NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: MARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100050011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 31, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
25X1 FROM ;
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: March
DDI #2609-82
31 March 1982
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situations.
a. Israel-West Bank-Lebanon:
(1) Israel's moves to break the power of the PLO in the West
Bank and Gaza have significantly increased the chances of a chain
reaction leading to a major Israeli military incursion into southern
Lebanon. The ouster of elected pro-PLO Palestinian mayors of three
major West Bank cities and the Israeli civilian governor's statement
that elections for an autonomy council will not be held until after
the PLO's "power and influence" has been removed represent not only
the effective end to meaningful autonomy talks with Egypt but a
virtual declaration of war on the PLO.
(2) The Israelis almost certainly believe that Yasir Arafat
and his Fatah colleagues will be unable to resist demands by more
militant PLO factions for strong reprisals. Israeli leaders have
repeatedly warned that they will authorize military operations
against PLO forces in Lebanon if there is a "clear provocation,"
and they almost certainly anticipate that the crackdown in the
West Bank and Gaza will produce such provocations in the very near
future.
(3) Prior to the crackdown, the Begin government apparently
intended to complete the withdrawal from Sinai on schedule. Its
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DDI #2609-82
31 March 1982
SUBJECT: -NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: March
decision to postpone West Bank elections indefinitely, however,
will place President Mubarak under strong pressure to denounce
Israel's implicit repudiation of the Camp David terms on Palestinian
autonomy. If Mubarak challenges the crackdown and refuses further
concessions on disputed Sinai borders, there would be at least a
50-50 chance that the Begin government will postpone withdrawal
from Sinai.
b. Iran-Iraq:
(1) The intensification of the fighting along the border and
Iranian military successes have strengthened the possibility that
Iran will carry the war into Iraqi territory. Iranian military
incursions would sharply increase the chances of mutinies in the
Iraqi army and of attempts by Iraqi military and political leaders
to overthrow President Saddam Hussein.
(2) If Saddam's position is seriously threatened, he probably
would attempt to avert disaster by unleashing his superior air force
against Iran's remaining oil facilities. The Iranians would respond
with counterstrikes, and the resulting escalation of the air war
might include Iranian attacks on Kuwait and other Gulf states that
have supported Iraq. Strikes against Saudi targets could not be
ruled out.
(3) The Soviet Union would attempt to turn any military
escalation to its advantage by moves calculated to enhance Soviet
influence in Tehran. The Soviets probably would offer military
assistance to the Khomeini regime on attractive terms, and they
might propose an international conference to arrange a ceasefire
and to agree on measures to "neutralize" or "demilitarize" the Gulf,
the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
(4) The United States may be faced with urgent appeals from
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and perhaps Egypt for immediate diplomatic
intervention to forestall an Iranian military breakthrough and the
danger of Iranian air strikes in the western shore of the Gulf.
c. China-US-Soviet Union:
(1) A Chinese decision to break off bilateral talks with the US
on American military sales to Taiwan and to downgrade diplomatic
relations from the ambassadorial to the charge level remains a
distinct possibility in the next 60 to 90 days.
-2-
SECRET _____.
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SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: March
DDI #2609-82
31 March 1982
(2) The Soviets seem to believe that a struggle over Taiwan
policy within the Chinese leadership may be coming to a head.
Brezhnev's 24 March proposal to resume Sino-Soviet border talks and
to agree "without any preliminary conditions" to expand economic,
scientific and cultural relations probably was aimed at strengthening
.the hands of Chinese advocates of a tougher stance toward the US
over Taiwan.
(3) Depending on Moscow's assessment of China's response to
Brezhnev's appeal, the Soviets may follow up with an offer of a
limited troop withdrawal from the border if Beijing agrees to resume
negotiations. China's initial public reaction to Brezhnev's speech
expressed skepticism, citing "massive Soviet troop deployment along
the Sino-Soviet border" and calling for Soviet "deeds." Moscow's
opportunistic flexibility on Soviet intermediate range missiles in
Europe suggests that this same kind of manipulation could be applied
to the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets have long had the option of
attempting to influence Chinese policy by making cosmetic adjustments
in their force structure along the border, and they may calculate
that the time is ripe for playing this "card" in the controversy
over US policy toward Taiwan.
d. West Germany--NATO missiles:
(1) The Social Democrats' sharp losses in the state elections
in Lower Saxony on 21 March will make it more difficult for party
leaders to defer a vote on the party's position on deploying new
NATO intermediate-range missiles at the special party congress at
Munich in late April.
(2) If the congress rejects the leadership's proposed resolution
to postpone a review of the SPD's position until another congress in
August 1983, there is a strong possibility that Chancellor Schmidt
will carry out his declared intention to resign. Even if the party
congress avoids a showdown resulting in Schmidt's resignation, an
acrimonious debate would weaken the party's prospects in the crucial
state elections in Hamburg in June and in Hesse in September. Defeats
in either of these states almost certainly would trigger a challenge
to Schmidt's leadership and accelerate the left-right polarization
in the party. Such an outcome would make it virtually impossible for
the SPD-FDP coalition government to proceed witb,Qans to deploy the
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SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: March
NI0/NESA
NI0/EA
NI0/WE
NI0/AF
NI0/USSR-EE
N 10/ LA
S, CRET
DDI #2609-92
31 March 1982
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SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: March
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI (w/atts.)
2 - DDCI (w/atts.)
3 - ER (w/atts.)
4 - DDI (w/atts.)
5 - C/NIC (w/atts.)
6 - VC/NIC (wo/atts)
7 - AC/NIC 11 11
8 - NI0/AF of "
9 - NI0/EA " *5
10 - NI0/GPF "
11 - NI0/LA
12 - NI0/NESA 13 - NI0/P-E 14 - NIO/SP
15 - NI0/USSR-EE
16 - NI0/WE "
17 - NI0/AG "
18 - D/OCO
19 - D/OCR
20 - D/SOVA "
21 - D/EURA
22 - D/ALA
23 - D/OIA
24 - D/NESA "
25 - D/OEA "
26 - D/ OG I 27 - D/OSWR "
28 - D/COMIREX
29 - SRP
30 - NIO/W / " 31 - NIO/W Chronot/
32 - Warning Reports File (w/atts.)
33 - DDI Registry (w/atts.)
DDI #2609-82
31 March 1982
SECRET
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