NOTE TO: AD HOC PANEL OF THE USIB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040030-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
19 February 1975
NOTE TO: AD HOC PANEL OF THE USIB
Attached herewith is a draft statement
which Mr. Colby plans to give before the
Defense Subcommittee of the House Appro-
priations Committee on the 20th of February.
While this statement deals primarily with CIA,
I wanted the members of the Ad Hoc Group to
have it since we anticipate its presentation
will be in open session. The Defense Subcom-
mittee-has received 100 copies for distribution.
Copies have been provided to Secretary
Schlesinger and Tom Latimer directly and
their changes have been incorporated.
17A s so ciate Deputy to the DCI
!//~ for the Intelligence Community
cc: DIA
Army
Air Forae
Navy
SAFSS
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Statement
W.E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Before
Defense Subcommittee
of the
House Appropriations Committee
February 20, 1975
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Mr. Chairman:
Our national intelligence agency, the CIA, is
the object of great attention and concern. A series
of serious allegations have been made by the press
and other critics about our operations and
activities.
At the same time, a number of responsible
Americans are concerned that a degree of hysteria
can develop that will result in serious damage
to our country's essential intelligence work by
throwing the baby out with the bath water.
There is equally serious concern within the
CIA itself as to whether its personnel can continue
to make their important contribution to our country
or will be the target of ex post facto sensationalism
and recrimination for actions taken at earlier times
under a different atmosphere than today's.
I welcome this opportunity to describe the im-
portance of our intelligence, how it works and what
it does, and the small extent to which its activities
may in past years have come close to or even over-
stepped proper bounds. We certainly make no claim
that nothing improper occurred, but we do think it
important that such incidents be given only their
proper proportion.
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It would perhaps be useful, Mr. Chairman, to
start by reviewing some of the allegations made
recently about the CIA.
The leading charge was that, in direct violation
of its charter, CIA conducted a "massive illegal
domestic intelligence operation" against the anti-
Vietnam war and other dissident elements in recent
years. In my testimony to the Senate Appropriations
and Armed Services Committees, on 15 and 16 January,
I flatly denied this allegation. I pointed out that
CIA instead had conducted a counterintelligence
operation directed at possible foreign links to
American dissidents, under the authority of the
National Security Act and the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives which govern its
activities and in response to Presidential concern
over this possibility. Thus this operation was
neither massive, illegal, nor domestic, as alleged.
The same allegations stated that "dozens of
other illegal activities," including break-ins,
wire tapping, and surreptitious inspection of
mail, were undertaken by members of the CIA in the
United States beginning in the 1950's. Again I
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reported to the Senate Appropriations and Armed
Services Committees a few such activities that
in fact occurred. I pointed out that most such
actions were taken under the general charge of
the National Security Act on the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods against unauthorized dis-
closure. Whether or not they were appropriate,
there are very few institutions in or out of
Government which in a 27-year history do not on
occasion make a misstep, but in CIA's case such
instances were few and far between and quite
exceptional to the main thrust of its efforts.
Another allegation given prominence was
apparently based on the statements of an anonymous
source who claimed that, while employed by the
CIA in New York in the late 60s and early 70s,
"he and other CIA agents had also participated
in telephone wiretaps and break-ins" in the New
York area. As I told the journalist involved
before the story was printed, it does not bear
any relation to CIA's actual activities in that
area. Nor can we identify any former employee
who answers to the journalist's description of
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his source. I fear that the journalist has been
the victim of what we in the intelligence trade
call a fabricator.
Another published allegation was that CIA,
through Agency-owned corporate structures organized
to provide apparent sponsorship for its overseas
operations, manages a "$200-million-a-year top-
secret corporate empire" which could circumvent
the will of Congress. This allegation is also
false. CIA does maintain certain corporate support
structures that are essential to conducting its
operations and concealing CIA's role overseas.
These activities are managed, however, in the most
meticulous manner by CIA to ensure the safekeeping
of the Government's investment, and to audit these
activities to ensure that they stay within proper
bounds.
