LETTER TO MR. NORVILL JONES, STAFF MEMBER FROM OLC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000800030005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 4, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

t. r I Cif C.1,1 Pk 1 C-
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CONFIDENTIAL
State Department review(s) completed.
Mr. Norvill Jones, Staff Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Jones:
inne 4,1974
This letter is in partial reply to your letter of
February 12, 1974, addressed to the Legal Adviser.
regret the delay in this response. Unfortunately answers
to some of the questions posed in the questionnaire you
enclosed are still under consideration. The answers in
this letter are as complete as possible at this date.
Because of the contents, this letter and some enclosures,
are classified. Where particular responses are un-
classified, this is so indicated.
BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED
With respect to the first several questions, which are
among those for which answers are still under consider-
ation, I would like to make clear that the Department of
State has not been asked by the FBI to approve any
surveillance of any American in the United States or
abroad, nor has the Department asked the FBI to institute
any surveillance of Americans in the United States or
abroad. There are no regulations on that subject.
With this general introduction, our specific responses
for the present begin with question 7.
7. ,For any electronic surveillance of an American which
was initiated, approved, or conducted by the Department
during each of the last ten years, or is currently in
operation, please state:
(al) where the request originated (State, FBI, etc.);
? (b). the name of the highest State official to approve
the reuest;
Classified by
SUBJECT TO C.'77-1.7...7j_ DECI ,f7?.S,;;!7iCAT:!.."';'
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(-) tflle ant and
(1) ths ntt?ora1 ecuri4- ju-tificati,=
A fl,-3arch b2 the tate 1)elnartnentIs records ;1c.'sr tha
Lariz),..1 1954-1374 has dl id no inztance of -?.lactronic
s-ar7e1llance of Azaerican citizana having 1,4SA r-l'ac?leted
Or coilducted by the Dapar-!=ant of 11;tata-Nie i10 haw
ot t'ae D'apaxt=ent 3tate having a:Ipro-ied
3uch ,-,;=r7e111.:v1c0.
z?a are a-Aiaro of 0...mly one insFal,ca (aes.cribed h,c0,,,,o) 0F
anA-.11'0.assaaor or et.Lutr, Decart=entliar in a -cost
a:zt-road participating iu the avuroval pr,=e3$ Zor such
we ceismot e=luda the possi2al1it7
that other Zmbezsv-ased personel ayha7s. participatad.
ol.4.a.-ent of the D4fanze :3eparnt .a.;?loyed a telephone
t_a? it ;la A.-gericaa Zaa;:..assv at aR -)v,r3-eas :'.ocation during
21-27:iarch 1973. This t4i,ler';,hozle intercept
used in the office of aA Zziericaa military ne.elber
who *:ias th,e subjftct 02 a =4-air...a3 lutftetigation tether
wizh 7nrious local national 3-asi,aects. it was carried out
tha proylsions of 1:t_f) Directi7e 5200.24 and
r-,-;:ertaa. to L.he tiflace of the Secret-1-y of 7--.4faAse az
r3snired by that r iitit The action was ten with
the concurrance of the Chia/ of 14Issioz b4s-ed on prob-
abl*-calase which was dotarnined by th.a 5ubjects
nilitary coomander. Lrietigatiort In7olved va,s
joillt17 cond=cted by Unitod States nilitar7 in7esti-
gative personntel local aational 7.olice authorities.
The invastigatiort vas of vmtual c;c.4.Acern to both cotIntriee.
in this instaaca, the acttiroval an conduct originat.2d
with the 1"3partzent of Deianse an,Jer the 'rciiisicus
DCD regulation aa cited above. Since the z..2...-mcusreltce
Or the Chief of :Aisi$ion wao obtained, however, it is
being Included in our ret-417.
_9- What wou14 be the affect or, the opernica ol? the _";eeartmft,nt
12 a Jr:a-IA-1A1 warrant were rr!tquired 3:or initiatics o 11
olatft:mniz surveillance:IshLc axo now i:litiattld or clearad
b7 the
9. Th e Da:partm*ut of Stats haa n intereat in an
tjitatelliTeneleotmeritelligees prosx,ter btlt
would aa;-!ar to tl..0 operating alencies conc;erniug the
i=plications c) a warrant p=30te(i2xe :Izr :their crogra..
