ESCALATION OF THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN CONFRONTATION AND THE SOVIET REACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 9, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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9 June 1982
MEMCRANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT -Escalation of the Israeli-Syrian Confrontation and the
Soviet Reaction
1. Israel's operations in Lebanon signal the execution of long-standing
Israeli plans not only to destroy the PLO's military end political infrastructure
but to force Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon and to establish fundamental
changes in Lebanon's political order. Having sustained substantial casualties
in the first three days of combat, the Begin government is likely to continue
the offensive until it is satisfied that a new government dominated by Bashir
Jumayvil.'s Phalange will be established in Beirut and Syrian forces are either
defeated or obliged to withdraw completely from Lebanon.
2. These Israeli ambitions collide directly with President Assad's plans
to exploit a military confrontation in a way that would compel the US and the
Soviet Union to intervene to halt the fighting and set negotiations in train
that would resolve- the Lebanese crisis and the Palestinian issue ante and for
3. Assad's scenario explains his high-risk decision to engage Israeli
forces and to reinforce his military strength in Lebanon. He is counting on
the Soviet leaders to intervene with a bid for an immediate international con-
ference that would. first arrange a ceasefire and then negotiate a general
settlement that presumably would include the return of the Golan Hei hts to
Syria. i
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4. Assad's scenario already has been fatally compromised by Israel's
military initiaative and momentum.
the Syrians stressed the crucial im r ance or a move by Syria, the Palestinians
and Lebanese Muslims to provoke a military confrontation with Israel "when they
are ready for it." Israel has in effect preempted Assad's scenario, and the
Syrians now face the imminent interdiction of their vital lines of communication,
especially the Beirut Damascus highway, and the isolation and destruction of
Syrian forces in Lebanon. The reported Israeli destruction of all S ian SAM
sites in the Bekaa : Valley and on the Syrien-Leba~ness border of
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expose Syrian forces to devastating Israeli air and ground attacks. Assad now
faces a decision either to commit the bulk of his arm forces in Lebanon,
gambling that superpower intervention will occur in time to avert a total military
disaster, or to withdraw his forces from Lebanon as, the only way to escape
catastrophe and the danger of an internal upheaval in Syria that would destroy
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Soviet Reactio,_n
5. This prospect of a Syrian military and political disaster confronts
Moscow with its most dangerous Middle East dilemma since the October 1973 war.
It is doubtful that Assad had secured Soviet approval of his scenario prior to
the Israeli invasion on 6 June.
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unurt-term reactions, should be recalled a Ass ad, early 1980, apparently
sought, but failed to obtain, Soviet and Saudi support to provoke Israel to
attack Syria as the initial phase of a similar scenario that would result in
an international, conference giving Assad a Camp David-type settlement.
6. The Soviets thus are caught between exasperation with Assad's obvious
maneuvers to force them to intervene in order to pull Syria's chestnuts from the
fire and their geopolitical imperatives to avoid an appearance of impotence in
protecting their assets in Syria and the Palestinian movement. Moscow's initial
response in the TASS statcrnant on 7 June was automatic-to call on the UN Security
Council to take immediate measures to curb Israeli aggression and safeguard
Lebanon's sovereignty. The Soviets probably will follow up with messages from
Brezhnev to Western heads of government urging joint efforts to stop the fighting
and then proceed to an international conference to resolve Syria's claims to 25X1
the Golan, Lebanon's future status, and the Palestinian question.
8. Moscow will be careful to avoid an open-ended commitment to assist
Syria and the PLO, but the Soviet leaders can hardly afford to limit their
reaction to the present confrontation in Lebanon to the essentially passive stance
they adopted during the "missile crisis" in Lebanon in April-July 1981. Their
staked in preserving the Assad regime are important but limited. Although they
probably will be willing to accelerate military deliveries to Syria in hopes of
deterring the Israelis from carrying the war into Syria itself, the Soviets
would ponder long and hard before committing any significant combat forces to
the defense of Syrian territory. These constraints, however, would not rule out
the dispatch of Soviet military advisers and technicians to assist Syrian air
and armored forces in Syria.
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9. In the ultimate crunch, the Soviets cannot afford to hazard any military
initiatives that might enable the Syrians to drag them into their war with Isra&.1.
The Soviets are well aware of Assad's repeated attempts to maneuver the USSR into
underwriting Syrian adventures, and they will be on guard to block his efforts
to force their hand. The Soviets, for example, must be genuinely alarmed that
if Assad is faced with an irretrievable military disaster, he will be capable of
such desperate actions as launching his SCUD and FROG missiles against Israeli
population centers.
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10, In sum, Rrezhnev and his colleagues are likely to revert to the tactics
that proved effective in October 1973 in enlisting US collaboration with the
USSR in bringing about an Arab-Israeli ceasefire. These tactics, of course,
require that the Soviets stage what would be interpreted in the West as a credible
demonstration of Soviet preparations for unilateral military interventions to
protect their Arab clients if the US refuses to cooperate in securing a cessation
of hostilities. The Soviets must show a putative readiness to "go to the brink,"
but the odds are that they would not be prepared to accept the immense risks of
unilateral military intervention on behalf of Syria and the PLO if their bluff
were called.
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Special Assistant for Warning
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