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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 20, 2005
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Publication Date: 
May 3, 1982
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040038-2.pdf121.38 KB
-25X'1 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Approve or National Intelligence Council 3 May 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 25X1 FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Warning SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: April 1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached. 2. Comments on warning situations. a. Falklands: (1) When the extent of Argentina's initial military setbacks filters through to the public, the junta's position will become even more precarious and it will resort to extremely high risk attacks on major units of the British task force in an attempt to hold public sup- port and avert anti-government demonstrations. British successes in interdicting the Argentine air bridge to the islands and damaging the air strips will soon make the position of Argentine forces untenable. Successful British landings, attacks on the Argentine aircraft carrier or other major naval units, and heavy losses of land-based aircraft could precipitate either a split in the junta, force Galtieri to resign, or even bring down the present junta. 25)& 25X 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRETI Copy.~of Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP83B07 040038-2 Approved FoSlea TOP SECRET e 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP83B 10000100040038-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 (3) Further humiliating Argentine defeats will increase the likelihood of attacks on British and U.S. citizens in Argentina and other Latin American countries. The growing threat to the junta's hold on power may impel it to break diplomatic relations with Washington. The junta also may attempt to deflect public attention from defeats in the Falklands by ordering naval and air actions to enforce Argentine claims against Chile in the Beagle 25X1 25X1 b. Israel-Lebanon-Syria: (1) In the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes against PLO military targets in Lebanon and the downing of two Syrian MIG-23s, PLO retaliation remains a strong possibil- ity. The Israelis almost certainly would respond to artillery and rocket attacks against settlements in northern Israel by launching air and ground operations to drive PLO forces north of the Zahrani River, eliminate the PLO's infrastructure in southern Lebanon, and destroy Syrian SAM sites in Lebanon. 25X1 c. Iran-Iraq- (1) The new Iranian offensive toward Khorramshahr has again raised serious questions about President Saddam Hussein's ability to survive another military setback. His vulnerability would increase sharply if Iranian forces penetrate into Iraqi territory and bring major targets such as Al Basrah under artillery fire. (2) The effectiveness of Iraqi front-line troops has been impaired by poor morale and defeatism, and Iraqi com- manders are reluctant to risk further offensive operations. If Iraqi forces suffer further humiliating defeats, we could not rule out attempts to oust Saddam Hussein by a faction in the ruling Baath Party or by military leaders. d. The Yemens: (1) The escalation of fighting around Juban between North Yemen and the National Democratic Front supported by 5X1 -2- TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040038-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved Fooelease 2 ,(0S i f 8 838010*00100040038-2 South Yemen may soon involve combat between the regular forces of both countries. North Yemeni reverses and advances by South Yemeni forces beyond Juban would alarm Saudi Arabia and may prompt Saudi re uests for U.S. assis- tance to North Yemen rr e. El Salvador: (1) Although pressures by armed forces leaders secured the election of Alvaro Magana as provisional president, the opposition of D'Aubuisson's ARENA party will lead to further potentially disruptive tests of strength over the extent of the president's powers. The rightist parties are likely to assert the Constituent Assembly's authority to pass judgment on the president's actions and to restrict his latitude in policymaking. (2) The guerrillas and their front groups will seek to exploit confrontations between the military and the rightist parties to score gains in the hope of offsetting their low morale and supply shortages 25X1 25X1 22AX1 25X1 Attachments: 1 771 NI0/USSR-EE NI0/WE NI0/NESA NI0/EA NI0/AF SA/ NP I N I0/ LA 25X1 -3- TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000100040038-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000100040038-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000100040038-2