To tha tnIt.ent that a -?larl-ant -,)roce'..ire incr_la.3e ri3k
01 -X1)40aUr.21 :ther'sCa1d alz:o ezaz.m?ag to rn,,A1 3.tates
forign rzlations.
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11. For each of the last ten years please provide the.
number of:
(a) surveillances of Americans within the U.S.
initiated, approved, or conducted by the Department
of State, broken down between wiretaps, electronic
eavesdropping ("bugs"), physical surveillance, cover
surveillance, and other surveillance?
(b) surveillances of Americans abroad which were
initiated, approved, or conducted by the Department
of State, broken down between wiretaps, electronic
eavesdropping ("hugs"), physical surveillance, cover
surveillance, and other surveillance (please indicate
any overlaps, e.g., if an American was the subject of
both a wiretap and a bug)?
11.(a)(b) A search in the State Department records
for the period 1964-1974 has disclosed no instance
in which surveillance of Americans, either in the
United States or abroad, has been requested,
approved, or conducted by the Department of State,
except for the special case, mentioned in 7 above.
Cs.
12. With :reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(a) Are there any regulations governing the clearance
and conduct of such 'operations?
12.(a) Yes, the general regulations on special
investigative techniques previously furnished apply
to this kind of case as well as to others (see SY
433;10 .enclosed Tab A).
12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(13) Does the FBI or CIA normally ask for the ambassador's
approval for such operations? If so, does the ambassador
seek the Department's advice or keep the Department
informed about such requests?
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4.
12.(3) Nb. The President's letter of December 9,
1969 places on each Ambassador full responsibility
to direct and coordinate the activities and
operations of all elements of his mission. He
is responsible for the activities of all personnel
present in. the country to which he is accredited
with the exception of members of military commands
controlled by the President through the Secretary
of Defense. Senior Representatives of other
.governmenti_acgencies are required to seek the
Ambassadors' guidance on policy matters but the
Ambassador is not expected to be cognizant of
operational details or to inform the Department
of them. The FBI, however, does not normally
carry out investigations overseas; it carries
out liaison activities with foreign police and
security units.
12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(c) Does the Department know how many Americans abroad
are currently under U.S.-initiated surveillance, either
beiri'g carried out by a U.S. agency or by cooperating
foreign officials?
12.(c) No.
12.- With 'reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(d) In what proportion of the cases is surveillance
of Americans abroad carried out withbut the approval
or knowledge of the ambassador?
12.(d) Not known.
13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(a) the number of investigations for leaks in each of
the last ten years, including the specific leak
investigated.
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uuring u-ie past ren y-E -s, tne uepartment
has investigated 23 cases of unauthorized disclosure
of classified or privileged information. In many
cases, the Department's inquiries were but a part
of a broader investigation involving other Federal
agencies.
The incidence of cases, by year, was as follows:
1964:
2
1969:
3
1965:
0
.1970:
2
1966:
1
1971:
8
1967:
0
1972:
3
1968:
4
1973:
0
For specific leak investigated see summary at Tab B.
CONFIDENTIAL
13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(b) for each investigation, please indicate those in
which the leak was traced to the source.
13:(b) (At Tab B is a summary of leak cases which
provides supplementary responses to questions 13(b)
through (f)).
In two cases investigation identified the source
of the unauthorized disclosure. As noted in the
summary, a number of cases concerned informati6n
which had been distributed to other agencies as
well as the Department of State. Because some of
those cases were controlled or investigated by the
other agencies concerned, we are unable to state
what degree of success they might have had in
identifying sources.
13: With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(6) for each investigation in which a lie detector was
used, a list of the names of Department of State
personnel subjected to testing.
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6.
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13..(c) The. polygraph was used in the investigation
of only one case, which was neither requested no-r-
conducted by the Department of State. The informa-
tion had been available to certain Departmental
officials, however, and three were asked to undergo
polygraph examination which they voluntarily did.
The name's of these officers are contained in
investigative files which believe should not
be disclosed in order to protect the integrity of
the files and the privacy of the officers.
13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(d) for each year, the number of "special investigative
techniques" used in an effort to track down leaks. Give
full details on the leak involved, the number of people
subject to the "special investigative techniques", the
nature of the "special investigative techniques", who
carried out or administered those techniques, etc.
