WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300120018-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC #1025-79/1
28 February 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Fcreign Assessment
: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information.
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
27 February with the NIO/AF as chairman and rapporteur. The attached
report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being
circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented,
or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further
to you.
Attachment
William Parmenter
J, 6'?r ~_ I
CGrDr7
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MEMO FOR:
DCI
NFAC #1025-79/1
SUBJECT :
Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
28 February 1979
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/att - NFAC #1025-79)
1
- DDCI (w/att)
1
- DD/NFA
(w/att)
1
- ER
1
- NFAC/RI
1
- NIO/AF
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28 February 1979
NFAC #1025-79
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 4
USSR/CUBA
Analysts remain much of the same mind as last month, that the Soviets
and Cubans appear satisfied with their general strategy and posture re-
garding African problems, and we do not foresee Soviet or Cuban initiatives
of a new kind during the next two or three months. We remain concerned, of
course, that the Rhodesian situation may evolve in such a way that a rela-
tively rapid expansion of Soviet/Cuban presence could occur, possibly at
the same time as draw-downs in Cuban forces in Ethiopia or Angola, and
analysts point out that even a relatively small increment of Cubans (say
1,000-2,000) injected into Mozambique or Zambia to provide more credible
anti-aircraft defense of guerrilla camps could be an important, even critical,
factor in the ability of the Rhodesians to continue to strike the guerrilla
base areas at will. In general, however, it was felt that the Cubans them-
selves would try to avoid or postpone moves of this kind if at all possible,
until after the non-aligned summit in Havana next September.
RHODESIA
Although we recognize the importance of developments between now and
the elections scheduled for the latter half of April (and the installation
of a new government sometime in May), at this meeting we focused on concerns
for the period after a new "internal" government is installed, assuming,
as virtually all analysts now do, that this will happen. Analysts look at
this future period from a number of different viewpoints, and hence express
a number of different concerns:
-- in one view, if the guerrilla war continues and international
acceptance does not appear in prospect, a fresh exodus of whites
could begin as early as the beginning of June and the situation
start to slip away from the new government fairly rapidly there-
after;
-- alternatively, in the view of at least one analyst, the election
and installation process may appear to be such a success that
This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NI0/AF. Its
purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that
would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments
will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not
occur at all.
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whites and internal blacks will be so heartened and the guerrillas
rendered so ineffective that the guerrillas will feel they
have no option but to seek Soviet/Cuban help on a scale
sufficient to tip the situation their way; lifting sanctions
could contribute to this development;
another view is that the internal process by itself, regardless
of how successful it is perceived to be from outside, will
result in a black government that is more intransigent in
negotiations with the guerrilla leaders than Smith has been;
a kind of corollary to this is the possibility that a black
government would feel less restraint. in using the security
forces (still white-led) against the national, as distinct from
the guerrilla, military bases in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania,
Botswana or Angola and would thus escalate the struggle both
militarily and politically.
NAMIBIA
We have no fresh thoughts, but continue to regard the UN operations
and subsequent developments as fraught with difficulties and in continuing
danger of breakdown.
ANGOLA
The RIO professed concern that Neto's efforts to broaden Angola's
contacts with Western Europe, China, and the US might arouse the Soviets
and/or Cubans to begin to try to undermine him. Analysts see no evidence
for this, however, and question the thesis; some would argue that the
Soviet/Cuban position in Angola is so strong at present that they need not
be concerned about the'kinds of contacts Neto is making -- indeed, the
Soviets at least might be encouraging him to lighten the economic burden
with Western European, if not US, aid.
ZAIRE
The, situation in Zaire both worries and frustrates the analysts. All
the classical elements of collapse seem to be present, but the track record
of Mobutu's enemies is so poor that we cannot point to a person, place, or
time which would enable us to say "here it goes." Certainly there is at
least an even chance, possibly more, that a Shaba III will occur in some
form -- not necessarily as an "invasion" from outside -- during this year
if the Inter-African Force is withdrawn. There almost certainly will be
some kind of rioting in Kinshasa, but we cannot forecast when this might
translate into a political move against Mobutu. But successive alarums
and excursions, even though they have no immediate consequences, are likely.
to have a cumulative effect of weakening Mobutu's hold on the governmental
fabric, flimsy as that is.
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ETHIOPIA
Analysts see the Ethiopian leaders shifting fairly rapidly from an
essentially defensive attitude toward one of much greater confidence, even
assertiveness, in their international relations. If this continues to
develop, as we think likely, it will have substantial impact on the other
governments and situations in the Horn region (including the Arabian
Peninsula). Siad's position in Somalia could become more actively
threatened, as might the French balancing act in Djibouti. Kenya is
already running a bit scared of the Ethiopians, although still glad to
cooperate with them against Somalia. The major immediate impact of the
Ethiopians' new confidence, however, is on Sudan, in connection with
Sudan's long standing support for the Eritrean separatists.
SUDAN
The analysts have a sense that pressures of various kinds, not all
of them fully visible to us, are growing on Numayri. While nobody fore-
sees his fall anytime soon, we think we detect signs that his position is
weakening, and that he has carried the reasonable and conciliatory policies
of the past few years about as far as they can take him at this stage. The
Ethiopian threats are one more problem, coming at a bad time.
CHAD
We sense that the troubles in Chad, which would appear to involve
both a kind of success for Islamic elements and a failure of sorts for
French politico-military tactics, may be beginning to have a broader im-
pact, which we are not now able to gauge. The situation here is one of
the sources of pressure on Sudan, and the Libyan involvement in Chad
makes it more serious, since Qaddafi is also hostile to Numayri. The
Chad problem itself is of course of very long standing; the background
against which the events there occur is what is changing, particularly
the growing activism of the Libyans along the southern shores of the
Sahara.
MAURITANIA
Analysts see some possibility, though not an imminent one, that
"black Moors" and "white Moors" (the former including ex-slaves of the
latter), could ultimately turn to outside elements for support against
each other's claims to pieces of the Mauritanian action. This could in-
volve Senegal, on the "black" side, and Polisario on the "white" if
developments move that far. This is yet another kind of north-south
division in an African Sahel country with few resources.
SECRET
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TANZANIA-UGANDA
We cannot see much of longer-term importance coming out of Uganda,
even assuming that Amin does depart the scene in some fashion; turbulence
there will continue to endanger the remaining American and other foreign
nationals. We are a little worried, on the other hand, about the impact
of the war in Tanzania. While there are no signs of this yet, a military
victory could enhance the position and prestige of the army vis-a-vis
other elements in a not very successful society. Economic analysts do
not see the costs of the war to Tanzania as a major factor -- how much
broker can you get?
CAPE VERDE
In our first memorandum last fall, we noted reports of Soviet efforts
to gain a broader foothold and perhaps facilities in Cape Verde; we con-
cluded then that as long as the current president remained in office, the
Soviets would be parried. We stand by this judgment, but analysts point
out that there have been assassination attempts against him, and that a
change of leaders could indeed change the ball game, as the Soviets have
embedded themselves in the country's defense establishment.
NIGERIA
Our pessimism with regard to the passage from military to civilian
rule has eased marginally since our last report, but we remain concerned
that the Nigerians might, under some circumstances, consider trying to use
their oil exports to the US for political leverage. A move to lift sanc-
tions against Rhodesia could produce something along these lines; certainly
the thought would occur immediately to most Nigerians interested in the
southern African question. There would likely be a lot of pros, cons,
and second thoughts about doing something.
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