AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: SUMMARY

OGC HAS REVIEWED.
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D R A F T
AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW
CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, . several other,
.
Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but
of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in
practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some
lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits
placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse
of power easily thrive. In reality, however, in the implementation
of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not
as many unresolved. ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.
The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is
such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of
the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that
should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any
disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to
current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation
has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are
suggested, below.
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1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by
amending the National Security Act of 1947 to
reflect:
--that included in the proper functions
of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign
intelligence information; (b) conduct of
activities to carry out CIA's counter-
intelligence responsibilities overseas;
and (c) conduct of covert action operations
overseas when authorized by the President;
--that CIA's responsibility to produce
intelligence relates only to foreign
intelligence;
- -that it is a duty of the Agency to develop
advanced technical equipment to improve
the collection and processing of foreign
intelligence information; and
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--that the conduct of any counterintelligence
operation or other activity overseas directed
specifically at U. S. citizens (other than CIA
employees) will be undertaken in coordination
with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by
other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.
2) Establish the authority for those agencies engaged
in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to
carry on certain specified activities within the United
States, such as:
--protection of classified information and
their own installations against penetration
and compromise;
--investigation of employees, applicants,
and those persons who could assist the U.S.
foreign intelligence effort;
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- -investigation of employees and other
individuals to be granted access to sensitive
information;
--collection of foreign intelligence
information from foreign nationals and
from cooperating U. S. citizens;
--establishment of mechanisms in support
of foreign intelligence activities; and
- -cooperation with the FBI in investigations,
relating to the unauthorized disclosure of
foreign intelligence.
3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for
internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to
establish clearly:
--that the collection of counterintelligence
information in the United States and the
collection of information related to internal
security are functions of the FBI;
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--that the responsibility for the
production of intelligence related to
internal security rests with the FBI; and
--that with due regard to assessed
reliability of the information and
responsibilities for protecting sources
and methods, those agencies engaged in
foreign intelligence activities will make
available to the FBI and other Federal
agencies, as appropriate, the security
and counterintelligence information relating
to foreign nationals in the United States and
to U. S. citizens which is derived as a by-
product of foreign intelligence activities.
4) Recognize international terrorism and international
illegal drug activities as threats to U. S. national security
and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts,
as well as for internal security operations.
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5) Provide protection against the unauthorized
disclosure of intelligence sources and. methods by:
--providing for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods on a statutory basis
independent of Executive Order 11652;.
--clarifying that the Director of Central
Intelligence is responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods related
to foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence;
--assigning to the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting
intelligence sources and methods related to
internal security and to counterintelligence
within the United States;
--imposing specific burdens, upon officers
and employees of all branches of the govern-
ment and others granted official access, not
to disclose such information without authorization,
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and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized
disclosures;
--establishing effective injunctive recourse,
through the Attorney General, for protection
of all intelligence sources and methods;
--providing for in camera judicial review
of material revealing intelligence sources
and methods when relevant and necessary
to criminal and civil proceedings;
--delineating authorities and responsibilities
for investigating suspected Tor discovered
unauthorized disclosures by (a) U. S. citizens
overseas and (b) all persons within the
United States.
6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that
facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote
economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are
desirable, for example:
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--cooperation in research and development
of technical collection and information pro-
cessing equipment, methods and techniques;
--loan or supply of equipment, methods and
techniques;
--provision of training in special skills and
techniques;
--passage of information derived as a by-
product of foreign intelligence activities to
those agencies responsible for the matters
involved.
A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence
activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of
paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits
the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely,
efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of
Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of sub-
stantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying
degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be
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"need-to-know. " To apply this test and to control and protect
sensitive information provided to Congress,.?a focal point within
Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee
or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating
changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might
find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review
would provide better insight and understanding.
The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They
do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence
community. deserve careful attention.
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