13:(d) Other than the aforementioned use of the
polygraph in one case, none of the other investiga-
tions involved any special investigative techniques.
All investigations were limited to interviews with
persons known or believed to have had access to the
documents or information involved.
BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED
13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(e) for each leak investigated, the name of the official
who originated the request for the investigation --
either within the Department or outside.
13:(e) Originators of the requests for investigation
of unauthorized disclosure have been identified in
the summary enclosed at Tab B.
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STATI NTL
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13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(f) copies of all reports prepared within the Department
as a result of investigations of leaks over the last ten
years.
13:(f) The relevant questions about the investiga-
tions have been answered in the summary at Tab B.
These reports are contained in investigative files
which We believe should not be disclosed in order
to protect the inte6=-r1ty of the files and the
privacy of those under investigation.
13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(g) copies of all regulations, instructions, or orders
issued within the Department, or applicable to the -
Department, during the last ten years relative to
investigations for leaks (which have not already been
supplied).
13:(g) Attached at Tab C are extracts of the
instructions relative to the investigation of
leaks of information.
,
14. With reference to the U.S. Intelligence Board, please
provide the following information insofar as it is known
from Departmental participation in the Board:
(a) Does the-Board ever recommend the initiation of
electronic surveillance operations?
(b) Is the Board apprised of the existence of electronic
surveillances for national security purposes? If so, in
what manner?
(6) Describe the Board's role, if any, in investigations
for leaks.
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(d) What was the Board's involvement, if any, in the
investigations for leaks of information regarding the
SALT negotiations, the Pentagon Papers, the Jack
Anderson documents and other leaks during the period
1969-1972?
(e) Does the Board ever consider inter-agency matters
relating to U.S. electronic surveillance activities?
14. While the Department of State has membership
on the United States Intelligence Board, its
Chairman is the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Department believes that any
questions concerning the Board's activities or
policies would more properly be addressed to the
Chairman.
15. How many electronic surveillances initiated, approved,
or carried out by State were terminated as a result of the
Supreme Court decision in the Keith case, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)?
15. State had no such surveillances.
17. For each of the last ten years, please indicate the
number of each of the various types of "special investi-
gative techniques" carried out on Americans by Department
of State personnel, broken down by type of "technique"
used, whether in the U.S. or abroad, and whether the
subject was an employee of the Department of State, a
reporter, or other private citizen.
17; To the best of the Department's knowledge,
none of its personnel has employed any "special
investigative techniques" in relation to any
American citizens at home or abroad in the past
ten years.
la. How many reports have been received from posts
abroad for each of the last five years concerning U.S.
citizens traveling abroad who "indicate a disaffection
toward the United States", as specified in 11 FAN 430.1?
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9.
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11 There is no statistical .urea_kdown possible on
this. A. manual check of passport records would be
necessary.
19. How many reports have been made pursuant to the
telegram of November 2, 1972, concerning the reporting-
by U.S. diplomatic posts on the activities of U.S.
military absentees in foreign countries?
19. The Department of State does not record these
reports, which are primarily of concern to the
Defense Department.
20. Please supply the following information for the
Department of State:
(a) Number of personnel on the Department's rolls
with the technical skills to conduct electronic
surveillance (either bugging or tapping).
20:.(a) The Department assumes that virtually
anyone who can operate a home tape recorder could
effect an electronic surveillance. Anyone with
any of a wide variety of technical skills or
experience would be even more likely to be able
to do so, using equipment readily available in
open commerce. Thus, it is a virtual impossibility
to determine the number of personnel on the Depart-.
-ment's rolls with adequate technical knowledge to
conduct electronic surveillance. To be sure, any
of the engineers or technicians of the Office of
Security who are involved in the effort to counter
electronic and other forms of surveillance of State
premises and personnel presumably could conduct
positive surveillance but none do nor. are there
any personnel on the rolls or on contract to the
Department of State whose duties are to engage in
such surveillance activities.
20. Please supply the following information for the
Department of State:
(b) The number of pieces of equipment owned by or
in the control of the Department capable of being
used for:
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(1) telephone surveillances,
(2) microphone surveillances,
(3) recording telephone calls without
knowledge of the caller.
20.(b) Again, assuming virtually any tape reco7-der
could be used to record telephone or other conversa-
tions surreptitiously, any effort to account for all
such pieces of equipment would require the review of
literally hundreds of inventory records and to
little practical purpose. In actual fact, the
Department does not engage in electronic surveillance
and, therefore, has no equipment intended for that
purpose.
