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February 7, 1975
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Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 PROPOSED AGENDA FOR AD HOC GROUP OF USIB ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS - 7 FEBRUARY 1975 1 ? Review of Chairman, USIB Security Committee Paper. 2. Status of Draft Annexes (Coordinating Session) 3. Proposed DCI Unclassified Statement Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 JUn?'a-i.J 27, 1 these two requ ap the entire g adjusted sales 000 or less. ,de once duri ;he adjusted s election may a gain based o justed sales pri 1 (Sale or Exe is helpful in d ;y, may be exc when he sells h payer may elect the sale of his year before- o s and occupies which equals-o; e of the old r lowed if (1) J ence or (2) he U.S. Arme Information o be helpful. Credit.-To q' rents from Schedule qualify or the retir The credit is 157o. 1. A tacpayer's q come, cr" both ta:?:payers are total of iontaxable Se;.urit jbenefits or income 41 excess of 62 year-;d but less The Ititernal Rev computajthe retirem t1remen., qualify ; unities. taspaye.-,s^ou d also Form 10}0. ifying retire income (pensi ends, and reu aproved For eJ~e "(A3 1J,$ @Q"000700040040-3 S 967 Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. . Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask that the time on this side be yielded to the control of the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER). The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will ca11 the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. - ? Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Miss Pam Tur- ner, of my staff, have the privilege of the floor during the consideration of Sen- ate Resolution 21 and all amendments thereto. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GARY W. HART). Without objection, it is so ordered. IMIr. TOWER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time? Mr. TOWER. To be charged equally to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will c,aU the roll.. - - I The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. . Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING -OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parli- amentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state It. i3USL`5 SS business? The P ESIDING O CSR. 4e time The . PRESIDING OFFICER. The for the onclusion oft morning usiness pending business is Senate Resolution having arrived, morning buss ess is No. 21. closed.. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President and col- leagues, I am not going to belabor this measure this morning by an extended SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY explanation. As a matter of fact, I did GOVERNINUENTAL INTELLIGENCE' explain it last week and I . think that - GATHERING ACTIVITIES - what we are trying to achieve is quite The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the well understood by the Members of the previous order, the hour of 1 p.m. having Senate. arrived, the Senate will now proceed to . I do not think we are going to have any the consideration of Senate Resolution difficulty with this resolution. As a mat- 21, which will be stated by title. ter of fact, it is generally conceded, to be The assistant legislative clerk read as necessary, and I point up the fact that, follows: by a vote of 45 to 7, it was approved by -A resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a the Democratic Conference. Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an As I understand it, the minority investigation and study with respect to in- leader has stated today his selection of telligence activities carried out by or on be- members of the select committee, so I half of the Federal Government. construe from that that the other side ,. ~~ . S r,*_ OFFICE R. The time is more or less amenable t0 this resolu- onthed T.sxpa the adr 'ed sale p Add:ior i time is ceived e4 ned incor4e in excess of each of any 10 cal dar years bef "retiretr-tut inton=e"I Five types of i .come- pensionsF annuities, linterest, and dividends included; on line 151 Form 1040, a d gross meets in from rice of is elec- a tax- es price e made a ratio e of the ange of termin- ded by home. to defer ersonal 1 year another exceeds sidence. u con- u were Forces. Selling ilify for ust (a) Lave re- $600 in re 1974, ,alifying where us the Social ent an- L9 upon of any reduce earned at least fount is ome in e total bver are itat-ion. o claim 11 also it for a S com- iestions lines 2 ount F.e- and ns, an- .. The E e 17, was viola ed. Had the enocide C ven- tion bee in existence two decad s ago those wh perpetuated trocities weep 1933 and 939 could ha been bro ht to justice. This s' uation displ s the sam kind of inaction that was brought ainst those res onsible t17 e Armenia4 mas- sacres ev n though Tu -ey and he Ger- man alli were defeat in World War I. There is evidence on the record that Hitler d y noted this act when a pre- pared program o extermin tions. Docume s introduce at the urem- berg tri s contain th following state- ment ma a by Hitler i August 19 9 just before t e invasion of Poland: i What t e weak weste European vlliza- tion thin about me dc ss not mat r... . I have s it to the Eas only my eath's head uni s with. the or er to kill ithout pity or m rcy all men, men, and ildren of the Pol sh race and la age. Only n such a way wi we win the tal space %v a need. Who- still talks nowaday of the ex rmina- tion of th Armenians? it is q Ito apparent rom the p evious statemel that Hitler interpret d the world's-' a.,tion on t Armenia mas- sacres tacit cons nt to do as he pleased. Why should t e world st p him when th y have alway failed in t e past to show concern? The nocide Treat is the do ument that displays the we Id's outra a and concern veracts of Genocide. et the United tates has re used to si this Important document. the int rest of further nternational peace and safety, in the opes of ell mating all future crimes ainst hums ty, I urge y col- leagues o join me support of the Genocid Convention ccords. OF T4-IE GENCC ,Ir. P ? C?a?T_IR E J Mr. President] one of the wcr4t offenders of the crime o9l geno- .. -Fla .A hV the L ned - ation was Lee LVa Ts cA- Ior aeoare on Luis 1-esvill-vi11J 1a1 11 ~U iiir. TOWER. Mr. President, wiil'the tfsrmin-.ion of 6 mi lion Jews. 212 nillion 2 hours, to be equally divided between Senator yield? tole ndreds of thousands of zechs, and controlled by the majority and iVlr PASTORS. Unless it was a gesture erb_. l; :' Russian;. minority leaders or their designees, with of futility. W1 th( Kure bird trials co vened the vote to occur. at 3 p.m. it - as 4 ecided the the Nazis co Id not 1.1r. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I Mr. TOWER. It was acceptance of the be nun' led for a is of genocid com- yield my time to the distinguished senior inevitable, I think. mitred . or to 1 39. The Nun mberg Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAS- Air. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish to ma'ie it abundantly clear at the out- tribtn=a which tri d war crimhn 1s for TORE). ch?im_ ; `,ainst humanity refused o con- I suggest the absence of a quorum, with set that the FBI, the CIA, and Military sides' oj_?.ses occurring before t e war the time to be charged against both Intelligence are absolutely necessary to -the on the g ro'.i-hds tP b M1-6 Fka641 01/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R OY686 0&46-3the survival of this CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--SENATE January 27, 1975 great Republic. Any(Aj9pY%w@de griR'e4L Se~r2-004#09M Q1/ C ~8 i l~ any sndtnla and the possibility d for a moment, anyone who should try or fine service. reconciling contrasting vile sa and theories anyone who should even begin to imagine We do pot know yet who the members which must be accommodMaid. that the Senator from Rhode island is are on the majority side. I know I am Ultimately, the report of this select com- trying to do anything to disrupt or to not one of them; I do not want to be one mittee must be widely accepted by many injure in any way these fine agencies, of them. I made that pledge at the time elements of the American people. Otherwise, our improprieties t's and ability should immediately disabuse his mind that I introduced this resolution, that efforts coofiderc correct in past of it. I was not doing it for any selfish reason; g I have been connected for a long time I was doing it because I thought it needed to conduct. in an appropriate manner the very sensitive and important intelligence with the workings of these agencies. I to be done. function, will falter. realize why they were instituted in the Mr. President, having said that, I have To fail to create a broadly based committee first place. We could not survive as a nothing further. I am perfectly willing would in the end be a disservice to ourselves, decent society without the FBI. We could to answer any questions. it is a very sim- the Senate.. our country and the American never survive as a great nation in this ple resolution. It is all spelled out. I people, troubled world, this sensitive world, with- understand there are going to be two Testimony already taken in the Congress out a CIA or military intelligence. So I amendments. I am amenable to both strongly indicates that there have been wish to make it abundantly clear, Mr. amendments, with the exception that on abuses and misuses of authority within the Central Intelligence Agency.. Allegations of President, that what we are trying to the Tower amendment, I hope we can other improprieties remain unanswered. A do is find out the abuses of the past and clarify one statement at the end, where virtual floodgate of questions and charges also of the present, to find out how it it says: has been opened. engul ag our intelligence all started, how far it went, to remedy The type of security clearance to be re- community in suspicion, and uncertainty. these abuses and make sure that in the quired in the case of any such employee or While some- of this may have been more sen- future they will not happen; and in the person shall be commensurate with the sent- sation than substance, the facts remain that final analysis, ultimately, that the confi- tivtty of the classified information to which both damaging testimony and allegations of dence of the people wil be reaffirmed such employee or person will be given access serious misconduct are before us and that by the select committee. they have not been. rebutted to the satisfac- tion 5trenothened in their appreciation tion of most members of Congress or of the and their consideration, as to the essen- I think we ought to nail that down to American people. tiality of these great arras of Govern- be within the determination of the com- The floodgate cannot and should not be ment. mittee itself. closed; the questions raised must be an- Mr. President, having said that, I must I should like to add. some language in swered; the faith of the people In this most in all fairness say that there have been there; in the last sentence: "within the sensitive area of. their government must be some very serious abuses. I am not going determination rliade by the committee restored. If an agency has overstepped its author-. to debate them this morning. As a matter itself." ity, if it has violated the rights of citizens of fact, our newspaper headlines have Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I wonder whom it is supposed to serve, if it bas been been replete with a dissertation of what if I might visit with the distinguished involved is illegal cetivittes, if it has been they are. There have been charges and Senator from Rhode Island. utilized in derogation of its- public trust. countercharges. There have been those Mr. PASTORE. When the proper time then these matters mast be' Yung investi- who- have exaggerated some of the comes. I do not think we are too much gated. Corrective steps must be taken. wrongs; there are those who have mini- in disagreement. I repeat what I said There was an. ei.rlier time- in this Nation when the agencies in question-born in a mined some the wrongs. Because the su- last week when I was questioned by the turbulent area of violent crime half a. cen- pervision on the part of Congress is distinguished Senator from P.2ississippi, tury ago, or in the aftermath of war 25 years spread throughout several committees, the chairman of the Committee on later-enjoyed a very different imao . They each of which has jurisdiction in its own Armed Services: The jurisdiction of each were looked.upon as guardians of the Nation v:ay-the Committee on Foreign Rela- committee as it now stands will continue. and protectors of law-abiding citizens. But, tions is absolutely interested in inteli- There is nothing in this resolution that like so many of this country's institutions in gence abroad; the Committee on the changes that one iota. I suppose that the recent years, they have fallen In esteem. The intelligence Services is absolutely Interested, authorization bills, when they come up, The FBI heero of community the 1930's has has been lost Its, glitter. replaced T :rBZ hero in military intelligence; the Joint Com- will be referred to the Committee on in the public eye by a much more dubious mittee on Atomic Energy is absolutely Armed Services, there is no question at all character. interested in where our nuclear weapons about that. I suppose before deciding the Thus, the need for a full investigation are and how well they are being pro- authorization the chairman will conduct* of the tide of current charges goer beyond tected and, vis-a-vis with our adver- some kind of hearings, not competitive the obvious-requirements of discipline within saries, what they have and what we must to the select committee; it could be- core- the government; it goes to a restoration of have-there is no question at all about sonant with it. I am not opposed to- that. confidence in a segment of government that, more than any other, must hold the pub- the essentiality. As a matter of fact, let us face it: We lie's confidence. The important thing. here is to restore public confidence so that these agencies, in the final analysis, will be responsive. That is what this is all about. This is not to challenge the chairman of one committee or to challenge the chairman of another committee. We are not here to rebuke any. Member of Congress for what supervision he gave or did not give. That is not the question this morning. What we are trying to do here is create a select committee consisting of 11 mein- bcrs-6 from the majority, 5 from the minority. I know it is not going to be partisan. There is not 'a Member of the Senate who does not put his country before his party, or even, indeed, his on, interest. If it were otherwise, that would be a blot on this great establishment. What do we do by this resolution? We create a committee of 11 members. The names have already been sug^ested by the minority leader of those on the part of the minority party. We know who are all here trying to do the right thing. No nation can gamble with its security. Let its do it. That is about the size of it. Indeed, the, guarantee of that security is Now, Mr. President, I have here a perhaps the, most fundamental of all govern- mental by Senator HUDDLESTU who mental responsibilities. Without. It, all else can quickly fade. asked me to have it inserted in the National security arrangements, defense RECORD, and I ask unanimous consent and foreign policy strategies, and decisions that that be done. regarding a host of other issues rely upon The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without intelligence. In fact, there are few who would objection, it is so ordered. argue that we could do without intelligence gathering activities--especially In what ap- STATEMENT BY SENATOS HUDDLESTON pears to he an increasingly complex and I am pleased to support Senate Resolution uncertain world. 21, which would establish a select committee Furthermore, the very nature of such ae- on intelligence activities. tivities requires that they be closely held I believe the creation of such a committee and carried out. with a certain degree of is essential at this time. - secretiveness and confidentiality. . I believe the committee as proposed in the But, the agencies involved in such activ- resolution before us twill meet the needs of sties, like Caesar's wife, must be .above re- the Senate and our Nation is terms of struc- proach-not just because of their .special tore, representation and mandate. status and charge but also because actions A committee such as we are about to cre- which involve them in suspicion and ques- ate must touch upon the carious ages, view:., tints tend to impair if not destroy their abil- geographical areas and philosophies which ity to function. are a part of the Senate and our nation-at- There are those in this body who have fol- large. lowed closely the activities of the CIA and To structure it otherwise would diminish other agencies with intelligence responsibti- Approved For Release 2001/09103 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3. January 27, 1975 CONORESSIONAL~R~G sties-the Defense Intelligence Agency, the we would not have accomplished as much States. There has to be accountability National security Agency, the Federal Bu- as we have so this very impor- and responsibility. The intelligence agen- reau of Investigation, and the Secret service. tart matter. The efforts of the Senator cies must be adapted to the needs of a For that reason. we should certainly make. from Rhode Island have manifested a constitutional democracy in our time- the best use of these persons; we should quality of greatness. or they must be eliminated. we. cannot eliminate them so we have build upon their knowledge and experience. At the same time. I believe we could bane- I also want to thank the major leader fit from new and fresh perspectives which (Mr. MANSFIELD), Senator MATSIM on to do what is necessary to keep them could bring to such review an inquiring ap- the minority side, Senator BAxsx, Sen- under control. That is a job for Con- proach which might not only develop new ator WzXCKER, and others who did so gress.. ade work Third. Therefore, as the Senate pro- itive tant s i t p mpor ally Ideas but also do much to insure a pos h of the vi . mucpublic response to the ultimate findings and which has brought us to this point. . ceeds to establish the select committee, recommendations. I have been involved in this matter. it is important to identify three impor I do, consequently, support establish- since 1971, when Y questioned Senator Cant missions of this committee: ment of a Special committee ou review in- tellige_ca operations in this country. I also Ellender, the then chairman of the First of all, it is charged with finding think, however, that our intent and deter- Committee on Appropriations, on the the facts in cases of alleged wrongdoing. mination to insure a broadly representative Senate floor about expenditures for in- ? Thus, the Pastore resolution empowers- committee must be made clear. telligence operations. I joined in earlier the select committee to "conduct an in-. the HMO that I helped vestigation ... of the . extent, if any, to tation of the i t or o modate the represen resolutions pr To accom various views, i proposed in the Democratic in the support that has been brought to-. which-illegal, improper, or unethical ac- the n ed i[1 b a b h i " g y g ave een e tivit es Conference that we consider an 11-member . gather behind the Pastore resolution. body, rather than a smaller one. While this I agree, of course, with the Senator intelligence agencies of the U.S. Govern- is an admittedly rather large committee, in land that we need an ef- ment. This will involve identifying in- I h d s e o from R this particular case, I believe that it is re-quired. Many Committees have some jurls- . fective intelligence. operation, we need' - dividuais responsible for such activities;: instituons. - as well as their nder clear and wise ground ti iti ti s v ng u es, it opera dictional claim over intelligence ac ec- and I cite paragraphs 1 23 10 of - Interest and concern over this matter goes rules and under firm 'control by the Ex- , . 2, tional bounds of com- I have been Grit- tion 2. _ .. di n re s i d C g s s c o r beyond the jur fa ecutive an . mittees, encompassing, I would imagine, ical of the CIA and other intelligence Second, . the - select committee - is It i t fu th ith r er. s ep go-La one s every member of the Senate. Views on. the agencies for many of the things they charged w subject vary widely, I believe that the spacial have done that they should not have to consider the institutional changes mitt commit*-ea must have broad authority, as done. There have been serious abuses., needed in the organization of the execs= the resolution contains. It must be em- But there also hav;i been great accom- . tive branch and changes needed in con-- powered not only to investigate possible il- plishments. There have been deeds done gressional oversight * mechanisms as: legal activities and abuses in the intellir by courageous and dedicated men and well-so that these abuses of power can- gence. community. but also to review - the women, many of whom have risked their not occur again I cite section 2, para- mandates of the agencies concerned; to study lives, and some of whom have lost their graphs 4, 5, . 6, 7, 8, 9,-and especially the role of intelligence in today's world and lives, in service of their country. 11, 12, and 13, of Senate Resolution 21. to make recommendations regarding the type ake t ese points for the Finally, the-select committee is di- ld u t I wou s m i hi a ve ._, ligence.. objectives which are seemed ue cos- Aegis- - --- - ~, and stud of the extent and necessity of sary and proper. ' . by the. committee -that will be. carryin, Y overt and covert intelligence activities some may perceive the proposal before us. on this activity as fraught with implications of sensational- First. If anyone needs reminding, there in the United States- and abroad. I cite- ism and headline hunting-an approach have been a series of revelations over section 2 of paragraph 14.. - - - which we clearly cannot afford and which th ,,.,mot decade a.nrl a half that point Fourth. It will be difficult for the e s ---o -- ---- made clear. But in this year-so soon after fu~au,gen e z gc,.a =c Watergate-we. cannot leave in doubt the assigned tasks, not only the lack of co- date entrusted to it, no matter how great -:.. --H- e?,4 its dplpaated nowers. and no matter how operaaionsauusw~iva~=oar= b .. -_------ va~a==.=.?_.,__ -- In such sensitive and significant endeavors, national policy as declared by the Pres- much access to secret documents and--, We must instead place our important Intel- ident and Congress, not only to the fail- processes is guaranteed in the. words of. ligence-gathering activities on a sound and ore of these agencies to communicate the Pastore resolution. viable basis. In this case, skeletons in the with one another and with the President Just how does it investigate matters " closet are likely to haunt us not only at home but also abroad, not only on security and the standing committees of Con- that, in their essence, depend on not . . issues but also in domestic politics. They gress-but, also, and more alarming-to being seen? How-will the select commit must be laid to rest. . their power to subvert the Constitution tee know when it is not getting what it The alternative is to let matters ride, to and threaten freedom here at home while needs to know to get at the full facts?