ALTERNATE HYPOTHESES, QUESTIONS, AND OTHER PROVOCATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 18, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

prove eIease 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B 127R0003Q0110025-9
M MQ UM FOR: Al N `
Attached is a sample of the work that Harry
Cochran will be doing for me. It comes too late
to be useful to you in this month's cycle of
meetings, but I plan to have such a paper or papers
available in time for your use next month. Our
hope is that through this device we can give you
some raw meat to throw to your troops in the meetings,
although we recognize that most of the time you will
be addressing these subjects anyway. We would wel-
come any comments.
Richard Lehman
NIO for Warning
Date 20 June 1979
FORM 1~1~ USE PREVIOUS
p~37 ) i Pl34" release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027ROO0300110025-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
? SECRET
18 June 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO for Warning
SUBJECT : Alternate Hypotheses, Questions, and Other Provocations
A.
1. ' The Soviet Predicament in Afghanistan: An Alternate Hypothesis
Brezhnev*s public pledge on 11 June that the USSR will 'mot abandon
in trouble our friend-the Afghan people" should be taken at face value as
a warning that Moscow will take whatever measures are necessary to protect
its geopolitical interests in Afghanistan. This decision to commit
Brezhnev's personal authority in the cause of defending the "Afghan
revolution" undoubtedly contains a large element of bluff. As such, it it
is an extension of Moscow's efforts during the past three months to intimidate
Pakistan and Iran and discourage external assistance to the Afghan rebels.
But Brezhnev's intervention also signifies a more fundamental perception
that Soviet actions in support of the Taraki regime, particularly since the
conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty last December, have engaged the USSR's
prestige and credibility so deeply that it now has no choice but to avert
an outcome which would be viewed abroad (and at home) as a clear defeat for
Soviet policy.
It is truel that the Soviets have passed up
several recent opportunities to voice support for Taraki and his government
and that this reflects an anxious concern to avoid as long as possible an
irrevocable commitment to the Kabul regime as currently structured. But it
is only a matter of prudence, under prevailing circumstances, to refrain from
foreclosing the option of replacing Taraki and Amin with other leaders who
could be relied upon to accept Soviet direction and protect Soviet equities.
Moscow*s predicament, of course, resides in the difficulty of finding
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
? 2 ?
Plausible alternatives to the present leadership, particularly since the
Khalqi purges of the rival Parcham faction.
The report F
suggests that the Soviets are exploring the possibility of negotiating some
kind of accommodation, however temporary, with the insurgents. However, in
view of the trends in the civil war which increasingly favor the re3 ls,
this option would seem to have minimal chances of success because, if for
no other reason, the rebels have little incentive to negotiate a compromise
settlement with the beleagured and progres.,ively weakening Taraki regime.
This hypothesis rests on the proposition that events have already passed
beyond the point where the Soviets might salvage their investment in the
present Kabul regime by playing the cards of a negotiated compromise
settlement, deterring Pakistani support for the rebels by activating local
assets in Baluchistan province, or sharpening diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.
Ambassador Azimov has played his final card in the intimidation game by
warning General Zia that, depending on the circumstances, the USSR would
reserve the right to intervene militarily on the basis of Soviet-Afghan accords.
The threat to unleash Afghan forces against Pakistan, moreover, simply lacks
credibility and will not impress Gen. Zia. Large numbers of Pakistani
tribesmen are crossing into Afghanistan to support fellow tribesmen.
In sum, the Soviets have already exhausted most, if not all, of their
alternatives to a show of force to protect their self-created stake in the
Afghan ?revolution." They must now confront the consequences of a serious
miscalculation with respect to the Taraki' regime's strength and long-term
prospects. The mystery is how the Soviets could have deluded themselves that
a !people's revolution" lacking an effective party apparatus could consolidate
its grip on a primitive country of Islamic tribesmen.
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
0 3 ?
The fundamental reality is that the Soviet superpower is saddled with
a rapidly failing investment and that Moscow is both unable and unwilling
to disengage or cut its losses. The pattern of Soviet behavior since General
Yepishev's mission in April has been to escalate commitments in a desperate
attempt to keep pace with and counter insurgent gains.)
V
end to this cycle is not in sight.
The Soviet leaders seem to have come to believe that they face an
unavoidable choice between defeat and some form of military intervention.
They are now building a justification for intervention, although they
probably have not made final decisions with respect to the timing and scope
of these operations. Brezhnev on 11 June portrayed the central issue in the
contest for power in Afghanistan as foreign "covert and overt attempts at
interfering in Afghan internal affairs"; Kosygin told Indian newsmen that
the Soviet Union intends to "protect" Afghanistan; and TASS has charged that
American, Chinese and Pakistani instructors are training Afghan rebels and
providing their weapons.