21. Please provide a copy of any forms used in connection
with:
(a) the initiation, clearance, implementation, or
termination of any type of surveillance of American
citizens.
- 21.(a) The Department of State has no forms for use
in connection with the initiation, clearance, imple-
mentation, br termination of any type of surveillance
on American citizens.
??
21. Please provide a copy of any forms used in connection
--(b) the use or storage of information obtained through
surveillance initiated or approved by the Department of
State.-
t;
21.(b) There is no form specifically designed for
oA:1[PAcc!oN_I such?infarmatiou.
21., Please provide a copy of any forms used in connection
with:
(d) requests from the FBI or other agencies to the
Department, or requests initiated within the Department,
for information on Americans abroad.
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21.(C) The Department of State has no forms for
use in connection with requests for information on
Americans abroad.
22. Please provide:
(a) all effective directives concerning relations with
the FBI.
22.(a) Copies of Foreign Affairs Manual Circular
NO. 102A and Department of State Instructions
CW-4099 (November 9, 1961) and CW-4999 (December 19,
1961) were submitted previously in the informal
stage of this review. Executive Order 10450
(Section 8-d), of course, requires referral to
the FBI of any information developed during the
background investigation of an applicant or
employee which indicates the individual may
have been guilty of disloyalty or certain other
activities adversely affecting the national
security
22. Please provide:
(b) copies of all existing statutes, executive orders,
and regulations concerning reporting on Americans
resiaent abroad.
22.(b) See 11 FAM 430 previously furnished.
23: Does the Department maintain files on individual
U.S. citizens who could be classified as potential
"trouble makers" for foreign policy or security reasons?
If so, please describe the extent of these files.
Describe the inter-agency procedures in effect for
sharing information of this nature.
23: Under Department regulations (22 C.F.R.
51.70(b)(4)) a passport may be refused to a person !
when the Secretary determines that his activities
abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious
damage to the national security or the
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foreign policy of the United States. Information
received by the Department bearing on the appli-
cation of this regulation to a particular individual
would be placed in the passport file of that
individual. Also under Department regulations
(22 C.F.R. 51.33), information in passport files
is privileged and may not be released except:
"(b) Pursuant to a subpoena or court order
directing the production of passport records.
"(6) At the request of another Government
agency.
"(d) When expressly authorized by the
Secretary."
Finally, as indicated in the enclosure (Tab D) labeled
'Protective Intelligence", the Office of Security
maintains some files on what might be called
"trouble-makers."
24. Has the United States entered into international
agreements for commitments concerning electronic sur-
veillance operations involving foreign diplomatic
missions in the U.S.? If so, please provide the text
of tilose agreements or commitments?
24.. There are no agreements of this kind. The
Department is not aware of any commitments of this
kind.
Telephone Addition to List of Questions:
When the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was
submitted to the Senate, was any consideration given
to the relationship of Article 22 to wiretaps or other
electronic surveillance of foreign diplomatic missions?
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ANSWER: We have no record that this matter was
considered. However, our records do indicate
that Article 22 was one which was considered by
the United States as reflective of existing
customary international law and United States
practice and was not a change in law. We note
the provisions of Article 47, paragraph 2, as
of potential relevance.
Enclosures:
As stated.
Cordially,
Linwood Holton
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations
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? 433.10 Special Investigative Techniques
The Special investigative technique's. such as
trash cover, mail cover, technical or
physical surveila.nce, or the polygraph, will
not be used without prior approval of Head-
quarters. If the Special Agent in Charge
deems a special Technique to be necessary
the will submit his request in writing to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
through the Chief, Division of Investigations.
Under no circumstances will any of the
. special techniques mentioned above be
initiated without prior approval of the Deputy
Assistant Secretarysfor Security.
?
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COI,TFIDENTIAL
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ISUMARY OF LEAK OF INFO7ATION INVESTIGATIONS
COi\!DUCTID BY TE OYZICE CF SECuaTTy
1964
On March 26, 1964, the Associated Press and columnists
Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott of the Northern Virginia
Sun carried articles concerning a sensitive project
LT-Tended to determine the location of American defectors.
No special investigative techniques were used and the
source of the unauthorized disclosure was not identified.
The Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular
Affairs requested the inquiry.
In 1964 the Central Intelligence Agency requested
investigation of the suspected unauthorized disclosure
of a classified CIA document which had been distributed
to the Department of State and other agencies. Inves-
tigation revealed that the document was handled in an
irregular manner but that there was no actual compromise.
No special investigative techniques were used.
1965
None conducted.
1966
On March 23, 1966, the New York Times published an ---.-
article written by John D. Pomfret which revealed infor-
mation from an administratively controlled:airgram to
the American Embassies in Paris and Moscow and also
details of a classified internal memorandum which rebuked
the Departmental official who was mistakenly thought
to have authored the airgram. The source of the dis-
closure of the airgram was identified but the individual
?responsible for the disclosure of the classified memo
' was not. No special investigative techniques were used.
The investigation was requested by the then Deputy Under
Secretary for Administration.
None conducted.
1967
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5 t'IA:RnindiEittOgin314000800011TOOT-2ed
about leak of certain sensitive in- Juse adminittrative
natters to the local diplomatic community, reauested
an investigation. by the Office of Security. No special
investigative techniques were used and the source of
the disclosures was never identified.
In 1968 the text of a Department of State classified
telegram to the Embassy at Panama became known to a
private American businessman. The Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the area requested an investigation but
the source of the disclosure was never identified.
No special investigative techniques were used.
In 1968 the Inspector General, Department of Agriculture,
requested investigation of the alleged unauthorized
possession by an American businessman of a classified
telegram which originated with the Agricultural Attache
at the American Embassy, Saigon. The Office of Security
began an inquiry but, when the matter appeared to come
within the jurisdiction of the Inspections Staff of
the Agency for International Development, the case waS
turned over to the latter agency.
Tn articles appearing in the October 18, 1968, and
November 17, 1968, issues of the Washington Post, re-
--porter Warren Unna revealed classified information con-
cerning the sale of military equipment to Pakistan.
The. source of the unauthorized disclosure was never
identified. No special investigative techniques were
-employed. The Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs requested the investigation.'
;1969
In 1969 the Department learned of the pos-sibility that
a classified report from the American Embassy, Montevideo,
may have been disclosed to an American missionary in
Uruguay while the latter was on leave in the United
tk:States. Investigation failed to identify the source of
the .disclosure. No special investigative techniaues
were used. The inquiry was conducted at the initiative
of the Office of Security.
On February 25, 1969, an article in the Washington Post
by Flora Lewis revealed classified information concerning
U.S.-Spanish negotiations relating to U.S. bases in
Spain. No special investigative techniaues were used
and the source of the unauthorized disclosure was not
identified. The Country Director reported in advance
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that the article was due for publication and the
results of the inquiry were reported to the Under
Secretary.
On June 18, 1969, an article in the New York Times
by Peter Grose revealed classified information derived
from a meeting of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The
?Attorney General requested limited inauiries and
affidavits prepared by those Departmental officials
-who had had access to the information were submitted
to the Department of Justice. No ?special investiga-
tive techniques were used in the Departmental phase
of the inquiry and State was not informed of the
eventual resolution of-the matter.
1970
On January 25, 1970, an administratively controlled
telegram from the American Embassy, Ottawa, which
concerned a deserter from the U.S. Navy, was shown
and read on Canadian television. No special investi-
gative techniques were used. The source of the dis-
closure was traced to U.S. Navy authorities in Boston
who had received the message from an unidentified source
in the Defense Attache Office, American Embassy, Ottawa.
The investigation was requested by the American Embassy,
Ottawa.,
In 1970 the FBI requested investigation of an apparent
unauthorized disclosure cE one of its documents which
had been disseminated to the Department of State and--
--other agencies. The Department phase of this inquiry
did not identify the source of the disolosUre. No
-special investigative techniques were used and the
Department does not know whether the source of the
-disclosure was ever identified.
1971
In a Washinuton Post article on February 7, 1971,
Michael Getler revealed highly sensitive information
derived from CIA information which had been distributed
to several Federal agencies, including the Department
of State. No special investigative techniques were
used in the State phase of the inquiry and we do not
know whether the source of the unauthorized disclosure
was ever identified. The investigation was requested
by CIA.