- - permit a series of well-intentioned but over- damaging-in the majority leader's . These questions are . without'' easy. lapping investigations proceed, to divide ef- words--"the good name of the United answers. forts at a time when prompt and comprehen- States" abroad. Section 3(a), paragraph 11 of Senate sire action is needed. Thus, the preferable course, it seems to me Further, it must be admitted, their Resolution 21 is of great importance. It is the creation of F. special committee (1) power was often misused at the direction grants the members and. staff of the her authority in the executive select committee "direct access" to any Con- i f hi ous g o sentative of the var broad g repre gressional concerns on intelligence (2) dedi- branch-or with the acquiescence of data, evidence, information, report,. rela- sis or documents or papers" anal i y ng . cated to a thorough investigation of ques- higher authorities-and with a know tioned activities and current intelligence op- wink or willful ignorance on the part of ting to the investiagtion in the possession eratiors and a reexamination. of the role of many members of Congress. of the intelligence agencies, - intellidence operations in our society, and (3) charged with the responsibility of making Second. But the problem goes beyond Despite this clause, it can be predicted- recomnmer.dations to the Senate as e:tpediti_ the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence that this information in some in- will be given up with great stances- n relations ei d f . g or ously as possible regarding both necessary agencies. It goes beyon corrective actions and the future structure. It goes beyond civil liberties at home. reluctance and, indeed, some of it already and relationships within the in- 1-Jere the great issues of national sec- may have been destroyed. thorit au y telligen=e co n n~u~ity. lenity and individual liberty are inex- Further, there will be a tendency for. I he::e.e Senate Resolution 21 will accom- tricably linked. We have to get some personnel of the intelligence agencies to plus this and that .adoption o1 it would he a perspective on ourselves, on our origins, use the classification system as a means rig'at more in the right direction. - on our immediate past, and on our fu- of avoiding full testimony before the se- Mr. PASTORE. I now yield to my dis- tore-as we proceed from the aftermath lect committee. That is, they may "tell tingu.shed colleagues from California. of the Cold War to what appears to be the truth" or provide the facts at the Mr. CRANSTON. I than!k the Senator an ci-a of interdependence in a multlpo- "top secret" or "secret" level, but not - very much for yielding. iar world. include information available on a given I want first to thank the Senator from The Iundantental problem-As we ap- subject at a higher level of classification. T1 executive or- Rhode Island for his v 'ft~-fZfl~@t&ti s2 W 31 sf OO~ftM~ i,executiveprix- ers_zip in this matter. Z/i bout his help constitutional governmen in a n1 e S 970 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE January 27, 1975 ilege" as shields of justification for not sitive-that bear upon the matters and telling all they know-even though they - questions posed in Senate Resolution 21. are under oath. in this regard. any classification-de- Fifth. This problem could be greatly classification system employed should be alleviated if the Senate through its select devised by the-select committee-in co- committee was guaranteed the full and operation with the executive branch, if active support of the Ford administra- possible. After all. one of the issues at tion in this inquiry. - As Walter Pincus. stake is, secrecy itself. The emphasis pointed out in Sunday's Washington. throughout should be on sharing the- Post, such an investigation must Inevita- maximum amount. of information with. bly end up questioning the past policies the public. and practices of Presidents and their Seventh.. In conclusion, several ele- staff. ments are required for a successful in- Perhaps a confrontation with the White House and the bureaucracy is in- evitable as the investigation proceeds- From the start, there are, some powerful incentives for a cover up. The Senate should understand this reality now. Already we see a former Director of the CIA, Mr. Helms pointing the finger, of responsibility at one dead President and at another who is incapacitated and who, so far, has managed to avoid. coming into court or before a congres- sional committee. This same man is known to have destroyed documents bearing :n his tenure as Director of the CIA. Further, the present Director of the CIA in his recent report apparently pointed to his predecessor and previous administrations as. being responsible for acts of wrongdoing. The Senate should be reminded that this same man had spent his entire career on the operations side of CIA before he became executive director and later director. Mr. Colby at' one time directed- the controversial and perhaps dubious Phoenix program In Vietnam, and at one time he was deputy director for operations, DDO, in the CIA-with, responsibility for counterin- telligence and domestic ., operations among others. This investigation cannot succeed without determining the individuals re- sponsible for illegal and improper acts-- be they in the Oval Office, the National Security Council-and the 40 Committee within it-the.Presldent's Foreign Intel- ligence Advisory Board, the U.S. intelli- gence Board, or in the individual agen- cies. A number of the persons involved in past actions still serve in high positions in the Government. So while the select committees' inves- tigation must not degenerate into a witch hunt, it cannot be a picnic, either. For here are hound to be a lot of skeletons in a lot of closets. Individuals and agen- cies involved in wrongdoing or ques- tionable practices must be identified. Or else the American people will be ill served Some have stated that this investiga- tion must not be a "TV spectacular." But it must not be conducted behind closed' doors, either. "Protecting the national security", arguments must not stand in the way of the American people's full understanding of this problem, and they must not stand in the way of publicly assigning responsibility for past actions. Again, the fundamental issue is account- ability and responsibility under a consti- vestigation. and study: A continuation of aggressive investigative reporting on the part of the press, and I know that will occur; a select committee with members and staff interested in. getting all the facts and sharing them with the Ameri-. can people to the extent possible; the full cooperation of the executive agen- cies involved; sources and witnesses who are assured of proper protection along the way. Again I thank. the Senator from Rhode Island, the majority leader, and the many others for the magnificent work that has brought' us to this point on this day. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require. Mr. President, I will be very candid with the Senate. It was my original feel- ing that this. matter should have been contained within the Committee on Armed Services which does have over- sight jurisdiction over the CIA. But in the spirit that this resolution has been offered by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, I am certainly pre- pared to accept it,?because I think that the Senator from Rhode Island has set the right tone for the conduct of this In- vestigation and the subsequent conclu- sions to be drawn from it.. I think-that some examination of the domestic activities of our intelligence- gathering organizations should be in- vestigated and I think perhaps such an investigation is overdue. I think it is essential that agencies in- volved in this kind of work be proscribed from activities that either violate their charter, their congressional authoriza- tions, or militate against the individual freedom of the American people. I think, to that end, this Is the most Important thing that our committee can do or that the select committee when It Is chosen can do. It is my view that we can develop con- structive legislation that affords such proscriptions and such protections. I would express the hope that has aireedy been expressed by the distinguished Sen- ator from Rhode Island that we can con- duct our work in a responsible way, so as to preserve the confidentiality of mat- ters that impact on the national security of the United States of America. We must recognize that our adver- saries and our potential adversaries have had a sophisticated intelligence-gather-- ing organization, that they have an ad- vantage over us in that they operate in this country in a free socie , and in most respects in our operations abroad we op- safeguards for our legitimate operations abroad. I am hopeful that w& can observe the need to conduct many of. our delibera- tions in private..1 think that although the objective set forth by the distin- guished Senator from California is de- sirable, that as much as possible they be- open to the public, there are going to be times, I think, when we can elicit more information and more significant and more penetrating and in. depth infor- mation, if we go. into executive session.. So I - think that what we must do is - have a balanced approach here, recognize that we have to- correct abuses, recognize that we must compel our intelligence-' gathering operations to conduct them- within the purview of the law that selves authorizes them. and at the same time recognize the vital interest of the United. States from the geographic, strategic, po- litical, tactical, economic situation that we find ourselves. in and make sure we do not hobble ourselves and render our- selves at such a disadvantage that we cannot maintain the kind of internation- al posture we need. I might mention. one other- thing, Mr. President, and that Is not only the neces- sity to protect some of our agents or some. of our covert operations abroad, but. also the confidence placed in us by foreign governments. We must, I think, be care- ful not to. embarrass. foreign govern- ments, not just friendly governments, but perhaps- some mutual governments and some that may not appear to be so friendly that may have supplied its some cooperation; and I would. hope we would take care not to embarrass governments of these countries. With the proper care, I think it is per- fectly correct that we embark on this course today. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from California. ? Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator for yielding- . On one point he mentioned, I recog- nize that there will have- to be closed - door sessions, first, in order to get such- information, that would not otherwise be made available, and that the committee will need. I recognize the reason for his . amendment. I think it is quite appro- priate. I would like to ask one question and make one Point about it. - First, I think, as I said in my earlier remarks just now, that the committee- must control the classification and de- classification process, hopefully in coor- dination and cooperation with the ad- ministration, but It cannot get itself into a situation where it is unable to do cer- tain , ork that it feels it must do. in regard to the specific amendment that the Senator has offered, under his amendment how do we prevent theexec- utive from abusing this authority? For example, suppose they did not cooperate r''lr. TOWER. If the Senator from Cali- fornia will withhold on his question, I was going to engage in colloquy with the Senator from I.hode Island on this mat- of polio; in the inf>tpprO ' eAM/p l ` x !1 3 ?8`~13R O1 and m cn more t !lit o r. 7 cannot be discussed in open hearings , all. facts bared-except for the most sen- I think we do have to afford adequate this out. r ne. . ) n we will bring all - Approved For Release 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENA' 'R Mr. CR-A.NSTON. Fine. Mr. TOT4".-_R. So that we will make It clear what everyone means and intends; but I ',:,irk the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has been seeking the floor and has been very patient, so I would like to yield to him, and then we will take this matter up subsequently. Mr. C-2- NSTON. Certainly.. I thank the Senator. Mr. TO :iW R. r yield to the Senator from M. ssissippi such time as the Sena- tor requires. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas. At this point, at least, I certainly will. not require over 20 minutes, so we can just lim?.t it to that. Mr. President, after a conference with the Senator from Rhoda Island and the Senator from Texas, I send to the desk an amendment to the proposed resolu- tion and ask. that it be considered now. The PRESIDLNG OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant. legislative clerk read as follows : The Se :a,.or from Mississippi proposes an amendment, at the end of the resolution, to add a new section as follows-- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous .onsent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. lvir. M. NSr ELD. Why not let him read it? Mr. STFINIS. All right, I withdraw that. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read it in full. The assistant legislative clerk. read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a. new section as follows: S=c. 7. he select committee shall insti- tute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any info= ..ation relating to the activities of the Cen tra. intelligence Agency or any other depa-ment or agency of the Federal Governme= engaged in intelligence activi- ties, obtained by .he select committee dur- ing the course of its study and investiga- tion, not sosc:.`_caliy authorized by the se- lect core: ?ee to be disclosed, and (2) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information c:hich would adversely af- fect thei _`elli;ence activities of the Central Intelligence A_cncy in foreign countries or The ?ntell:,once activities in foreign countries of any o-ner department or agency of the Federal Co-e=nment. Mr. PAS' -rORZ. Mr. President, will the Senator .-ld ? Mr. STEN IS. Yes, I am glad to yield to the Senz'or from Rhode Island. I want to state rear briefly what the purpose is, but I3'le'_= sio-. Mr. P.SS TORE. r or the purposes of the RECORD, ?.,_.'~i the Senator in explain- ing his .._.=r. -men t, which I am going to accept. e`_'pi L'1 what he means by "not specific . .uthorizec"? Mr. S'i ENNIS. Yes. That is oi- the second part, is it not? Mr. P ` D :'-E. Yes. ?fir. Sll-N-NIS. Mr. President, this amer_c~-neat r__..'cs to what we ordinarily out by the-.committee itself or its mem- bers. It just requires that such reason- able rules and regulations as the com- mittee may see fit be established by the committee regarding disclosures of in- formation that might, in the second part, affect intelligence abroad.. But going back to the first one for just a moment, this relates to disclosures by those,other than the committee, staff members or anyone else that might come in contact with this information.. In other words, the committee itself Is called on by the Senate. to make these rules and regulations. Now, with reference to foreign intel- ligence or intelligence activities abroad- and that is what my plea is for here to- day, the protection of this foreign in- telligence--there we are trusting the committee to write rules-and procedures to. set out for themselves and staff mem- bers regarding. this foreign intelligence. Mr. B_iKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly for a question? Mr.. STENNLS. I am. responding to a question of the Senator from Rhode Is-. land. Will the Senator restate. his question with respect. to paragraph 2? Mr. PASTORE. I was wondering if-the word "specifically"' was. not rather redun- dant. If it just. said "not authorized by select committee," that would not lead to any controversial confusion. Naturally, the authorization would have to be explicit. The word "specifical- ly" for the time being, without knowing within what context it was inserted in the amendment, disturbs me for the mo- ment, unless. it is more explicitly ex- plained. I thought if we just said "not authorized by the Select Committee". it would be enough. In other words, I do not want the com- mittee to sit down and begin to write a bill of particulars every time they are going to authorize some disclosure. Mr. STENNNIS. What line is the Senator referring to? I see it. That is before the second paragraph. That relates to staff members. Mr. PASTORE. I know that. This whole amendment relates to staff members. I quite agree with the Senator from.Alis- sissippi. I hope that the staff does not begin to hold news conferences. That al- ways happens. They just take this whole thing over. I think if there are going to be any news conferences, they should be by the chairman or the members of the committee themselves. But in the past we have had the sorrowful situation that staff members.fall over one another to see who can tell it to the press first. I think everything should be told to the press that needs to be told to the public. I think the public understands that. Mr. STENNIS. This is not to prohibit that kind of information. Mr. PASTORE. I know that. But I was wondering if the word "specifically" is not a little too tight for the committee. If we said "not authorized by the com- lnittee," I thin':. we a ccomplisll the objective. at we were trying Mr. STENNIS. W h } r,~, Q are not exP21 r PNa'tit?fdliYeYt' Ale S IYIMoP&P,ft S 971 covered. In any way. very pl3.inly, that there was no prohibition on it. I do not , think this puts too much of a burden. The Senator is opening up all of these files. Mr. PASTORE. No. ' Mr. STr` NNIS. The resolution does. I do not mean the amendment does but the resolution opens up the files. We just have to have a safeguard. Mr. PASTORS. I do not think we are meeting on our intent here. I am not op- posed to the Senator's suggestion that the matter of leaks should be prevented, and that the staff should. not disclose anything- without authorization by the. committee. The only thing. that bothers me is that he. is tightening up the obli- gation and responsibility of the commit- tee a little bit too much by using the word "specifically:' If he left the word. - "specifically" out, I think ha would ac- complish his purpose and not- open it up to debate every time there is the % question of disclosure. Mr. STENNIS. The main.'point here is to have something' explicit in writing by the committee as to rules and proce- dures. When we nail. that down, explic- itly, how it should be. done,,.. then we cover the waterfront.. . . We can strike out the word "speci. - Ically." Mr. PASTORS: Will the Senator strike it out? ? Mr. S'ITNNIS. Yes. . ' Mr. PASTORE. If he strikes it out, I . would accept the amendment.. Mr. STENNIS.. With the understand- ing that this still carries with it. --- Mr. PASTORE. With the understand- ing that the committee and only the - committee -has the authority to disclose. I will admit that. Mr. STENNIS. It is better to be case- fur here than to be sorry later- This is. not directed at the committee- - Mr. PAASTORE. I know that..- Mr. STENNIS. This is putting the Senate in a proper, position_ I. think it will help the committee to have the Sen- ate go on record here in making this one of the ground rules, so to speak. Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator willing to delete the word "specifically." Mr. STENNIS. Yes_ Mr. PA.STORE. With the modification. I will accept the amendment. Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield for 3 minutes? I support the amendment. Mr. S'rENNIS. I do not have control. of the time. The Senator from Texas has control of the time. Mr. BALER. Mr. President, I ask the ' Senator from Mississippi it he will yield for a question on his amendment. ? Mr. STENNIS. All right, and then I will yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota out of my time. I yield for a question. Mr. BAKER. This is a question of clarification. This amendment, of course, Is an antileak amendment. ?I think that is fine. I hope- we succeed. We failed miserably in the Watergate Committee. Our former colleague and I tried in every way we could. It did not work. There are some matters of sensitivity that have not been leaked, but are still 8972 Approved For Release 2001/09103-: CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE January 27, 1975 Paragraph 2 concerns me. It says: And, number 2, disclosure outside the commutes of any information which ad- versely affects the intelligence activities of the United States. ele, or anything else-about things that were disclosed to them in these proceed- ings. I think that is a matter we have to trust to the discretion, of the commit- tee. Under present law we have to. I be- it would appear on its surface to say lieve the Senator raised a good point. that if we stumbled into a matter such, Mr. CURTIS. I certainly am for the as the Chilean situation, the Bay of Pigs, amendment of the distinguished Senator, or the Lebanon incursion, notwithstand- but I believe we have to rethink our posi- ing that it might appear to the Commit- tion on some of these things. Here in- this tee to be something that ought to be country if someone discloses a tax return, dealt with in' the Congress, we should he has violated a criminal law and can be not disclose it. Punished. If he discloses secrets vital to Will the Senator from Mississippi re- the security of the United States, he is assure me that that is not the purpose apt to defend it as the right of the people of paragraph 2? to know. We have, certainly, a right to Mr. STENNIS. No. that is not the pur- not only make it a law violation to dis- pose of paragraph No. 2. We tried to close, but there ought to be a penalty to wrap it up in such a way as require it. rules of procedure In the committee I thank the Senator. which I understand to be the feeling of Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. the Senator from Tennessee. If there is no further discussion, could Mr. BAKER. If there appears to be we have a vote on the amendment? conduct by any agency of the U.S. Gov- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- ernment that appears to be improper or tion is on agreeing to the amendment, as exceeds its jurisdiction, that would not modified, of the Senator from Mississippi. be limited by paragraph 2 of this The amendment, as modified, was amendment? agreed to. Mr. STENNIS. This does not put a Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I - ask limitation on the committee. It requires unanimous consent to yield 3 minutes to the committee to proceed under rules, the Senator from North Dakota without reguiati:kns, and procedures. But these losing my right to the floor. things are still left in the hands of the The PRESIDING OF'F'ICER. Without conlsnittee. objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator. Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I see no Mr. STENNIS. It is a rule of the Sen- objection to a thorough examination of ate by a guideline. the operations-of the CIA, the FBI, or any Mr. PASTORE. With the . Inodi?ica- other intelligence-gathering agency, but Lion; I am willing to accept the llmend- I believe it can only be done effectively, mei't? and without great injury to the agencies, Mr. ST TIS. If no one else wants the by a relatively small committee and a floor, can we have a vote on the amend- small staff. A big Investigating committee ment`t Will the Chair put the question? with a sizable staff-no matter how well The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the intentioned-cannot avoid much of the Senator from Mississippi modify his information that develops at the hearings amendment? being leaked to the public, thereby be- M=r. STENNIS. Yes; by striking out the coming easily available to the intelligence word "specifically" in the sixth line from agencies of Russia and every country in the bottom. the world. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- If the pending resolution involved a tion is on agreeing to the amendment -much smaller committee with only a very the GRU, disclosed to Great Britain and the United States a great deal of Inside Information regarding how far Russia would go in this missile crisis. He also provided us with much other Information regarding the entire operations of the GRU and KGB-their two major intel- ligence-gathering agencies. A book was published regarding the Penkovsky pa- pers and information which has been in circulation for several years. The. point I am trying to make, Mr. President, is. that Penkovsky expected to be caught and was caught. There was a 2- day trial and he was killed. Here in the United States there is not much of a pen- alty for even the highest ranking intel- ligence officer, a Member of Congress, or anyone else for disclosing our most highly classified intelligence. Mr. President, the Washington Star= News of Sunday, January 28, 1975, pub- lished a very good editorial on the sub- ject of intelligence and the forthcoming. investigations entitled "The Great Intel- ligence Exam." I ask unanimous consent that it be Printed in the Rzcoan. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RZCORD, as follows: Tiex GREAT I?-r*ts,rcENcE Exact This Is the era of bosom-baring and the country's numerous intelligence-gathering organizations are not immune. As things stand now, various committees of the House and Senate are gearing up for investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FFed- era! Bureau of Investigation, the Defense In- telligence Agency and the National Security Agency. We hope that these investigations will be boiled down to, at most, one select committee in the House and Senate. We also hope that the investigations will be skepti- cal, thorough and responsible. A witch-h.cnt born of the peculiar sensitivities left over from Watergate would not be helpful. A careful analysis of this country's intelligence p:obletns and legislation to remedy the mls- .takes and deficiencies of the past are ver? surely in order. A bipartisan congressional Investigation is especially desirable, In- view of the conservative complexion of the blue- ribbon executive panel headed by Vice Presl- dent Rockefeller whi h i l l ki i t c ng s a so oo n o as modified. minimal staff, I believe the security of CIA activities. Mr. CURTIS. Reserving the right to this Nation could be safeguarded and the The difficulty, of course. Is that, when it object and I, of course, will not object. investigation could be very helpful. I comes to intelligence-gathering operations. I would like to ask a question. would hope that the meetings of the com- bosom-baring is a tricky procedure. The risk Is there any penalty or enforcement mittee would be open to the public. If this is that too much public execst:re of P. highly means to compel staff members of this were the procedure, then the public would whole sensitive S operation oion of out obuss government will put the o goof of business, and imperil -committee to not disclose information get firsthand information rather than the reputation_ and even the lives-of peo- that their committee directs should not from leaks highly distorting the facts dis- ple Involved, to say nothing of the nation's be disclosed? . closed in the hearings. - security. In the past, the congressional com- Mr. S? ENNIS. It is a sad state of the Mr. President, I cannot help but be mittees with intelligence oversight responsi- la.w, Mr. President, but I am quite doubt- deeply concerned about the future effec- too bilities have been squeamish ae- a tnquiring ful that we have a law that really is tiveness of the Central Intelligence Agen- entp into these clandestine- al The, present danger Is that post-Watergate gate zeal- drawn to cover situations of this kind. cy. No intelligence operation-particu- otry, Inspired by news stories of a "massive, We have the old Espionage Act of 1918, larly involving clandestine operations in Illegal domestic intelligence operation" which specifically requires there must be foreign countries or involving some of mounted by the CIA a few years back, will .an intent to do harm to the United our most advanced technology, especially Iea-d to excesses of revelation. States. Tt is a kind of wide-open proposi- in defense areas-can be publicly dis- For our part, we remain unconvinced that tion which is, in itself, a very strong closed without endangering our sources the charges have much real foundatton. argument here for the adoption of this of information, the lives of those involved From what has been revealed so far-mostty by CIA Director William E. Colby to a House amendment. It puts In some kind of an in this type of intelligence operations, Appropriations subcommittee-it appears obstacle. A staff member, if he violated and the very effectiveness of an intelli- that the agency was involved In a program of the rule, would violate a Senate rule. It gence-gathering organization. Russian internal Surveillance of certain domestic die- would not have any criminal penalty at- intelligence agents, for example, would sirlent groups suspected of having connec- ta^hed to it, but it would be a rule to only have to read our publications to tions with foreign agents. CIA agents were that extent. obtain information highly- valuable to "Inserted" in some of these organizations. I hope the committee will get a prom- them. some mail between American citizens and Communist correspondents was read, and ice in advance that no one is going to About 12 years ago when we had the files-largely furnished by the FBI-were write a book-that no staff me b is missile c,C' ~ople. In addi- going to write a boob 6i'F '~dth1E1 ~3 13fJJ. oHit~~~Yi~+ta Rl'o ~~~ll~ da ! ~n lnvotted physi- Approved For Release 2001/09103 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700640040-3 . January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--SENATE Cal surveillance, wiretaps and break-ins di- rected at CIA personnel suspected of security leaks and. In a few ca sea, those who were thought to be receiving the Information. In Colby's opinion and that of his immedi- ate predecessor, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, the CIA, In this period, may have overstepped the strict limits of its charter. The various acts have been labelled as "'regrettable" or "Inappropriate" or-in the case of Colby-the result of "a miscon- ception of the extent of the CIA's authority," Richard Helms, who was CIA director during most of the period of anti-war fervor, stoutly denies any impropriety on his part, The dif- ference in judgment reflects more than any- thing else the change-in climate is the last two years. But surely a large-part of the problem lies In the ambiguity of the charter of the CIA, written by Congress in 1947. In setting. up the agency, Congress ruled that it should have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or Internal security functions" wit1S- in the United States--this areas, being strictly reserved to the.loag-established' T1 - . How realistic and workable this prohibi- tion was is sharply illustrated by the events under Investigation. Despite, the prohibition against domestic spying. the director of the CIA was also made "responsible for protect- ing Intelligence. sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." He was also In- structed by Congress to "perform such other functions and duties relating to Intelligence affecting the national security as -the lva- tional Security Council- may from time: to time direct." Between them, it can. be argued that these directives provide ample justifies. tion for the activities being denounced. as "Illegal" And the evidence. Is. reasonably clear that a number of former-directors be- lieved this was indeed the case. Clearly, the.iirst objective of the current investigations must be to spell out more clearly the rules under which the CIA-and other intelligence agencies as welt--are sup- posed to function. If all domestic counter- espionage is to be more severely restricted- a3 seems to be the mood of the liberal major- ity--Congress will also have to figure out how the CIA 13 to protect its "sources and meth- ods from. unauthorized disclosure." One ob- vious way, of course, would be pass a law making It a crime for former CIA agents to write books. But this woul& not salve the larger problem: of trying to separate domestic end foreign intelligence into neatly separate operations.. Mr. STENNTS. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining out of my 20 minutes? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DolwErnct). The Senator has 2 minutes remaining. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 10 additional minutes to the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, that will leave me 12 minutes. Mr. President, may we have order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, my main plea today is for the protection of for- eign intelligence and intelligence sources. I think.all-other matters do not add up, in the range of importance with the CIA's operations, to compare with this collection of foreign intelligence. stood, either, by all the people. There is a great deal of -zentimeizt, even under- standing sentiment, that would question the necessity for the CIA, or the pro- priety of having It. Another- thins, Mr. President, is that this is not a political issue, and CIA is not a political agency of any kind. It serves one President after another, as they come. It makes no difference which party that President belongs to and has nothing to do, with political matters. Primarily, CIA is a Government agency collecting foreign intelligence of the most highly sensitive nature. To be effective,,it must be secret. If intelligence facts are disclosed, they often lose all of their value. If an adversary merely infers that we have certain in- telligence, of ten it. is no longer of value. An illustration would . be work on a - code i,& purpose. of gathering intelligence Is- to learn intentions and capabilities. The first extensive foreign, intelligence act ever passed by the Congress was in 1947. Ca'led the CIA, it has come a long, long- way in the past 26' years. For il- lustration, we no longer argue about a missile gap, or a bomber gap. -. In the broad and essential fields, the CIA has done an extensive and effective job in dealing with enemy capabilities and intentions.. As we go through investigations, let us keep in mind the, dangers from expo- sures. Exposures can. be a. matter of life and death to Americans. abroad as well. as friendly foreigners. This opinion. Is strongly shared by many highly respected persons, Including Director Colby, who have been a part of the operations and know the facts first-hand. Friendly gov- ernments and friendly foreigners will greatly reduce, If not terminate their co- operation and assistance. They already have. The information flow has been greatly reduced. Our relations with other nations have been strained. Exposure of sensitive facts through hearings, through pressures, through staff members, or through other sources, regardless of the good intentions of the actors, comes at a price we cannot bear. In a time of nuclear weapons, with the power to deliver warheads on target from continent to continent, we must have re- sponsible information from many foreign sources. Further, our ships at sea, our military manpower scattered throughout the world in support- of many commit- ments voluntarily made, are all in need of the fruit of intelligence gathered around the world. . The President, all Presidents, have to have this worldwide Intelligence in for- mulating foreign policies, including trade and other economic policies. formulated with nations around the world. Intelligence comes from several sources, but much of it comes from our CIA agents abroad. In my travels, I have found them to be excellent men, capable and loyal, with a steady stream of highly valuable and responsible information. expressed on the floor of the Senate as They often get blamed-but by and people that foreign intelligence supplied to the necessity for CIA and other Intel- large, they continue to carry on. by th6 r.T is absolut=l -- e S9739 men, to tell them they are appreciated, and to ask them to carry on under highly adverse conditions- From some of this intelligence, we make decisions in the Congress as to military weaponry. We often save great .sums of money, because this intelligence lets us know what weapons to avoid -building as well as, what weapons are - most probably needed. Without. the In- telligence gained under the CIA direc- tion, we would not have -known of-the missiles in Cuba until they were actually fully installed. and we were directly un- der the gun- - Indeed, U.S. Intelligence, on which the - CIA sits at the top, has come a long way over the past - two decades. We have reached the point where the SALT agree- ment Is possible, because we- can. now - verify what they have- in. being. A num- ber of other treaties have also been pos- sible, because of ourvertificatioa process. Under Director Colby, I feel that the CIA is now operating in. a fine way, en- tirely within the law. I shall do-my- part in keeping it that way. The organic act creating the CIA. needs some amendments which tighten up- the present law. Our committee has given some major amendments which I intro- duced in late 1973, special attention: in 1974. I. assisted Senator Pnoxannz with a similar major amendment offered by-him to the military authorization -bill It passed the Senate wit t my active sup- port and we made a strong effort- at. the conference in behalf. of the amend- meat. It finally lost at conference be- cause- it was not germane, but the con- ferees for the House supported the idea of hearings- which the House has started.. We shall continue our efforts on that amendment and others- We may have certain intelligence of great value to us. But. if. It is known to our adversaries that we- have it, or if they suspect that, we- have it, then it - turns to ashes in our hands and. is of no value- whatsoever. Illustration. Hundreds- of millions-.of dollars-invested in electronic devices can become- valueless overnight if it be- comes known we have such devices.. Our committee shall continue to exer- cise committee jurisdiction on legisla- tion regarding the CIA, and also exer- cise surveillance over its operations, and such other activities connected therewith as- may be-necessary. We shall continue to have the Senator from Montana (Mr. MAalsi ..n), and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mn Scoxx}, the Democratic and Republican floor leaders and hence representing all of the Senators, invited to all of our meet- ings regarding the surveillance of the CIA. I have discussed this with the-Sena- tor from Montana on last Thursday and - he expects to attend. The Senator from Pennsylvania attended our session last Thursday. The CIA, of course must operate withi_-t the law, but I want to emphasize to all of my colleagues and to the American y ssaly or out ligence agencies, but that view Is not One purpose of my remarks today is to President and his close advisers, Includ- shared by all the peo*&5YV#@@lt FN fusers' 2N4/99 t1 W IRW 3BDG82MNO,40g3Qn of our military S'974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 27, 1975 tart' positions. In modem times this fa- by the select committee. of mistakes and they have to be cor formation Is not merely needed, it is es- As determined by the committee. -rested. But we are not out to destroy sential. After all, who Is going to make this intelligence-gathering. Therefore, someone has to stand up for determination? We are not going to have I remember one time when I was sent the CIA through foul as well as fair a debate by the members of the commit- by President Kennedy to Moscow to wit- Weather, and make hard decisions and tee every time we get to a point where ness the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban take firm stands, whether popular at this would apply. I am all for preserving Treaty. I was sitting on the porch of the the time or not. I have done that and I the classification; the Senator from Embassy, together with Dean Rusk, at propose to do just that in the future. I Texas knows that I am all for his amend- the time, and we were talking about a shall not shirk this duty. ment, the spirit of it, the intention, the lot of measures. Finally, the Ambassador This does not at all mean that I _pro- objective of it. But I think we should came out and said, "I suggest you two pose to operate a duplicate or rival in- make clear that the determination ought gentlemen take a walk and do your talk- vestigation with any select committee. to be on the part of the committee. ing because this place is bugged." ill make no attempt to do that, but I When it says "sensitivity of the classi- This-place is bugged." Now, that is I will' will carry out the purpose, as I have fied information," who is going to deter- what the Russians are doing to us. As'a briefly outlined it here. mine whether it is sensitive or not? We matter of fact, they did it right down I thank the Senator from Texas for have to say here "the type of security there at the United Nations. They had a yielding this time to me. clearance to be required in the case of bug, I think, under the American seal. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who any such employee or person shall, with- We all remember that. yields time? 'in the determination of the committee, Let us face it: We are in a critical Mr. TOWER. .Mr. President, I thank be commensurate with the sensitivity," world where we are being spied upon the distinguished Senator from Mis- and so on. and, in order to know what they are sissippi for his cogent remarks. Mr. TOWER. I should be glad to ac- doing, we have to spy on them. There is I think it would be appropriate for cept that as a modification by the Sena- no question about that. But that has me to thank him at this time for the tor from Rhode Island. nothing to do with many of these charges splendid leadership he has shown in the Mr. PASTORE. That is what i want. I that have been made. Committee on Armed Services. In fact, want the determination to be made by Nobody is out to destroy the CIA. Let on numerous occasions, we have looked the committee, if we can work out that us get an understanding on this. No one in depth at some activities of the CIA language. is out to destroy military intelligence. No and it has not been generally known Mr. TOWER. That suits me splendidly. one is out to destroy the FBI. Let us make that we have. I think the Senator from As a matter of fact, if the Senator will it all clear. Mississippi has always measured up to read that language again, I, think that. On the other hand, this is an open his responsibility in the highest tradi- would be a suitable modification, society. All we are saying is that there iron the Senate. Mr. PASTORE. The type of security are some things that have been wrong, Mr. . President, may I Inquire how clearance to be required in the case of and under the pretext of either national security or secrecy, private rights are be- The time I' have left? any such employee or person shall, with- sec sec violated unnecessarily. priright is all we The PRESIDING OFFICER. The in the discretion of the committee itself, Ing Senator has 15 minutes remaining. be commensurate with the sensitivity of are trying to eliminate. That is all we are Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I send to . the classified Information to which such trying to do. It is as simple as all that. the tiled an amendment and ask that it employee or person will be given access I am perfectly willing to accept this to the select committee. amendment with that modification. be stated. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk Mr. TOWER. I will accept that Ian- Mr. TOWER. The modification has will state the amendment. guage as a modification by the Senator been accepted. The amendment has been from Rhode Island. . so modified. Mr. TOWER. May I call to the at- - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The I might say one other thing. I think tention of my friend from Rhode Island amendment will be so modified. Will the this is partially for the committee's pro- that I have now offered the amendment. Senator send the modification to the tection. If we did not require clearance The legislative clerk read as follows: desk? , of some sort, It is not impossible that an ? At the end of the resolution add a new alien intelligence organization could section as follows: The amendment, as modified, is as -penetrate the committee by inserting one "No employee of the select committee or follows: of i s people on the committee staff. So I any person engaged. by contract or other- No employee of the select committee or think we would want that kind of protec- wise to perform services for the select com- person engaged by contract or otherwise to tion, because I do not think the commit- mittee shall be given access to any clas- perform services for the select committee tee would ever want to be embarrassed sifed information by the select committee shall be given access to any classified in.for- unless such employee or person has received mation by the select committee unless such by finding, having failed to require any an appropriate security clearance. The type employee or person has received an appro- kind of clearance, that their staff had of security clearance to be required in the priate security clearance as determined by been penetrated. case of any such employee or person shall the select Committee. The type of security Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield? be commensurate with the sensitivity of the clearance to be required in the case of any Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator classified information to which such em- such employee or person shall within the from Tennessee. ployee or person will be given access by the determination of the Select Committee be Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator from select committee." commensurate with the sensitivity of the lr 4.U t b exas ea s tt Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the amendment Is somewhat self-explana- tory. However, I think we should make some legislative history on It. What Is contemplated here is the type of Q clear- ance which Is administered by the Atomic Energy Commission and which the Senator from Rhode Island is so well faaniliar with. I should like the Senator from Rhode Island to comment on it at this time if he would. illr. PASTORE. I have no objection to the amendriment provided I get a fur- ther explanation of the last sentence: The type of security clearance to be re- quired In the ca :,e of any such employee or person shall be commensurate with the sen- sitivity of the classified Information to which r s ure me a y Se ing up classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the these requirements for. classification, vie select committee. _ are not setting up within the committee in- Mr. TOWER. What is conte_7rlpiated layers of access and levels of access to in- formation that will be available to the here is a simple type of Q clearance committee? What I have in mind is the which is ordinarily required of Senate possibility that the committee may de- employees. side that there is a requirement for seen-. Mr. PASTORE. I realize that. Every 'city beyond even the requirements for Q member of the staff of the Joint Com- clearance, a kind of "eyes only" classi- mittee on Atomic Energy has Q clear- fication, and have someone say to Ho- ance and has to have it. I think in this ward Baker, that he can read those 8,- particular case, where we are dealing Coo pages, but his staff man does not with classified information, covert ac-. have that clearance. tivities abroad and domestically, I think Now, can the Senator assure me than we have to have reliable people. We just nothing that is contained in this amend- cannot afford to take a chance. meni: will in any way deprive any Mem- Now, I ar_t all for this study and this ber of access, and his staff, if otherwise investigation. I repeat, I do not ;ant to properly cleared? Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 ? Approved For Release 200.1/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 S 975 juttl:ut'y 7, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--SENATE . - Senator . I do not perceive that it . or effectively, of any information that in question It to would decide be up to whether the he was he receives. J Ir. TOWER comes before this committee. If there the rules of the senate if he are 10,000 pages of classified material, oI violating committee and at the same would. In other words, for the protection of the staff- read it, and the senatior going was discussed the co any matter with somebody that he is cannot Mr. BAKER. What does the Senator cannot or it who did not have the proper clearance. mean, he does not perceive that it would? tither, or it is unlikely Am I correct in that? Is it his opinion that it would or would tOI be t able to. have that assurance. i his in- f the Mr. BAKER in tel9? not? senator from Texas win express Mr. PASTORS. That is. right. No one Mr. TOWER. It is my opinion that it . derstaudine that this will not be used disputes that- would not. Mr. disputes that. STENNIS. Mr. r. President, will the. Mr. BAKER. Does the Senator wish a device to deprive eany ct of le ofdth it Senator yield fora question? that to be included as part of the legit- tioMnr. TOWER It was thee Intention of Mr. PASTORE. Yes. lative history? . I believe the Senator ter of fact, the the Senator from Texas Mr. TOWER. As a mat to establish what was talking about some- part will determine. that hinks is the minimum requiremen Mr. t STENNIS. staff. BAKER. Dow ~ he wish it to be a thwe can establish; that is, some sort froze. Missouri cleara one who was not on the noted f who would was a pt of the legislative iti not his ?r nder- ago that. t so conr people. that if we r ent - I not would not responsible think ththat c a n committee as amendment thaat it is is not h nave access responsible information. this a ae d intention to the author of quired nothing, the committee staff - access to this hi , no- ene-ga herin8 organization. Ihthink Mr. PASTORE. O O :hMay I say fn n- to r. TOWEnt to ere not hmysintention? tion gcould be Pei lcirTOWER. it is this would be particularly true of clerical ewer to my able friend, Mai Senator ' a matter . BAKER.. that situation. ewer tippi, Z was discussing this r from to create that that will occur? And it is not his belief heI think that the professional staff that with the distinguished senior Senator M this staff; and from t Teennessnessee distinguished. bit. TOWER. I is not belief that is likely to w engaged will pray etting be Senator on the he basis co of hist,and it will occur. But It is ray in tention that' people who wall have no difficulty It -is not he is on tcods entirely tee--and I read he arance the we should not have people on the staff any intentioneto proscribenore to hobble ? if h is the the e commttee then d would be who - ho v;BA be security risks. his problem to see that the people on his in. BAKER. We all share that con- the action of any Senator on the com- sffwon - it ere to cleared to rthe people on is tto- dMr.BAKER. Whose authority will be staff 'w the basis of receive their e the ince; and earn. keeping Let s very much hope we succeed in hapileaks from oator- ing did not receive it if -they did not have g-1U be. I assure the, Senator- that this required to gain the aranc that of adequate not clearance. ts. Trill ba he case as far as this Senator is the full committee o or the chairman and ~~. PASTORS. Provided they got the concerned. But as far as I am concerned, vice chairman? permission PASTORE. at the committee. I option in good conscience see the Mr. PASTORS. By vote of the corn- S~ It wouit be a com . Mr. make part of an n this amendment committee that Privy will dMr. TOWER I should say the commit= tee responsibsibility. ' - ?- writ- mahl Poi li the partls s of sensitive the committee. material though while lega gally, rules rules has to to meet the and guidelines Mr. r. . PA TO E. That itwhy determinati I on ate at part BAKER Is that the Senator's committee." f a practical matter might be deprived here. o of that information. Mr. BAKER. I entirely agree with that. - Mr. TOWER. That Is my intention. Does the Senator from Texas? - Mr. ? BAKER. PASTORS. Yes. Will the Assume for a Senator ex- mo- Mr. intention? PAST ORE. May we have the Mr. TOWER. The determination is to plain that again? be made the committee, s . o cent that- the g com to the amendment amendment Mr- BAKER. Mr. President, one fur- difference. =ttee, in its dis- ~ BAKER. neces- F~ER And it can be made for cret-th, according catdin security M. B KERca personal for p se the Senator f ro Rhode Island pro- ther question, mxperi May: It toe enlist one's well as classification aff--- adopt and Senator r Tol.AiER accepted, sa, sa pars, Iyh TOIyEp Not for personal stag. 2 adept; some c We an tion on beyondd, sayy. personal seat, lelpin ve aspil or t*is hMr for any information rson the Se. I s. Q e clearnce. We all knw there "ar- anyone, elsf, to help a ioriatla hio oI thin fors to has rmationl staff, a has ante classifieti be d a Q clea piths on at han nd. - the personal his p rsonal st he has whatever clearance is ante. Supposse the the .tee nat sta al fully a ffcomes to fully ag toe that then the e then tees should be Te' wator hether that staff sibmber ors to vine pde- h staff im or lad saysselect, 'c i cannot gain access to required,and be fully investigat d. But quote er that st My y e ow pm p has an icy rim do tha ts that on nobody handles classified o sent last soms t mto I hope there nv a the amen - marts on od staff unless they hcu- : e to ut becaucause e the coommmitte ee says eras for that wou uld p pre st a, and that s mea we Nav v to haxe an XC~i clearance re for clearance of h peersoe rsonal nal cea y wouhld Mr BAr TR That is the essence of my - f I want nt to , o in b, be that cto the s, question. The answer t? e e e question ce of to as a a a a ce that as a m m s aer er o peace co mbe be s ehetee or - factact, ee s subject to the same rules as the Senator from Texas i he correct.We do anyon ne ile as a member of r t the fpm- committee staff. Mr PASTORS. exa ors confusing a mittee, ss ail no ot r os tived of b- Mr Mr. pA PASTOR That s ttee no . he eery . simple PAS flung. Let get o plain. No cu fore th that any infor committeema. tition th that comees bee- S that on the nator joint in M souri h s had memb rs very son ,le t at Let usled i t prin. No .cM s t PASTORS. His amendment only of so staff wr have Q clearance ova Ms. they'ER. Rleaance rear o do tot is sa ing staff members. not The b- at some of ruue clo it, ith the unless theo have cl- Mr PASTR Ei If a personal staff to: is saying he does paant s t to be T They are entitled to its the p perr- member f any E. If a of rso al stat- aonyone If a memmbenot er of has tbe e- mission of the comdmmitittee it t c. tee has that learem e, ho t she mn - z nsie o on that staff hat mayy ing formperson who looks at should entitled to thea cnced a she can be d ors noz the e cnicat ftm heacorn- information hts to . cleared. We e should enti a the committee gives permission. f: its not get t t the c ar fro t the court be clear S MINt thb hatt. ly i the co mi President, that s my tho re `.-ins he mult haust have re, he he cannot get tl eiSe ator y eld n3r President, "11 understandER. tv info is nosh ZVIr. PASTORS. That is the rule of the There is he one woneter that, be- Mr. TOtiVER. I yield to the Senator Joint Commite Tat is tc Energy nose. cza-e 2 he is ct y ageet o it. ne nho determined thhat from r?SY INGTON. I thank my able I cannot say it more clearly than ghat. h 1 ..r~ .w :.Ir. EA l used ? Pi esident, lino friend from Texas. Mr. BAKER. Is that correct? - :1 oun asst:red, v.h ich is the only y thing As I understand it, whoever is cleared, I ex- p eased that t the inncern tent onatof the staff, i srclehe be on the staff or off the Mr. ared for he nfo'mat on. He pol cy wll b Rset by the committee. I see - auth~~r . of the amendment, I will bP sat- is cleared for the information on the no reason why a maiority of e.comsatisfactorily. S tho..-S not e o isftzd I do not the clearance that mittee cannot work it out ~s ant~goi leFidP ea ~ 1S1~0 '~0 ~ 1 IA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved F&'fe'.2WWAOUbPMR0007000co'?/ 27, 1975 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Texas has expired. The Senator from Rhode Island has 32 minutes. Mr. PASTORE. I think we ought to get this amendment clarified further. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand, Mr. President, after listening to this debate, that it is the Senate select committee, if there is one approved by the Senate, which has the final determination as to who shall have access to what informa- tion; is that correct? Mr. PASTURE. That is correct. Mr. MANSFIELD. No executive agency shall determine directly or indirectly who shall have access to information. Mr. PASTORS. That is correct. And I cannot be more explicit than that. I would like to have the amendment read. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new sec- tion as. !ouows: "No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or otherwise .to perform services for the select committee shall be given access to any classified in- formation by this relect committee unless such employee or person has received an appropriate security clearance as determined by the select committee. The type of secu- rity clearance to to required in the case of any such employee or person shall within the de termination of the select committee be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee.' The PRESIDING OFFICER_ The Sen- ator from Rhode Island has 30 minutes remaining. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, Will the Senator yield? 1,11r. PASTORE. I yield. Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator from Rhode Island, I think, has performed a very useful service in making plain-that the second part of this amendment is finally in hand for decisionmaking pur- poses of the committee. Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. Mr. CRANSTON. -But the first part creates a similar problem. 1,1r. PASTURE. No, he added the words for the first part, too; right at the end of the first sentence he added the words "within the determination of the select corunittee." 1.1r. CRANSTON. I have a somewhat similar question to ask; it is similar in its implication, and I perhaps.need the help of the Senator in figuring out what to do about it.. ' With respect to the words "unless such e-nploee or person has received an ap- propilate security clearance," who gives cccurity clearance? :'r. PASTORE. Usually by the FBI and all other sensitive agencies of Gov- erament. That is the way they do it now. Ir. CRANSTON. The question I ask Is, how do you prevent, and just make certain, that there is no abuse of this by the executive branch? They would not, I assume, try to hold down the staff to zero, but they might improperly with- -hold or delay security clearances. Mn PASTORS. Th& Senator from Montana just asked the question and I answered it. It is not up to any agency executive; it is up to the committee. Mr. CRANSTON. Who is going to give clearances, the committee or the execu- tive? Mr. PASTORE. The committee is going to determine whether the clearance is adequate and sufficient. Mr. CRANSTON. If a staff person that the committee wishes to use is denied clearance by the executive branch can the committee override and decide they are going to hire that person? Mr. PASTORE. Well, in an extreme case, I would have to answer the Senator in the affirmative, but I mean, after all, I do not anticipate that. I do not antici-. pate that trouble. Mr. CRANSTON. I did not anticipate it generally. I think we might anticipate it in regard to certain individuals who might render invaluable service to the committee but who might be preferred not to be on that committee staff by one or another of the agencies we are talking about. Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator saying to me if for some capricious motive some executive department refused to grant a clearance, the question would arise, would that put that individual out of commission? Mr. CRANSTON: Yes. Mr. PASTURE. The answer is no. The answer Is it is up to the committee to make the determination. Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine. I thank the Senator. Mr. PASTORE. OK. Does any other Senator wish to speak before we vote? Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am happy to have this opportunity to express my support for Senate Resolution 21, legislation establishing a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Oversight. As an original cosponsor of the resolu- tion offered by Senators MA,`isPIELD and MArHias, and as a strong supporter of this legislation offered by Senator PAs- ToRE, I believe this resolution to set in motion a responsible study of the intelli- gence activities carried out by or for the United States is of tremendous impor- tance. In supporting the creation of a select committee, as in sponsoring legislation to establish a permanent Joint Commit- tee on Intelligence Oversight, let me em- phasize that it is not my intention to criticize the distinguished chairmen of the Armed Services Committee or the Ap- propriations Committee, or the ranking minority members of those committees. They have done an admirable job in carrying out the diverse duties and re- sponsibilities of leadership on those com- mittees. In my view, however, the far- reaching operations of the some 60 Gov- ernment agencies which conduct an in- telligence or law enforcement function demand the careful scrutiny of a select committee created for that purpose and charged with that responsibility. Some have argued that Congress can- not be trusted to participate in the crit- ical and terribly secret operations of the intelligence community. They cite the fact that Washington has become known as a city of leaks. I suggest, though, that critics are losing sight of the explicit con- fidence in which Congress has dealt with national security agencies of the highest order in the past. In our past national conflicts, during World War I, World War II, the Korean war, and the war in Vietnam, the rule has been confidentiality where required. I am proud to serve on the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy, a committee which is so ably chaired by the sponsor of Senate Resolution 21, Senator PAS- TORE. I believe I am correct. in saying that, in more than a quarter century, there has never been a security leak from the Joint Committee, which daily deals with what are perhaps the most sensi- tive materials in the entire annals. of the defense establishment. It Is evident, then, that ample precedent. exists for congressional participation. in such a sensitive area. I am not' impressed by those who contend that Congress is not to be trusted with the truth. A balance must always be made be- tween the requirements of a. democracy for public knowledge, and the require- ments of its security and defense. When a doubt arises, the people's branch of Government must be privy to those re- quirements and the pertinent informa- tion required to make a balancing judg- ment. The outcome of the select committee inquiry, obviously, cannot be foreseen. I pledge my personal efforts. just as I- know the other members of the select committee will dedicate their efforts, to seeing that our job is done thoroughly and that we follow the facts whenever. they lead without fear or favor. This res- olution charters neither a whitewash nor a witch hunt; it does establish a select committee to carry out a sensitive mis- sion as fairly and as even handedly as. possible. It is not my intention to carry out a vendetta against the Central Intelligence, agency, or against any established intel- ligence agency of our Government. I be- lieve that the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies are necessary to the security, of our national institutions when they per- form their proper functions. Serious allegations have been made, ? however, and it is the responsibility of the Congress to weigh the charges, find the facts, and determine what remedial ac- tion, if any, is necessary to make sure that an effective intelligence program is maintained without endangering the rights of our citizens. Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate long. Everything has been said which should be said, I believe. I am pleased and I am gratified and enthusi- astic about the action that I believe the Senate is about to take. I think that it signifies diligence and sensitivity and the recognition of a necessary national pur- pose. It speaks well of the viability of this group as a great deliberative body in support of the executive branch of Government. I have no quarrel with the CIA. I cer- Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Jan2ta7?y 27, 197proved Fc(r QOi00 REC- IDR8S ZR000700040040-3 S977. tainly have no quarrel with the Senate Armed Services Committee or its distin- guished chairman. This resolution, how- ever, is drafted so that it extends far be- yond the CIA, to the entire intelligence apparatus of this country. Some of my colleagues may be interested to know there are 60 agencies of the U.S. Gov- erument that conduct some sort of Intel= ligence or law enforcement responsibility. There are 16 agencies of the Government conducting intelligence operations other than the CIA and the DIA, Defense In- telligence Agency, and the FBI, which have a combined budget of over a billion dollars a Year. The intelligence. of the Federal Government is an enormous business. . I became concerned about this matter in the course of. Watergate. The stories which have appeared in the press and. been related by others to me since that time have done nothing to allay. that concern. It is important, I believe; that we have a thoroughgoing investigation to determine whether or not the agencies Involved in the intelligence activities of, the Government are complying with the requirements of the law. . But maybe-just maybe, Mr. Presi- dent-there is one other thing that we need to do to reassure not only Congress but the people of this country, and that is to make sure that the intelligenceecom- munity and, of--course, to some extent the law enforcement community, Is. un- der somebody'.: control. They are not au- . tonomol.s entities within a representa- tive -democracy,' as I am sometimes tempted to suspect.. We are not talking about a Republican national administration or a Democratic. I rather suspect that some of the prac- tices that we see discussed in the public I pledge, as well, that the public's right Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the to know is second only to national sur- Senator yield? - vival, and that when we are finished with Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator. the private portion of these hearings Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send there will be a.public disclosure, a public an amendment to the desk and ask for its declaration including the good and bad, immediate consideration. recent and in the past. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The It Is a terrible time we are in. We have amendment will be stated. - not had a President who has completed The legislative clerk read as folllo:vs: his term, in a sense, since President Ei- At the end of the resolution add a new sec senhower. These are turbulent times tion as follows: when we have set about the business of SEC. 7. As a condition for employment as investigating ourselves to-the point where described in Section 3 of this Resolution, . sometimes I. think we are devouring our each person shall agree not to accept any public officials, oui leaders. - honorarium, royalty or other payment for a When I permit myself the luxury of speaking engagement, magazine article, book, or other endeavor connected with the inveeti- thinking that, sometimes it also dawns gation and study undertaken by this Com- on me that the investigation has been mittee. - - pretty productive, and we have got to do Mr.. PASTORE. I will accept this this one, too, not because we are bent on amendment, Mr. President political cannibalism, but because it has to be done. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- I believe, Mr. President, that it will be tion is on agreeing to the amendment of a ? _ the Senator from Oregon. done, and done effectively. The amendment was agreed to. t t respec I. pledge my efforts is tha Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send v I serve notice, 94 well, that I will deup another amendment for the purpose vote every ounce of f my energy gy to seeing - - - - - that we find. all the facts and pursue :of colloquy. . - . The PRESIDING OFFICER. The. ., _ them, wherever they lead us. amendment will be stated. - It is far too late in my political career . The assistant legislative clerk read as_ to worry about whom I might hurt or :follows - who might be injurad. _ on Page, 4, line 4, Insert after the word Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the. ?agency" the following: "or any Committee Senator. yield? or Subcommittee of the Congress." . - Mr. PASTORE. Have we voted on the On Page 5, line 13, Insert after the word, amendment? "agencies" the following: "or any Commit- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- -tees or Subcommittees of the Congress". . - tion is on agreeing to the amendment of Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, - I the Senator from Texas, as modified by would like to ask the Senator from Rhode the Senator from Rhode Island. Island a question because I may -with-. The amendment was agreed to. draw the amendment after I have the Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will-the record 'made on the problem that -con-? Senator from Rhode Island yield to me? corns me so greatly. - - -Mr. PASTORE. How. much time will a member of the Rules Commit- the Senator require? tee, I am aware that we have brought Mr. . TOWER. A couple of minutes. = Mr. PASTORE. All right... ? ? . ' before in the requests from various com- Mr. TOWER. Since- I have run out. of mittees and subcommittees in the Senate time. for the budget to operate that committee. - Mr. PASTORE. OS. The Internal Security Subcommittee Mr. TOWER. I have an amendment -of the Committee on the Judiciary, dur- here which I will either offer or not offer. Ing the presentation of their budget re- it is copied directly out of the resolution quest on February 27, 1974, indicated that authorized the select committee for that they kept records on various people the Watergate investigation. ? in this country which they gathered .It simply says: through intelligence activity. They had - The minority members of the select con- files, names of people that could be con- - mittee shall have one-third of the profes- sidered. as suspicious, and other such atonal staff of the select committee (includ- characteristics as they indicated to our Ing a minority counsel) and such part of the committee. . clerical staff as may. be adequate. My only point is that I realize that this Mr. PASTORE. Why not leave that to Is not a matter. of one Senate committee the committee? investigating 'other subcommittees or I think- committees where we have the word - Mr. TOWER. The Senate resolution re- "investigation" on page 2 of our resolu- quires 30 percent, I believe. _ tion today, however, we have some vari- Mr. PASTORE. Yes. ous generalities as to what this commit- Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from tee's authority may include. Rhode Island will simply assure me the A prime responsibility is that it can minority will get adequate staffing- look into, of course, any agency which is Mr. PASTORE. It will be up to the carrying out intelligence or surveillance committee itself. I will not have any au- activities on behalf of any agency of 'thority over the committee. the : ederal Government. - D/Ir. TOWER. I think an undertaking I would like to ask the Senator from by this side of the aisle would be honored Rhode Island if he considers that the by the majority on the committee. - language is broad enough, on page 2, Mr. PASTORE. All right, so I under- lines 8 and 9, to include the reviewing of take it. the activities of the Internal Security - Mr. TOWER. I thank my friend from Subcommittee of the Committee on the forum began a long time ago, and maybe , included' activities going all the way back, possibly, to the Eisenhower administra- tion, the Kennedy administration, and the Johnson administration. I think, Mr. President, one of the major undertakings of this committee ought to be to talk to the last surviving ex-President we have and to examine the records that are available to us to determine whether or not the President of the United States knows what is going on in the CIA, the DIA, and the FBI. I want to be reassured in that respect, and I confess I am not now. I suppose we would run into the. ,questions of. -our friendly adversaries on executive, privi- lege and executive powers with respect to those Presidential powers. I know for- mer President Harry Truman declined to grant certain information after he left oface, but I think we ought to try. We ought to find out not whether the CIA, for Instance, was engaged in domestic surveillance, but whether somebody was running the show. I know Congress was not running the show; and I want to be relieved of that shuddering fear I have that the White House was not, either. So I pledge, if I am a member of this committee, that I will conduct it as dis- cretly and privately as I can commen- surate with my responsibility. I pledge that we will be careful to tercets. nate .Approved For ReI?8e2T6~'T'1b9/03 : CIA-RDP83B0082' 8b6 ~o~T, as it might 94 8 Approved For 070004004 3n1tar'?l 1975 relate to snu veillance activities or gather- ing of intelligence. Mr. PASTORE- Well, I mean, if they so determine. I do not see how that is apt to happen. The House already dis- banded that committee. I hope we do it here in the Senate, as well. But this is a far-reaching authority. If they so choose to do It, I would say that they could, but I would not want to amend the present resolution as it now stands. PMIr. H.ATF'IELD. Would the Senator have any objections to the latitude and scope of this committee being interpreted to include some review or investigation of activities of the Internal Security Sub- committee, to see how it is collecting data? Mr. PASTORE. Well. If they have done things as bad as the CIA or FBI, if It is so determined, I do not see why any Senate committee should be immune. I mean, we have got to treat ourselves as we expect to treat everybody else. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I am very happy to hear the Senator say this, because it would seem to me if we are basically concerned about the abridge- ment of civil rights of our citizens through the action of gathering intel- ligence,. and so forth, of executive agen- cies, we should be doubly concerned about the procedures used by one of our own subcommittees of the U.S. Senate. I, for one, am not satisfied with the answers I received from the chief clerk of that subcommittee as he appeared -before our Rules Committee. I would like to think it is understood that the resolution certainly carries with it enough authority for that committee under this resolution to look into these activities of the Internal Security Sub- committee, if someone brings that issue up before the committee. Mr. PASTORE. Or any other com- mittee. - Mr. HATFIELD. Or any other com- mittee, but this one committee is already involved. Mr. PASTORE. But that is not the thrust, I want to make it clear, not the thrust of this resolution, but it would be encompassed in it because it is broad in scope. Mr. HATFIELD. I understand, but I would not want to exclude one of our own subcommittees, if we are so anxious to investigate the executive agency. That is why I am raising the question. Con- gress should look at Its own intelligence gathering and file keeping also. Pair. PASTORE. That is right. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I with- draw my amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn. Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Rhode Island yield to me 2 minutes? Mr. PASTORE. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator. Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I call up my amendment. Ths PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows: To :^etion 2 add a new subsection as fol- lows: Approved "(16) Whether new legislation or an amendment to any extsilug iegtsiation ahou;d be enacted-to strengthen the national secu- rity, intelligence or surveillance activities of the United States." Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, the amendment adds to section 2. beginning on page 3, one more paragraph, to insure that the Senate further expressly auth- orizes and directs the select committee to make a complete investigation with re- spect to the following matters, or ques- tions. It adds the question of whether there needs to be any bill introduced or any amendment to strengthen the na- tional security, intelligence or surveil- lance activities of the United States. I am aware, as the Senator from Rhode Island knows, that section 4 on page 10 of the bill authorizes the select commit- tea to recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces- sary for these purposes. But I want to be assured that the ques- tion will be answered by the committee, and to know that In case there was no forthcoming legislation that there would be a definite and definitive answer as to whether this question had been reviewed and answered by the committee In its recommendation. Mr. PASTORE. I would suppose so, otherwise this whole investigation would be a nullity. In other words, if nothing was found and nothing was wrong, and naturally, of course, they had given a bill of en- dorsement, we would have to change nothing by legislation. On the other hand, if certain authority was exceeded or the agencies went be- yond the. parameters of the present char- ter and got us mixed up in Laos, got us mixed up in Chile, got us mixed up in Cambodia and other parts of the world, where they had no authority without the consent of Congress, in that particu- lar case, the committee would come back and make a recommendation, if they would find it necessary to do so. I would hope, without encumbering this with duplicate language, that we would understand that these are legisla- tive words of art when it says the select committee shall have authority to recom- mend the enactment of any new legis- lation. They have the authority. I would hope that they would exercise it. Mr. BAR LETT. Will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE, What the Senator wants to do is to say that they have to make a recommendation one way or the other. Mr. BARTLETT. I am saying, if I may say to the Senator from Rhode Island, that they shall make a determination of whether or not there is legislation needed to strengthen the national security, in- telligence or surveillance activici_es, that. they shall make that determination. Is the Senator assuring me that they will make that determination in deciding whether or not they will avail themselves of the authority of section 4? Mr. PASTORE. I would hope so. I w ouid hope so. Mr. BARTLETT. With that assurance from the Senator from Rhode Island, I The PRESIDING. OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr, President, will the Senator yield? I would like to ask one question of the Senator from Texas regarding his amendment. I assume that it was not his intention - that the amendment would. be used to deny a member of the select committee staff of the knowledge of the existence of a classification designation or a classi- fied program. I ask that in light of the fact that many documents and pro- grams bear a classification that is actu- - ally higher than the secret which, 'itself. is classified. Mr. TOWER.. May I say to the Senator from California I believe we have already answered that question. It would be up to, the committee to determine what kind of clearance is required. That will be an internal housekeeping -matter for the committee. But the guidelines should be laid down. I believe the committee would want to be protected. I mentioned as a worst case theory awhile ago that per- haps a foreign intelligence-gathering organization, in the absence of any in- teilYgence clearing on our part, could insert one of its people into our commit- tee staff and actually penetrate the com- mittee. That would be of considerable embarrassment to the committee mem- ber. under whose sponsorship that per- son was. I think we should have that protection. - In addition to that fact, the country should have that protection. I believe we have a public responsibility to make sure that the people that we put in these staff positions are going to be people whose sense of discretion and loyalty are be- yond question. Mr. CRANSTON. I admire the Sen- ator's efforts to cut off such dangers. Since there is no law that gives the Exec- utive the power of clearance or dental of clearance, since that Is done by Execu- tive crder, whatever rules the committee writes will govern what happens in this area. - Mr. TOWER. This. is correct- It Is the committee's baby. . Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator. Mr. PASTORE. Well, let us see if we cannot put the baby to sleep. I suggest the absence of a quorum. Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator with- hold that for a minute and yield to me? Ivr. PASTORE. I yield. - Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in the Fri- day, January 24, issue of the. Arizona Re- public, William P. Maloney, Jr., a former ambassador to Ghana and a good Dem- ocrat who insists that CIA regulation is long overdue, he states that: . In the approaching investigations. It is im- portant to keep two things in mind: That a competent inteilio n e branch is essential to our survival and that the CIA, with all its faults. is one of the best, if not tite very best. orL=izatio:is of its kind around. So let us not throw the baby out with the bath. I ask unanimous consent that his letter in the Arizona Republic be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: - For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 pproved FV i ?MNW0 e . ? MAR000700040040-3 sr 979 January 27, 197Jun CIA RCGw.ASXGN LONG ovznnva As a. former diplomat. I have followed re- cent news on alleged involvement of the CIA in domestic affairs with special concern. Clearly, congressional oversight and appro- priate regulation of the agency are long over- due. A recent best sealer on the subject, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Mar- chetti & Marks, the accuracy of which is generally recognized, makes a compelling case in this regard. There is enough blame to taint all in- volved, not only the agency itself but recent administrations and especially a pliant and gullible Congress.. Additionally, the agency operates under a vague grant of powers which falls to define what is "domestic" and what is "foreign," let alone providing guid- ance for what falls in either category when it involves legitimate intelligence operations. But in the approaching investigations, it is important to keep two things in mind: that a competent intelligence branch is es. sential to our survival, and that the CIA. with all of its faults, is one of the best, if not. the very best, organizations of its kind around. So, let's not throw the baby out with the bath. Hopefully, in'the coming months both our domestic freedom as well as. the struc- ttue and role of this excellent organization will be strengthened,. Mr. SCHWEICIt. Mr. President, I would like to commend the distinguished majority and minority leaders for their decisive action in moving to establish a select Senate committee to investigate the recent charges involving various or- ganizations within the U.S. Intelligence community. I had introduced my own legislation in this area, Senate Resolu- tion 6, cosponsored by my colleague from Wisconsin (Mr. PaoxzmE), and I am pleased that the Senate has decided to move forward with a similar proposal. - I think it is appropriate to empha- size four points In connection with this. First, this Nation vitally needs an effec- tive intelligence service. No one disputes that, and I am confident no one in this body would support any action. which would undermine the effectiveness of Government organizations performing legitimate, necessary. Intelligence func- tions. In the 14 years I have served in the House and Senate, I spent. 10 years as a member of the Armed Services Com- mittee, both in the House and here in the Senate, and that experience convinced me of the necessity for an effective in- telligence organization. But second, and equally important, it Is the responsibility of the Congress to define legitimate Intelligence activities, and to establish guidelines which the ex- ecutive branch must follow in conduct- ing intelligence activities-and then to see that these guidelines are enforced. The intelligence community, like every other sector of our free society, must be subject to the rule of law=and in fact, because of the unique nature of intelligence activities, it is fundamental to the integrity of our free Institutions that the intelligence community respect .the rule of law. Unfortunately, the Congress has not been as vigilant in this area as it should have been. Despite nearly 200 legisla- tive proposals, no major legislation re- garding our intelligence community has been passed since 1949, when the original CIA charter was amended. In the inter- Approved vening years, the statutory authority of the CIA has apparently been modified and expanded by a series of secret ad- ministrative actions, Executive orders, and National Security Council actions. As a result, the CIA now has a "secret charter- which may be vastly different from the original statute passed by Con- gress-and even those Members of Con- gress with oversight responsibilities for CIA cannot say with confidence what is in the secret charter. I hope the select committee will focus a major inquiry in this area, and will untangle the various provisions of the secret charter and in- sure that our basic intelligence author- ity is embodied in a new, statute, passed by Congress, rather than in a series of secret documents. In a free society, the entire concept of a "secret charter" is an intolerable contradiction in terms. and must not be permitted. Third, there are numerous indications that the intelligence community-and particularly the CIA-has expanded its functions into noninteiligence areas, creating a shadow government, dupli- cating and even superseding the activi- ties of other Government agencies. I re- cently disclosed an unclassified, CIA con- tract proposal, asking American firms to conduct industrial espionage against our NATO allies and others, to determine their future plans in the area of ground transportation- Certainly we have a legi- timate Government interest in this area, but it should be pursued openly, by the Department of Transportation or Coln- xnerce, rather than covertly by the CIA. And in response to my.disclosure, our NATO allies said they would be happy to share information of this nature with our Government and in fact, are now doing so, thus elisninationg any need for CIA activity. I hope the select commit- tee will explore intelligence community activities in this area, to determine to what. extent a shadow government has in fact been created, pursuing nor- mal Government functions in secret, simply to avoid congressional oversight and accountability. Finally, I think it should be empha- sized that the CIA represents only about 15 percent of the entire U.S. intelligence effort. Recently, this has been the most visible 15 percent, in view of press dis- closures, but certainly no responsible congressional evaluation in this area can take place without inquiry into all facets of the U.S. intelligence community. My bill specifically authorized Inquiry into all U.S. intelligence agencies, and I would hope the select committee bill adopted today will have similar broad authority. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the reso- lution before the Senate is the product of long and thoughtful concern over the role of intelligence agencies in a demo- cratic society. Nearly 20 years ago, the distinguished majority leader urged the Senate to adopt a related measure to exercise its responsibility for the activi- ties of our Nation's intelligence com- munity. Since the adoption of the National Se- curity Act, there have been more than 200 attempts to establish separate and broadly based intelligence oversight committees for the Congress. Today, with the leadership of the dis- tinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island and the esteemed majority leader, and the many other Members of this body who have labored for this change, we can take a vitally significant step by- the creation of a Senate Select Commit- tee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. . This select . committee is similar in many respects to a proposal offered by Senators Msrrsrxal.n and A ATH_IAa which was referred to the Committee on Gov- ernment Operations. The Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, which I chair, held hearings on December 8 and 10 on that and other proposals to strengthen congressional oversight of in- telligence activities. While we will continue to explore the long-range congressional needs for a more permanent oversight mechanism, it is essential that we have a select com- mittee study what has gone before us and to measure past activities of our Intelli- gence agencies against_ the laws. which authorized them. . ' .. For many years now we. have been given constant assurances by the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelli- : gence agencies that they have been- forthcoming to the Congress through the appropriate channels such as the present oversight committees. Unfortunately, events of the past few years, and more particularly of the past few weeks, ap- pear to suggest that there is an instinct on the part of these agencies to withhold information from. the Congress to protect themselves. In the past, Proposals from the Con- gress, from scholars and from Presiden- tial task forces have been met with little more than indifference. Certainly public opinion and opinion in the Congress have changed, in recent years we have seen alarming evidence that the FBI has spied on Con- gressmen and on domestic political groups. The President has acknowledged that the CIA mistakenly became involved in domestic surveillance. We have had evidence of military agents spying. on civilians on behalf of an agency created by Department of Defense directive. The list goes on. The creation of a select com-,nittee to explore- these allegations and activities as well as the overall activities and re- sponsibilities of the entire intelligence community, represents an objective re- sponse by the Senate to difficult and complex circumstances. It is not a call for a witch hunt. At is an assumption of responsibility. This is an undertaking of the greatest importance. It is one which has the strong support of most of the Members of this body. , - It is essential that this select commit- tee bean now to obtain answerry to the many questions which have been raised in the short run about the recent dis- closures and allegations and in the long run about the authority and functions of all of our intelligence gathering agencies. The committee should address the question of how we can balance vital national security needs with the public's S 980 Approved Fo 22pD~p ~~oQ / 3~_ ~CCWW~~RR~pP83g008238000700040040-3 - ~ 55Ii~N REEOR~-SENATE January on, 1975 right to know what its Government is leged misconduct by the CIA and the of adverse publicity results. Witness the doing and why. FBI. Legislation was offered to establish Bay of Pigs fiasco and the toppling of If the events of the past 2 years are to- a Watergate-like select committee to the Allende government in Chile. While provide the momentum to help fashion thoroughly examine these allegations I do not dispute the need for secrecy in any changes in the way we conduct our and determine their validity. We are go- their overseas intelligence operations, I Government, they should at the very Ing to vote on that legislation this after- would be Interested to know if the CIA least underscore the necessity for public noon and I Intend to support it. operates solely under the direction of the accountability-in this case, account- In addition to the CIA and the FBI, National Security- Council and/or the ability to the Congress for the proper the select committee will also review the President. Correspondingly, have the and judicious administration of ?intelli- activities of the other Federal intelli- members of the current congressional gence gathering agencies and the assur- Bence gathering agencies, including the subcommittees on intelligence oversight ance that those activities are subject to National Security Council and the De- more often than not simply been pre- the restraint'of law as they, impinge upon fense Intelligence Agency. However, the sented with a fait accompli rather than the free exercise of our constitutional main focus will be an the heretofore consulted during. the initial decision- rights. largely unknown activities of A he Cen- making process? I do not think this is at If the select committee is to carry out tral Intelligence Agency and the Federal _. all clear and it should be. this wand t it t B a t b o , mus no e Impeded m ureau of Investigation. any way in its investigations. For the last 2 months,. the newspapers The committee should explore still tm- have been replete with stories of CIA answered questions about the use of in- involvement in Watergate-related In- telligence agencies in the Watergate trigue in violation of the CIA's legisla- incident and any other instances where tive mandate to restrict all intelligence agencies exceeded their authority. gathering activities to foreign countries. The committee should examine the existing laws and procedures for review of their implementation and recommend necessary changes. Finally, ? the work of the committee should serve as a basis for restoring pub- lic confidence in the Integrity and quality .of our Intelligence agencies. - In the December hearings before the Intergovernmental Relations Subcom- mittee, Senator BAKER testified. that as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities he was told at one point in his investigation that the CIA would supply no further in- formation to the Watergate, committee but instead would 'supply all of the in- formation to their regular oversight committees- Senator BAKER went. on to say: That effectively ended the Watergate Com- mittee's inquiry into CIA involvement. Based on the explanation by Senator MANSFIELD and Senator PASTORE on the day Senate Resolution 21 was introduced, there should be no question about the right and the authority of this commit- tee and its staff to obtain any Informa- tion which in any way affects or relates to the intelligence activities of the Gov- ernment. . - As the able majority leader stated so well : it should be made clear that this committee will only be able to perform its. function effectively if. the provisions of this resolution are liberally construed by com- mittees and by the agencies which are the subjects of its Investigation. Nothing should be able to be used as a bar to a thorough investigation- neither the system for classifying na- tional secrets nor the provisions of the National Security Act Itself. I am confident that the members of this committee will use this authority FBI was actively and illegally wiretap- ping civil rights leaders and other poli- ticians at the 1964 Democratic Conven- tion. Who, Mr. President, sanctioned these wiretaps? Who suggested to the CIA that they assist E. Howard Hunt with his masquerade for the purpose of clandestinely breaking into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist-a pat- ently illegal act? Who put together the Huston. plan to infiltrate dissident groups for the purpose of gathering In- formation on them? These are questions that need to be answered and I trust that in the course of the select committee's investigation they will be. Mr. President; the collection and cata- loging of information on individuals- without their knowledge or consent-has always been abhorrent to the American people. It is, at a minimum, a violation of the constitutional right to privacy as guaranteed by the fourth amendment and, at maximum, a threat to one's lib- erty and freedom 'of expression. In the context of these recent revelations, we hear the phrase "police 'state" bandied about and I am disturbed by it. A de- mocracy is founded on the principle that the Government is for the people, not against them. Consequently, as the elected Representatives of the American people and their interests, it is inctini- bent upon the Congress to' act quickly to insure that this unwarranted intru- sion into, the private lives of U.S. citizens has stopped and will not recur. The re- sponsibility is ours and the response must be ours as well. Mr. President, included within the pur- view of the select committee's inquiry is "The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad." I have al- -I have indicated my support for a permanent Joint Congressional Commit- tee on Intelligence oversight which should, in theory, enjoy a more compre- hensive oversight capability .than has been the case with the current subcom- mittees in the House and Senate. Given. that reality, however, exactly what will that oversight capability include? And, more importantly, given the congres- sional track record on sensitive informa- tion leaks, can the security of intelligence information imparted to the oversight committee be guaranteed? These are very serious questions in my mind and I hope that. the select committee will include ? them in its inquiry. Mr. President, I believe that the need . for the creation of a select committee to investigate the Federal intelligence com- munity has been amply documented. I strongly endorse- its. enactment. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President. I rise in support of Senate Resolution 21 creating a Select Committee to Investi- gate Intelligence Activities. At the outset, I want to state that the. intelligence community has served the Nation loyally and ably. Moreover, I want to take this opportunity to salute the dedicated, hard working man and women of the intelligence community whose work goes largely unheralded be- - cause of the climate in which they must work. Production of useful intelligence to guide the Nation's policy makers in mak- ing decisions relies upon the efforts of thousands of persons who do their work in a painstaking and careful way. While agent operations are important to the Nation, they constitute a very small proportion of the total intelligence effort. Agent operations have been glamorized in novels and movies. Most of us enjoy this kind of entertainment, but the image that emerges Is very far from reality. The truth of the matter is that the production of intelligence requires the painstaking work of many- specialists who carefully analyze information from many sources. Most of the work is far judiciously with the .utmost concern for erat?ions within the United States, from glamorous and very far from James par.- Bond. preserving and improving the institutions titularly those conducted by the CIA, but Under the political climate now pre- they are charged to examine. i would also like to remark briefly on the veiling, I suppose a, select committee was It has taken us a long time to reach need for some congressional knowledge of inevitable..I would have preferred that this important point but the effort prom- and input into the foreign intelligence the Senate inquire into intelligence ac- Ises to bring forth fruitful and construc- activities. tivities through the existing committees tive change. Up to this time, the Congress has gen- and subcommittees that have responsi- Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, early era'_ly had very little knowledge of CIA bilities for intelligence. last week the Senate determined to take operations in a foreign country unless In supporting Senate Resolution 21, an active role in the investigation of al- something goes wrong and a great deal I want to make It clear that in no way Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3. January 27, .Approved For 881fts 'W&383? AJ000700040040-3 S 981 do I agree to the crittatsm that has been made concerning our existing commit- tees. I know that our colleagues on these committees have done their utmost to carry out the trust of the Senate. Because the attacks on the intelligence community persist, and because part of that attack is directed to the existing committees, I am supporting Senate Res- olution 21 as a way to clear the air and set the record. When the distinguished senior Sena- tor, from Arkansas was chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, I believe he established the procedure of having closed hearings before open hear- ings were held. if I remember correctly, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas 1 established this procedure to protect both his subcommittee and witnesses from unnecessary embarrassment. It is my hope that the Senate select committee will proceed in a careful and deliberate manner. I believe the com- mittee's work, at least initially, should be in camera. Most of the Senators and staff, who are going to serve on the committee, are not thoroughly familiar with the orga- nization and functions of the intelli- gence community. Before any decision on open hearings is made, I would hope the members and staff would have ample opportunity to do some homework. Ube Senators and staff who serve.on the select committee are going to have knowledge o.: a lot of matters which, if . improperly handled, can cause our Na- tionharm, It is important that the select com- mittee establish sensible rules in dealing with the intelligence community. In other words, let us get the information we need to do the job but no more. There is a reason over and above se- curity considerations for the select com- mittee to hold its meetings in camera: The basic American idea of protecting professional and personal reputations unless unlawful or unethical acts are in- volved. Although Senate Resolution 21 does not specifically make this point, I believe the work of the select committee should have as its focus the National Security Act of 1947. It is that act and the direc- tives issued under its provisions which have created the intelligence community as we know it today. Using the act of 1947 as a frame of reference, I believe the select committee should have two prime objectives: First, to determine whether or not the act of 19t7 needs revision. Second, to determine whether or not there have been illegal activities within the intelligence community. If there have been illegal activities, then I believe the committee must de- termii:e whether these illegal activities constitute a pattern or are merely aber- rations. Sornetimes what may appear to be an illegal activity may turn out to be some- thin; quite different. Ultimately. the select committee will make its findings and recommendations known to the Senate. It would be a trag- edy for the Nation should this document reflect anything but the best of the Sen- ate. - If surgery is required, let it be per- formed only after the most careful diag- nosis. And, if there is surgery, let us use a very sharp scalpel-not a meat ax. Mr. DOMENICL Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is charged with conducting the kinds of intelligence activities that are absolutely essential to preserve our free and open democratic society in the real world in which we live. I say this because example after exam- ple has shown that our Nation must re- main ever-vigilant against the publicly stated desires of other governments to destroy our free existence. The charter establishing the CIA lim- ited it to foreign intelligence gathering. Allegations have been made that the charter has been exceeded on occasion. If correct, then much of the blame for these excesses lies with the Congress for failure to discharge its duty of congres- sional oversight. Recognizing that our Nation must have an intelligence gath- ering capacity that Congress has failed in its overight responsibility, the ques- tion becomes: Is the creation of a-select committee to investigate our intelligence operations, with all its extensive press coverage and certain leaks, the wisest method to explore and correct past wrongs and prevent future abuses? I have grave doubts. There are many possible alternatives to such a suggested select committee. One alternative that comes immediately to mind is the creation of a permanent joint committee to oversee intelligence gathering by our Nation's agencies. Such an alternative has been offered in the form of S. 327, which I have cosponsored and intend to support. However, the realities of our current situation dictate my reluctant support of Senate Resoultlon 21, with the strong reservations mentioned previously and an admonition to my colleagues that we must not breach our national security by revealing matters of truly critical impor- tance. These hearings must not be char- acterized by a veritable flood of leaks and publicity stunts that will perma- nently jeopardize the effectiveness of our intelligence operations which serve a very legitimate purpose. We must be on our guard that such legislation with a commendable purpose is not allowed, through error or excess, to undermine our country's security. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, yes- terday's Washington Post included an editorial by Walter Pincus entitled "'Spies' and Presidents." In speaking of the investigation before a select commit- tee to study the Federal intelligence community, Mr. Pincus declares that: No select Senate committee-not even a joint congressional committee-wilt get to the bottom of the U.S. intelligence commu- nityproblems without the full and -active, support of President Ford and his staff." This is because. he goes on to say, "The inquiry into i ltel1i an e activities must inevitably find out what pact Presidents authorized the agencies to do. Because of its particular relevance to the bill ire will vote on today, I am bring- ing this article to the attention of my colleagues. Mr. President, .I ask unani- mous consent that the text of Mr. Pin- cus' editorial be printed at this point in the Rzcoaa. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Rrcoav, as follows: "Serz3' AND P SIDEPrs (By Walter Pincus) No select Senate committee--not even a joint congressional committee--will get to the bottom of the U.S. Intelligence coca- munity's problems without the full and ac- tive support of President Ford and his staff.. The reason is simple: such an Inquiry must inevitably end up trying to find out what past Presidents and their stags authorized these agencies to do; what formal groupa, such as - the, 40 Committee, approved; and what steps, if any, the White House ever took to stop abuses of authority or projects that. were il- legal on their face. Current newspaper allegations about the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic no- tivities and the CIA partial amdrnsation plus admission that the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation has collected files oa members of Congress Illustrate the point. Former CIA Director Richard Helms tied the start of that agency's domestic activities in the late 1960s to "the express concern of the President" (Lyndon Johnson), although he did not detail how this "concern" was transmitted-to him. The present CIA Direc. tor, William Colby, told a Senate subcom- mitteethat. under Helms, the agency on Aug. 15, 1967 established a unit within Its coun- terintelligence department "to loo's into the possibility of foreign links to American dis- sident elements." Two weeks later, Ct.tby went on, the executive d_rector of the.Presl- dent's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder asked how the CTA might asals4 that inquiry.. in setting up the commission, President Johnson's executive order had called upon all government agencies to cooperate. Colby never stated, In his prepared text, why or under what authority Helens had established the unit prior to receipt of the, commission's request for assistance. Colby did add, how- - ever, that later the same year "the CIA ac tirity became part of an interagency program, In support of the national commission- (on disorder), among others." . What that program was and who the "oth- ers" were who received its output were not spelled out. The only known group est2b- liahed at that time was one Intended to work out a plan for handling disorders in Wash- ington. Former participants on that Inter- agency panel from the Pentagon and Justice Department don't remember CIA having been a party. Colby's later disclosure.-that at this time the agency's Office of Sectalty "inserted 10 agents into dissident orgur L'ratigns operat- ing In the Washington, D.C. area ... to gather information relating to plans for demonstrations . . . that might endanger CIA personnel, facilities and information-- parallels what this Interagency group did. Whatever the facts were, only information from the White House tracing establishment of each a group could shed light on how the CIA became a participant. In 1969, the CIA was asked by the White House to undertake surveillance of the Presi- dent's brother, Donald Nixon, who, accord- ing to documents from the Ilouse impeach- ment Inquiry, was moving to Las Vegas where it was feared he "would come into contact with criminal elements." The agency refused, but the Secret Service Act, which requires government agencies to cooperate in the pro- tection of the President and his family, may - - have been the source of other such requests, Only the White House can disclose what role Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 S982 Approved Fir &Kg P/OAEgQP QA8 R0007OOO4W g 27, 1975 the CIA has been asked to play under that law. In 1070 and 1971, White House aides asked CIA to participate in what was known as the Huston domestic intelligence plan and to provide assistance to a former agency official, E. Howard Hunt,'who at the time worked for the President. Again, the question must be raised as to what White House authorization the agency was given to undertake the re- r_ues:ed activities. Hunt's aid was cut off only when, in the words of the man who was then chief assistant to the deputy director, it appeared the agency was becoming involved in a "domestic clandestine operation." In 1971 and 1972, according to Colby, the CIA undertook physical surveillances of five Ame:Icans including, apparently, newsman Jack Anderson, "to Identify the sources of (ne'sS) leaks." This appears to complement the so-called "national security" wiretaps conducted by the FBI at the direction of the Nixon White House from 1969 to 1971. Again, the agency and the White House must make clear the authority under which the CIA conducted such operations. In March 1974, Colby "terminated the do- riestlc intelligence collection program (be- gun 7 years earlier) and Issued specific guide- lines that any collection of counterintelli- gence Information on Americans would only take place abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI. Was this at White House direction? And if not, could a future President reverse such a policy? Tae FBI situation Is slightly different. There is no information as to how or why former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began collecting politically-tantalizing material about congressmen and other public figures. One point is clear, however-lie frequently used the information to titillate Presidents, and apparently no Chief Executive or White House aide ever told him to stop. When the so-called "national security" FBI wiretaps were operating, Hoover regularly sent social and political gossip picked up from over- heard conversations to Nixon chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman. No objection or order to stop ever came back from the Oval Olfice. One other presidential role in these areas needs exploration. Were agency directors ordered by the White House to cover up certain activities when called before con- gressional committees? Former CIA Director Helms, for example, when questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee In February 1973, was asked directly about CIA participation in a White House plan in 1969 or 1970 to coordinate domestic Intelligence activities. Helms said he could not recall- though he knew full well of his activities in 1970 Huston plan discussions. Last week he told senators he misunderstood the question, At a May 1973 hearing. Helms told senators he had no Idea that Hunt, prior to public nten>ion of the Ellsberg break in; "was going to be Involved in any domestic activity." Of course, he did-that was why aid to Hunt s`,opped. Former President, Nixon and his's l:ept a close watch over any congres- sional testimony that could Implicate them Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. . The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for 2 minutes? Mr. PASTORE. I yield. JOINT REFERRAL OF CERTAIN' COMMUNICATIONS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a communica- tion from the Federal Energy Adminis- tration transmitting a study under Pub- lic Law 93-391, be referred jointly to the Committees on Interior and Insular Af- fairs, Public Works, Commerce and Fi- nance, and that a second communication received this day from the Council on En- vironme.ital Quality on Land Use, pre- pared as a part of its annual report, be referred jointly to the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Public Works, Commerce. Agriculture and For- estry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE TO FILE REPORTS UNTIL .M DtUGHT TONIGHT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce be authorized" to file re- ports until midnight tonight. . The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection., it is so ordered. . unanimous consent that the order for the quorum be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Pursuant to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to vote on the resolution, as amended. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in-the negative). On this vote I have a pair with the junior Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON). If he were present, he. would vote "Yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "Nay." I therefore withdraw my vote. Mr. GRIFFIN (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT). If he were present, he would vote "nay." If I were perrrdtted to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw my vote. - Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD: I announce that the Senator from Washington (Mr. - JACKSON), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from California, (Mr. TUNNEY), and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTRE) are -necessarily - absent. - I further announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HvnoLESTON), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOaYE) are absent on official business. - I further announce that, if present and. voting, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Cali- fornia (Mr. TIINNE-v) would each vote .,yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) is necessarily absent. . I also announce that the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATifris), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. McCLVRE), and the Sen- ator from Vermont (Mr.- STAFFORD) are absent on official business. I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent to attend a funeral. I further announce that, If present and voting, the Senator from New York. (Mr. JAVITS), and the Senator from Maryland - (Mr. MATHIAS) would each vote "yea." . The result was announced-yeas- 82, - nays 4, as follows: tROilcall Vote No. 1 Leg.] - YEAS-S2 Abourezk Eastland Metcalf - Allen Fannin Mondale Baker Fong . Montoya or their assistants in Watergate. Was Helms tcid to mislead? The Senate continued with the con- If current congressional efforts to harness sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21) tae Intelligence community.break up as a to. establish a Select Committee of the re t of lack of White House cooperation, Senate to conduct an investigation and ddi:tonal allegations of past wrongdoings study of governmental operations with are mound to be made because the climate respect to intelligence activities. rervi es has and changed. outside Strong the Internal al agency security Mr PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for :: E?r~tC h 1sa c:^sh1p has gone. And on Capitol Hill, the the yeas and nays on passage. cud staunch defenders of intelligence ac- The yeas and nays were ordered. are either zone or powerless. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug- Bartlett Ford Bayh Garn Beall Glenn Morgan Moss Muskie Bellmon Goldwater Nelson - Bentsen Gravel Nunn Biden Hansen Packwood Brack Hart, Gary W. Pastore Brooke Hart, Philip A. Pearson Buckley Haskell Percy Bumpers . Hatfield Proxmire _ Burdick Hathaway . Randolph Byrd. Hollings Ribicof Harry F., Jr. Hruska Roth By-d, Robert C. Humphrey ?' Schwelker Cannon Johnston Scott. Hugh Case Kennedy Sparkman Chiles Laxalt Stennis r C?r :.nwr Clark Lon., . i r ':e functions of the Intelligence comma- Tha PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk Cranston b:aenuson _Ley, the future looks grim-indeed black If will Call the roll. Culver Mansfield the Ford White House fails to see that far ? The assistant legislative clerk pro- Curtis McClellan more is needed than a }t(~~}1~ i}~~1q~ coaLnission studying a H3tY lbbr stit' dl~ele ~l8 r1Yt18~6~1z CIA-RDP83B008."VA Q700dX&r Bra allegations. Mr. MANSFIELD._Mr. President, I ask Eagleton . McIntyre QUORUM CALL Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the. absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Stevens Stevenson Stone Symington Tower Weicker Williams Approved For Release 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 January 27,,1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-=SENATE. S 983 NAYS--4 kind Which have any tendency to reveal the covert intelligence activities in the United Helms Talmadge full facts with respect to the following mat- States and abroad. Such other related matters as the Scott. Thurmond tern or questions: (1b) _ carry William t. A (1) Whether er the A gal Intelligence domestic coout mmie r deeilitle9 under section (a Pg)rgW^7T AND LY rVING LIVE PAIRS, AS intelligence operation in the United States. Sec. S. (a) To enable the select commit- PREVIOUSLY RE (2) The conduct of domestic intelligence tee to make the investigation and study au. Young, against or counterintelligence operations against thorized and directed by this resolution, the Grif3n, for. United States citizens by the Federal Bureau Senate hereby empowers the select com- NOT VOTING-11 of Investigationor any other Federal agency. mittee as an agency of the Senate (1) to (3) The origin and disposition of the so- employ and Sx the compensation of such Hartke Javits Stafford called Huston Plan to apply United States in- clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and Huddieston Mathias Taft telligence agency capabilities against indi- other assistants. as it deems necessary or Inouye PicOlure Tunney viduals or organizations within the United appropriate, but it may not exceed the nor- Jackson Pell States. . -mal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and So the resolution (S. Res. 21) Was (4) The extent, to which the Federal Bu- act at any time or place during sessions, re- agreed to, as follows reau of Investigation, the Central Intelli- cesses, and adjournment periods of the Sen- S. REa. 21 gene Agency, and other Federal law enforce ate; (3) to hold hearings for taking Resoit?ed, To establish a select committee meat or intelligence agencies coordinate their testimony on oath or to receive documentary of the senate to conduct an investigation respective activities, any agreements which or physical evidence relating to the matters and study of goveruuaental operations with govern that coordination, and the extent and questions it is authorized to investigate respect to intelligence activities and of the to which a lack of coordination has contrib- or study; (4) to require by subpena or extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or uted to activities or actions which are ille- otherwise .the attendance as witnesses of unethical activities were engaged In by any. gal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con- any persons who the select committee be. agency of the Federal Government or by any trary to the intent of Congress. lieves have knowledge or information con- persons, or in combina- (5) The extent to which the operation of cerning any of the matters or questions At acting domestic intelligence or counterintelligence is authorized to investigate and study; (5). lion with o, with respect-to ny bebAlf activities and the operation of any other ac- to require by subpena or order any depart-.. = ligence actithersvity carried out cby tivities within the United States by the Cen- meat, agency, officer, or employee of the of the Federal Government; be it further tral Intelli ency Agency conforms to the leg- executive branch of the United States Gov- Resolved, That (a) there is hereby estab- g . which islative charter of that Agency and thu intent : ernmeat, or any private person, firm, or cor- llshed a select committee of the Senate of the Congress. potation, to produce for its consideration or the may select Co cairnmm mi sittee To ee 11,o Stud y of expression- (6) The past and present interpretation for use as evidence in its investigation and tai Operations With Respect to Intelligence ca by tote Director of Central Intelligence of the study any books, checks, canceled checks, Activities to conduct an investigation and responsibility to protect intelligence sources correspondence, communications, document, study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, and methods as it relates to the provision in papers, physical - evidence, _ records, record- improper, or unethical activities were ea- section 102(d) (3) of the National Security ings, tapes, or materials telating to any of in by any agency or by any persons, Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)) that "... the matters or questions it is authorized to. gaged that the ency shall have no police, subpena, investigate and study which they or any of - acng wIth others, S carryng o out or in any Intentellike ce law enfor ement powers, or internal security them may have in their custody or. under with others, ce activities behalf of functions...:' their control; (6) to make to the senate- ag eiy of net Feder l o on bent. of (7) Nature and extent of executive branch any recommendations - it . deems appropriate or any agency the Federal Government. oversight of all United States intelligence in respect_to the willful failure or refusal (b) The select committee created by this activities. of any person to answer questions or give ppon ed t d mem thebers Prest- 8 The need for specific legislative sit- testimony in his character as, a witness dur- resolution Senate, on shall consist a of dent of the sie a be the majority mem- hority to govern the operations of any Intel- - ing his appearance before It or in respect to Of the emligence agencies of the Federal Govern- the willful failure or refusal of any officer or dent of tsenate from t he recommendations omen ve berS of the aj Senate upon f the Senate, te, and five meat now existing without that explicit scat- employee of the executive branch of the ority minority the members r of he Senate, and ve utory authority, including but not limited to United States Government of Say person, o mems d f the Senate to be RP- agencies such as the Defense Intelligence firm, or corporation to produce before the the m the Pres ident of the Senate upon Agency and the National Security Agency. committee any books, checks, canceled the recommendation the the minority leader The nature and extent to which Federal checks, , correspondence, communications, of the Senate. For thpurpoden of peof agencies cooperate and exchange Intelligence document, financial records, papers, physical graph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of information and the adequacy of any regula- evidence, records, recordings,. . tames, or the Senate, service of a Senator as a mem- tions or statutes which govern such coopers materials In obedience to any subpena or ber, chairman, or vice chairman of the select lion and exchange of intelligence informs- order; (7) to take depositions and other committee shall not be taken into account. tion. testimony on oath .anywhere within' the (c) The majority members of the com- (9) The extent to which United States !n-. United States or in any other country; (81 mittee shall select a chairman and the minor- agencies, are governed by Executive to procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants, or orga- icy members shall select a vice chairman and telligence orders, rules, or regulations either published the committee shall adopt rules and prose- or secret and the extent to which those Exec- nizations thereof, In the same manner and dares to govern its proceedings. The vice under the lconditions as a standing- the Senate may procure such chairman shall preside over meetings of the utive orders, rules, or regulations interpret, committee same select committee during the absence of the expand, or are In conflict with specific Iegis- . Soicit unof section a may or the Lsuch chairman, and discharge such other respon- lative authority. lative Reorganization Act of 1948; (9) to use sibilities as may be assigned to him by the ? (10) The violation or suspected violation on a reimbursable basis, with the prior con- select committee or the chairman. Vacancies of any State or Federal statute by any In- sent of the Committee on Rules and Ad- l In the membership of the select committee telligence agency or by any person by or on ministration, the se of personnel agency, to use shat not affect the ate the the of t he eral Government including but not limited authority of ing members to execute the of the starts titious entries, surveillance, wire- on a reimbursable basis or otherwise with select committee and shall be filled in the to p the prior consent of the chairman of any same manner as original appointments to it taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the subcommittee of acommittee of the Sea- es of any services any members a e made. United States mail, or the monitoring of the ate the facilities h (d) A majority of the members of the se- United States mail. of the staffs of such other-Senate commit- lest committee shall constitute a quorum for (11) The need for Improved, strengthened, tees or any subcommittees of such other the Senate committees whenever the select the transaction of business, but the select or consolidated oversight of United States In- committee may affix's lesser number as s. telligence activities by the Congress. - committee or its chairman deems that such .quorum for the purpose of taking testimony (12) Whether any of the existing laws of action Is necessary or appropriate to enable or depositions. the United States are inadequate, either in the select committee to make the invest!- Sac. 2. Ti:a select committee is authorized their provisions or manner of enforcement, to gation and study authorized and directed safeguard the rights of American citizens, by this resolution; (11) to have direct access and directed to a everything necessary or to Improve executive and legislative control through the agency of any members of the appropriate a make the Investigations the first and of intelligence and related activities, and to select committee or any of its investigatory . sect o specified in abridging (a) ) any the resolve uncertainties as to the authority of or legal assistants designated by it or Its section. ' con er abridging in any way the he United States intelligence and related agen- chairman or the ranking minority member ..nut' ee b conferred upon the select com- vies. to any data, evidence,' ittlormation, report, ate a by the preceding authorizes a and the Sett- directs (13) Whether there Is unnecessary dupil- analysis, or document or papers, relating to the select mmittecation of expenditure and effort in the col- . any of the matters or questions which it is ate elect committee to make a complete investigation and study of the activities of lection and processing of intelligence infor- authorized and directed to investigate and any merry or of any p~. @ oration fates a encies. stud in the custody or under the control a* oY'si'lSeleat6 ,~ `E d:DP~B~iBflitd8~t3F ~(d~7 ? cy. officer, or em- ,groups of persons or o ! Approved For Release 2001/09703 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE January 27, 1975 S 984 p!oyee of the executive branch of the United States Government, including any depart. ment. agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the power : er the laws of the United States to inves- tizate any alleged criminal activities or to presecute persons charged With crimes against the United States and any depart- rnent. agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the au-, thority to conduct intelligence or survetl- lanae within or outside .the United States, . without regard to the jurisdiction or au- thority of any other Senate committee, wblch will aid the select committee to pre-. pare for or conduct the investigation and sandy authorized and directed by this reso- 5lution; and (12) to expend to the extent it dete.-nir_es necessary or appropriate any moneys made available to it by the Senate to perform the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the investigation and study it is authorized by this resolution to make. (b) Subpenas may be issued by the select committee acting through the chairman or any other member designated by him, and .may be served by any person designated by such chairman or other member anywhere' within the borders of the United States. The chairme a of the select committee, or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized ? to administer oaths to any witnesses appear- ing before the committee. . (c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation and study authorized and dt rected by this resolution, the select com- mittee shall be empowered to exercise the powers conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of title 18; United States Code, or any other Act of Congress rog elating the granting of Immunity to witnesses. Sec. 4. The select committee shall have au- tho:ity to recommend the enactment of any ne v legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces- sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the nacionst security, Intelligence, or surveil- lance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to those activities. S=c. 5. The select committee shall make a fnat report-of the results of the investiga- tion and study. conducted by it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and its recommendations as to new congres- sional legislation it deems necessary or de- sirable, to the Senate at the earliest practica- ble date, but no later than September 1, 1973. The select committee may also submit to the Senate such interim reports as it con- siders appropriate. After submission of its rr-al report, the select committee shall have three calendar months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of such three calendar months shall cease to exist. 6. The expenses of the select commit- tee through September 1, 1975, under this Tso:cation shall not exceed $750.000 of which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be avail- able for the procurement of the services of individual consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the coatin gent fund of the Senate upon vouchers rnpro.ed by the chairman of the select com- nei? t=e. ? S--c. 7. The select committee shall institute -^_d c>rry out such rules and procedures as it m deem necessary to prevent (1) the dis- committee, or any cicst,:?e, outside the select i:,rorrtatlort relation to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other c:enartmer t or agency or the Federal Govern- ?nt; en^a--ad In intelligence activities, ob- ties of the Central Intelligence Agency In foreign countries or the Intelligence activt- tles In foreign countries or any other de- partment or agency of the Federal Govern- ment: . Src. 8. As a condition for employment as described in section 3 of this resolution, each person shall agree not to accept any honor- arium, royalty or other payment for a speak- ing engagement, magazine article, book, or other endeavor connected with the investiga- tion and study undertaken by this commit- tee. Ssc. 0. No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or other- wise to perform services for the select com- mittee shall be given access to any classified information by the select corrimittee unless such employee or person has received an ap- peepriate security clearance as determined by the select committee. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, within the determination of the select committee, be commensurate. with the sensitivity of the classified Information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the reso- lution was agreed to. Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to_ SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE? CREDENTIALS The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now pro- ceed to the consideration of the motion by the Senator from Montana (Mr. MVIP.1QSPTSLD) to refer all credentials and papers dealing with the New Hampshire election dispute to the Committee on Rules and Administration, which the clerk will state. The time on this debate is limited to 1 hour, to be equally di- vided and controlled by the Senator from Montana (Me. MANSFIELD) and the Sen- ator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), The Senate will be in order. The clerk will state the motion. The legislative clerk read as follows.. The Senator from Montana (Mr. Divcrs- FinaD) moves that the credentials of Louis C. Wyman and John A. Durkin and all papers now on file with the Senate relating to the same be referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration for recommendations 'thereon. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business be laid aside temporarily, so that I may complete the work on the res- olution providing for the select commit- tee, on which the Senate has just, ex- pressed its approval. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may we have order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Montana has the floor. May we have order in the Senate? to 'establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an Investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to state, before proceeding with the dis- cussions and consideration of this resolu- tion, that insofar as the majority leader is concerned, the chairman of the Com- mittee on Armed Services, our colleague from Mississippi (Mr. Srz ie ts) is owed a vote of thanks because throughout the years he has scrupulously endeavored, to the best of his ability and in line with his other responsibilities, to scrutinize all activities of intelligence agencies related to the defense community. He need not yield to any Member of this body his stance as the preeminent "watchdog" of the Congress in performing this critical oversight function. I commend JOHN Srnrrsls. The Senate commends JoHN SrLw.vm for his assiduous and conscien tigtu work in this endeavor. Mr. President, now that the select committee has been approved by the Sell-. ate, the minority leader and I have, di- rected a. letter to the heads of agencies: and departments of Government most preeminently concerned with intelli-..._ gence endeavors. The letter reads as .Allows: As you may be axare; the Senate to = duct an investigation and study of govern- went operations with respect to intelligence. activities. The scope. of the investigation is set out in S. lies. 21, a copy of which has been enclosed for your information. We are ,writing to request that you not destroy. remove from your possession or con- - trol, or otherwise dispose or permit the dis- posal of any records or documents which might have a bearing 'on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res, 21. Sincerely yours, - This letter is being directed to heads of 19 separate governmental units as listed here: Jsrrveax 21, 1975. ? . Honorable William E. Colby, Director, Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, and as Coordinator of Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. 20505. ' Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham,-Director, De- fence Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. Honorable William B. Saxbe, Attorney General, Dept, of Justice, 9th and Constitu- tion N.W.. Washington, D.C. 20530. Mr. John C. Feeney, Acting Asst. Attorney General, Criminal Div., 9th and Constitution N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530. Mr. John It. Bartels Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 1405 Eye St. iV.W., Washington. D.C. 20537. Honorable James R. Z-acretary of Defense, Room 3E 880. The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. -Honorable Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army, Room 3E 718, The ?eeutagon, Washington, D.C. 20310. Hon. J. W. Middendorf, Secretary cf the Navy, Room 4E 710, The Pentagon, Washlrg- ton, D.C.20350. Hon. John L. McLucaa, Secretary of the Air Force, Room 4E 871, The Pentagon, Wash- ington, D.C. 20330. Lt. Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Director. National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, r, c :wed by the select committee during the SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY c? trso of its study and investigation, not GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AC- a :*.harised by the select committee to be TrvITIES d_,e!j,ed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the ~r :c.lee*, committee, of any iti?t~jled Re~ i 0/A~/b8' 1 7 . ~ would adversely affect the Intelligence activi- S era.ion of he resolution Approved For Release 2001/09/03 :CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040=3 A Li rules and to define their procedures, and that would include the question of when to close or open the door to the use of television. As I have indicated, I would not anticipate any great requirements for the latter at this time. Most emphat- ically, I would express the hope, too, that committee staff would. be selected with as much concern for discretion as for other. qualifications. What comes to the public ' from this committee and when. ought to be solely -I stress the word "solely"--determined by the members of - the committee. ? . ? The Senate is entrusting this commit- tee with its deepest confidence. I know that that trust is secure and that the re- sults of the inquiry will reflect the high- est credit on this institution. I submit to the Chair the names of those assigned to - the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities and ask that . they be read and I'do so on behalf of the - distinguished Republican leader and myself. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will. read the nominations. - - The assistant legislative clerk read as follows Senators Church. Hart of Michigan, Mon- dale, Huddleston, . Morgan... and Hart of Colorado. 'Mr. MANSFIELD. The, Republicans also. The assistant legislative clerk read as Senators Tower, Baker, - Mathias, and Schwelker. et cetera, applies as well to all agencies and sub agencies concerned but not spe- cifically singled out. The task faced by the select commit- tee which the senate has just established is to examine into the intelligence ac- tivities of the U.S.. Government. No more . important responsibility to the people of the Nation can be assumed by Senators than membership on this committee. What is asked of them, in the name of the Senate, is to probe fully and to as- sess completely, to understand thorough- ly and to evaluate judiciously. To the ex- tent that the intelligence agencies have acted correctly and within, the law, that must be made known. if there have been abuses, they, too, must be set forth. There can be no whitewash in this inquiry: nor is there room for a vendetta. in the end, 'the Senate must know what has. tran- spired so that it may seek to close legal loopholes it there are any. In the end, we must brow so that together with the House and the President,- we may move to foreclose any demeaning of the basic premises of a free society. . What is at stake in the work of this committee is a resolution of doubts. What is at stake is a restoration of confidence in a large and costly and little known segment of the Federal Government. The Senate must be satisfied that the intelli gene community is doing the people's business, to the end that the Nation may be with assurance so advised. The Sen- ate must be 'persuaded that what is be- ing done in the name of security under a cloak of obscurity is the people's busi- ness, as defined, not by employees of a Government agency, but the people's business as defined by the Constitution and the laws duly enacted thereunder. The committee is called on, further- more, to elucidate for the Senate the relevance of the intelligence commu- nity as it now operates to the Nation's contemporary needs. We need to know what may be.required, today, not what might have seemed necessary yesterday. The fact that a commission is looking into the CIA is all to the good; the re- sponsibility of that group is to the Presi- dent who created it. Its existence in no way relieves us of our responsibilities. It Is appropriate and proper at any time that the Senate so determines, to inquire into any agency and, as necessary, to seek to clarify and redefine its functions and the scope of its activities. One aspect of the impending inquiry concerns covert activities. Theee activ- ities have been acquiesced in, to say the least, by the Congress for a long time. No one should be surprised or appalled, therefore. to discover their existence a quarter of a century later. In recent years, however, the extent and necessity for them have come under question. Who sets the policy and why? What obtuse intrusions may there have been by these activities into the President's conduct of .foreign affairs? What indifference, if any, to the laws passed by the Congress? What damage, if any, to the demeanor of the Nation? What interference in the personal lives of Americans and by whose authority and under what guidelines? What public funds have been committed and to what end? What proliferation of Approved For Release 2001/09/03.: CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 ' activities and -how much . overlap and duplication? It used to be fashionable, Mr. Presi- dent, for members of Congress to say that insofar as the intelligehce agencies were concerned, the less they knew about such questions, the better. Well, in my judgment, it is about time that that at- titude went out of fashion. It is time for the Senate to take the trouble and, yes, the risks of knowing more rather than less: We have a duty, individually, and collectively, to know what legislation en- .acted by Congress and paid for by ap- propriations of the people's money has spawned. in practice in the name of the United States. The Congress needs to recognize, to accept and to discharge with care its coequal responsibility with the Presidency in these matters. The Senate has begun to address itself to these questions by approving the cre- ation of this select committee. There is a need to understand not only the pres- ent intelligence requirements of- the United States but also what systems or procedures for oversight and account- ability ma;/ be required to keep them within bounds set by the Constitution, the President and the elected Repre- sentatives of the people in Congress. Wisely, I believe, a special committee for handling the investigation has been established by this action today. The scope of inquiry is far larger than can come. within the purview of any- single committee. Hopefully, within the select committee, the pieces-all-of the pieces- can. be fitted together. May I say that in- sofar as the Senate is concerned, I think this action expresses the expectation that the matter will be concentrated in this one committee. In. my judgment, it would be most Inapproprruw v a -The S of studies of intelligence to proceed ow charged. Mr. N The select committee is equipped with _,,, ,.., a. ? wllu will be selected for service on back on . committee are no different than the rest. ,*,~,,, it bon or a white or pink ribbon. There is no higher or lower order of patriotism in the Senate. There are no first- and sec- I~FSflL are men of competence, understanding. JOHN tee will act with discretion, with re- able John P. KluczynskL straint and with a high sense of ma- from the Slate of Illinois. u n.vuinu a XLr s vs. " ,,.... ~......-???- ? the funeral There is only the need to see to the sober Resolved- late continued with til of the credenti of the U.S. Senator rom. th -mpshire. RESIDING 0' . CER. ,7 . NSFIELD. Mr. Preside z the regular o er of bu .-SIDING O C. to Mansfield m tion. ator from Illino is reco ent, I MR. They mthe > clerk re has bear l of the Represe of 65 Me _ers of th dated to a at Arms c rected to ry for cat esolutton is Conn KLUCZYNS e message f stant legislativ at the serge 593J. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Investigations SUBJECT : Security 1. The Ad Hoc Security Group of your committee, with representation from DIA, ERDA, FBI, NSA and CIA, has considered security measures and procedures which should be sought from the Select Committees in the interest of both national security and the protection of privacy of individuals. 2. There are certain issues that appear to us of such concern and of such a nature that agreement on these issues lies principally with the DCI and the chairmen of these committees. Once such agreement is made in principle, then, hopefully, the other security measures could be implemented. 3. There are attached the following: (a) Agreements to be sought by the DCI with Chairmen of the Select Committees. (b) Guidelines for protection of information and documents furnished the Select Committees which should be discussed with and, hopefully, adopted by them. (c) Suggested secrecy agreement for personnel employed by or assigned to Select Committees. 