The immediate requirement for warning intelligence is to assess the
timing and nature of Soviet military options. The judgments in the Special
Repprt of 5 June should be reexamined and updated. The judgment that the
Soviets "probably would not send in ground forces to restore order throughout
the country" remains plausible, but it seems unlikely that Moscow, under any
circumstances, would contemplate what would in effect be a military occupation
of the entire country. On the other hand, it is questionable that the Soviets
would judge that intervention limited to the "dispatch of an airmobile combat
team to hold Kabul for the Taraki regime" would be an adequate response to
a situation that seems likely to confront them in the very near future.
The "political" argument that the Soviets will refrain from actions
anywhere which, in their view, would jeopardize Senate approval of SILT II
 should also be reexamined: for example, the possibility that Brezhnev's
refusal to come to Washington for the summit meeting signifies more than a
desire to protect his fragile health by avoiding long captivity in a Soviet
airliner. Have the Soviets come to believe that the odds are strongly
against Senate approval of SALT II, or that approval will be conditioned
on Soviet consent to unacceptable amendments? Are they proceeding on the
assumption that they can live with a situation in which both powers, following
the precedent of SALT I since that agreement expired last October, will, in
their own interests, tacitly observe the terms of SALT II despite its failure
to be ratified? (President Carter's statement in this regard will not have
escaped Soviet attention.)
Although there are impressive arguments against a Soviet decision to
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R 0300110025-9
opt for large-scale military interventioni the
Soviets, impelled by familiar great power anxieties over prestige and the
credibility of commitments in what they regard as a sensitive area, may
persuade themselves that the chaotic situation in Afghanistan can be mastered
by measures well short of "massive intervention," and that forceful Soviet
action, at the "request" of the Kabul regime, will not only protect a highly
valued geopolitical stake but remove the negative impression of Soviet
resolve created by their ambiguous performance in reaction to China's invasion
of Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027R0300110025-9
II. Sino-Soviet Negotiations: Vietnam Linkage-An Alternate Hypothesis
The May-June community consensus that Sino-Soviet talks will not Y161d
meaningful change in the near future-at least nothing more than a limited
reduction in tension-focussed essentially on the bilateral relationship.
An alternate hypothesis builds on the proposition that Chinats motivation
in proposing talks in a new forum was not to manipulate the Sino-Soviet-US
triangle in the conventional way but rather to engage the Soviets in
negotiations in order to hold their feet to the fire on one of the PRC's
leading foreign policy preoccupations-how to cope with the Soviet-Vietnamese
Position of strength in Indochina. The "punitive" action in February-March
yielded few if any dividends in dealing with Hanoi's defiance, pretensions,
and presence in Kampuchea or in loosening its alignment with the Soviet Union.
This hypothesis suggests that the Chinese do not intend to use the talks
with the Soviets to wheedle more attractive terms from the US and Japan on
trade, credits, technology transfers, or Taiwan, but to maneuver Moscow into
an awkward and indefensible position with respect to its support for Vietnamese
ambitions and policies. The Chinese, in this scenario, intend to turn Soviet
advocacy of a joint statement of "principles" governing bilateral relations
&;ainst Moscow e conditioning acceptance of an anodyne joint statement on
Soviet t:illingness to join China and other powers (includ.ing the US) in
working out a "compromise solution" on Kampuchea which would replace both the
Pol Pot and Heng Samrin regimes with a "neutral" government (the Sihanouk card)
and require the withdrawal of foreign (Vietnamese) forces from Kampuchea.
The Chinese presumably believe they can count on US, ASEAN, and other
foreign support for this approach. They have no illusions that such a
"compromise solution" would be acceptable to Moscow and Hanoi, at least in
the foreseeable future, but the Chinese are confident that an ostensibly
reasonable and statesmanlike proposal would have wide appeal abroad and give
them an effective political warfare weapon against the Soviets and Vietnamese.
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027R(200300110025-9
This line of thinking was implicit
who said the PRC holds the initiative in Sino-Soviet negotiations and that
Hanoi's posture in the next round of Sino-Vietnamese talks will be the 'key
factor" in Chinese policy planning regarding negotiations with Moscow. He
indicated that the PRC was not prepared to play its "Soviet card" yet and
will base future policy on "timeliness." Soviet intentions, he said, would
be gauged by Hanoi's attitude. Getting down to the central issue,
0
China does not expect Vietnam to accept all of China's eight
points but Hanoi, at a minimum, must agree to cease interfering in internal
Kampuchean politics.
