MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300070025-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 23, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-6421:-80
23 September 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: none; for your information only.
2. Jamaica
The recent lull in political violence is likely to end in
October, during the final stages of the election campaign. Manley's
supporters continue to hammer out anti-CIA themes, in an attempt to
divert attention from economic failures. Thus, Americans in Jamaica
could become the targets of violence once again, and the US could
be blamed for attacks on prominent Jamaicans.
PNP radicals are also leading a charge against Jamaica's
security forces, whose augmented powers have reduced opportunities
for sidestepping the elections. They may seek to terminate these
powers shortly before election day, in a last effort to retain power
through voter intimidation or terrorism. Manley's growing confidence
that he can win the election, and the general public momentum toward
an electoral showdown would be obstacles in the radicals' path.
3. Nicaragua
The trend toward more heavy-handed authoritarianism on the
part of the Sandinistas is likely to continue. Concern about small-
scale raids by insurgent groups and worker discontent with living
conditions could further decrease the Sandinistas' tolerance for
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opposition pressures for elections and for support of the private
sector. Reverberations of the assassination of Somoza could increase
the incidence of cross-border violence, and raise domestic political
charges against Sandinista assistance to the Salvadoran insurgents.
This too would strengthen the FSLN's underlying tendency toward
dictatorship.
4. El Salvador
The leftist extremists apparently have lost some of their
domestic political appeal. At the same time, public acceptance of
the junta government as legitimate, or at least a willingness to
give it a chance to advance its program and prove its good intentions,
has risen some. The extremists have turned toward more vigorous para-
military activity to recoup their momentum, and the US presence has
clearly become one of their targets. This will necessarily divert the
government from pressing administrative and economic problems. And
indiscriminate violent reactions could add as well to a loss of
popular support.
Finally, the extremists, supported by small numbers of
articulate non-Marxist leftists, have done a better job in winning
uncritical foreign support than they have done at home. Some open
move by Mexico to recognize their legitimacy could lead to a bandwagon
effect that could further isolate and weaken the junta. This in turn
would make it more difficult for the US to advance its policy interests
in El Salvador and Central America generally.
5. Guatemala
The frustrating pattern of increased leftist violence and
corresponding indiscriminate repression by the government--supported
by extreme rightist violence--continues. There probably is no
immediate serious threat to the control of the situation by the govern-
ment. But this pattern drives a deeper wedge between the US and the
Guatemalan Government, which in turn strengthens its bunker mentality,
and the likelihood of ultimate civil war, i'n which moderate forces
are eliminated or forced to the side of one or the other extreme.
6. Cuba
The Castro regime continues to send out mixed signals: a
desire to reduce tensions with the US, and a more radical propensity
to support revolutionary groups that threaten US interests, especially
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SECRET
in Central America. While not without costs and risks to the US,
responsiveness to Castro's overtures might create difficult domestic
political pressures for the Cuban Government. For example, the public
might expect much quicker improvement in their living conditions than
the circumstances of reduced bilateral tensions would justify--thereby
forcing Castro to concentrate on domestic affairs. On the other hand,
Cuba's inability to reduce tensions with the US would probably, over
time, serve to strengthen the tendency toward indiscriminate support
of revolutionary forces, with high risk of conflict with the US. This
might lead temporarily to public rallying to the regime, but would
probably weaken it eventually by diverting attention from pressing
economic problems.
7. Bolivia
Bolivian political developments have sharpened the distrust
between moderate civilian governments and conservative military
regimes in South America. Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are
resentful not only of the replacement of a civilian government by a
brutally-repressive military one, but also by the displacement of
their influence in LaPaz by Argentina and Chile. The replacement of
Garcia Meza by a more moderate and less repressive military dictator--
which seems an increasingly likely prospect--would pose particularly
vexing policy choices for the US, regarding its influence in LaPaz and
with other interested regional governments. Half a loaf may be the
best the circumstances will allow (e.g., support of a less repressive,
more promising authoritarian regime that can slow polarization, and
a course of action that does not sharply antagonize any of the major
regional actors).
`1 Lr "y-~-
Jack Davis
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Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/W
1 - NI0/AF
1 - N I 0/ EA
1 - NI0/GPF
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/PE
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - SA/NPI
1 - SA/CI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OGCR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/ O PA
1 - D/OSR
1 - D/OSWR
1 - NFAC Reg
1 - ER
1 - AS/NFAC
2 - NI0/LA
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