ti.ve
positions. Fitness includes both security and suitability fi.tness.
Investigations, whenever practicable, should be conducted on.a pre-
employment basis and reports used as a personnel selection device.
habits, morals, associations, and reputation shall be
Character
,
investigated generally. Loyalty should be particularly stressed and
if a question is raised concerning the subject's loyalty the case
'shall be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in'accord--
:ance with Section 8(d) of Executive order'.-10450,
peoved;Fot,-Release.2001/09/03:. CIA-RDP83B00823R0'00100150007-4
 Approved For Rel a 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R0~00150007-4
.
and -qualifications I E.C~II...
l
-
, 1 11 .,
Over and above the minimum st%1.11.a ruw , . .?. _ W .- - -
be tailored to obtain inform~lt.i