DRAFT TOR FOR THE SWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100200016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 22, 1979
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group Members
SUBJECT : Draft TOR for the SWS
22 August 1979
Comments on the draft SWS Terms of Reference received prior to
today have been minor. DIA's suggestions, at enclosure, are significant,
and are provided to you now so that you may review them prior to Friday's
meeting.
Acting
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
This memo can be downgraded to
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from
attachment.
DIA review(s) completed.
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 Approved For se 20051GREL-RDP83B01027 0100200016-8
ENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
16 AUG 1979
S-0592/VP
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING, CIA
SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Terms of Reference for the SWS (U)
1. (U) In accordance with NIO/W memorandum of 6 August 1979, subject:
"Meeting on Friday, 17 August 1979," DIA provides the following comments
on the draft Terms of Reference for the Strategic Warning Staff, enclosed
with referenced memorandum.
2. (S) As a general comment, DIA believes that the draft Terms of
Reference, if adopted, would involve the realignment to the SWS of
functions which are being satisfactorily performed elsewhere in the com-
munity and give the SWS a charter which marks a radical departure from
that of the past. DIA would be disinclined to concur with a change of
the magnitude proposed without strong evidence that a need exists, and
that the proposed change would satisfy that need. Specific comments
follow..
3. (S) Reference paragraph 2, change as follows:
"2. The Staff should have three main functions:
a. To serve as a catalyst to community activities with
regard to Strategic Warning.
b. To synthesize military, political, economic and
scientific intelligence related to strategic warning, and to
provide that synthesis to the remainder of the community as
a catalyst and stimulus, but not as an alternative which
would absorb any function now being performed elsewhere.
c. To conduct research on methodology for use by I&W
analysts, and to provide the results of that research to the
community."
4. (S) Reference paragraph 3, delete the word "conscience" in the first
sentence and substitute "catalyst." Under 3, change the first underlined
sentence to read "Alert NIO/W and the community to:" and the second tick
mark under paragraph 3 to read:
"-- Reasonable hypotheses, not covered in other com-
munity publications, providing alternate explana-
tions and short-term forecasts for situations of the
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON US 1999
REVIEW ON
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threatening nature. These should be disseminated
only to the intelligence communuty, not to consumers."
To the third tick mark under paragraph 3, add a sentence: "This is also
a function of the NIO for Warning and the remainder of the community and
not a unique SWS function." In the underlined portion following the
third tick mark of paragraph 3, change sentence to read: "Produce, for
Nl$ and the community, hypotheses on the course of major developments,
strictly for dissemination within the community and not to intelligence
consumers." In the last separate paragraph of paragraph 3, DIA does not
understand the reference to "a useful model," and suggests that this
particular sentence lacks meaning without such an understanding. The
first sentence should be changed to read: "The objective is to give
NIO/W an independent capability to stimulate...."
5. (S) With respect to paragraph 4, DIA does not understand the ap-
parent assumption that the links with State/INR and CIA political analysis
do not already exist. If the suggestion is for a private SWS-State/INR-
CIA communications channel, DIA would obviously object. If the suggestion
is that useful intelligence is being withheld from the remainder of the
community with respect to warning situations, then the entire community
should be made the recipient of such intelligence and not just the SWS
staff. Finally, the paragraph makes no reference to DIA, although it
does suggest that the SWS should be linked with the economic and military
elements of INR and CIA. DIA presumes that this apparent oversight is
based upon the assumption that the SWS, due to its collocation with the
NMIC, already has a satisfactory link with DIA. However, DIA believes
that the structure of the paragraph could lead the reader to judge that
the link is unimportant. If the point of the paragraph should be that
there must be, in.a crisis situation or in any situation which appears
threatening, full sharing of information by all Washington agencies
concerned with warning and that a function of the SWS should be to assure
that this exchange is planned for and will take place, DIA would agree
that this might be an appropriate task to assign to the SWS but it is
not an appropriate part of the SWS charter.
6. (S) With reference to paragraph 5, DIA desires a detailed explana-
tion of what is intended. The major U&S Commands are by law incorporated
into the national and military command system, and provision already exists
for a continuous dialogue between Washington military staffs and U&S
Commands. A function of DIA is to be sensitive to the needs of the field
for information, and a detailed reporting system exists to assure a flow
to and from the U&S Commands on intelligence. Accordingly, DIA could not
agree with this paragraph as written without further and satisfactory
explanation of the purpose and mode of the suggested dialoque.
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7. (S) DIA has similiar difficulties with paragraph 6, which appears
to suggest that SWS will take over functions presently performed by
the NMIC, by the NIO for Warning, and by other agencies. DIA cannot
concur with any portion of paragraph 6 as written.
8. (S) With respect to paragraph 7, DIA takes into account that most
of DIA's effort, more than half of NFAC's effort, and a very high per-
centage of efforts of other intelligence agencies are already devoted
to the military field. The suggestion that 'SWS should look upon itself
as the only military research organization dedicated to the warning
problem is, in DIA's judgment, misleading, because warning is specifically
a function of the NMIC and there is a very extensive Department of Defense
mechanism devoted to the warning problem. Further, because of the
limited staff of the SWS, because of the talent and depth in other organ-
izations, and because of the need for unfettered research, DIA questions
whether the SWS could or should be developed to the level that could
lead the community effort. DIA considers that this is too ambitious
an undertaking for the SWS. DIA therefore disagrees with the recommenda-
tion that SWS should coordinate the national program and draft NIE's or
other products. Because of the complexity of the warning problem and
the obvious conflict of interest, DIA most strongly disagrees with the
suggestion that SWS should draft any NIE with respect to U.S. warning
capability.
9. (U) For similar reasons, DIA would disagree with the SWS functions
outlined in paragraph 8.
10. (S) For the reasons which appear at various places above, DIA would
disagree with paragraph 9, which does not take into account the other
community arrangements for dealing with crises and warning situations.
The nature of existing arrangements indicates that SWS would have great
difficulty integrating its efforts with that of the remainder of the
community under the concept proposed.
11. (S) With respect to paragraph 10, DIA recommends that the SWS be
directly subordinated to the NIO/W. As written, the paragraph leaves
much room for uncertainty as to the SWS subordination. DIA further rec-
ommends that the proposed Terms of Reference be discarded, and that the
SWS continue under the Terms of Reference approved by the NFIB on
23 May 1979,. as incorporated in DCID 1/5.
25
Acting vice uirector-r"
Foreign Intelligence
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