MINUTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300010029-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 17, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
17 February 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group
SUBJECT : Minutes
1. The Warning Working Group met at CIA Headquarters on
12 February, 1981. In attendance were:
Dick Lehman. /W - Chairman
NSA DIA
Pete Oleson, DUSD/PR
Bob Martin, State/INR
Dick Kerr, CIA
1RMS
CTS
CTS
, , A/NI0/W
2.1 RMS, presented a briefing on his plans
to conduct a study of Washington area operations/alert/warning centers.
His purposes would be to identify FY83-87 abilities to utilize the
information derived from new collection systems and to review agency
plans to upgrade personnel and equipment. A lively discussion ensued.
The concensus was that there was ample material available in studies
already completed, and that would be better advised to
review existing material than to conduct a new stud Th Chairman
agreed to convey the WWG's r endation to The Group
agreed to provide dditional guidance if required after
his review of existing studies is completed
3. The Chairman distributed three papers on the future of the
Strategic ing Staff. They will be discussed at the 26 February
meeting. I
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SUBJECT: Minutes
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17 February 1981
4. The Chairman described his recent meeting on warning with the
new DCI and announced he wn~~ld meet with the new DDCI tomorrow re. his
warning responsibilities.
5. Il announced that RMS and CTS will be consolidated.
The supplanting organization will be decided on in two weeks or so.
Emphasis will be on planning and product evaluation.
F
7. Mr. Oleson recommended the Group be briefed from time to time
on innovative technical developments related to warning. The Chairman
accepted the recommendation, stating he could do more along those lines
if his staff is augmented. II
8. At attachment are a paper on the Alert Memoranda Track d
and a background paper on the Community's warning capabilities
9. Our next meeting is scheduled for 1315 on Thursday, 26 February.
We will meet in the NMIC conference room at DIA rather than CIA Hq. as
previously announced (see Para 6 above). II
Attachments:
As stated
for Warning
Handle via COMINT SC #08208-81
Control System Only
chard Lehman
rationI Intelligence Officer
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SUBJECT: Minutes 17 February 1981
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Peter C. Oleson, OSD/DoD
2 NSA
3 - o ert A. Martin, State/INR
4-
5 - D/JCS
6 - JSW-I-DIA
7 - RMS
8 - Richard J. Kerr D/OCO
9 - , CTS
10 -
11 - NIO/W
12 - A/NIO/W
13 - WWG File
14 - NFAC Registry
Handle via COMINT SC #08208-81
Control System Only
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TOP SECRET
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The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by
the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence
Community. It warns explicitly of impending potential developments
abroad that may have serious implications for US interests.
The Alert Memorandum was an active vehicle between 1974 and
1976, after which it fell into disuse. When the National Intelligence
Officer for Warning was appointed in October, 1978, the Director of
Central Intelligence revivified Alert Memoranda. Since then, thirty one
have been issued.
The decision to publish an Alert Memorandum is reserved by the
Director of Central Intelligence. In theory, anyone in the policy
or intelligence communities may request one. In practice, the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning usually has taken the
initiative.
An Alert Memorandum is not predictive. Rather, it explores
reasonable possibilities which, if they come to pass, would have
serious implications for US policy. In fact, the greater the poten-
tially adverse effect on US policy, the lower the threshold for issuance
of an Alert Memorandum.
It is aximomatic that the amount of lead time is inversely
proportional to the confidence of the judgment. There has been a
constant, and probably healthy, struggle between the warners, who wish
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to act earlier, and the analysts, who like to wait for more evidence
in order to increase their confidence. There is also the problem of
false alarms, "crying wolf" in the venacular. One obviously does.not
want to devalue the currency by flooding the market with warnings.
In the final analysis, there is no rule of thumb. Each budding
crisis has been judged on its own merits, and the decision of
whether or not to issue an Alert Memorandum has been unique to the
problem at hand.
SECRET
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This memorandum is intended to provide information on the Intelli-
gence Community's capabilities in the area of warning intelligence.
For our purposes, warning is defined as "those measures taken, and the
intelligence information produced, by the Intelligence Community to
avoid surprise to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Armed Forces by foreign events of major importance to the security of
the United States." It includes, but is not limited to, strategic
warning, ie: the threat of, t- itiation of hostilities against the
US or our military forces.
There exists a well structured national warning system under the
leadership of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The chief
operating officer is the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
He, in turn, is supported by the regional National Intelligence Officers
who are broadly responsible for the production of warning intelligence
in respective geographic areas. For specifically military warning, the
Defense Department operates an elaborate worldwide network of watch
centers manned a,! a clock. CIA also has capabilities in the
military field.
The principal warning document at the national level is the Alert
Memorandum. It is issued by the DCI on behalf of the Community. It
is not necessarily predictive, but is designed to warn of potential
developments abroad which, if they occur, ma have serious implications
for US interests. I~n tF t two years, Alert Memoranda
have been produced.
In summary, we are confident we can give ample warning of large
scale military preparations, but not so sanguine about judging high-
level political decisions.II
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