One individual continues to give national promi-
nence to an allegation that CIA was somehow more in-
volved in Watergate and its cover-up than has been
demonstrated publicly. His lack of credibility
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should cause the charge to fall of its own weight,
but in addition I believe the extensive investiga-
tions made into this subject, and in particular
the tapes most recently released, indicate that
CIA's limited assistance in 1971 certainly had
nothing to do with the Watergate in 1972, and that
CIA was the institution that said "No" to the
cover-up rather than be involved in it.
There are also a number of allegations of im-
proper CIA relationships with domestic police forces.
The facts are that CIA maintained friendly liaison
relationships with a number of police forces for
assistance in CIA's mission of investigating its
applicants, contractors, and similar contacts.
These relationships from time to time included
various mutual courtesies which have been warped
into allegations of improper CIA manipulation of
these police forces for domestic purposes. These
allegations are false. Since the 1973 legislation
barring any CIA assistance to the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, CIA has terminated any
assistance 'to the LEAA and in compliance with the
spirit as well as the letter of that particular
law has terminated any assistance to local police
forces as well.
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One charge stems from a dangerous misunder-
standing of the true nature of the modern intel-
ligence process. CIA invited several U.S. industrial
firms to bid on a contract to study new foreign
developments in transportation technology. This
has been alleged to constitute a program to spy
on our closest allies. In truth, of course, it is
nothing of the kind. The prospective contractor
was only expected to conduct open research and '
analyze information made available to him. Intel-
ligence work today includes analysis as one of
its major elements. It is no longer synonymous
with spying.
Mr. Chairman, these exaggerations and misrepre-
sentations of CIA's activities can do irreparable.
harm to our national intelligence apparatus and if
carried to the extreme could blindfold our country
as it looks abroad. To this Committee I of course
need not stress the importance of our intelligence
work to our defense. May I only remind you that our
intelligence must not only tell us what threats we
face today but also what threats are on the drawing
boards or in the research laboratories of potential
enemies that might threaten us some years hence.
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This Committee is well aware of the contribution
intelligence makes to decisions about defense
levels. I would also like to remind you of its
contribution to the Strategic Arms Limitation
and similar treaties. Such agreements help
reduce the need for the heavy expense of arms.
I would like to stress another aspect of
intelligence today -- its contribution to peace-
keeping. Aside from its assistance to our ability
to make treaties to reduce tensions between us and
other nations, it has on occasion provided our
Government information with which it has been
able to convince other nations not to initiate
hositilities against their neighbors. This peace-
keeping role can grow in importance as our intelli-
gence coverage improves. Correspondingly, it can
decline if our intelligence machinery is made
ineffectual through irresponsible exposure or
ill-founded exaggeration.
Mr. Chairman, CIA does carry out some of its
activities within the United States. About three-
fourths of its employees live and work in this
country. Most are in the Washington Metropolitan
Area, performing analysis, staff direction,
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administrative support and Headquarters activities.
About ten percent of CIA's employees work in the
United States outside the Headquarters area. They
perform support functions that must be done in
the United States, such as personnel recruitment
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Another responsibility of the Office of Security
is the investigation of unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence. This function stems
from my responsibility under the National Security
Act to protect intelligence sources and methods
against unauthorized disclosure. Thus the Office
of Security would prepare a damage assessment and
endeavor to determine the source of a leak so that
we could take corrective action.
Mr. Chairman, CIA conducts a broad program of
research and development, largely through contracts
with U.S. industrial firms and research institutes.
In many such contracts, CIA sponsorship of the
project must be hidden from many of the individuals
working on the program itself. This was the case
in the development of the U-2 aircraft, for example,
so that the ultimate purpose of the aircraft,
to fly over hostile territory for photographic
purposes, would not be known beyond the necessary
small circle rather than by the entire'work forrP
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In addition to these direct activities, the
Agency has cooperated and collaborated with a number
of governmental elements in the United States.
