NIO/W'S ROLE IN WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100200028-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: July 11, 1979
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
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11 July 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT : NIO/W's Role in Warning
1. I spent some time this week reading the NIO Monthly Warning
Meeting files, the Presidential Trends, and emos. Realizing
the state of flux in which we find ourselves (SW5 restaffing, Bowie
leaving, your staff only recently completed), I would understand a
desire on your part to make haste slowly. On the other hand, the
situation in Afghanistan may provide a classic test case to answer the
question "what does the NIO/W do when he feels something "should be
done?"
2. Analysts' opinions are divided vis a vis Soviet military inter-
vention. The majority opinion now is that the Soviets would not use
ground troops. Analysts' tendencies, quite naturally, are to emphasize
the potential disadvantages to the Soviets should they intervene. They
have largely ignored some obvious advantages, which Harry has pointed
out very well. On the other hand, at least some analysts feel the
Soviets would use troops, given the right circumstances. In antici-
pation of an Alert Memo, should the situation take a turn for the worse,
it might be worthwhile to do some pre-analysis along the following
lines:
1. Assume the worst: Soviet military interven-
tion in Afghanistan.
it:
2. Investigate the circumstances which might cause
a. Military collapse in Kabul?
b. Gradual deterioration countrywide?
c. Other?
3. Given sufficient provocation, investigate the
military options available for the Soviets, and identify
the pros and cons of each:
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a. VTA/VDV
b. Normal infantry
c. Air strikes
d. Border only
e. Kabul only
4. Based on #2 above, identify indicators which would
support an increasing probability of intervention generally,
and each specific course of action.
5. Solicit support from CT in developing contingency
collection tasking should we at some time feel the possibility
of intervention was increasing.
3. Care to discuss?
25X1
Attachments
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3
Despite the "hwniliating defeat" of the US resolution in the C S, he said, the
US re raided "great capacity for rnaneulier." Havana's unusua s= ate:~ent on
19 June charging that the U3 was plotting "direct intervention" suggests
apprehensions are hared by the Cubans.
Iv/e may be dealing here with the familiar problem of conflicting perspectives
and perceptions. Our analysts assume there.is virtually no chance of direct
US military intervention, even if pro-Cuban elements in the r_Ii seen. to be
On the verge of seizing supreme power. But do the embattled jc leaders
and their Cuban backers share this assumption?
We now have a broad range of information-eveihts, pronouncements, and
intelligence reports-which could be interpreted to support a warning judgment
that the Cubans may be contemplating and/or preparing a military intervention
on behalf of, and at t ,he request of, the 3LI provisional government. If such
a warning is not issued, and the Cubans do undertake more cons::icuous actions
Which could be described as "intervention," it could be a:k-:ard to explain
why this contin,;ency as not foreseen in the information available before
the event.
X1 Afghanistan (excerpt fromi 28 June memo)
Ni analysts devoted over half of their meeting to this sub..ect. Several
voiced uneasiness :'with :!hat they felt :aas the Soviet sreci a-'is s' overly
complacent view of the possibility of so m- form of :soviet military intervention
t0 prevent the collapse and defeat of t._e T_araki regime. T