STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100120022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 27, 1981
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC #353/81
27 January 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
SUBJECT : Strategic Warning Staff
1. As you will recall, the Warning Working Group appointed a
subcommittee last fall to review the role of the SWS. Its charter
was to investigate the mission, composition, subordination, location,
and publication policy of the Staff with a view towards improving its
contribution to the Community.
2. The paper at attachment A contains the recommendations of the
subcommittee. The only area of disagreement was whether manning should
be on a rotational basis representing the principal agencies or per-
manent cadre drawn from a larger population (see p. 5). Final wording
of the text was left to the undersigned, who assumes full responsibility
for its content.
3. The composition of the subcommittee is at attachment B. The
report has not been coordinated with agency principals.
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
Attachments:
As stated
All Portions of this Memorandum
are Classified CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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I. Background: The Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) was established
in 1974 as a replacement for the National Indications Center. It is
manned jointly by the agencies of the Intelligence Community, located
in the National Military Intelligence Center, Pentagon, and chaired by
a CIA officer. DCID 1/5, National Intelligence Warning, placed the SWS
under the supervisi el allowance
presently stands al
In February 1979, the NIO/W prepared a paper for the DCI which
explored potential roles for the SWS. These included:
-- Option A: A 1 SWS
would be increased to Such
a staff would maintain a working discipline by issuing a
daily national-level warning report (emphasis added). Its
report in normal periods would be primarily a device for
maintaining dialogue and warning consciousness in and with
the Community in Washington and the field. In major crisis,
however, it would serve as a vehicle for periodic reporting
to policy officers (emphasis added). Manning to this level
would permit the Director/SWS to issue such a report without
becoming consumed by routine. His analysts would have time
to think and to bring their expertise to bear on Community
analyses, and the staff would be strong enough to maintain
around-the-clock manning in crisis without the augmentation
that could be had only with great difficulty in such periods.
At the same time, the staff could ma eri is contribution
to an inter-Agency research program. analysts work-
ing full-time on important questions.Vou provide the core
around which a coherent program could be built.
-- Option B: at Its Present Strength. Wit
professionals an lericals, SWS could either issue a
daily report as in Option A or do this weekly and supply
some working manpower for research. Crisis operations would
require augmentation.
-- Option C: Reduce Present Strength b Three. Under
this option manning would a reduced by profes-
sionals a NIU with a
staff o
tion D: A Sharply Curtailed SWS. Option D would
ad ssionals to the NIO's staff, raising its
streng including the NIO/W. There would be an
SWS of perhap
reducing total
SWS could synthesize agency contributions and probably
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encourage a dialogue between Washington and the field. Any
larger analytic or "conscience" role would have to be assumed
by appropriate NIOs.
-- Option E: No SWS. Further reduction in manning would
It n" This an i
make maintenance of a separate SWS inefficient.
These
pusMuns u provide nucleus tor a s rong research
effort and provide some additional backup to the NIOs respon-
sible for strategic warning.
-- Option F: No special Attention to Strategic Warning.
This would not only eliminate SWS but somewhat reduc MM/Lop
staff from that in Option E. He would have an A/NIO
officers respon jhli- for plumbing, systems, bu support
to the NIOs, an clericals, for a total o including
the NIO/W himsel .
e DCI approved option C, however the transfer o~rofessionals
and lerical from the SWS to the NIO/W office was never accomplished.
DCID 1/5 delineates responsibilities for the NIO/W, the NIOs and the
SWS. Relevent portions follow:
The NIO/W is charged to advise and assist the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to
coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a
focal point for warning in the Community. For organizational purposes,
he will be located in the National Foreign Assessment Center. He will
to the maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out
his duties. The responsibilities of the.National Intelligence Officer
for Warning are:
i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources
which might provide warning. In particular, he should be
alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and
assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning.
He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at
all levels of the Community.
ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President
and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination
of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intel-
ligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National
Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the
President and the National Security Council with concurrent
dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
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iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
and Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment on appro-
priate Community response to developing warning situations.
iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the
Director of Central Intelligence in crisis situations.
v. To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
vi. To chair the Warning Working Group.
vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National
Intelligence Officers.
viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff.
ix. To arrange for intelligence research and production
with respect to strategic warning.
x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline
throughout the Community.
xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures
for warning, including communications and dissemination of
information.
xii. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the
government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer
for Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff of the information
they need to carry out their mission.
xiii. To promote improved analyst training in indications
and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that
might contribute to improved warning.
xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the
Deputy for Research Management, as appropriate, on warning
activities that relate to their responsibilities.
The National Intelligence Officers are specifically charged with
substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They
will conduct Communitywide reviews at least monthly of situations poten-
tially requiring issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of
Central Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually
alert to the need for immediate issuance of warning.
