COMMENTS ON DRAFT SNIE 34/36.2-82: IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN'S VICTORY OVER IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 4, 1982
• Content Type: MF

Approved Release 2005/IA-RDP83BO~R000100040019-3
4 June 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, tidlC
SUBJECT Comments on DRAFT StVIE 31/36.2-82: Implications of Iran's
Victory Over Iraq
This is a generally impressive draft in view of the haste with which it was
prepared. The following comments are intended to raise questions whether it would
be desirable to sharpen several points.
I. Iranian intentions:
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A. The draft suffers from a lack of clarity .and inconsistency over what
is meant by "Iran's victory over Iraq." Some judgments treat the effects of
Iran's successes vo far. Others are addressed to implications of an invasion
of Iraq, an attempt to incite a Shia insurrection, or a bid to install an
Islamic regime an Baghdad.
B. The discussion of Iran's options to bring Saddam Hussein down--agitation
among Shias and Kurds, limited military incursions, and a major military attack
to spark a general insurrection or to cripple the Iraqi Army-implies these are
discrete choices. Isn't it more likely that the Iranians will employ the first
two simultaneiously and, if these fail to produce the desired results, will
continue them as adjuncts of a "major?' attack?
C. Judgments regarding the likelihood of a major invasion deserve
greater weight. If the draft is correct in asserting that Saddam's overthrow "iss
neither necessarily imminent nor assured without direct Iranian action," wouldn't
it be prudent to strengthen the judgments i~egarding the likelihood of a major
invasions More attention might be given to the Khomeini regime's nationalistic
incentive to settle accounts with Saddam and to its authentically "Islami.c revo-
lutionary" ambitions to spread the revolution throughout the Gulf, particularly
into predominantly Shia southern Iraq.
D. The discussion of prospects for Iraq might also indlude the contingency
of de facto partition into a Shia client state, autonomous or even independent
Kurdish areas, and a Sunni rump state under Saddam or his successor. It is
admittedly difficult to judge Syria?s assets in Iraq' but some reference might be
made to the possibility of a Syrian attempt to replace the Baathist regime with
one based on the Syrian--supported "Patriotic National Democratic Front for Iraq."
A. The judgment in paragraph 7q deserves a closer look. Is it accurate
to conclude that if the Soviets fail to "come down osz one side or the other," or
if they gamble on the "wrong" side, this "could cost the Soviets dearly in the
Persian Gulfi1? The Soviets probably believe theirpolicy of neutrality has
served them well, and it seems doubtful that even a major Iranian invasion would
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cause them to "choose sides" unequivocally.
$. The first sentence of paragraph f32 should be recast to clarify the
meaning of "Ths Tehran regime seems willing to turn to Moscow and its allies
despite widespread suspicion of the USSR." It seems highly unlikely that even
if Iran fails to oust Saddam or an invasion bogs down, Tehran would "turn to
Moscow" in the usual meaning of trais phrase.
C. Is it accurate (paragraph 86) to attribute to Moscow a realization that
"the immediate effect of Iranian predominance would be a move by the Gulf states
closer to the United States?" Isn't it eoual.l plausible that the Soviets
would anticipate that these regimes will instead shift to
a more "neutral" posture, avoz provo zn a ran, and work out ex edient
accommodations with Iran?
A. Is it plausible (paragraph 88) that, in the event of an Iranian invasion:
the Soviets "might issue veiled warnings to Tehran to desist," or "try to employ
the Syrians to lobby with Iran to halt any drive in Iraq?" Z~hile it is probably
true that the Soviets do not want to see anIranian-oriented fundamentalist
regime established in Baghdad, it seems unlikely that they would openly attempt
to avert an Iranian military~p~litical victory. From the outset of the Iranian
revolution, the Soviets have taken along-headed view. They are not convinced
that the present clerical dominance represents the final and permanent phase
of the revolution, and they are playing for high, long-term stakes in Iran.
It would beycontrary to Moscow"s consistent view and policy for the Soviets
at this stage to attempt to restrain the Iranians and thus to risk their long--term
prospects for establishing significant influence in an Iran that is hostile and
alienated from the Western world.
3. Implications for the US:
A. Paragraph 92 "Sizable Arab military intervention" is a straw man and
could be deleted entirely. The draft earlier discounts the possibility of Arab
military intervention and a "general Arab-Persian war."
B. Paragraph 9t~ deserves a closer look. The judgment ttxat the Ire~c~-Iran war
"is advancing some US interests" is fragile at best and open to serious challe~ge?
Will the Gulf Arabs really respond to the Iranian threat by being "more willing
to accept US support in the intelligence and security fields", or .is it equally
likely that they will move instead to distance themselves from Khomeni's "Great
Satan" %n order to purchase safety and appease Tehran? These states, moreover,
are moving toward abandoning Saddam. Bahrain, far example, reportedly has
rejected an Iraqi request to permit their ships aid aircraft to use Bahraini
facilities to attack the Iranian coast.
C. The judgment in paragraph 9k that moderate Arab need for US support
will "increase the US bargaining position for obtaining greater strategic coopera-
tion against the Soviets and for gaining concessions on some Arab-Israeli. issues"
is very much open to challenge. It is not so much a question of "driving moderate
Arabs toward accommodation with the Soviets and. Iran" as the impossibility of
translating US support, for Iraq into greater Arab support for US policy toward
the USSR and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 11Linkage" is a peculiarly American notion
that would seem to have little relevance to Arab interests in these fundamental
issues.
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D. Paragraph 1C+0 offers speculative judgments about the dynamics of the
Iranian revolution that might better be excluded from this limited estimate.
It seems improbable that anon-provocative YJestern~Arab respatise to Iran's
successes will deny the clerics the benefits of an "external threat." They have
fully demonstrated their capacity to cantrive trireats where. none exist. Tt also
seems dubious that the Iranian revolution is destined to experience a Thermidorian
period which would provide the US with f1more attractive options for influencing
Iranian policy." The last sentence aclaiowledges that ''this is no'~moY?e than a
"longer term hope." In any events such an improbable prospect has no bearing
an the contingencies covered in this estimate.
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Special Assistant for Warning
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