WARNING ASSESSMENT: CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110044-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: April 18, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
18 April 1979
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
Charles Neuhauser ,
Assistant National Intelligence
Officer for China
SUBJECT: Warning Assessment: China
1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis
of community views expressed at the warning meeting held
on 16 April. This memorandum has not been coordinated
with the participants but is being circulated among them.
2. The next warningmeeting will be held on Monday,
21 May at 1400 hours in room 7E-62 CIA Headquarters.
Please provide the name of your representative to Frances
19 May 1979.
da
B F
y,
ri
Tsakreos, 351-5721, prior to CO
Attachment:
Memo
Distribution:
State - Mrs. Patricia Barnett
NSA
Army Col. Jac Churchill
A.F. - Major Wally Astor
Navy - Ca t. George B. Pressly
DIA
SWS - Harry C. Cochran
Internal:
1 - DDO/DCEA
1 - D/OSR
1 - OPA/EA
1 - OPA/CH
1 - NFAC/RESE
1 - NIO/Warning
1 - NIO/CF
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NITO/CH
2 - NIO/CH
1 NFAC Reg.
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NFAC No. 1971-79
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
18 April 1979
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for,National
Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
FROM: Charles Neuhauser
Assistant National Intelligence
Officer for China
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: China
Summary
Community China analysts of our meeting on 16 April found the
situation in Indochina still fluid but did not find other po-
We
ncture
hi
.
s ju
tential problems especially troubling at t
examined three problems in detail: the possibility of a new
round of major hostilities between China and Vietnam; the
possibility that a new wave of leadership instability could
develop in Beijing, with adverse consequences for US policy;
and the possibility that dissident activity in Afghanistan
could lead to some sort of proxy confrontation between China
and the USSR, which share a common border with that country.
Community representatives found these propositions in order
increasingly improbable; they generally concluded that the
Indochina situation remained potentially explosive, but
tended to doubt that a new flash-point was imminent.
1. Renewed Sino-Vietnamese Hostilities. Community
representatives focused on the talks just beginning in Hanoi
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as a "safety valve" that in the short run reduced the chances
for renewed heavy fighting. No one thought the talks would.
proceed very far or very fast; as a result some thought that
Beijing might in time come to the conclusion that.Hanoi had
to be taught another lesson. Everyone thought there would be
a period of temperature-taking first, however, and that serious
consideration would not be given to this option for at least six
or so weeks. Others thought that, since the original Chinese
attack had been primarily a political act, rather than a purely
military operation, there was little China could gain merely
by repeating the initial attack, and that a much larger opera-
tion--against a much more formidable opposition--would run
risks Beijing had deliberately avoided the first time round.
2. The actual evidence is mixed: Chinese propaganda
leaves open the possibility of a "second strike", a theme
that is occasionally echoed by Chinese officials in private;
but most officials say that Beijing will not renew the attack.
Most of the forces assembled after Christmas remain close to
the border, but tactical command centers have apparently been
phased out and civilians are returning to the border areas in
the north. In sum, the Chinese retain the capability to re-
peat their strike, but there is'little good evidence they
intend to do so. On balance, logic appears to point away
from a major renewal of hostilities.
3. The representatives agreed that two factors were
major variables in the situation: Hanoi's apparent determina-
tion to continue to pursue those policies that aroused China's
anger in the first place; and the situation in Cambodia. The
analytical question was whether the Chinese expected its action
of 17 February would lead to an early change in either factor
in the short run. After some discussion there seemed to be
general agreement that Chinese behavior suggested that Beijing
had not and did not expect an early or major change in either
area.
4. The representatives briefly addressed the question
of whether the important Vietnamese buildup of forces in
northern Vietnam presaged a . macjoorVietnamese attack on China.
There was general agreement that the buildup was designed to
make a new Chinese attack more.costly and to increase Viet-
namese bargaining leverage at the new talks. A Vietnamese
attack could not be ruled out entirely but was irrational
and unlikely. Everyone agreed that friction, shooting inci-
dents and possibly occasional artillery fire along the border
were all but a certainty for the next several months.
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5. Renewed Domestic Instability. The representatives
considered the recent indicators of trouble in this quarter--
the crackdown on "democracy", the halt on attacks on Mao, the
rethinking of the foreign purchases program, and a wide-spread
report of a major purge that went uncorrected for several
weeks--and concluded that it was largely insubstantial. Most
thought that the evidence that serious instability was in the
offing was not very good, and most also believed that Deng
Xiaoping remained in a relatively strong political position.
There was general agreement, however, that Deng was central
in the continued development of US-China policy, and that
therefore stronger.evidence of a weakening of his position
would have to be examined with great seriousness.
6. The Afghan Problem. The meeting considered only
briefly the possibility that the Afghan situation could pro-
duce a warning situation in the China context. It was gen-
erally agreed that China was unlikely to play an extensive
and active role in the developing situation, and that the
possibility of a Sino-Soviet confrontation, even by proxy,
was remote. It was generally agreed that a further intensi-
fication of Soviet influence would be regarded with apprehension
in Beijing, but most representatives thought there was little
China could do or would be prepared to do,1however.
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