The Strategic Warning Staff will be under the supervision of the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Its principal functions are
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to assist him in his responsibilities with respect to strategic warning
and to conduct research with respect thereto. It may also engage in
other warning related activities within the Intelligence Community with
the concurrence of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
II. The Evolution: The NIO/Warning position was-established in
October, 1978 to provide a single point of accountability for warning at
the National level. Prior to that time, emphasis had been on "strategic
warning,"* and that flavor carried over to the new organization. Most
assumed the NIO/W would continue to observe precedence and devote most of
his attention to the threat of hostilities involving US military forces
(by implication--USSR, North Korea, or China). A trend had already started,
however, which was to broaden the scope of warning** attention considerably.
Over time, there had been a gradual realization that most "intelligence
warning failures" had had nothing to do with the use of military force
against US troops, ships, or aircraft, nor had they involved the use of
force by the USSR, North Korea, or China. The Community was already
moving from an emphasis on the more restrictive strategic warning to the
broader context of avoiding surprise.
Concurrently, the NIOs were assuming their revitalized warning roles.
The Alert Memorandum was revivified as the principal national level warning
vehicle. Potential crises in Iran, Pakistan, Egypt/Libya, Nicaragua, and
El Salvador, among others, became the subjects of Alert Memoranda whose
production was chaired by the responsible area NIO in concert with the
NIO/W. Potential crises, and their warning implications, were judged
important as a result of their impact on US policy interests. The old
strategic warning-imminent hostilities concept was not abandoned, nor was
it deemphasized. Rather, it was subsumed by a broader warning context.
Meanwhile, our concept of the Strategic Warning Staff's mission
lagged the realities evolving in the Community. The SWS mission had
been extrapolated from its previous role-3ig W, or strategic warning
concerning the USSR, North Korea, and China. Provisions had been made
to broaden its area of interest at the discretion of the NIO/W, but this
was envisioned as an infrequent, ad hoc occurence. The Director of the
SWS was charged to concentrate on the larger problems threatening general
war.
*DCID 1/5 defines strategic warning as "intelligence information or
intelligence regarding the threat of the initiation of hostilities against
the US or in which US forces may become involved; it may be received at
any time prior to the initiation of hostilities. It does not include
tactical warning.
**DCID 1/5 defines warning as "those measures taken, and the intelligence
information produced, by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the
President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign
events of major importance to the security of the United States. It
includes strategic, but not tactical warning.
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The Chinese-Vietnamese imbroglio, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and the Polish crisis with its potential for Soviet intervention served
to keep the Staff occupied through 1979 and 1980. At the same time,
however, the NIO for Warning staff of two was hard pressed to keep up
with the rest of the world. As the NIO for Warning assumed his role as
warning conscience to the regional NIOs, the Intelligence Community,
and the DCI, it became apparent that he needed more help in areas other
than strategic warning.
III. The Problem: No one disagrees that the Community needs a
warning conscience, and DCID 1/5 charges the NIO/W with that task. While
the SWS has supported him well with respect to the Soviet Union and China,
they have done little or nothing in other areas. Yet twenty four of the
thirty one Alert Memoranda issued since the NIO for Warning fished
have been concerned with other areas. The present NIO/W staf
In early 1979 the DCI decided to leave the SWS in the Pentagon for
various reasons not the least of which were historical. As the warning
responsibilities.have shifted to the NIOs at Langley, it has become
increasingly difficult to do business via the grey telephone and the
Bluebird shuttle bus. As a result, the ability of the Staff to effectively
support the NIO for Warning (and the other NIOs) has suffered.
IV. The Solution: There are five major elements to be considered
in establishing a revitalized, pertinent SWS.
-- Direct Control by the NIO for Warning
We recommend eliminating the SWS.as a separate, semi-autonomous
b d replacing it with an enlarged NIO/W staff consisting
o fficers in addition to the NIO/W and A/NIO/W. Most of
the su committee believe th onnel should represent the
lligence agencies from CIA, from DIA, and
I rrom NSA and State , all servi rotational tours.
view would prefer disassociating the personnel from
the agencies and establishing permanent cadre rather than
rotational tours. A mix of the two approaches is probably the
best approach. Consideration should be given to retaining an
additional CIA slot as a liaison to the DIA warning office.
-- Expansion of Mission: The NIO/W's area of interest and
responsibility is worldwide. If his staff is augmented as we
recommend, emphasis should be on selecting officers with broad,
general experience who are well schooled in the warning discipline.
The NIO/W staff should review community intelligence production to
ensure it adequately treats the warning aspects, provide aggressive
skepticism in the face of too comfortable an acceptance of the con-
ventional wisdom, and research longer term matters of warning
significance worldwide.
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-- Access to Community Resources: Implicit in the arrange-
ment we recommend is broad access to community analytical
resources. This should be facilitated by the manning recom-
mended above, with representation by CIA, DIA, NSA and State.
The NIO/W should, like the other NIOs, tap Community resources
for assistance when it is needed.
-- Access to the NIO/W and NIOs: The need for effective
communication between the NIO/W, NIO/W staff, and the geographic
NIOs dictates location of the staff at Langley.
-- Access to Customers: The NIO/W should publish, either
routinely or aperiodically, for the consumption of the Intel-
ligence Community. Subjects should include alternative hypothesis
and research in depth on warning matters. In times of impending
crisis, the NIO/W should have the option of expanding distribu-
tion to include the policy community.
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