4. It is recommended that these be presented to members at the next meeting of your committee for approval. Attachments Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES 1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings. regarding sensitive matters,that: (a) Departments and agencies shall have the right to request that testimony be given only in executive session, that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and that certain testimony be heard only by members and in some cases only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman. (b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony prior to any publication of it. (c) The "Third-Agency Rule" is binding upon members of the United States intelligence community and may require witnesses representing one member of the intelligence community to decline to testify concerning matters within the proprietary purview of another community member. 2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from those document, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. This would include names of sources or specific information on highly technical devices and operations in keeping with the DCI's responsibilities to protect sources and methods. 3. J k' eO DC/ o scl..ce-viceJ Q~rc~ Qgtce e~rner~z ~` ry.7. n , ee , ) Gt~f/L CK~ ~~t.C..C+C/C.C.X.tii czr~Y LtiY WC-/ C/ C./vwe-.e~ C.G,2./ y0.4 ~ G-14L CI- Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED. INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES 1. Personnel Security Clearances (a) Background Investigation It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that no-staff member is to be given access to any classified material, testimony or information received or generated by the committees without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field investigation. (b) Secrecy Agreement It would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions: 1). That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a condition precedent of employment or assignment; 2) Recognizing US Government property rights to classified information; 3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence of classified information. 4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 signer to administrative and/or legal action under appropriate statutes; 5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the agreement. 2. Physical and Document Security The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved. These rules be made known to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials. Among these should be rules on physical security and document security. (a) Physical Security It would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following .rules related to physical security: 1) All classified material will be storednfor safe- keeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with the regulations of this registry for classified material. 3) Material should b stared in wits when not in --- Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 K.u-~-Orn1 X21, Guard protection,ishould be required cam. thwnarea. JA Areas selected for use in closed session should be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons. 9181 Agencies presenting testimony should be permitted to conduct or arrange with the Sergeant-at-Arms to conduct audio countermeasures inspections to preclude the possibility of surreptitious use of transmitters and/or unauthorized recording devices similar to the device located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973. $,K) At. the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff officer who will secure any misplaced classified material or waste. 2) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience except when necessary for the work of the committees and should not be transported overnight to the office or residence of personnel of the committees. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823 R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 (b) Document Security 1) Committees should select and identify a single location/and specific personnel authorized to sign acknow- . It ledgement of receipt of classified materials provided -by the committees. 2) A system of document control should be established to permit control of classified documents to provide for. accountability. 3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so as to pe a record of the document reproduced, the number of copies reproduced, and the custodian or receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls as the original. 4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for the destruction of classified waste. 5) Transcripts. The committees should give consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate security in the transcription of testimony by committee transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In some, if not all cases, this might include escort of 4 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 materials to the place of transcription, the securing of carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with committee rules. 6) At the conclusion of the committees' investigations classified material should be reviewed for .~~ Lc~L & -c~2 vcrr ) disposition,b7-T1e+d o contributors of material submitted by them. 3. Security Of Ficer It would be desirable if the committees appointed one member of its staff as a security officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the committee. It. would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee. 5 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 US CODE TITLE 18, SECTION 798 798. Disclosure of Classified Information (a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information . (1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or.any foreign government; or (2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or (3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or (4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign govern- ment, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes- Shall be fined not more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not m )re than ten years, or both. (b) As used in subsection (a) of this section- The term "classified information" means information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution; The terms "code, " "cipher, " and "cryptographic system" include in their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications; Approved For Release 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 The term "foreign government" includes in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such government is recognized by the United States; The term "communication intelligence" means all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtain- ing of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients; The term "unauthorized person" means any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the United States. (c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof. Added Oct: 31, 1951, c. 655, Section 24 (a), 65 Stat. 719. 798. Temporary extension of section 794 The provisions of section 794 of this title, as amended and ex- tended by section i (a) (29)' of the Emergency Powers Continuation Act (66 Stat. 333), as further amended by Public Law 12, Eightythird Congress, in addition to coming into full force and effect in time of war shall remain in full force and effect until six months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on December 16, 1950 (Proc. 2912, 3 C. F. R. , 1950 Supp. , p. 71), or such earlier date as may be prescribed by concurrent resolution of the Congress, and acts which would give rise to legal consequences and penalties under section 794 when performed during a state of war shall give rise to the same legal consequences and penalties when they are performed during the period above provided for. Added June 30, 1953, c. 175, Section 4, 67 Stat. 133. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 The following sections of Title 18, U. S. Code, and Sec. 19 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Public Law 831, 81st Congress) reflect the pertinent provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended to date. The Act of June 25, 1948 codified the provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917 with amendments thereto and placed all of the provisions of the foregoing Acts into a single format. TITLE 18 UNITED STATES CODE CHAPTER 37. - ESPIONAGE AND CENSORSHIP Section 792. Harboring or concealing persons Whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe or suspect, has committed, or is about to commit, an offense under sections 793 or 794 of this title, shall be fined not more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. Section 793. Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, research laboratory or station or other place connected with the national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or agencies, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject of research or development, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the President by proclam- ation in time of war or in case of national emergency in which anything for Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 the use of the Army, Navy, or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or (b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or '(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instru- ment, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or (d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model., instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instru- ment, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit-or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (f) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photo- graph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information, relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or lost, or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer- Shall be fined not more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (g) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the fore- going provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,.. each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy. June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 736; Sept. 23, 1950, c. 1024, Title I, Sec. 18, 64 Stat. 1003. 794. Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign governments (a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to com- municate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any re- presentative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. (b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communi- Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 cates, or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. (c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the con- spiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such con- spiracy. June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 737; Sept. 3, 1954, c. 1261, Title II, Section 201, 68 Stat. 1219. Section 795. Photographing and sketching defense installations (a) Whenever, in the interests of national defense, the President defines certain vital military and naval installations or equipment as requiring protection against the general dissemination of information relative thereto, it shall be unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of such vital military and naval installations or equipment without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military or naval post, camp, or station, or naval vessels, military and naval aircraft, and any separate military or naval aircraft, and any separate military or naval command concerned, or higher authority, and promptly submitting the product obtained to such commanding officer or higher authority for censorship or such other action as he may deem necessary. (b) Whoever violates this section shall be fined not-more than $1, 000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Section 796. Use of aircraft for photographing defense installations Whoever uses or permits the use of an aircraft or any contrivance used, or designed for navigation or flight in the air, for the purpose of making a photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of vital military or naval installations or equipment, in violation of section 795 of this title, shall be fined not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Section 797. Publication and sale of photographs of defense installations On and after thirty days from the date upon which the President defines any vital military or naval installation or equipment as being within the category contemplated under section 795 of this title, whoever reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map or graphical representation of the vital military or naval installations or equipment so defined, without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military or naval post, camp, or station concerned, or higher authority, unless such photo- graph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation has clearly indicated thereon that it has been censored by the proper military or naval authority, shall be fined not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950 (Public Law 831, 81st Congress) PERIOD OF LIMITATION Sec. 19. An indictment for any violation of title 18, United States Code, section 792, 793, or 794, other than a violation constituting a capital offense, may be found at any time within ten years next after such violation shall have been committed. This section shall not authorize prosecution, trial, or punishment for any offense now barred by the provisions of existing law. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 SECRECY AGREEMENT I~ in accepting employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee. It is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 his designees or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee. I hereby agree that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct, 4 , s o b,._.,de st or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assign- ment with the Select Committee, without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative. I hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence and prepared for publications by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of the /Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of deter- mining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 representative has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted. 00 I Y`caue~ ~ zed yp ~,o (Insert relevant codes and sections as considered appropriate by the Department of Justice) and understand their meaning. Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material. I understand that any breach any part of the obligations in this agreement could subject me to legal ancadministrative action. I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated. I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion. Signature 'DTC Signature Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Date 25X1.A Approved For Release g1\1 L33 CIA-RDP83BO The Congress of the United States has placed a responsibility on the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure In accepting employment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to .Intelligence Activities, I recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. ENTRANCE ON DUTY SECRECY AGREEMENT 1. I, hereby agree to accept as a condition precedent of my employment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January- 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee, the specific obligations set forth below. 2. It is my understanding that in the course of my employment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee, or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment with the Select Committee. 3. I hereby agree that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by writing, word, conduct, including interviews for radio and television, broadcasts, or otherwise any classified information, including CIA cover arrangements, to any unauthorized person without prior written consent of the Chairman or the Director of Central Intelligence, or their duly authorized representative. I further agree that any information learned _th - -- during my employment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence or intelligence sources and methods and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency prior to discussing with or showing to any publishers, editors or literary agents for the purpose of determining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Central Intelligence Agency has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain if the information is classified and who is authorized to receive it. 5. I understand that any breach on my part of the obligations contained in this agreement could subject me to administrative action, including termination of my employment. /I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regu- lations apply during my employment and continue after that relationship has terminated. 6. I take the obligation set forth above freely without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion. Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040040-3 January,/ 28;::19 -CON through a gove{nment oree:Si]L'iAY01 - -- popurar VUia[[i,necrecaryof ne [cuicures:ar[ -- --"----?- -;;,...- am aware .that-the CIA-is specifically-_,., Butz whose department has the, say-so on. traneous-matter.) ?.;..:;:..`; M SIKES M Sek o proscribed from internal seit f food and nutrition: A candidate given credit ., -.r..r.paer,n the 22dcuryune- by those in the. know is. Roy L.,Ash, director. , of .. December, the New.=;:York ' Times Lions. if someone has-evidence that CIA by Congress, his-order will prevail.,;: charter, conducted a illegal do- matters can be discreetly explored and-., th e CRI1, M~7AL=7ACTIVITIES- OF THE. CIA sy "' a, " Preesisi ei"dentia al c o om "' m ""o ission ""`was a :. - have had a distinguished- succession of (?his. HOLTZMAN asked and was given pointed and. congressional- committees, Directors of Central -Intelligence-Mr..- point in the REcoRD and to Include ex- it is already abundantly clear that., the iiiiat naoorn, ivir. ivicuone, Mr., Dulles, traneous matter) activity which is under attack and which to name some. They are dedicated men- Ms. HOLTZiVIAN. Mr. Speaker, today may have been used purposely to stir up dedicated to our Nation, the need for ob I am resubmitting, with -24 cosponsors, the fuss: _ ]ective, intelligence. They- have been - a resolution of inquiry calling on the Was not a domestic operation; 'served by equally devoted professionals President to disclose to the House Judici- Was not in violation. of CIA's charter; within_CIA who helped give us the type regarding possible criminal acts commit- Was not illegal. Made_? possible "treaties: on:-nuclear behalf of Congressman JOHN BURTON and . sworn testimony given to congressional aavea the Nation literally hundreds, of myself at the beginning , committees,. this New York Times alle millions of dollars by accurately assess-- assess-- The resolution has abeen- - this referred, d to to the gation. .ing the force structure against: us; and The ree - '~ -~ -_? `, ":?::.:~. _ Judiciary- Committee: Mr: Speaker, the essential facts .have Forestalling: miscalculations by our was asxea, slanging.. in 1y67 ivir.speaker,. such people are the'pre- does not inquire into the CIA s adherence..: to Orviolation.of its 'own charter: :Other help, ;determine if anti-American for servers of our. system, .not'its destroy- `- fi ' ed in leads supplied mostly by t tbe FBI- dermine that orie institution in 1;~!r q~d_ reptitloq.5~ entry,. burglary, intercepting maiiwiretapping 'and electronic and eras structure which is assio~ned the es- veiIla- wi not .pursuant- to court to corder, : - CIA s 'job then was to r- eport'back to sential task of giving us the unvarnished and maintaining files t U.S. citizens=.: , the. FBI-.:or -other. appropriate authorities - truth about the-- world ? around us_ Let thereby engaging in the violation of Fed-".. gn travel- where they us remember instittutions after all- are oral by en aT.statutes w on ent who their . ;foreithey, saw ?: what they did only the length and breadth of the shad 'r cr ~r:.aa l . Committee has over- abroad - _. ows of those who work within t'r em Let ? Speaker, I submit that the foreign S not -now unfairly: besiege' 'and: -be- sight responsibility for. the enforcement aspect of this situation fits- foursquare leaguer -those who have served so well. of our Federal criminal laws. The recent within the CIA's foreign intelligence. Let us give then the tools and the over allegations regarding the CIA make it charter-there simply is no other Fed sight' they deserve and ' need. Who. but imperative that the - committee- deter- oral egeMcy -intended for . _ .. the People or, mine whether the existing laws are the e job or intelligence ence collection abroad.-', benefit -from- compromising and'' inter; selves -sufficient to deter Government in fact; failure to carry out.such an as fermg with CIA? agencies from -.violating the laws and signment.would be tantamount to a der.- abusing' the- rights of-citizens ... eliction of duty.. 7 Allegations of high-handed and crimi- Now it is clear, Mr Speaker that this WHO Wes' AWARD DAMAGES :TO nal -behavior by-the CIA-area very serf intelligence collection -program" abroad T VICTIMS. OF THE MAY-DAY . DEMONSTRATION?.. ous matter. Surely one of the principles has either been misunderstood or some= on which our system is based Is that has been the victim of intended dis -(Mr'SIKES asked aridwas given-per- of- TT body is abovethe law-not the President tortions. But to confuse matters-further, mission to extend his remarks at this and not the. CIA. It is imperative that someone has lumped together with this point-in the RECORD and' to include: ex- ? agencies of Government, as well as priv- program several undertakings within the traneous'matter.) ate citizens, be made to abide by our United States-activities anyone is free Mr. SIKES. Mr.-Speaker one laws. of -the- to either applaud or deplore-designed ` more ridiculous court actions of recent I urge my. colleagues to support this to protect intelligence sources and meth- - times is an award of $10,000 each to law- esolution when it comes to the floor. ods-an obligation imposed upon the Di- breakers who sought to shut down our The 24 cosponsors of the 'resolution rector of Central Intelligence by the Na- country. Nevertheless, that is what has are: Ms. Aezuc, Mr. BADILLo, Mr. BAUCUS, tonal Security Act of 1947. - happened in the-case of 1,200 demon- Tr. BROWN of California, Mr. CovYERs, Mr. Speaker, I am one of-those privi- strators who were booked by police in Mr. DELLUMS, Per. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. leged to sit on the Appropriations Com- Washington during the May Day in- - IARarNCTON, Mr. HAwxiNs, Mr. HELSTO- mittee which considers, evaluates and vasion of the Capital in 1971. It is to be uI Mr JENRE M i e K . t e x r ocx Mr MET c s or approves CIA s budt I k hd tht hi ,.-ge.nowopea agher court will overturn .Au ; Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland, Mr: how costly some of our intelligence col- this absurd decision . tANCEL, Mr. RICHbIONn, Mr. RosgN - L, 1?ction systems --are. I am aware that Wlieft_ the demonstrators came to Mr. Rovxat, Mr. SoaArz, Mr. STARsr, Mr.. countermeasures can' deny us the bone- Washington vowing to shut down the TOicas, Mr. -WAXMAN, Mr. \VE:ivzs, and fit of vital information. I am aware of Capital City and the Government of the [vlr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. the threat to the safety of individuals United States, they came here deter- Approve d For Release 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R000706040040-3 - RESSIONAL .RECORD--= HOUSE-- WHO vv nv is v t 1 tfi$ Yk vPL,E SEEK who collaborate with CIA, If' their - se- TO DESTROY' US WILL BENEFIT crets are compromis d:Th e erefore I am ., FROM- COMPROMISING :AND M- going to err,- if. I must, on the. side of,-