MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110006-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 5, 2007
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 24, 1979
Content Type:
MEMO
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110006-0.pdf | 132.98 KB |
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 24 July 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign, Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer for Near East
and South Asia
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
1. India. Continued political unrest is likely through the summer;
it is possible that no stable government will emerge for months or even
years to come. A prolonged period of political instability could
challenge democratic processes, and the military might eventually be
tempted to intervene. The collapse of a ruling majority government is
a new development in 30 years of Indian parliamentary democracy. The
long term results of this development are uncertain. A short term
result which is virtually certain, however, is the reversal of Desai's
policy against the development of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Desai
was the only impediment to an Indian nuclear weapons program; his
weakness/removal combined with concern about neighboring Pakistan's
nuclear program makes resumption of an Indian program almost certain.
2. Pakistan. The economic situation in Pakistan is bad and growing
worse. Opposition elements are becoming more active, insulting the MLA
though not outrightly challenging it yet. They are exploiting the re-
laxation of restrictions prior to the November elections. There is
terrible fragmentation in Pakistan, and we see no good at all coming
from the elections -- if, indeed, they are held at all. Violence is
probable.
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3. PLO Terrorism. We expect an increase in international terrorism
by Palestinian groups, even though Arafat (Fatah) is not involved.
Arafat does not control Saiqa, the PFLP, and other radical groups, and
there is strong competition for leadership with the PLO. Moreover,
certain provocations -- e.g., a "Litani II" operation by Israel -- may
circumscribe Arafat's options to the extent that he feels he has
choice but to resume terrorism against Egyptian and US targets. IM,
0
Iraq. The introduction of T-72 tanks to Iraq must be seen as a
destabilizing element in the Arab-Israeli military balance. The laminate
frontal armor of the T-72 provides much improved protection and could
defeat both Israeli tank guns and anti-tank guided missiles (e.g., the
TOW missile).
. Developments in Areas of Continuing Concern
a. Western Sahara. The following recent events cause us
concern: The OAU call for a referendum in Western Sahara, the
Polisario ending of the year-long cease-fire in Mauritania, and the
renewed Polisario claims to portions of southern Morocco. Although
the "hot pursuit" option into Algeria which we mentioned last month
seems to remain an empty threat by Hassan, there is increased
likelihood of political instability in both Mauritania and Morocco.
b. Syrian Internal Unrest. The continued inability of
Assad's security forces to come to grips with the attacks rein-
forces the concern we discussed last month.
c. The Yemens. No change from last month: The four-month
period for unity talks ends on 30 July. We are concerned that NDF
activity may resume then or shortly after Ramadan. The Salih
regime is insecure even without a renewed threat from the NDF
and/or the PDRY.
d. Afghanistan. The new element in Afghan turmoil is the
prospect of a Soviet-backed coup to install, ironically, a less
conspicuously Soviet-inclined government. By changing the govern-
ment in this w? ay, however, the Soviets may not get the stability
they seek. III
Approved For Release 20fgo0?/ ~~l t P83B01027R000300110006-0
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
(TCS-2372-79)
A/NI0/NESA:BEarl:lm (24 July 79)
Distribution:
Cy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - ER
4 - DD/NFA
5 - NI0/NESA
6 - NI0/NESA
7 - NI0/Warning
8 - NI0/PE
9 - NIO/USSR
10 - NIO/CH
11 - NIO/CF
12 - NIO/NP
13 - NI0/LA
14 - NI0/EAP
15 - NI0/WE
16 - NI0/AF
17 - NIO/SS
18 - D/OCO
19 - D/OCR
20 - D/OER
21 - D/OPA
22 - D/OSR
23 - D/OGCR
24 - D/OIA
25 - D/OSI
26 - D/ OW I
27 - SRP
28 - PBC
29 - OPA/NESA
30 - OPA/USSR (Mary Jo Roos)
31 - OER/D/NE (Paul Metzger)
32 - NFAC Reg
33 - DDO/NE (Mark McEnroe)
34 - DDO/EPDS (Joanna Fox)
35 - NITO/Near East (Roger Sullivan)
36 - State/INR/RNA (William Wolle)
37 - DIO/Near East (Col. Robert Patrick)
38 - DIA/Dn2Ela (LTC Thomas Howell)
39 - NSA/G-6 (Robert Spencer)
40 - ACSI DAMI FII (LTC Norvell DeAtkine)
41 - ONI/Estimates Br (Alexander Button)
42 - AF/INAKB (Capt. Ronald Bergquist)
43 - HQ USMC Code INTP (Major William Ferrier)