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December 16, 2016
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October 27, 1978
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Approv ROOM NO. BUILDING Approv 200a 7 - 3B01027R0 TR.A"NSMI-rT' L SLIP D ATE i ~ 78 . All NIOs ROOM NO. BUILDING REMARKS: This is preparatory o our meeting tomorrow afternoon. FROM: Richard Lehman, NIO/Warning 25X1 25X1 1 FEB 55 )A I REPLACES FORM 38-8 (47) WHICH MAY BE USED. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 Approved For R Thase 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027F 0200010008-7 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SC-03656-78 Notional Intelligence Officers 27 October 1.978 FROM James R. Lille" National Intelligence Officer for China SUBJECT Draft Warning Report: China 1. Attached is our draft initial warning report based on our discussion of last Thursday. Jim Lilley has asked me to take charge of this endeavor in his absence. Although this report will not be coordinated we welcome your comments, especially if you find what you consider errors of omission or misreflections of our discussion. Please rememberthat rather than offering judgments as to the likely we are being asked to lean well forward in considering the possible. 2. N%e will be in touch about next month's meeting: there ma:! he further guidance from the NIO/`?7a.rnina after he has considered our initial effort. Could I nle:ise have any comments either on rnaner or bv phone by 2 November. Attachment: DISTRIBUTION LIST 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01(?~;.,9A-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 C1WQA3MI7UZT U0010008-7 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20303 Notionol Intelligence Officers 30 October 1978 i'tE`IORA i FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA : National Intelligence Officer for Warning Director, National Foreign Assessment Center FRO''-I ; National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Meeting for the Near East and South Asia 1. Initial Meeting of the NESA Warning Group. On 26 October repre- sentatives from tate, D IA,, _NS A, t e Army, and Navy net at CIA .Headquarters for the first monthly warning meeting for the Near East and South Asia. Dick Lehman, the NIO for Warning, began this first meeting with a brief discussion of the purposes of the new warning mechanism. Discussion then followed on.a country by country basis. 2. Summary. The MESA group recognized that many countries in its area of concern are the focus of continual attention (Egypt, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and India) and that unless we saw trends not covered in on- going analytic activities we would not warn the already warned. Of immediate concern is the possibility of political upheaval in Algeria following the possible demise or incapacity of President Boumediene; a miscalculation by either side along the Egyptian-Libyan border in view of the heavy troop build up; an increase in terrorist and civil disobedience activities in Israel in the wake of Camp David; political instability in Syria as a result of a combina- tion of factors; further anti-regime activity in the YAR; increased demonstra- tions in Iran during the holy month of Muharram and the possible ouster of Pakistani Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia. Of a general nature, the type of decision taken at the Baghdad Summit could cause problems in the ranks of the moderate Arab States. 3. Al eria. Since we don't know the condition of Algerian President Boumediene, w o is ill in Moscow, an Algerian succession problem could occur. Algeria's Third World role, its role in OPEC, and the possible impact of a change in Algerian leadership on the western Sahara dispute with Morocco, make Boumediene's health and the lack of a system of succession important factors to watch. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 Approved For ReI ae se 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027RdW200010008-7 4. Lihyan-E tiara Border. US policy makers have been adequately of the massive buildup informed of Egyptian forces along its border with Libya (currently twice the size of forces in the Western Military District. in July 1977 during the last outbreak of fighting). However, it is probably worth pointing out from a warning point of view that the initiative for beginning hostilities does not lie wholly with the Egyptians. The July 1977 war resulted from an escalation of a series of border clashes, which had been provoked by forces on both sides. The action ball does not lie wholly in the Egyptian court and what occurs at the Baghdad Summit may cause Libya to be more adventurous. 5. Israel. US policy makers should not be surprised by unrestrained Israeli reaction to any Arab terrorist attack that might occur over the next few months -- no matter how tenuous any negotiations with Egypt at the time of such an attack. Although not considered likely, Arab riots in the West Bank in reaction to Israeli expansion of settlements must be mentioned as one of the "less than probable contingencies" suitable for this report. 6. Syria. There are numerous sources of instability in Syria: Events in Lebanon,, tie health of President Assad, Baath Party in-fighting, and relations with Iraq. The possibility of Iraqi troop deployments to the Golan Heights is of particular warning concern, because of the potential for Israeli military reaction. 