THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200030006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 6, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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The Director of Central intelligence
ALERT MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
SUBJECT : Thai-Kampuchean Border
The Vietnamese are placing Thailand under intense pressure to
accept their consolidation of control in Kampuchea. This pressure
will increase as the Vietnamese escalate operations to eliminate
resistance in the border areas of western and northern Kampuchea.
The Thai Government would doubtless turn to the United States for
support, possibly invoking the Manila Pact. China may appear another
avenue of recourse. If, in the Thai view, neither US nor Chinese
support is suffthey may feel impelled to seek an accommodation
with Vietnam. u
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ALERT MEMORANDUM*
Thai-Kampuchean Border
A combination of factors could Lead to rapid
deterioration of the situation along the Thai-
Kampuchean border. When Vietnam exerts even greater
military pressure against the anti-Vietnamese resist-
ance in Kampuchea
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F
Jf'ighting could occur across the Thai-Kampuchean
border to such an extent that the Thai armed forces
would be unable to cope. In addition, the government
could be faced with an intolerable refugee burden and
increased political criticism. Should the Thai see
their security imperiled by Vietnamese military oper-
ations, they would doubtless appeal for US aid, pos-
sibly under the terms of the Manila Pact. Thailand
would probably also seek increased Chinese military
pressure on Vietnam. If, in the Thai view, neither
US nor Chinese support is sufficient, they might feel
impelled to seek some accommodation with Vietnam.
Vietnamese leaders may believe that they cannot eliminate
resistance as long as Kampucheans continue to enjoy supposed sanctuary
and resupply in Thailand. In such a case, attacks on refugee camps in
*The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the
Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community.
Its purpose is to ensure that senior poZicymakers are are of the
serious implications for US interests of impending potential developments.
It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This
memorandum has been coordi d by CIA, DIA, NSA, State/INR, and the
Strategic Warning Staff. _
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If, by accident or design, a significant engagement occurred
between Thai and Vietnamese forces, and the former did not acquit
themselves well, the situation would take on an even graver character.
A major Thai defeat could constitute sufficient reason for China to
teach Vietnam a second lesson; this, in turn, could invite a greater
Soviet response. Besides the threat of wider international military
involvement, there are domestic implications for Thailand as well.
At this point, Prime Minister Kriangsak seems to have a fairly secure
hold on power and the support of the Thai Army and its Commander,
General Prem. A major Thai military reverse, however, could embolden
Kriangsak's civilian and military critics.
ri angsa might e prompted to ca upon tie
United States and China to provide military assistance against an
external threat and to preserve his government. Likely principals in
a new Thai Government would probably not alter internal policies
significantly, but a successor to the current Prime Minis
be freer to begin seeking an accommodation with Vietnam.
The continuing massive influx of refugees, which the Vietnamese
offensive will certainly aggravate, could alone have serious conse-
quences for Kriangsak. The Thai Government and international aid
*State/TNRbelieves it important to state that currently there are
no indications that Vietnam is planning a major attack on Thailand.
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agencies are already struggling to aid the nearly three quarters of a
million Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. Although Thailand's present
humanitarian policy of admitting refugees has public support, the
refugee issue has aroused domestic opposition in the past, particu-
larly when it appeared that Thailand was being forced to assume too
much of the burden. The area of Vietnamese operations harbors large
numbers of refugees. Some quarter million are estimated encamped
in Kampuchea within 75 kilometers of the border town of Poipet alone,
and the Vietnamese might decide that the more it can push out of the
country, the easier its job of pacification will be. The Thai fear
that there may be as many as a million more potential refugees in
western Kampuchea. If the refugee situation deteriorates and the
international community, particularly the United States, does not
respond promptly with increased assistance and cooperation, Kriangsak's
political opponents would have a readymade issue to exploit.
The pressures outlined above are beyond the capabilities of the
Thai to control adequately on their own. Should fighting spread across
the border in a major way, the Thai will face an array of military and
political issues that could force them to seek outside assistance,
first from the United States, but also from China. If the Thai should
believe that sufficient support is not forthcoming from either quarter,
they might find it necessary to seek some accommodation with Vietnam.
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