MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 26, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIO/W
National Intelligence Council
DDI-4413-82/1
26 MAY 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Attached is a copy of the Latin America Warning Assessment based upon
our discussion of 19 May 1982.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on 23 June 1982 at 1015 hours
in room 7D64 CIA headquarters with the following tentative agenda and
requested brief oral presentations (2-3 minutes) by department/agency or
individual as indicated:
Argentina/UK/Falklands
- Current military balance and losses on both sides (DIA);
- Possible next military and political steps (CIA/Falklands Working
Group; INR/political);
- Any possibilities of Argentine action against Chile (CIA);
- Actions of Latin American countries (CIA)
-- pro-Argentina;
-- other territorial conflicts;
- Soviet/Cuban actions and possible next steps (CIA/Falklands
Working Group);
Impact on the Argentine economy of war costs and economic sanctions--
likely effects in next weeks (INR).
Central America
El Salvador (DIA)
- Coalition politics; implications for reforms, potential
negotiations, etc.;
- Guerrilla/military balance; guerrilla plans and intentions.
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Guatemala (CIA)
- Chances for another coup; political realignments; implications for
insurgency.
Nicaragua (CIA)
- Military actions at the borders--attacks from Nicaragua; attacks into
Nicaragua; export of subversion; military buildup; MIGs.
Mexico (INR)
- Political implications of the economic problems and likely
austerity measures. Note also 26 May still unconfirmed reports
of insurgents in four Mexican states.
3. Please cal with names and clearances of 25X1
individuals attendi by noon, 22 June 1982.
Constantine C. Menges
Att: (1)
25X1
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National Intelligence Council
DDI-4413-82
26 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
25X1
1. Argentina/UK/Falklands
Military
Losses to date for each side are: for Argentina--7 ships (destroyed
or damaged), 63 aircraft, at least 400 personnel; for the UK--18 planes, 5
ships, at least 96 personnel. It is most probable that the UK will defeat the
Argentinians on the Falklands in the next weeks. The greatest perceived risk
of military escalation has been UK attack on Argentinian mainland airbases
which could bring about direct military action by other Latin American
countries or an Argentine acceptance of Cuban/Nicaraguan/Soviet offers of
various forms of military support. Continued serious UK losses to Argentine
air attacks may yet lead to this UK action, but the probability is lower than
it was before the assault of 21 May.
Latin American Actions
Barring a UK attack on the Argentine mainland, it seems most likely
that even the strongest Latin American supporters (Peru, Venezuela) will
confine their actions to the transfer of military equipment and political
support. The longer the conflict continues the more intense the political
reaction against the UK and (to some degree) the US will become.
The immediate practical consequence for the US will be to slow down
or halt the new anti-Castro consensus which had been building after the years
of Latin American normalization of relations with Cuba (1968-80). So far,
Venezuela and others with Caribbean Basin concerns have not taken direct
action to terminate cooperation in support of governments being helped by the
US--that is an encouraging sign. However, the OAS has been lost for the near-
term as an instrument for more active programs to contain either Cuba or
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Panama might act directly or more likely permit some group to take
actions to prevent the UK from having access to the Panama Canal. The
intelligence community discounts this, but it warrants (I believe) careful
monitoring as a potential threat with large practical and symbolic
implications.
Cuban/Soviet Actions
The previous warning report (April 1982) discussed five possible
levels of Cuban/Soviet action to exploit the crisis for anti-US purposes.
Propaganda and political action activities are certainly evident (e.g., the
pre-Non-aligned Movement "Caribbean Zone of Peace" meetings in Havana
26-28 May). NI0/LA believes there will be some use of Latin American Cuban-
linked terrorist groups for anti-US or anti-UK activities in the next weeks.
In addition, it seems logical to assume that Soviet/Cuban covert operatives
will be trying to establish relationships with key Argentinian political,
military, and labor leaders or groups. In addition, a direct or proxy (e.g.,
Libya) Soviet Bloc military supply/consultation relationship is possible.
There is agreement that the USSR is collecting substantial
intelligence on the Falklands conflict; however, CIA analysts state "there is
no evidence that a substantial amount is being passed to the Argentines".
NI0/LA suggests that it would be logical for the USSR to pass along much of
this information along with disinformation (e.g., US tankers fueled the
Valcons . The absence of i
access
J
25X
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inreats to Nationals
Consensus both at the warning meeting and of an intelligence
community memorandum of 21. May 1082 (coordinated by the NI0/LA in response to
an urgent State request): no additional evidence of serious Argentine
preparations but the risks of actions by the government, uncontrolled units or
mob violence would grow if the US were perceived to be directly involved
militarily and/or the UK attacked the mainland, and/or there were massive
Argentine losses.
2. Central America
Cuban/Nicaraguan support for the extreme left continues in
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, along with covert action and attempts to
intimidate Honduras and Cota Rica into neutrality. Nicaraguan military
strength continues to grow. However, positive trends in the region also are
continuing. A few highlights:
-- El Salvador - improved military operations along with
.guerrilla factionalism and some demoralization; a few
analysts believe Cuba may use the next months of the rainy
season to reduce somewhat the levels of military support in
order to force a more unified, capable fighting force for the
fall and winter; the actual or perceived actions against the
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land reform may cause severe additional frictions beteen the
PDC/democratic labor groups/military and the rightist
parties; it may also threaten external support from Venezuela
and the US (Congressional certification requirements end of
July 7982_).
-- Guatemala - a sharp decline in civilian deaths (from about
500 per month to about 100 per month after the 23 March
coup); however, there are many coup reports while the extreme
left continues strong and is being well supplied.
3. Venezuela/Guyana
The 12-year truce about the large disputed territory recently
discovered to have oil will expire in June 1982. The high costs of the
Argentine military action will probably deter Venezuelan military moves, but
the situation bears close watching.
4. Suriname
Cuban links are growing, and the NI0/LA believes it is moving (but
not yet gone) into the communist orbit a la Grenada.
5. Mexico
Serious economic difficulties and the austerity measures most likely
to be imposed after the July 19P2 presidential election might have unsettling
political and social effects (including expanded illegal immigration to the
US), which require monitoring.
0
Constantine C. Menges
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