7. The Yemens. A coup in either Yemen is considered likely almost at any time, but this is the way most policy makers have grown accustomed to seeing the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula. No amount of Saudi (or US) propping up of the Sana regime is likely to forestall a series of coup attempts in the YAR. 8. Iran. It was agreed that probably everyone in the US government was sensitize to the current unrest in Iran. However, it was considered worth mentioning that the likelihood of further unrest is increased by the occurrence of the Shia holy month of '?buharram in December. 9. Pakistan. With a decision on the fate of former prime minister Bhutto coming up wit n e next several weeks, the Army generals are becoming increasingly upset with Chief 1IL Zia and may move to replace him. 10. The next monthly warning meeting for the Near East and South Asia will be conducted on Tuesday, 21 November at 1430. Rather than a country-by- country analysis, discussion of several major topics such as "The Arab-Israeli Dispute" may be attempted. Suggestions from all agency participants have been encouraged. 25X1 Robert C. Ames Approved For Release 2005 p~ CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 Approved For Rel` ase 2005 I,A RDP83B01027RO200010008-7 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers NFAC 4806-78 31 October 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA . National Intelligence Officer for Warning kV Director, National Foreign Assessment Center National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe SUBJECT Organizational Meeting on Warning and Initial Report - Western Europe 1. Following a briefing by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, the West European group had a brief discussion of procedures and agreed as follows: -- that we will plan to meet every fourth Wednesday at 1000; -- I will circulate an agenda of items to be discussed two days before the meeting; -- all agencies are invited to propose items for the agenda, and these will include a one sentence statement of the gen- eral thrust; -- ad hoc meetings may be suggested by anyone and may be used to initiate or coordinate an Alert Memorandum; -- the regular sessions will also provide occasion to discuss any pending community business even if not necessarily asso- ciated with warning., 2. Concerning how the concept of warning might be made meaningfully applicable to Western Europe, I suggested that we might have a report con- sisting of two categories of items: The first would be more or less spe- cific things involving some potential "nastiness" the US should be alerted to. This might become a kind of check list of contingencies, and many of 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01 CnrQP8313010271 000200010008-7 SECRET Approved For Rel a e 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027RO 200010008-7 - 2 - them could perhaps be handled briefly. The second category would be more in the nature of adverse trends leading up to some untoward consequence for US interests. This seemed to make some sense to most. I then dis- tributed an illustrative agenda, and with some changes and the addition of a couple of other topics, this served as the basis for the following first report: a. Contingencies Checklist. Berlin - The Soviet and East German governments have again protested that the election of a Berlin mayor as president of the Bundesrat is a violation of Allied agreements. Mayor Stobbe is scheduled to preside over Bundesrat sessions in November and December, and there are precedents for East German attempts to deny him use of ground transit routes to take up his post. The eastern protests have thus far seemed pro forma, however, and we doubt that Moscow will allow its displeasure to threaten larger interests in the West. Azores - There is a new crop of rumors that the Front for the Liberation of the Azores (FLA) may attempt to depose the regional government and declare the islands independent. II 25X1 doubt that a FLA-engineered coup attempt would attrac pu c support, and while the regional government itself has had ties with the sep- aratist movement, it is currently more interested in the autonomy-under- Lisbon route. b. Portugal - The designation of Carlos Mota Pinto as prime min- ister suggests an easing of the three-month government crisis. Mota Pinto is a compromise between the feuding President and the Socialists-who, together with the other parties, may now be willing to lend the prime minister limited support. The outlook is nevertheless guarded, and Mota Pinto's failure would likely lead to early -- and probably polarizing -- elections. c. Spain - With tensions rising in the Basque country, the gov- ernment is deeply concerned by the continuing problems of low morale and indiscipline in the security services. open talk of work stoppages and strikes has spread from the armed police to the civil guard in the wake of recent terrorist attacks. Resentment of the government's efforts to replace hardliners in key command positions with loyalists to the new regime adds uncertainty to the reliability of either service should the Basque situation seriously worsen. d. Belgium - The recent collapse of the Tindemans government will prolong indecision on long-pending economic and defense issues, and perhaps adversely affect Belgium's role in the shoring up of Zaire's economy. The new elections, which the caretaker government is expected to hold in about three months, seem unlikely to ease the ethnic issue that has virtually para- lyzed the central government in recent years and come close to putting Belgium as a national state in question. e. Italy - Some community observers are reducing the odds that the Andreotti government will last into next year, and possibly, until after the 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/0SECRMP83BOl 027R000200010008-7 Approved For R`eTease 2005RDP83B01027R`0200010008-7 3 - elections to the European Parliament next June. Working against Andreotti are the increasingly hard attacks on the Communists