NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: APRIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040038-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: May 3, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Approve or
National Intelligence Council 3 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: April
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situations.
a. Falklands:
(1) When the extent of Argentina's initial military
setbacks filters through to the public, the junta's
position will become even more precarious and it will
resort to extremely high risk attacks on major units of
the British task force in an attempt to hold public sup-
port and avert anti-government demonstrations. British
successes in interdicting the Argentine air bridge to
the islands and damaging the air strips will soon make
the position of Argentine forces untenable. Successful
British landings, attacks on the Argentine aircraft
carrier or other major naval units, and heavy losses of
land-based aircraft could precipitate either a split in
the junta, force Galtieri to resign, or even bring down
the present junta.
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(3) Further humiliating Argentine defeats will
increase the likelihood of attacks on British and U.S.
citizens in Argentina and other Latin American countries.
The growing threat to the junta's hold on power may impel
it to break diplomatic relations with Washington. The
junta also may attempt to deflect public attention from
defeats in the Falklands by ordering naval and air actions
to enforce Argentine claims against Chile in the Beagle
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b. Israel-Lebanon-Syria:
(1) In the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes against
PLO military targets in Lebanon and the downing of two
Syrian MIG-23s, PLO retaliation remains a strong possibil-
ity. The Israelis almost certainly would respond to
artillery and rocket attacks against settlements in
northern Israel by launching air and ground operations
to drive PLO forces north of the Zahrani River, eliminate
the PLO's infrastructure in southern Lebanon, and destroy
Syrian SAM sites in Lebanon. 25X1
c. Iran-Iraq-
(1) The new Iranian offensive toward Khorramshahr
has again raised serious questions about President Saddam
Hussein's ability to survive another military setback.
His vulnerability would increase sharply if Iranian forces
penetrate into Iraqi territory and bring major targets
such as Al Basrah under artillery fire.
(2) The effectiveness of Iraqi front-line troops has
been impaired by poor morale and defeatism, and Iraqi com-
manders are reluctant to risk further offensive operations.
If Iraqi forces suffer further humiliating defeats, we
could not rule out attempts to oust Saddam Hussein by a
faction in the ruling Baath Party or by military leaders.
d. The Yemens:
(1) The escalation of fighting around Juban between
North Yemen and the National Democratic Front supported by
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South Yemen may soon involve combat between the regular
forces of both countries. North Yemeni reverses and
advances by South Yemeni forces beyond Juban would alarm
Saudi Arabia and may prompt Saudi re uests for U.S. assis-
tance to North Yemen
rr
e. El Salvador:
(1) Although pressures by armed forces leaders
secured the election of Alvaro Magana as provisional
president, the opposition of D'Aubuisson's ARENA party
will lead to further potentially disruptive tests of
strength over the extent of the president's powers.
The rightist parties are likely to assert the Constituent
Assembly's authority to pass judgment on the president's
actions and to restrict his latitude in policymaking.
(2) The guerrillas and their front groups will seek
to exploit confrontations between the military and the
rightist parties to score gains in the hope of offsetting
their low morale and supply shortages
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Attachments:
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NI0/USSR-EE
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NI0/NESA
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