In sum, the PRC in proposing negotiations is laying a trap for the
Soviets. When Moscow, as expected, righteously refus"to make Vietnamese
policies and interests a subject of Sino-Soviet bargaining, the Chinese will
claim this exposes Moscow's sinister aims in supporting the "regidnal
hegemonists" in Hanoi and proves that the Soviets have no genuine interest
in improving relations with China.
The other side of this coin is that the Soviets may be sandbagged if
they enter negotiations on the assumption that talks can be manipulated to
create an impression of more benign relations which will influence US, Japanese
and European policies toward China.
China's foremost objective in Southeast Asia is to block further foreign
recognition of the Heng Samrin regime and, in this way, to hold open the long-
term option of a concerted international effort to arrange a "compromise
solution" in Kampuchea. (Prime Minister Desai reportedly has decided not
to recognize the PRK now because of ASEAN pressures
If the Vietnamese succeed in a gradual
attrition of Pol Pot's forces and credibility, time will then work against
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027RIW300110025-9
China. TheChinese therefore must seek to maintain the PRK's isolation by
keeping international attention focused on Vietnam's "occupation" of Kampuchea.
Injecting a Vietnam linkage into the Sino-Soviet negotiations offers an
effective forum for achieving this objective.
III: Iraq-Iran: Drift toward confrontation?
The latent antagonism between the two countries has surfaced in the last
few weeks and the dynamics of mutually provocative activities may trigger
QX* process of escalation which will carry both Baghdad and Tehran well
beyond what they conceive to be their present interests and imperatives.
They are engaged in a competitive action/reaction cycle which affects highly
sensitive matters of domestic security and territorial integrity. Tehran
must view Iraqi efforts to exploit Arab unrest and demands in Khuzestan
province as a serious threat to Iran's integrity. Iranian attempts to
stir up a challenge to the Baghdad regime within the Shia majority in
Iraq poses a parallel threat to Iraq.
A warning assessment might address the following:
1? Chances that the weakness and chaos of central authority in Iran will
tempt Iraq to revive claims that were relinquished in the 1975 agreement with
the Shah regarding the dividing line in the Shatt al Arab, Khuzestan
province ("Arabistan"), islands in the "Arabian Gulf," Kuwait.
2. Danger that the Iraqis, in view of Iranian military/political
confusion and weakness, will miscalculate and overreach in applying pressure
on Tehran. (Was Iraqi bombing/strafing of border towns and activation of
the 5th Mechanized Division intended as a warning to Tehran to refrain from
agitation within Iraq's Shia population?)
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027ROO 300110025-9
g
3. Is Baghdad preparing for further bold action to exploit Iran*s
vulnerabilities? Beyond the obvious precaution against a sacking of the
mission, what is the significance of the Iraqi embassy's reported destruction
of documents and return of families to Baghdad?
IV. Iran: Will external threats trigger a challenge to Khomeini?
Will the Iranian perception of growing dangers posed by Iraqi ambitions
and irredentism provide a catalyst for a serious challenge to Khomeini?
will the Iraqi threat generate efforts to cope with vulnerabilities to
external pressures created by Khomeini's erratic and arbitrary rule?
(Note the unconfirmed report of a plot to overthrow him involving Barzargan,
Ayatollah Taleghani, ALL Shariat-Madari and son.) Will further deterioration
of relations with Iraq, including border fighting and mutual reprisals
against Iraqi Shi's and Iranian Arabs, impel Khomeini's disparate opponents
i
to unite in a bid to overthrow him? Might Iraqi assertions of the right
to "protect" the Arab population of Khuzestan escalate into a confrontation
which world disrupt Iranian oil production?
V'. Arab Rejection Front: Is there an incipient shift by Syria/Iraq toward
higher risk tactics in reacting to Israeli operations in Lebanon?
Might the Syrians, backed and prod.ed by Iraq, perceive the early
difficulties in Israeli Egyptian negotiations on blest Bank/Gaza autonomy,
the blunt reaffirmations by Begin, Dayan, Ueizman, and Sharon of Israel's
right to establish further (unlimited) settlements in the West Bank, and
acerbic reactions in the Cairo press, as creating an opportunity for bold
actions to derail the negotiations, discredit Sadat's policy, and make it
difficult for Cairo to continue the talks? Are the Syrians preparing to
stage a bluff or provocation to lure the Israelis into an air battle and/or
reprisals against Syrian bases or forces? Do recent Syrian fighter reactions
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027R
9 0300110025-9
deep into Labanese airspace foreshadow a shift in Syria's risk calculus?
Might the Syrians be gambling that by creating an appearance of greater
willingness to engage Israeli aircraft, they can prompt the US to apply
pressure on the Israelis to scale down their activities ton Lebanon across
the board?