by the "rejuvenated" Socialists, pressures from the rank and file on Berlinguer to bid for a larger slice of influence, and within Andreotti's own party, restiveness on the part of those who are uncomfortable with the role of the Communists and/or are simply ambitious. Working for Andreotti are the Socialists' need to consolidate their recent gains, the unresolved leadership problem of the Christian Democrats, anticipation of some clarification of the Communists' future line at the party congress next March, and the desire of most poli- ticians, particularly the Communists, to avoid an early parliamentary elec- tion. f. Greece-Turkey-NATO - Efforts to achieve Greece's early reinte- gration into NATO are hung up on Greek-Turkish differences over how to divide up the Aegean commands. The Turks have rejected the interim solution of "no boundaries" that was worked out by General Haig and General Davos and are insisting that agreement be reached at a political level. But both countries think definitive arrangements affect not only their security, but may also set precedents for other, politically-sensitive issues in the Aegean. There are differences of view whether Ecevit's authority has already been seriously eroded by Turkey's continuing economic problems and the unending violence, but it will not be easy for him to appear magnanimous toward the Greeks. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/OS CR TDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 ECE NIO/W Approved For RTase 2005/01/06 CIA-RDP83B01027FW0200010008- THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 National Intelligence Officers NFAC-4685-78 24 October 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH . Director, National Foreign Assessment Center National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America SUBJECT : Latin America -- Warning of Impending Developments 1. Action Requested: None; for your information only. 2. Background: The convergence of severe economic, social, and political problems suggest that political turmoil will characterize the nations of Central America over the next 60 to 90 days. Challenges to government stability will be particularly strong in Nicaragua, where the FSLN plans to launch another guerrilla attack from Honduras and Costa Rica with logistic support from Venezuela and Panama. In preparation for this attack, President Somoza is doubling his National Guard, but the loyalty of new. recruits and their military capacity is questionable. We should anticipate that Somoza might call on the OAS to protect his country from military incursions from his neighbors -- a step which could place the US in the awkward position of voting in the OAS to protect Somoza. 3. The Nicaraguan situation is causing consternation in El Salvador, where the stability of the government is precarious. This tiny, over- populated country is next to the poorest in Latin America. Demographic problems create pressures difficult to contain. There are currently 205 persons per square kilometer in El Salvador compared to 25 elsewhere in Central America, and 12 elsewhere in Latin America. With its current birthrate of 2.9% per annum, the population density will increase to 297 by 1990. Terrorism has been on the upswing for the last two to three years with political figures and the prominent families which control the economy the prime targets. There are indications that some of the prominent families are preparing to abandon the country with as much of their wealth as they can muster unless outside help can be obtained to control terrorism. Approved For Release 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000 25X1 Approved For ease 20054S(Q6::' A-RDP83B010271W00200010008-7 4. Elsewhere in Latin America there is a potential for conflict between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel despite the negotiations in train. Argentine military movements in the vicinity of the Chilean border. While this may be an Argentine tactic to intimidate Chile, it could result in frontier clashes and possibly in Argentine occupation of the contested islands in the Beagle Channel. While these islands are of no strategic importance to the US and US national interests are not directly affected, the US could become involved in restoring peace to the area. 5. Finally, the economic situation continues to deteriorate in Peru, and there is some possibility Peru will default on its IMF commitments. Peru is not quite poor enough to benefit from low-interest loans available to the poorest nations, but its per capita income is rapidly descending to that point. In 1976 the per capita income was $800., A year later it was $740. By this year it dropped to $680. At this rate it will cross the poverty line of $580 by August 1979, or possibly even before because of the drought. Only at this point will Peru be able to apply for low-interest loans. Peru's grave economic condition will prevent that country from embarking on a military adventure in Chile, should there be a conflict between Chile and Argentina. 6. The above judgements are made as a result of consultations on 19 October 1978 with the "Latinos", the senior intelligence analysts and collectors in the intelligence community who specialize in Latin America. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200010008-7 Approved For Release 20/f'[/06 ~ CIA-RDP83B01027RTt0200010008-7 Distribution: 1 - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - D/NFAC 1 - NIO/W State NSA Treasury 1 - DDO Representative 1 - Mr. OE R 1 - Mr. OGC R 1 - Mr. , FBIS 1 - Mr. 1 - Mr. n, OSR 1 - Mr. 1 - Mr. FAC/RES 1-ER 1 - NFAC Reg 2 - NIO/LA Warning of Impending Developments , DIA Approved For Release 2005/0110.6:: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 SECRET Approved For FIease 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027'00200010008-7 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 National Intelligence Officers NFAC #4642 20 October 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Africa SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa 1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. 