QUO VADIS THE STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100120030-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: January 6, 1981
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
NFAC #046/81
6 January 1981
FROM Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
SUBJECT Quo Vadis the Strategic Warning Staff (U)
1. At attachment is a draft paper on the Strategic Warning
Staff and its future. I have broadened it slightly beyond the
SWS, primarily as a result of our previous discussion. (C)
2. I would like to meet at 1400 on Wednesday, 21 January,
in Room 5G00, CIA headquarters to finalize the paper. (U)
Attachment
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NFAC #046/81
SUBJECT: Quo Vadis the Strategic Warning Staff (U) 6 January 1981
1
- Robert J. Ray, NSA
1
- LCoI. James J. O'Brien, DIA
1
- William D.
Howells, INR
1
- William J.
Peterson, DUSD (PR/IP)
1
- Douglas J.
MacEachin, CIA
1
- NIO/W
1
- A/NIO/W Chrono
1
- SWS File
1
- NFAC Registry
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I. Background: The Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) was established
in 1974 as a replacement for the National Indications Center. It is
manned jointly by the agencies of the Intelligence Community, located
in the National Military Intelligence Center, Pentagon, and chaired by
a CIA officer. DCID 1/5, National Intelligence Warning, placed the SWS
under the supervision of the NIO/Warning. The staff personnel allowance
presently stands at twelve professionals and five clericals.
In February 1979, the NIO/W prepared a paper for the DCI which
explored potential roles for the SWS. These included:
-- Option A: A larger SWS: Under this option the SWS
would be increased to 20 professionals and 8 clericals. Such
a staff would maintain a working discipline by issuing a daily
national-level warning report (emphasis added). Its report in
normal periods would be primarily a device for maintaining dialogue
and warning consciousness in and with the Community in
Washington and the field. In major crisis, however, it would
serve as a vehicle for periodic reporting to policy officers.
(emphasis added). Manning to this level would permit the
Director/SWS to issue such a report without becoming consumed
by routine. His analysts would have time to think and to
bring their expertise to bear on Community analyses, and the
staff would be strong enough to maintain around-the-clock manning
in crisis without the augmentation that could be had only
with great difficulty in such periods. At the same time, the staff
could make a serious contribution to an inter-Agency research program.
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Five-six analysts working full-time on important questions
would provide the core around which a coherent program could
be built.
-- Option B: SWS at Its Present Strength. With 11
professionals and 6 clericals, SWS could either issue a
daily report as in Option A or do this weekly and supply
some working manpower for research. Crisis operations would
require augmentation.
-- Option C: Reduce Present Strength by Three. Under
this option SWS manning would be reduced by the two pro-
fessionals and one clerical needed to provide the NIO with
a staff of three assistants and two clericals.
-- Option D: A Sharply Curtailed SWS. Option D would
add two more professionals to the NIO's staff, raising its
strength to eight, including the NIO/W. There would be an
SWS of perhaps six, four professionals and two clerical,
reducing total manpower by 30 percent. At this level the SWS
could synthesize agency contributions and probably encourage
a dialogue between Washington and the field. Any larger
analytic or "conscience" role would have to be assumed by
appropriate NIOs.
--.Option E: No SWS. Further reduction in manning would
make maintenance of a separate SWS inefficient. This option
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would therefore further augment the NIO/W staff by two more
professionals and a clerical for a total of eleven. These
positions would provide the nucleus. for a strong research
effort and provide some additional backup to the NIOs
responsible for strategic warning.
-- Option F: No Special Attention to Strategic Warning.
This would not only eliminate SWS but somewhat reduce NIO/W's
staff from that in Option E. He would have an A/NIO, three
officers responsible for plumbing, systems, budget, and support
to the NIOs, and two clericals, for a total of seven, including
the NIO/W himself.
The DCI approved option C, however .the transfer of two professionals
and a clerical from the SWS to the NI0/W office was never accomplished.
DCID 1/5 delineates responsibilities for the NIO/W, the NIOs, and the
SWS.
Relevent portions follow:
The NIO/W is charged to advise and assist the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to
coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a
focal point for warning in the Community. For organizational purposes, he
will be located in the National Foreign Assessment Center. He will to the
maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his duties.
The responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning are:
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i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources
which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert
to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess
these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He
should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at
all levels of the Community.
ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President
and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination
of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intel-
ligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National
Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the
President and the National Security Council with concurrent
dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
and Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment on appropriate
Community response to developing warning situations.
iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the
Director of Central Intelligence in crisis situations.
v. To support the Deputy Director of Cental Intelligence
and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
vi. To chair the Warning Working Group.
vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National
Intelligence Officers.
viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff.
ix. To arrange for intelligence research and production
with respect to strategic warning.
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x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline
throughout the Community.
xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures
for warning, including communications and dissemination of
information.
xi~i. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the
government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer
for Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff of the information
they need to carry out their mission.
xi.ii. To promote improved analyst training in indications and
warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might
contribute to improved warning.
xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the
Deputy for Research Management, as appropriate, on warning
activities that relate to their responsibilities.
The National Intelligence Officers are specifically charged with
substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They
will conduct Communitywide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially
requiring issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of Central
Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the National
Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually alert to the
need for immediate issuance of warning.
The Strategic Warning Staff will be under the supervision of the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Its principal functions are to
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assist him in his responsibilities with respect to strategic warning and
to conduct research with respect thereto. It may also engage in other
warning related activities within the Intelligence Community with the
concurrence of the Pational Intelligence Officer for Warning.