More broadly, have the Syrians decided that higher risk actions are
necessary to arrest developments that can only further prejudice their prospec-6s
of recovering the Golan? Is there any link between the recent shift in
Syrian air reactions and Israel*s announcement that it has placed 24 Jewish
settlements on the Golan--a move which in Syrian eyes must be an ominous sign
of Israel's long-term intention to annex the Golan? If Damascus, for
whatever reason, feels under heightened pressure to halt the trend toward.
annexation before it becomes completely irreversible, what alternatives
might the Syrians perceive other than to raise a credible threat of an
e):plosive confrontation?
V-II o ','astern Sahara: Grociing Risk of IMioroccan-Algerian hostilities?
Do the Polisario attacks during the first half of June on Moroccan units
within southern Morocco mark a significant escalation in the struggle?
Might King Hassan be compelled, perhaps against his better judgment, to
authorize military reprisals against Polisario bases in Algeria? Co4d his
order that Moroccan troops exercise the "right of pursuit" against Polisario
forces if civilian lives are threatened trigger a rapid escalation? Are
the new Algerian leaders seeking to provoke Hassan into an overreaction!
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027RQ0 300110025-9
10
VIII. Rhodesia: Race for recognition?
The elections and installation of Muzorewa have introduced a new
element in the contest which will work against the long-term prospects of
the Patriotic Front and create powerful new incentives for measures to
fundamental problem succinctly when he acknowledged that if Muzorewa survives
until next year, a number of African states will recognize him and thereby
strengthen his government's hold on power.
Current intelligence assessments continue to express skepticism that
recent events in Salisbury will finally impel ZAPU and ZAN to subordinate
their rivalry and differences in the interest of countering new dangers to
their future prospects. Are these assessments too complacent in discounting
significant progress toward implementing the Addis Ababa agreements? Do they
take sufficient account of new incentives for concerted action, if not
"unification?"
If the Popular Front can neither overthrow the Salisbury regime by force
nor negotiate a political settlement pith it (because Muzorewa has no
incentive to negotiate), what options remain? If the PF's main short-term
concern is to forestall foreign recognition of Muzorewa by other African states
and the lifting of economic sanctions, has the idea of a government-in-exile
become more attractive? In addition to discouraging foreign recognition
of Salisbury, might the PF see a government-in-exile as more urgent now
as a means of eroding the discipline and loyalty of Salisbury's security
forces? -and as accelerating the white exodus? In this.context, what is
the significance of Nkomots removal of virtually all Shona members of ZAPU's
military nigh command? If ZAPU and 7 IU, under the prod of events in ,~alisbury,
the Tory victory, and the Senate votes, are now more; ready to move, might
Nyerere and Machel be more Favorably disposed to join Kaunda in endorsing
a PF provisional government soon?
Aaoroved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300110025-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1 O27ROOO3OO11 OO25-9
11 0
////I-
. Nicaragua: The race for succession--LSill Cuba intervene to support
the FSIN's bid for power?
This hypothetical scenario rests on the assumption that the FSIN and their
Cuban backers anticipate that the US and other OAS members will organize a
diplomatic/military intervention to arrange a "compromise solution"' that
would avert a Sandinista takeover. The FSU presumably is aware of
proposals, such as those expresssd by Foreign Minister Quintana, for an OAS
peace force and a negotiating commission. In this situation9 the Sandinistas
may conclude they cannot afford to wait in the hope that guerrilla tactics
will stretch GN capabilities to the breaking point and oblige Somoza to resign.
The Sandinistas' announcement of a junta to lead a provisional government
in the southwest and their new offensive to capture Rivas suggest a belief
that the time has come for pre-emptive action. The stage is being; set for
an appeal by the provisional government for Cuban and possibly other foreign
intervention to forestall US/OAS moves to deprive the FSIN of the fruits of
its militar.Jvictories and sacrifices.
With events moving rapidly toward a final test of strength, Castro may
be strongly tempted to undertake a bold diplomatic and military intervention
on behalf of, and. at the request of, the FSIN provisional government. He may
be encouraged to gamble by his reading of the growing sentiment in the OAS that
Somoza should resign. Castro, moreover, may persuade himself that the risks
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9
? 12 ?
of audacious action have been significantly reduced by the attitudes of
Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru and other Latin American governments. He may
calculate that the rapid deployment to the provisional government's "liberated
zone" of a Cuban "praetorian guard" would yield high dividends for Cuba's
prestige in Latin America and the Third World and greatly enhance its ability
to support challenges to other Central American regimes, particularly in
El Salvador.
The Cubans may not be albn.e in contemplating at least token military
intervention.
Is the race for succession to be accompanied by a race for intervention?
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110025-9