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In /,,.paivealrdERddhaseD2093/1)4/2051AIRCAROBOOMFP00099_31:Wt;
American _asinessman was in possess_Lon of a Secret
telegram originated by the American Embassy, Singapore.
Investigation by State and the Department of Defense
identified the source of the unauthorized disclosure
as an official of the Department of Defense. No
special investigative technicues.were used in the
Departmental phase of the inquiry. Results of the
_investigation were reported to the Executive Secretary
of the Department of State and to the Secretary of
Defense.
In an article in the Washington Evening Star on
March 23, 1971, Jeremiah O'Leary disclosed highly
classified information believed to have been derived
from telegrams originated at the U.S. Embassy, Quito,
and distributed to several Federal agencies. Inves-
tigation by State and Defense failed to identify the
source of the leak. No special investigative techniques
Were used. Investigation was requested by the U.S.
*Mbassy, Quito.
An article by George C. Wilson in the Washington Post
on March 21, 1971, revealed information derived from
a. sensitive document which had been disseminated to a
?71umber of Federal agencies. Investigation of the State
Department phase of the inquiry failed to disclose the
source of the disclosure. No special investigative
techniques were used. The U.S. Intelligence Board re-
quested the investigation.
In his July 27, 1971, article in the Washinaton Post,
Jack Anderson revealed information derived from an ex-
change of classified telegrams between the American
Embassy at Nairobi and the Department of State. Inves-
tigation did not disclose the source of the unauthorized
disclosure. Contrary to a subsequent Anderson columlon
September 30, 1971, no special investigative techniques
were used. The inquiry was requested by the Deputy
Under Secretary for Management.
On July 23, 1971, a New York Times article by William
Beecher revealed highly classified information con-
cerning the U.S. negotiating position in the SALT Talks..
Atthe direction of the White House and with the
qualified concurrence of the Secretary of State, three
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examinati administerea by ano,_er _eaera agency.
The Secretary's .approval was conditioned upon the
willingness of the three officials and all three
voluntarily participated. No other special inves-
tigative techniques were used by or in relation to
Departmental Personnel and, to the best of the Depart-
ment's knowledge, the source of -the disclosure was
-never identified. The Departmental phase of the
investigation was reauested by the Executive Secretary
of the Department and all results were reported to
Mr. Egil Krogh at the White House.
On August 13, 1971, an article in the New York Times
by Tad Szulc revealed information derived from a
classified CIA document which had been distributed to
the Department of State. No special investigative
techniques were used and the source of the disclosure
was not identified. The Departmental phase of the
investigation was requested by the Deputy Under Secretary
for Management and the results were reported to Mr. Egil
'Krogh at the White House.
In 1971 several foreign newspaners published the .sub-
_stance of a Secret telegram which had been sent to our
embassy at 'Paris and to our "interests section" at Algiers.
. _Investigation revealed that the unauthorized disclosure
probably occurred in the United States and possibly
:through one of the several other agencies which were
.includ-ed on the distribution of the telegram but the
--actual source was not identified. No special investi-
gative techniques were used during the Denartme.ntal-
- ?phase of the inquiry. The Office of Security initiated
the investigation upon learning that the Algerian Govern-
--ment apparently had a cony of the telegram and the results
of the inquiry were reported to the Country Directors
most directly concerned.'
1972
On July 26, 1972, a syndicated article by Jack Anderson
concerning U.S.-Paraguayan efforts to control narcotics
traffic revealed information derived from or attributed
to classified State Department telegrams. The Country -
Director brought the matter to the attention of the
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Office of Security but did not specifically request
14
an inAve st (ertfi easeldpa 5 talibizi83r6.66gtiQ8tOkidaftid
likelrge? m or tne di cE;-ure was classified re-
port prepared by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs which included the Department's information.
Under the circumstances, the investigation was not
continued by the Department of State. No special in-
vestigative techniques were used in the inquiry and
the source of the disclosure was not identified.
On October 2, 1972, a syndicated column by Jack
Anderson revealed information derived fronl or attri-
buted to a classified telegram from the American
Embassy at Kuwait. The Office of Security was not
requested to conduct any investigation of the leak
but did report the internal Departmental distribution
of the telegram to the National Security Council at
the latter's request. No special investigative techni-
ques were used and there is no indication in the file
that the source of the disclosure was ever identified.