This begins with the extensive collaboration and
coordination with the other elements of the
Intelligence community, such as the Department of
Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
These joint activities are ones in which it is
proper for one Government agency to assist another
within the principles established by the Economy
Act. As I noted at the outset, an example of this
was the counterintelligence program conducted
during recent years, in which CIA focused on the
question of whether foreign manipulation or support
was going to'American dissident elements from abroad.
The research and development of some of the complex
technical equipment required for intelligence is in
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many cases conducted jointly by the Department of
Defense and CIA, as the resulting flow of information
will be of value to both. Similarly, there is an
exchange of trainees with various Government agencies,
both to improve the breadth of knowledge of the CIA
trainees and to orient trainees from other agencies
on the role of intelligence in American foreign policy.
As I noted earlier, in the course of these
various activities, there have been occasions when
CIA may have exceeded its proper bounds. I have
outlined a number of these in my report to the
Senate Appropriations Committee, a copy of which
I submit herewith for your record, along with some
changes in detail which have come out of our con-
tinuing investigation. I think it important to
make three points with respect to any such events:
1. They were undertaken in the belief
that they fell within the Agency's charter
to collect foreign intelligence or to pro-
tect intelligence sources and methods.
2. The Agency has held and adhered
to the principle that its responsibilities
lie in the field of foreign intelligence
and not domestic intelligence, and any of
the above activities were believed to have
been related to foreign intelligence.
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3. Any missteps by CIA were few and
far between, have been corrected, and in
no way justify the outcry which has been
raised against CIA.
Mr. Chairman, in May 1973 Director Schlesinger
issued a notice to all CIA employees instructing
and inviting them to report to him or to the Inspector
General any matter in CIA's history which they
deemed questionable under CIA's charter. This
instruction has been made a matter of regulation
within CIA and is brought to the attention of each
employee once a year. As a result of the May 1973
memorandum, various incidents were collected and
brought to the attention of the,Chairman of the
House and the Acting Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committees. They were then used as the
basis of a very specific series of internal
instructions issued in August 1973 directing the
termination, modification, or other appropriate
action with respect to such incidents in order
to ensure that CIA remains within its proper
charter. These instructions have been carried
out and are periodically reviewed to ensure
continued compliance.
It appears that some version of these matters
came to the attention of the New York Times reporter
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who wrote the article of December 22, 1974. A
day or two before the article appeared, he con-
tacted me stating he had obtained information of
great importance indicating that CIA had engaged
in a massive domestic intelligence activity,
including wiretaps, break-ins, and a variety of
other actions. In response to his request, i met
with him and explained to him that he had mixed
and magnified two separate subjects, i.e., the
foreign counterintelligence effort properly con-
ducted by CIA and those few activities that the
Agency's own investigation had revealed and termi-
nated in 1973. He obviously did not accept my ex-
planation and, instead, alleged that CIA had con-
ducted a "massive illegal domestic intelligence
operation." I am confident that the investigations
of the President's Commission and the Select Com-
mittees will verify the accuracy of my version of
these events. I also believe that any serious re-
view of my report to the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee will show that I essentially denied his
version rather than confirmed it as some have
alleged. The sensational atmosphere surrounding
intelligence, however, encourages oversimplication
and disproportionate stress on a few missteps rather
than on the high quality of CIA's basic work.
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Mr. Chairman, these last two months have placed
American intelligence in danger. The almost
hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story
mentioning CIA, or referring even to a perfectly
legitimate activity of CIA, has raised the question
whether secret intelligence operations can be
conducted by the United States. A number of the
intelligence services abroad with which CIA works
have expressed concern over its situation and over
the fate of the sensitive information they provide
to us. A number of our individual agents abroad
are deeply worried that their names might be
revealed with resultant danger to their lives as
well as their livelihoods. A number of Americans
who have collaborated with CIA as a patriotic
contribution to their country are deeply concerned
that their reputations will be besmirched and their
businesses ruined by sensational misrepresentation of
this association. And our own employees are torn
between the sensational allegations of CIA misdeeds
and their own knowledge that they served their nation
during critical times in the best way they knew how.