II. The Evolution: The NIO/Warning position was established in October,
1978 to provide a single point ~bf accountability for warning at the National
level. Prior to that time, emphasis had been on "strategic warning",* and
that flavor carried over to the new organization. Most assumed the NIO/W
would continue to observe procedence and devote most of his attention to the
threat of hostilities involving US military forces (by implication--USSR,
North Korea, or China). A trend had already started, however, which was to
broaden the scope of warning attention considerably.** Over time, there
had been a gradual realization that most "intelligence warning failures"
had had nothing to do with the use of military force against US troops, ships,
or aircraft, nor had they involved the use of force by the USSR, North Korea,
or China. In fact, those analysts who devoted most of their efforts to
"strategic warning" were seen by some to be outside the mainstream--sitting
around waiting for World War III was a phrase heard not infrequently. The
Community was already moving from an emphasis on the more restrictive
strategic warning to the broader context of avoiding surprise.
*DCID 1%5 defines strategic warning as "intelligence information or
intelligence regarding the threat of the initiation of hostilities against
the US or in which US forces may become involved; it may be received at
any time prior to the initiation of hostilities. It does not include
tactical warning."
**DCID 1/5 defines warning as "those measures taken, and the intelligence
information produced, by the intelligence Community to avoid surprise to
the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign
events of major importance to the security of the United States. It
includes strategic, but not tactical warning.
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Concurrently, the NIOs were assuming their revitalized warning roles.
The Alert memorandum was revivified as the principal national level warning
vehicle. Potential crises in Iran, Pakistan, Egypt/Libya, Nicaragua,
E1 Salvador, etc. became the subjects of Alert Memoranda whose production
was chaired by the responsible area NIO in concert with the NIO/W.
Potential crises, and their warning implications, were judged important
as a result of their impact on US policy interests. The old strategic
warning-imminent hostilities concept was not abandoned, nor was it
deemphasized. Rather, it was subsumed by a broader warning context.
Meanwhile, our concept of the Strategic Warning Staff's mission lagged
the realities envolving in the Community. The SWS mission had been extrapolated
from its previous role--Big W, or strategic warning concerning the USSR,
North Korea, and China. Provisions had been made to broaden their area
of interest at the discretion of the NIO/W, but this was envisioned as an
infrequent, ad hoc occurance. The Director of the SWS was charged to
concentrate on the larger problems threatening general war.
The Chinese-Vietnamese imbroglio, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and the Polish crisis with its potential for Soviet intervention served
to keep the Staff occupied through 1979 and 1980. At the same time,
however, the NIO for Warning staff of two was hard pressed to keep up
with the rest of the world. As the NIO for Warning assumed his role as
warning conscience to the regional NIOs and the DCI, it became apparent
that he needed more help in areas other than strategic warning.
III. The Problem: No one disagrees that the Community needs a
warning conscience, and DCID 1/5 charges the NIO/W with that task. While
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the Sl~1S has supported him admireably with respect to the Soviet Union
and China, they have done little or nothing in other areas. Yet twenty
four of the thirty one Alert Memoranda issued since the establishment of
the NIO for Warning have been concerned with other areas. The present
NIO/W staff of two professionals is just not enough.
In early 1979 the DCI decided to leave the SWS in the Pentagon for
various reasons not the least of which were historical. As the warning
responsibility has shifted to the NIOs at Langley, it has become
increasingly difficult to do business via the grey telephone and the
Blue bird shuttle bus. As a result, the ability of the Staff to effectively
support the NIO for Warning (and the other NIOs) has suffered.
IV. The Solution: There are five major elements to be considered
in establishing a revitalized, pertainant SWS.
-- Director Control by the NIO for 4Jarning
We recommend eleminating the SWS as a separate, semi-autonomous
body, and replacing it with an enlarged NIO/Ir! staff consisting
of six officers; two from CIA, two from DIA, and one each from
NSR and State. One existing S4JS slot should be converted to a
permanent State billet against which an officer could be charged.
Consideration should be given to retaining an additional CIA
slot as a liaison to the DIA warning office.
-- Expansion of Mission: The NIO/W's area of interest and
responsibility is worldwide. If his staff is augmented as we
recommend, emphasis should be on selecting officers with broad,
general experience who are well schooled in the warning discipline.
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The NIO/4J staff should review community intelligence production to
ensure it adequately treats the warning aspects, provide aggressive
skepticism in the face of two comfortable an-acceptance of the con-
ventional wisdom, and research longer term matters of warning
significance worldwide.
-- Access to Community Resources: Implicit in the arrangement
we recommend is broad access to community analytical resources.
This should be facilitated by the manning recommended above, with
representation by CIA, DIA, NSA, and State. The NIO/W should, like
the other NIOs, tap Community resources for assistance when it is
needed.
-- Access to the NIO/ W and NIOs: The need for effective
communication between the NIO/W, NIO/W staff, and the geographic
NIOs dictates location of the staff at Langley.
-- Access to Customers: The NIO/W should publish, either
routinely or aperiodically, for the consumption of the intelligence
community. Subjects should include alternative hypothesis and
research in depth on warning matters. In times of impending
crisis, the NIO/W should have the option of expanding distribution
to include the policy community.
V. Conclusion: In summary then, we recommend replacing the SWS with
an NIO/W staff of six professionals drawn from the Community and located
at Langley whose function would be to support the NIO/W in publishing
alternative hypotheses on budding crises and in-depth research papers
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on warning issues. Consideration should also be given to providing an
NIO/W liaison officer to the DIA warning office.
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