MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 5, 2007
Sequence Number: 
51
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 22, 1979
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0.pdf142.28 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110051-0 National Intelligence Officers MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence IV ? THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 22 March 1979 Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment Acting NIO/Warning Robert C. Ames National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia 1. Reaction to Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. In reaction to the pro- jected signing of the treaty between Israel and Egypt on 26 March, the other Arabs are likely to convene immediately a high-level session (like that held in Baghdad in November 1978) to discuss implementation of sanctions against Egypt. We expect that the economic and political sanctions agreed to earlier will be invoked, although in the important case of Saudi Arabia, perhaps with some restraint and delay that will cushion to a limited extent the serious economic blow to Egypt. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the few other relatively "moderate" Arab states are likely to make no more than a pro forma effort to temper the anti- Egyptian rhetoric and actions at a new conclave. Punitive political actions will be taken immediately; punitive economi ions will take more time to be implemented and become effective. I 2. Both the Saudis and the Jordanians face a basic problem in reconciling their desire for a special relationship with the US with their desire for Arab consensus. for the near term, they will empha- size consensus, even at a cost in their relations with the US. We expect the Saudis, for example, to be less cooperative with the US and to bow more quickll to OPEC consensus on matters of oil price and pro- duction levels. fLy-i 3. The signing of the treaty is likely also to lead to an increased nuniber of terrorist acts and to civil disorders, primarily on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in Lebanon. The likelihood has also increased, however, of international terrorist attacks on Egyptian, Israeli, and American officials and installations. Chances of the latter occurring will be raised still further at such symbolic stages as the exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel. 0 Approved For Release 20OIU 6 4. Afghanistan. The insurgency against the Taraki government continues to intensify, most notably with the serious clashes this month in the western Afghan city of Herat. The clashes in Herat not only represent a significant geographic spread of the problem (which generally has been limited to eastern Afghanistan), but raise the .likelihood that important regional states, notably Iran and the USSR, may become more directly involved politically and/or militarily if the threat to Taraki becomes much more serious. Religious leaders in Iran have publicly endorsed the anti-regime activity in Afghanistan; the Soviets are expressing increased concern about foreign involvement 5. Mauritania/Morocco/Algeria. Intelligence Community reporting suggests that a coup is likely in Mauritania in the coming months. This could lead to the accession to power of any regime ranging in policy orientation from pro-Morocco to pro-Algeria. Either extreme could worsen the already difficult Western Sahara problem. A pro- Moroccan regime might "restart" the war, where a conventional military victory may be impossible; a regime more sympathetic to the Polisario and Algeria could prompt a more rapid deterioration of Morocco's political posit* n that could further undermine King Hassan's weakening hold on power. 6. Developments in Areas of Continuing Concern. a. Iran - where separatist movements by minority groups now pose an additional serious problem and i;e the chances and opportunities for Soviet involvement. ja b. Egypt/Libya - where the continued military buildup and patrolling on both sides and continued high political tensions have increased the chances of another clash. c. Rapprochement between Syria and Iraq - which will be furthered by the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and may soon result in at least a superficial union of the two countries Robert C. Ames TOP SECRET 25 39 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300110051-0 ? ? TOP SECRET F SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia A/NIO/NESA:L I(22 Mar 79) Distribution: Cy 1 - DCI 2 - DDCI 3-ER 4 - DD/NFA 5 - NIO/NESA 6-NIO/W 7 - NIO/PE 8 - NIO/USSR 9 - NIO/CH 10 - NIO/CF 11 - NIO/NP 12 - NIO/LA 13 - NIO/EAP 14 - NIO/WE 15 - NIO/AF 16 - NIO/SS 17 - D/OCO 18 - D/OCR 19 - D/OER 20 - D/ORPA 21 - D/OSR 22 - D/OGCR 23 - D/OIA 24 - D/OSI 25 - D/OWI 26 - SRP 27 - PBC 28 - NFAC R 29 - DDO/NE 30 - NITO/NE 31 State/INR/ r East (Phil Griffin) 32 - DIA/DN2E1 33 - NSA/G-6 34 - Army AC orve eAtkine) 35 - Navy ONI (Alexander Button) 36 - Air Force INA (Capt. Ronald Bergquist) 37 - USMC (Major William Ferrier) TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1