MONTHLY WARNING REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300120032-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300120032-0
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300120032-0
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TIE DII'+ECiO~:. C): CE-1,1-1-1 A I. INIELl.1GI.:I-',C,;,
National Intelligence Officers
18 January 197.9
copy L -* -
MEMORANDUM FOR: Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear
Proliferation
FROM: NIO for Nuclear Proliferation
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Report
1. Attached is the latest result of our recent meeting on items
for warning.)
2. All readers of this report should be notified that:
This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly
by the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Prolifera-
tion. Its purpose is to review possible developments in
the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests.
Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the
time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur
at all. _
3. I will welcome your comments on this report and suggestions
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Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300120032-0
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300120032-0
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Monthly Warning Report: Nuclear. Proliferation
18 Januar 1925X1
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1, Taiwan's New Interests in Long-Range and Nuclear Weapons Systems
Since a schedule was recently set for the normalization of US-PRC ties
and for the termination of the US-ROC defense treaty, Taiwan has had stronger
motives for acquiring independent strategic capabilities, particularly long--
range nuclear weapons systems. Without a sufficient stock of fissile material,
which Taiwan could probably not obtain within a year unless foreign supplies
were acquired, significant new strategic capabilities are very unlikely to
materialize before the US-ROC defense treaty terminates. Nevertheless, Taiwan's
leaders may still expect US defense commitments to remain effective for at
least another year or two, and possibly for as much as five or ten years. So,
their new military development efforts seem now to be aimed only at acquiring,
within the next several years, options for independent strategic capabilities
that could be deployed on'short notice. F25X1
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.2. India's Changing Strategic Perceptions
Indian assessments of their international security needs are being
affected by various changes in the region. The disintegration of secular
civilian authority in Iran, mounting Soviet influence in Afghanistan, Pak-
istan's maturing nuclear program and chronic political tensions, and new
prospects of a stronger China due to US-PRC normalization plans have stimu-
lated official worries in New Delhi. By raising new or aggravating long-
standing security concerns, these trends and events seem to have reinforced
Indian interests in acquiring fully independent military capabilities.
Moreover, the De'sai government, the nuclear research establishment, and
India's space coi:mission seem to have felt growing pressure in Parliament,
from the press, and within the Janata Party itself to accelerate the
development of India's nuclear and strategic capabilities.
As long as Desai is in power, a resumption of nuclear explosive testing
is virtually out of the question. However, proposals for a visible new
commitment to military research on nuclear weapons and long-range delivery
systems could receive favorable consideration even,by Deai, especially if
pessimistic Indian assessments of Pakistan's weapons dc-..'.opment efforts
begin to alarm military or public opinion leaders. And - -:e those assess-
ments seem to correspond quite closely with Pakistani p. and do not
differ greatly from views that have begun to circulate :uropean capitals,
India's own military research priorities could become an important political
iss
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hi
ue w
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n the next several months.
A continuation of Mrs. Chandi's political recovery would exert pressure
on Desai to demonstrate that he has not imposed imprudent restraints on
India's military research program. Either success or failure in tests of
India's satellite-launching rocket, scheduled for the first half of this
year, could also provide the occasion for new moves to accelerate India's.
3. Pakistani Gas Centrifuge Development and Foreign Supply Acquisition
Efforts
The Community continues to be concerned that Pakistan, if it has not
already done so, may soon acquire all the essential components for a plant
that could ultimately produce the fissile material for several nuclear
weapons a year. Indeed, Pakistan may already have succeeded in acquiring
the main missing components for a gas centrifuge plant and ancillary
facilities that are probably being built to produce highly enriched
uranium for weapons, perhaps even by 1982. Still, foreign suppliers,
by limiting Pakistan's access to specially suited materials and equipment,
could at least marginally complicate Pakistani efforts to complete the plant
and to make it fully and efficiently operational. However, Pakistan has
probably already acquired all the technology--designs, plans, and technical
expertise--that is critical for the eventual operation of this plant.
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5. South Africa
Concern over the possibility of renewed activity at the Kalahari test
facility has abated in the last month since additional monitoring has yielded
no significant new indications, F----] 25X1
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