On July 24, 1972, an article in the New York Times
by Seymour Hersh revealed classified information from
a report of the International Narcotics Control Task
.Force on Air and Sea Smuggling. An investigation by
the Office of Security was unable to resolve conclusively
the source of the disclosure. No special investigative
techniques were used. The investigation was requested
by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management.
1973
No investigations of unauthorized disclosure were
__conducted.
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446 Miscellaneous Lives tigations
446.1 Leak of Information Cases
446.l1 General
A leak of information case arises when classi-
fied or administratively controlled informatior
becomes available to a person or persons not
authorized to receive it. Obviously a person
unauthorized to receive classified information
Is unlikely to reveal the source from which
he obtained it. Therefore, the Special Agent,
in all probability, will have to use an indirect
Method of investigation. Cases of this kind
are extremely difficult to solve, since.infor-
rnation may be disseminated in a variety of
ways. However, certain inquiries may aid in
determining how the material was compromise
or at least indicate some of the ways in which
compromise could have occurred.
5-20-66
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hticed-
offices abroad. other ?_....o..ertm?to,,, other
United States agencies, and individual
addition to information ti!it ,riHnates in th.
Department. The first st. p in a leak of infor-
-rnation that has been compromisc.d. After
determining the origin and the date of it
arrival in the Department of t.de, the -pecial
Agent should look into the possibilities of
compromise outside the Department. In
this regard it may be necessary to request
that inquiry be made abroad or by some other
agency through Headquarters.
446.13 Investigation of Possibility of Leak
? in the Department
In following up possibilities of t ompromlse
within the Department, the number of copies
of the basic document involved, together with
the distribution given the copies, should be
determined. If the basic document is (1) an
Operations Memorandum; (2) a telegram; (3)
a WIROM; or (4) an airgram, this information
should be obtained from the Records Services
Division. If the document in question is an
Official-Informal letter or an office memo-
randum, the office of primary interest (action.)
will have to be contacted. Following this,
--inquiry must be made at each office receiving
copies to determine the names of the individuals
?
who received the document; the present location
of the copies; whether any copies have been
-destroyed; and Whether or not any person
having access to the compromised information
made the document available to others, dis-
cussed it with others, or discussed it in any
place where the information might be in-
? advertently overheard by others. Inquiry
must also be made to establish if any copy
-has been left exposed in an unoccupied office,
hag been taken from the Department, or
otherwise handled in a way that might lend
Itself to compromise. In making these in-
vestigations, the Special Agent should coordi-
tate with the appropriate unit security officers.
the cooperation of the Special Assistant for
Press Relations has been valuable in such
taaes, and he may be contacted. Representa.-
Allies of the Press are not to be interviewed
by Special Agents in connectiot, with these
Cates without special permission from !lead-
curlers.
CROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification
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- -
PROTECTIVE INTELLICE7TCE
In fulfilling its responsibilities for the protection
of the Secretary of State and certain other dignitaries,
the Office of Security maintains files concerning Per-
sons who have written threatening letters or otherwise
made themselves suspect as rtential threats to the
safety of the Secretary or other persons protected. The
relevant portion of our-Instructions_and Procedures
-is quoted below:
?
'"The Office of Security maintains a 'crank and threat'
file. The file is maintained in two parts: 1, alphabetical,
by name; 2, geograiphical.
The file consists of all 'crank and threat' letters
,received by mail, summaries of all crank telephone
calls, summaries of statements made by and the Physical
:descriptions of all unauthorized visitors to the Secretary
of State and foreign dignitaries visiting the United
States, and information l'urnished by other intelligence
agencies of the U.S. Government.
When the Secretary of State travels abroad or visiting
. dignitaries travel in the United States, pertinent inf6r-
mation from this file is forwarded to the Special Agents
and Security Officers concerned."
When the Secretary or other persons being protected
travels to a different jurisdiction either home or abroad
and we have reason to believe any potential serces of
threat are located in these jurisdictions, it is our
practice to provide a summary of information available
?.regarding these sources of threat to the local official
'sharing the protective responsibilities. We also share
protective intelligence information with the United States
__Secret Service and other Federal agencies as appropriEte -
when the nature of the information suggest that it falls
within the scope of the latter's lawf-L_IaL7Isporlities.
1/FLOW
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP,
DATE
19 June 1974
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OS REGISTRY
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