2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on the afternoon of 19 October with the NIO/AF as the as the chairman and rapporteur. The attached report is the NIO's understanding of what was said and thought at that meeting; it has not been coordinated with the participants, but is being circulated to them. I will of course report to you cases where they feel their views have been misrepresented or where they believe they have significant additional thoughts. We stand ready, as always, to use these discussions to address topics of a warning character that you may wish us to take up. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/9/ TTlA RDP813B0102 r R0002000 - 1 SECRETJI 25X1 Approved For Rease 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027F60200010008-7 WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Summary - Intelligence Community specialists are particularly con- cerned this month that the situation in Rhodesia and adjacent areas is moving downhill more swiftly than it has in previous periods -- they have a sense of impending crisis that is accompanied by a general feeling that the Soviets/Cubans place increasing emphasis on supporting the creation of conventional forces which would have political roles in both Namibia and Rhodesia under black rule. Specialists also sense the possibility of a new phase in military operations in Ethiopia, with more direct Cuban involvement despite the political arguments against this. Other areas of particular concern are Zaire, Chad, and Uganda. Analysts do not believe there is imminent danger of the Soviets obtaining new facilities in Cape Verde. Rhodesia - We have a sense that the Rhodesian situation is now tilting more steeply both toward intensified military operations on all sides and toward the possibility of a sudden break in white morale with a consequent- collapse of orderly process. We feel that the Rhodesians' military situation is constricting so that they may soon be left with no alternative but the dramatic cross-border strike (with the political complications this brings) if they wish to demonstrate that they still have significant military capabilities. Specialists in the Rhodesian economic scene have noted increased evidence that whites are preparing to make a sudden flight if they have to, and that white farmers are delaying planting this year for the first time because of political uncertainty. At the same time, our concern over the situations in the surrounding Front Line states -- on whose leaders the US has been relying diplomatically has sharpened. While we have long doubted that Front Line unity, fragile and partial as it is, could survive the transition to an independent Zimbabwe, we now see real danger of an even earlier collapse. If this occurs, civil war among the black nationalists in Zimbabwe appears an even surer bet that it has been previously. If, as we fear, the situation continues to deteriorate, Botswana could well be drawn into a more active and turbulent role as fighting spreads to its territory, while Kaunda's position in Zambia will become more desperate. Although we still think he can win his forthcoming elections without trouble in a technical sense, he will very likely be calling urgently for help from the US and the UK -- the latter apparently having promised support that it is reluctant to provide. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 GIA RD1283f 01027R000200010008-7 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R0200010008-7 The arrival of Nigerian elements on the ground in. Zambia appears to us to be an ominous development, possibly opening the way to broader complications in ways we cannot yet clearly see. In sum, the Rhodesian situation has reached a point where a dramatic turn is ir: the offing. Southern Africa/USSR/Cuba - We are concerned over the possibility that the situation in southern Africa may be passing, or indeed may have already passed, into a phase where the Soviet/Cuban role is shifting from supporting "liberation movements" in their essentially guerrilla/terrorist operations to helping build, out of the same elements, conventional military forces which can be used to dominate the internal political situations in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia after independence under "majority rule" and, ultimately, to threaten South Africa. A number of specialists have teen fragments of information which they believe point in this direction, in- volving possible Soviet conventional training for SWAPO as well as the better known Soviet/Cuban efforts with ZAPU, ZANU, and South African groups. If the South Africans should come to see something like this happening, or to believe that they needed to strengthen their position by further military demonstrations, we would look for signs of new South African military and covert action in southern Angola. Such a development would make it more difficult, of course, for Neto to reduce his dependence on the Cubans, as we have hoped he would do, while the general deterioration of the situation in the region would work to the advantage of Soviet/Cuban influence by sharpening the security anxieties of all the black nationalist groups and of the Frontline leaders. Recent Rhodesian actions, we believe, also net out to push the situation in this direction. Ethiopia - Military analysts tend to think that in Eritrea a new phase in military operations, involving more direct Cuban participation, may open within the next 60 to 90 days if the Ethiopians are unable to make further gains with the level of Soviet/Cuban help they are already receiving and if the Soviets continue to be unsuccessful in bringing about negotiations. Political analysts tend to agree, but note that the political factors which have militated against deeper Cuban involvement are still present. In the Ogaden, analysts are again concerned that we may see Ethiopian retaliatory air strikes into Somalia, while they think the danger of ground incursions has diminished with the transfer of Ethiopian troops to the Eritrean front. The danger that the Ethiopians will activate anti-Siad ethnic Somali "liberationists" still appears some distance off; little has been heard of these groups lately. