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POLISH TRENDS AND SOVIET UNION PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020011-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 7, 2006
Sequence Number: 
11
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 19, 1980
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020011-2.pdf115.77 KB
Body: 
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200020011-2 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200020011-2 TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved Mr Release thOUAMW c&Al- f Vn7R000200020011-2 19 September 1980 ALERT MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council SUBJECT: Polish Trends and Soviet Union Perceptions and Reactions Soviet military activity eads me to believe that the Soviet leadership is preparing to intervene militarily in Poland if the Polish situation is not brought under control in a manner satisfactory to Moscow. Recent events in Poland itself suggest that the Kania regime may rjunter severe difficulties in meeting Moscow's requirements. Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200020011-2 I-IAM- - J TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved Mr Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BOM27R000200020011-2 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 19 September 1980 ALERT MEMORANDUM* Polish Trends and Soviet Union Perceptions and Reactions The Soviets are likely to give Kania some additional time to master the situation. But if current trends continue unabated and the Polish Party's control over the nation or Poland's role in the Warsaw Pact are called into question, the Soviets will threaten or employ military force. *The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior poZieymakers are aware of impending potential developments that may have serious implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working ZeveZ with CIA, DIA, NSA, Army, Air Force, State/INR, and the Strategic Warning Staff. NI-IAM-80-10008J Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : - 01021r,0002000200 1 1-2 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved Pr Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP83BOT27R000200020011-2 The Soviets have publicly endorsed Kania and could hardly have expected him to have brought the situation under control within two weeks of his appointment. The situation has continued to deteri- orate, and another confrontation between the regime and workers cannot be ruled out. A renewed confrontation could be precipitated by the workers' insist on the prompt establishment of a nationwide union organization and/or by[ I 0 call for renewed job actions if they decide that the regime has not made adequate progress in registering trade unions by 15 October. Unless the regime can reverse current trends there is a high prob- ability that the Soviet Union will escalate its political and mili- tary pressure on Poland. If the Soviet Union concludes the regime is losing control of the country or that Poland's loyalty to Warsaw Pact is in question, they will intervene militarily. II In the immediate future Moscow will mount increased public warnings and heightened propaganda campaigns decrying the new unions, and may arrange visits to Warsaw by high-level Soviet leaders. Moscow will also continue to take measures to enhance its readiness to intervene militarily in Poland. 2 Approved For Release -P7-: FIA-RE)PBS 1027R000200020011-2 TOP SECRET Approved Ff Release 2007/02/08 i 11D' 7R000200020011-2 There are important considerations which argue against Soviet intervention. Either with or without the cooperation of the Kania regime, military intervention undoubtedly would be perceived in Moscow as a last resort. Nevertheless, the geopolitical importance of Poland and Moscow's determination to preserve Soviet influence in the bloc will be overriding considerations. I I 3 Approved For Release-Q7Slpe 8 : CIA P.91293 01027R000200020011-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200020011-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200020011-2