NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: DECEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100010003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 3, 1983
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
3 January 1983
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National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM NIO for Warning
SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: December
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
a. USSR-Middle East
(1) The Soviets apparently are planning new
initiatives calculated to enable them to play a
more active political role in the region including
a possible visit to Egypt and other Arab states by
a senior Soviet official--perhaps Andropov
himself--in early 1983.
(2) Moscow's resolve to strengthen its influence
in the region also has been underscored by its
decision to install SA-5 long-range, high-altitude
surface-to-air missiles at two sites in Syria.
This marks the first export of this system to the
Third World. The SA-5s will significantly upgrade
the Syrians' air defense capabilities by
establishing a defensive envelope 240 kilometers
deep.
b. Iran-Iraq
(1) Iran is accelerating preparations for another
offensive along the Doveyrich River and in the
central border area in January and is mobilizing
more reserves. The Khomeini regime remains
determined to prosecute the war until Saddam
Husayn is overthrown, and it apparently believes
the eventual collapse of the Iraqi army will open
the way for the establishment of a Shia clerical
regime in Baghdad. The Iranians may install the
Shia government-in-exile that was created in
November on "liberated" Iraqi territory as the
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first step toward a Shia takeover.
c. Mozambique
(1) In the aftermath of the South African raid in
Lesotho and destruction of the petroleum terminal
at Beira, President Machel may be approaching a
decision to call for Cuban combat troops and for
greater Soviet military and political support.
The Soviet military delegation's recent visit to
Maputo reflects Moscow's growing concern about the
government's capacity to contain the South Africa-
supported insurgency.
d. Vietnam-China
(1) Conflicting claims to Gulf of Tonkin waters
and islands may lead to air and sea clashes and
intensified skirmishes on the land border in the
next three months. China may be preparing a
forceful political and military response to
Vietnam's expansion of its territorial waters on
12 November to 100 nautical miles in the Gulf and
72 nautical miles off Vietnam's south-eastern
coast. Beijing quickly rejected Hanoi's claim as
"illegal and null and void." Further Chinese
reactions may be timed to coincide with Vietnam's
dry season offensive in Kampuchea.
(2) Hanoi's recent conclusion of an air route
agreement with Taiwan's government-owned airline
also represents a provocation to Beijing.
(3) The timing of Vietnam's defiant moves against
Chinese interests suggests that the Hanoi regime
is seriously concerned about the implications of
the Sino-Soviet dialogue and may be seeking a
controlled confrontation with China that would
derail a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
e. El Salvador
(1) The insurgents are preparing for a major new
offensive in early 1983. Their last campaign in
October-December 1982 demonstrated improved
coordination among the five main groups and a
capacity to sustain offensives longer than in the
past.
(2) In the coming offensive, the guerrillas may
attempt to draw the bulk of government forces away
from San Salvador in order to open the way for
spectacular attacks in or near the capital. In
striving for maximum political impact, the
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insurgents' principal objective would be to compel
the government to enter direct negotiations on a
power-sharing arrangement. Failing this, they may
hope to trigger a rightist coup aimed at blocking
movement toward negotiations, including President
Magana's idea of a "dialogue" with leftist
political groups aimed at splitting them from the
guerrilla movement.
f. Argentina
(1) The drift toward a potentially explosive
confrontation between the military regime and its
civilian opponents was accelerated by the anti-
government protest demonstration on 16 December--
the largest since the military seized power in
1976. Growing anti-military sentiment will compel
opposition party and labor leaders to strengthen
their demands for an early return to
constitutional rule with no preconditions, and it
may deepen the military regime's resolve to secure
an agreement that will protect the military's
interests following the installation of an elected
government. Further public disorders could prompt
a coup by hard-line military elements who wish to
cancel the restoration of civilian rule.
Attachments:
NIO/AF
NIO/LA
NIO/WE
NI0/NESA
NIO/NARC
NI0/EA
NI0/USSR-EE
NIO/NP
Upon Removal of Attachments
Regrade as SECRET
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