I believe it a time for a review of what this
nation needs and wants in the field of intelligence
and the determination therefrom of how, and con-
sequently whether, American intelligence will
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operate. In this
process, I believe four things
are necessary.
First, it is essential that a sober and res-
ponsible review of our intelligence apparatus take
place. By reason of the sensitivity of some of
these matters, it is
essential that it be conducted
without a sequence of sensational allegations and
exposures. I am sure that the
responsible members
of the President's Commission and of the Select
Committees will take this approach.
Second, the inquiries must be conducted in a
manner that protects
the secrecy of these sensitive
matters after as well
as during the investigations.
For this reason, I am recommending to the investigating
bodies, and the President's
Commission has already
accepted, arrangements for the
physical security of
the material to be developed, secrecy agreements
for the staffs similar to those utilized by the
Intelligence Community and recently ratified by
the Fourth Y
Circuit Court of Appeals, and arrange-
ments for compartmentation of
the different levels
of sensitivity of the information to be provided.
There must not only be no exposure of our most
sensitive material, such as the names of our agents
and collaborators and the specifics of our sensitive
technical machinery, there must not even be a risk
that this occur.
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Third, I look forward to clarification from
these inquiries of the proper authority and limitations
of American intelligence. For example, in my
confirmation hearing I suggested the addition of
the word "foreign" before the word "intelligence"
whenever it appears in the National Security Act
referring to CIA, to make crystal clear its function.
I also expect that the arrangements for authorization
and oversight of the operations of CIA and the
Intelligence Community will be reviewed and clarified
wherever necessary. But in the establishment of
these new rules, it will be essential to include
arrangements for their modification, as the rules
of 1975 may be no better fitted for the problems
our nation will face in 1990 than those of 1947
may be considered by some for 1975.
Fourth, I believe it essential to improve our
tools to protect those secrets necessary to the suc-
cess of American intelligence and even the conduct of
foreign policy. I am charged by the National
Security Act with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
If there is to be no gray area in this charge,
I believe it essential that the tools to carry
it out be plainly identified and adequate.
Today they include our screening and orientation
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process, our physical arrangements to protect our
material, and the secrecy agreement we require of
our employees. But intelligence sources and methods
do not have the kind of protection provided by the
criminal penalties that apply to the unauthorized
revelation of income tax returns, census returns,
and cotton statistics. One of our ex-employees has
recently published a book abroad, where he is out of
range of our injunction process, in which he claims
to reveal the name of every individual, American
and foreign, that he could remember working with,
acknowledging the "important encouragement" of the
Communist Party of Cuba in writing the book. I
believe it absurd for anyone to be immune from
criminal prosecution for such an act.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity
to speak publicly about the serious situation of
American intelligence today. This is a matter that
concerns not only us in the Intelligence Community,
and our critics, but our entire nation. American
intelligence today, thanks to the dedicated work
of thousands of professionals, and in particular my
predecessors in this post, has improved in quality
to a .degree undreamed of a few decades ago. Thanks
to it, our Government's policymakers can draw on
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factual information and reasoned analysis in
cases where until recently they had to rely only
on hunches, circumstantial evidence, and cautious
hopes. It is not only helping our Government to
be better informed about the complex world in
which we live, it is also serving the Congress and
the people to help them play their full role in
American decisionmaking. During 1974, for example,
CIA alone appeared before 17 Congressional com-
mittees or subcommittees on 48 occasions and had
substantive discussions on foreign developments
with journalists on some 600 occasions.
As public understanding of the real nature of
modern intelligence grows, I am confident that there
will be an equal growth in public support of its
necessities, including the fact that its details
cannot be exposed to the bright glare of publicity
or irresponsible exaggeration. With this, I believe
1975 can mark the year in which America reaffirmed
the need for intelligence to protect itself and
to maintain world peace, and replaced the sensa-
-tional, romantic, but outdated intelligence image
of the mystery writers with a mature understanding
of the modern intelligence process. Intelligence is
still an exciting profession, but in the intellectual
and technological sense, not just the physical.
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