MARXIST THREAT TO SOMOZA IN NICARAGUA (S)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200030003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 12, 1979
• Content Type: MF

25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030003-0
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030003-0
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washinston,t).C 2USUS
ALERT MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Security Council M O RI
SUBJECT: Marxist Threat to Somoza in Nicaragua f review(s) 25X1
completed.
The Marxist-led Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) is waging an active guerrilla warfare campaign
against the regime of Anastasio Somoza with logistical
support from Cuba and Panama. The National Guard has been
stretched thin by FSLN attacks and ambushes in outlying
cities and the capital city of Managua. Although Sornoza
may be able to hold on to power for a short time, the
economy is at a standstill and the FSLN is steadily gain-
ing strength and popularity. The possibility of an even-
tual FSLN victory looms large. u
NI IAM 79-10009C
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030003-0
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
ALERT MEMORANDUM*
Marxist Threat to Somoza in Nicaragua
The Marxist-Zed Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) is waging an active guerrilla warfare cam-
paign against the regime of Anastasio Sornoza with
logistical support from Cuba and Panama. The National
Guard has been stretched thin by FSLN attacks and am-
bushes in outlying cities and the capital city of Managua.
Although Somoza may be able to hold on to power for a
short time, the economy is at a standstill and the FSLN
is steadily gaining strength and popularity. The pos-
sibility of an eventual FSLN victory looms large. 0
The recent attacks by the Marxist-led FSLN guerrillas are designed
to draw the Nicaraguan National Guard (GN) into combat in widely
separated regions of the country.
n is increase Hera strike called by the
FSLN, w is is about 80 percent effe t' e,in part due to fear of re-
taliation from the FSLN.
A large segment of the GN moved south to repel the invasion by
the FSLN,which has been supplied with weapons, equipment, and
ammunition from countries supporting the FSLN, including Ciihj F_1
*'['he Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the
Director of Central In toiZigenee on behalf of the Intelligence
Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior poZicyrnakers are
aware of the serious implications for US interests of impending
potential developments. Tt is not a prediction. that. these develop-
ments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the
working level by CIA, PTA, NSA, and S1,ate/11Vli'.
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The ranks of the relatively small FSLN guerrillas have been
swelled by the support of anti-Somoza activists who do not necessarily
share the Marxist ideology of the FSLN. Their combined strength
is between 3,000 to 4,000 with more joining daily. Total GN
strength is about 10,000. The GN has been hard pressed by guerrilla
ambushes for a month and has operated at a disadvantage because the
guerrillas control the time, place, and intensity of attack. Never-
theless, the GN, with its superior weapons and training, is still
holding its own. As yet, there is no evidence that its loyalty
to President Somoza is wavering. 0
While Sornoza may be able to hold on, if the FSLN continues
to receive supplies and reinforcements and to conduct hit-and-run
attacks'in isolated localities, GN capabilities could be stretched
to the breaking point. Faced with this eventuality, Somoza might
appeal to neighboring Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras for
assistance. These countries, particularly Guatemala, may provide
such support if they believed the FSLN were about to seize power.
0
If this major effort by the FSLN to oust Somoza nevertheless
proves successful, opposition elements would probably try to form
a coalition government and eventually hold elections. It is
unlikely that these will lead to a stable representative government,
however, because, isolated from the democratic process and institutions
for over 40 years, many Nicaraguans are united only by their
determination to get rid of Somoza, and individual opposition leaders
or factions are weak. Under these circumstances, the FSLN may then
assert itselfi begin to form a Marxist-oriented government with
Cuban help. I
If the GN should break down and Somoza leave the scene, there
is likely to be a period of chaos in which the population will
exact retribution from those who supported or benefited from the
Somoza regime. US citizens and installations may be targets for
such attacks. Nonofficial US citizens in Nicaragua total 3,000-4,000.
Should the evacuation of all US officials and residents prove necessary,
they could probably get out to neighboring countries or the United
States by road or air.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030003-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030003-0
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030003-0