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 01027R000200010008-7 SECRET 25X1 SECRET)I Approved For Re'rease 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 We are, incidentally, much less concerned than earlier over the possibility of an Ethiopian expeditionary force in southern Africa. Cape Verde - We may be seeing a fresh Soviet effort to acquire facilities or a more substantial presence in this territory, but we believe (while admitting large areas of ignorance) that President Pereira will resist this as long as he is around. [State/INR has done a paper on this which it circulated to other agencies for comment and will publish shortly.] Western Sahara - There is a danger that the continued failure to move toward a settlement among Mauritania, Morocco and the Polisario may generate a fresh upheaval in Mauritania and/or another clash between Morocco and Algeria. Uganda - We are of course worried that Amin has some new move against Americans under consideration, despite reporting that he has decided against it for the time being. Both the nature of the situation and the character of Amin make it virtually fruitless to speculate on just what form such a move might take. Zaire - Economic analysts are attempting to resolve what they see as a contradiction between the reports of remarkably good cobalt production from Shaba and the absence of evidence that these supplies are reaching the world market. There is suspicion that we may have been misled and that our original concerns about the impact of Shaba II on production were more valid than subsequent reporting indicated. Even if this suspicion is unfounded, we are still worried that the production situation will deterior- ate in early 1979. Political analysts find Mobutu's mood disquieting; he is reacting again against the pressures -- heavier from the US than from other members of the "reform club" -- to get his house in better order. We do not know what he might do, other than some kind of diplomatic refrigeration, but we may be in for another turbulent period in US-Zaire relations. Chad - The situation is still worrisome; the new compromise government is not working well, and a collapse is possible. This could lead to a resumption of hostilities and a fresh Libyan intervention. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 25X1 SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 200I/ 1/Re~~l D%3B01027R000200010 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers Thanks for your presentation to the IIWG/NP. Attached is my distillation of subse- quent discussion and reflection. Please let me know how this suits your needs. Since national security policy is ultimately concerned with the possible deployment and use of weapons by new nuclear powers, as I see it, warning of nuclear proliferation will need to be incor- porated into the strategic as well as the political warning system. So I will be interested in following if not joining in the development of new procedures for strategic NIO/NP Attachment: NFAC 4641-78 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R00020001' 7 Approved For Rlease SECRET 002000100087 Warning 25X1 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers NFAC 4641-78 20 October 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Report (Initial)--Nuclear Proliferation 1. Action Requested: None; for your information only in conjunction with the new procedures for warning intelligence. 2. Background: I convened a meeting of the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP) on 18 October to identify possible items for this report and to introduce Richard Lehman (NIO/W) who led a discussion of the procedures and criteria for warning. The discussion during the two and one-half hour meeting was about one-half substantive and one-half procedural. 25X1 3. Among the numerous items discussed, several are worth noting: Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200010008-7 ',1'., ? ~ efermins Approved For Release 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B01027R'0200010008-7 4. Attached is a checklist of the kinds of items on which warning would be desirable in the area of nuclear proliferation according to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The list should be expanded to include the following: --Preparations for the deployment or employment of suspected nuclear weapons by a non-weapon state anywhere and of known nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapon state in a nuclear weapon free zone or against a non-weapon state. --Indications that anti-nuclear political forces or movements will nullify the authority of important governments. --Plans for the disclosure or transfer of critical technology for nuclear weapons, reprocessing, ehment, p-r-.heavy water production. 25X1 25X1 Attachment: Checklist SECRET Approved For Release 2005/01/ -RD P83B01027R000200010008-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200010008-7