MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 5, 2007
Sequence Number:
51
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 22, 1979
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0.pdf | 142.28 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
22 March 1979
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Acting NIO/Warning
Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and
South Asia
Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
1. Reaction to Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. In reaction to the pro-
jected signing of the treaty between Israel and Egypt on 26 March, the
other Arabs are likely to convene immediately a high-level session
(like that held in Baghdad in November 1978) to discuss implementation
of sanctions against Egypt. We expect that the economic and political
sanctions agreed to earlier will be invoked, although in the important
case of Saudi Arabia, perhaps with some restraint and delay that will
cushion to a limited extent the serious economic blow to Egypt. Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and the few other relatively "moderate" Arab states
are likely to make no more than a pro forma effort to temper the anti-
Egyptian rhetoric and actions at a new conclave. Punitive political
actions will be taken immediately; punitive economi ions will take
more time to be implemented and become effective. I
2. Both the Saudis and the Jordanians face a basic problem in
reconciling their desire for a special relationship with the US with
their desire for Arab consensus. for the near term, they will empha-
size consensus, even at a cost in their relations with the US. We
expect the Saudis, for example, to be less cooperative with the US and
to bow more quickll to OPEC consensus on matters of oil price and pro-
duction levels. fLy-i
3. The signing of the treaty is likely also to lead to an
increased nuniber of terrorist acts and to civil disorders, primarily
on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in Lebanon. The likelihood has
also increased, however, of international terrorist attacks on Egyptian,
Israeli, and American officials and installations. Chances of the latter
occurring will be raised still further at such symbolic stages as the
exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel. 0
Approved For Release 20OIU 6
4. Afghanistan. The insurgency against the Taraki government
continues to intensify, most notably with the serious clashes this
month in the western Afghan city of Herat. The clashes in Herat not
only represent a significant geographic spread of the problem (which
generally has been limited to eastern Afghanistan), but raise the
.likelihood that important regional states, notably Iran and the USSR,
may become more directly involved politically and/or militarily if
the threat to Taraki becomes much more serious. Religious leaders
in Iran have publicly endorsed the anti-regime activity in Afghanistan;
the Soviets are expressing increased concern about foreign involvement
5. Mauritania/Morocco/Algeria. Intelligence Community reporting
suggests that a coup is likely in Mauritania in the coming months.
This could lead to the accession to power of any regime ranging in
policy orientation from pro-Morocco to pro-Algeria. Either extreme
could worsen the already difficult Western Sahara problem. A pro-
Moroccan regime might "restart" the war, where a conventional military
victory may be impossible; a regime more sympathetic to the Polisario
and Algeria could prompt a more rapid deterioration of Morocco's
political posit* n that could further undermine King Hassan's weakening
hold on power.
6. Developments in Areas of Continuing Concern.
a. Iran - where separatist movements by minority groups now
pose an additional serious problem and i;e the chances and
opportunities for Soviet involvement. ja
b. Egypt/Libya - where the continued military buildup and
patrolling on both sides and continued high political tensions
have increased the chances of another clash.
c. Rapprochement between Syria and Iraq - which will be
furthered by the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and may
soon result in at least a superficial union of the two countries
Robert C. Ames
TOP SECRET
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Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300110051-0
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SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
A/NIO/NESA:L I(22 Mar 79)
Distribution:
Cy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3-ER
4 - DD/NFA
5 - NIO/NESA
6-NIO/W
7 - NIO/PE
8 - NIO/USSR
9 - NIO/CH
10 - NIO/CF
11 - NIO/NP
12 - NIO/LA
13 - NIO/EAP
14 - NIO/WE
15 - NIO/AF
16 - NIO/SS
17 - D/OCO
18 - D/OCR
19 - D/OER
20 - D/ORPA
21 - D/OSR
22 - D/OGCR
23 - D/OIA
24 - D/OSI
25 - D/OWI
26 - SRP
27 - PBC
28 - NFAC R
29 - DDO/NE
30 - NITO/NE
31 State/INR/ r East (Phil Griffin)
32 - DIA/DN2E1
33 - NSA/G-6
34 - Army AC orve eAtkine)
35 - Navy ONI (Alexander Button)
36 - Air Force INA (Capt. Ronald Bergquist)
37 - USMC (Major William Ferrier)
TOP SECRET
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