MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300090004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 21, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
21 December 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Near East and
South Asia
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
1. The continuing confrontation between the United States and Iran,
other anti-US manifestations in the Muslim world, and what appears to be
a major escalation of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan have raised funda-
mental questions about the prospects for US interests in this troubled
region. Near East and South Asia intelligence analysts represented at
this month's meeting on 19 December felt that the Intelligence Community
had been providing warning on key issues but that they might usefully
emphasize their concern on several particular issues.
2. Pakistan.. Because of the poor state of US-Pak relations, the
Soviet buildup in Afghanistan and consequent intimidation of Pakistan,
and the provocative posture of Iran, representatives felt that Pakistan
was under pressure to reach a modus vivendi with its neighbors and the
Soviet Union that would hurt US interests in the region. The "worst case"
vision of the future elicited by our exchange included an Afghanistan
under total Soviet domination, evolution of events in Iran leading to
predominant leftist strength, and a Pakistan unable and perhaps unwilling
to withstand pressures to break entirely from the United States.
3. Afghanistan. The judgments made in the recent Alert Memorandum
were reaffirmed by the representatives. However, it was emphasized that
the integrity and reliability of the Afghan military were in serious
question and that the collapse of the armed forces would bring down the
regime. Soviet concern over this possibility might explain, at least in
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part, the recent large-scale buildup of Soviet forces adjacent to Afghan-
istan. This analytic line was not featured in the Alert Memorandum and,
although these judgments were not fully accepted by all those at the
meeting, many subscribed to them.
4. Iran-Iraq. Relations between Iran and Iraq are deteriorating
rapidly. Both sides have begun supporting dissident groups against the
other and are engaging in a virulent propaganda war. Iraq has issued
several ultimatums to Iran warning it against further harassment of
Iraqi citizens and has threatened to withdraw its diplomats from Tehran.
There have also been several small border incidents. Barring some last
minute concessions by one side, a rupture in diplomatic relations ap-
pears likely. Iraq, moreover, may soon demand unacceptable border re-
visions in the 1975 Algiers Accord, particularly in the sensitive Shatt-
al-Arab area. Neither side apparently wants to initiate a full scale
military conflict at this time, but Baghdad appears inclined to demon-
strate its resolve and frustration by limited military incursions. The
primary dangers in the situation, should tensions escalate, are disrup-
tion of oil production in one or both countries, possible increased
danger to the American hostages in Tehran, and further destabilization
of the Middle East.
5. Iranian Volunteers to Lebanon. The arrival of some 40 Iranian
volunteers in Syria on their way to fight alongside Muslims in southern
Lebanon, and the prospect of as many as a thousand finding their way into
the troubled area could upset the relative calm that has existed since
late August. None of the key players -- Syrians, Lebanese officials,
Lebanese Shias, and even some Iranian officials -- wants the volunteers
to enter southern Lebanon, yet none has had the resolve to challenge the
venture. The Israelis are not likely to tolerate another uncontrollable
element of any size and would react to an influx of Iranians in ways
that could well rekindle the southern Lebanon crisis.
6. 'Syrian Domestic Stability. Sectarian violence in Syria increased
over the past several weeks in northern Syria, and Syrian authorities
have sent special security troops to the northern city of Aleppo. The
Aleppo area is supposed to be an area of Iraqi influence, thus trouble
there suggests Iraq has resumed support of opposition groups in Syria.
The inability of the Syrian regime to stop terrorist activity even during
the recent period when relations with Iraq were good indicates the
Syrians will be facing an even more dangerous challenge if Iraq has,
indeed, entered the fray.
Robert C. Ames
/I
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Approved For Release 2007/04/18: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300090004-5